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Abstract 
 
This study examines the neglected role of other animals and art in Aristotle’s 
classic conception of the human being, and argues that the work of T.W. Adorno 
can be drawn upon to recover this conception’s neglected promise.  By reading 
Aristotle’s oft-cited claim that ‘the human being is by nature a political animal’ in 
light of his works on biology and poetics, I find that Aristotle displaces ideas 
concerning the role of human being in the cosmos prominent in the Ancient 
Greek world, binding the self-understanding of human beings to other animals 
and the arts. This self-understanding can be summarized as follows: 1) Aristotle 
recognizes that humans are not the only political animals, and provides the 
rudiments of a theory concerning how nonhuman politics might be possible; and 
2) Aristotle’s theory of nature is unintelligible without artistic metaphors that 
suggest the creative power of the arts to produce what we understand to be 
human, not simply in terms of revealing natural human capacities, but in creating 
these capacities in the first place. 
Though largely unappreciated by his descendants, detractors, and even Aristotle 
himself, I argue these insights can be recovered through Adorno’s critical theory.  
Adorno enables us to grasp the creative power of art in the construction of the 
human being and the distance it can place between humans and other animals 
while at once allowing us to see how a turn toward the repressed possibilities 
upon which the emergence of the human depends is also a turn toward animality.  
In this sense, the promise of humanity and its legacy concerns less a defense of 
the classical humanism being eroded by the vicissitudes of history, than the 
possibility of uncovering the paths not followed by this tradition that might 
inform posthuman subjective possibilities more able to confront the challenges of 
the present.   In this way, Adorno enables the theorization of an aesthetic animal, 
the subject of a radically transformed society. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
A Sketch in Triptych  
In The Time Machine (1895), H.G. Wells describes the feeling of time travel as 
“excessively unpleasant”: one is hurtled through time in a “helpless headlong 
motion” as if riding a “switchback,” gripped by a “nightmare sensation of falling” 
and “horrible anticipation” of “an imminent smash.”1  The world in which Wells’ 
time traveler finds himself proves worthy of these premonitory sensations, for it 
is a world wherein the working class, driven into a troglodytic existence, has 
returned to prey on its erstwhile oppressors. In Wells’ future the poor finally eat 
the rich, though history is ironic enough to avoid the rudeness of cannibalism—
they have, in this distant future, become different species.   
While there is much that might be said of this tangle of ideas, what I wish 
to extract here is the idea that socio-political domination is bound up with nature, 
and that ‘time travel’ might reveal the transformations undergone by humans in 
relation to other animals—that the natural or even permanent appearance of 
humanity in any single image might, through the juxtaposition with others, reveal 
history through their frayed edges.  With Wells, then, we might become time 
travelers in order to glimpse the three images of humanity, which, together, form 
the triptych that I claim intimates something of the transformation of the self-
                                                     
1 H.G. Wells, The Time Machine, ed. Nicholas Ruddick (Peterborough: Broadview, 2001), 76-77. 
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understanding of human nature through history, and its relation to socio-political 
domination.  If we have the stomach, then, we might leap: 
 Venice, circa 1550.  Tintoretto’s The Creation of Animals depicts part of 
the creation story found in the Book of Genesis.  An anthropomorphic God is 
suspended above the earth, as if having leapt into the air: the upper-half of His 
body bent forward, His right hand extended.  It is an active, theatrical pose—
perhaps too much so, for a God who need only speak for it to be so.  He is dressed 
in a blue robe and red cloak, and around His body is a kind of aura of light, 
delineating His separation and independence from the world of His creation, and 
which appears arranged around Him.  There is a clear distinction between land, 
sky, and sea, and each is teeming: beasts of the field, birds of the air, fish of the 
sea.  All appear to be moving at His behest, in straight lines even; they are 
ordered in a world and occupy a particular place in it according to their kind in 
the manner designated by their Creator, who stands apart from them. 
 Beneath this image another stirs, as if the first were a kind of palimpsest, 
for Tintoretto based the composition of this piece upon a painting completed only 
some thirty years earlier in the same city: Titian’s Bacchus and Ariadne (c. 1523).  
Here it is Bacchus who is suspended in mid-air, having leapt from his chariot 
towards Ariadne, who is dressed in a blue robe and red cloak.  In his wake is a 
procession of other figures, including animals, creatures half-human and half-
animal, and others who at a glance could be either god or human.  Unlike the 
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order built on the clear symmetry of the positioning of the animals and the 
prominence of their Creator in Tintoretto, Titian gives us here an image of 
disorder, of unruliness—not quite chaos, for Bacchus does appear to occupy a 
position of authority among his horde, but his position appears relative and 
unstable.  Confronted with this procession, Ariadne’s fate is also unclear: will she 
be recruited by this mob, or even made its Lord?  Or will they enslave her, or tear 
her apart and devour her, as they appear to have done a calf whose remains they 
parade around as trophies?  The image, shorn of other knowledge of her story, 
does not say. 
 In Tintoretto we see the dominant interpretation of the human-animal 
distinction as it is found in the Christian tradition.  Though, strictly speaking, no 
human appears in the painting, insofar as “man” was made in the image of God 
and it is this special relation to God that sets him apart from other animals, we 
might see humans as occupying an analogical position to God in the painting, as 
creatures who, made in the image of God, share in His dominion over animals.  
Humans may, like animals, be in the world, but their relation to God means that 
they are not of the world: the realization of their properly human nature extends 
beyond the world of animals, and toward the eternal and divine.  This division of 
human from animal through divine proximity strips the animal of the possibility 
of making moral claims. At best, the mistreatment of the animal can be seen as 
wrong due to what it does to the human agent involved: that the human either 
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violates divine law or fails to rise to its semi-divine stature when it mistreats 
others—these others do not matter in their own right. 
Yet this image draws upon another, very different image: the world of 
Greek mythology as it is captured by Titian.  Here the line between human, 
animal, and god is far from clearly drawn, and we have no reason to believe it is 
stable.  The remains of an animal are being bandied about—so it is not a world 
without violence—but other animals occupy different positions, and there is no 
indication that one is fundamentally different from another.  That is, there is no 
evidence that a human could not occupy the position of an animal, or an animal, 
the position of a human, and the gods and other creatures appear to circulate 
between these two categories, occupying one and then the other as they desire.  
Thus the relation here between human and animal takes on different shapes 
particular to context: the animal might represent a foe to be subdued, or a 
potential friend whose allegiance must be secured through various rites; what 
matters is how the relation with the animal might secure or threaten one’s own 
status as human and so define the kind of human one is. 
 Despite the apparent incongruity of these images, their historical and 
geographical proximity betrays their hidden unity.  This image of an unruly 
separation between human and animal, where each appear to be continuous with 
the other in some important way, lies beneath the image of orderly separation 
according to the design of the Creator, and is never quite excised by the latter.  
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The active and theatrical pose of a God whose word should be all-powerful, whose 
bodily gestures are always already superfluous to His mind, is a Bacchanalian tic, 
the shudder of myth within a monotheism that would exercise its ban, yet 
nevertheless feel compelled to dress in its garb.  Indeed, not only does 
Tintorello’s Christian God wear the robes and cloak of Ariadne, but even the 
anthropomorphic representation of God itself seems to undermine his alleged 
separation from, and superiority to, the world of created things.   
As I will develop below, it is the philosophy of Aristotle that stands 
between these two images of the human and animal.  The manner in which 
Aristotle formulates the human-animal distinction undermines that found in the 
earlier world of poetic myth illustrated by Homer, the tragedians, and even to an 
extent Plato, inaugurating a new relation between humans and animals based on 
natural potentials stretching up toward the divine.  That Aristotle establishes this 
identity of the human being as the most divine through a conception of nature 
dependent upon aesthetic representation and metaphor is the return of 
mythology repressed, which, in preserving the socio-political domination that 
ordered Aristotle’s world, finds expression in Aristotle’s hierarchical conception 
of capacities that claims some humans to be more human than others.  This 
manner of dividing and relating human and animal, its political consequences, 
and the role played by art therein, I call the Aristotelian problematic, and it is 
 
 
6 
through it that Titian and the world of poetic myth appear as past, and Tintoretto 
and Christianity as future. 
It is thus to Aristotle that those thinkers that claim the Christian tradition 
to have been exhausted turn—Nietzsche, Heidegger, and those working within 
their legacies—in trying to re-think the human-animal distinction and the role of 
art therein.  They do so not as a return to Aristotle, but his overcoming, 
attempting to excavate the root of the metaphysical tradition culminating in 
Christianity and strive for, in the case of Nietzsche, the re-birth of an aristocratic 
animality to rival the greatness of the displaced world of poetic myth, or in the 
case of Heidegger, the emergence of an aristocratic height more lofty than even 
Aristotle and the Christians imagined.  Yet both of these tendencies overlook the 
place of art in the Aristotelian conception of nature they would overcome, and 
hence misrecognize the promise of the Aristotelian problematic, while failing to 
escape the violence and domination it also reproduces.  In order to grasp the 
promise of Aristotle’s philosophy Aristotle must be seen not as the origin of a 
tradition but as a messenger from its future: we need a way to re-contextualize 
the possibilities made available by Aristotle, one that would allow us to free 
ourselves of the obstacles that prevent Aristotle himself from directly providing 
these answers.  Put differently: we must be time travelers, and we require another 
stop to proffer our last image and so take stock of the promise held in the 
Aristotelian problematic: 
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Prague, 1915. Gregor Samsa awakes within the prose of Kafka’s The 
Metamorphosis to find himself an insect, a kind of giant beetle, to be worried 
over and hidden, as the object of disgust, before finally succumbing to his ill-
treatment.  Far from fanciful or fantastic, Kafka’s description of Gregor’s plight 
can be understood as a report on the state of the human subject of modernity: no 
longer stretching up toward the divine and so elevating itself above other 
animals, or caught in a frenzy circulating between animal and divine, humanity is 
no longer as it was envisioned by Tintoretto or Titian.  Rather, in a world where 
domination has taken on the shape of bureaucratic regularity and murder and 
suffering have become processes to be managed, the human being can no longer 
hide that which it would repress beneath a beautiful veneer.  Just as Schoenberg 
quizzically mused that it was only after the First World War that people seemed 
to have acquired an ear for his music,2 so perhaps it is only within the world as it 
was established following the Second World War that we have acquired the 
sensibility for Kafka, and so the possibility of recognizing the place of humanity—
that promise of history as the escape from nature—in domination. 
The horrors of modernity brought terribly to fruition in Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima make it no longer possible to divide human from animal in the 
Christian manner, nor do the rituals that regulated their circulation in the world 
poetic myth still have force. We are faced now with the terror of slipping back 
                                                     
2 Arnold Schoenberg, “How One Becomes Lonely,” in Style and Idea, trans. Leo Black, ed. Leonard Stein 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 51. 
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into the maw of nature, of living as animals, and any attempt to theorize the 
possibility of the good life and its politics must begin from this historical position.  
It is the work of Theodor W. Adorno, I contend, who offers us the surest guidance 
in this situation, and through which we might theorize the possibility of art 
playing a moral and political role in re-aligning the relation between human and 
animal such as to enable life to live free of domination.  It is this promise, the 
promise of life lived free of domination introduced and betrayed in the 
Aristotelian problematic to which Adorno might speak.  How this is so demands 
some attempt at justification, by way of a cursory overview of the role the human-
animal distinction and its relation to art has played in political theory. 
 
Humans, Animals, and Art in Political Theory 
The history of political thought in the West has been frequently characterized by 
an attempt to pair theories of politics with what we might call ‘philosophical 
anthropologies’: theories of what a human being fundamentally is that shape 
what is understood to be possible, or at least probable, and thus serve as guides to 
theories of politics.  If the human being is such and such a creature, so the 
argument goes, then its life ought to be organized in such and such a fashion.  
However, the amazing growth in the last century of the technological capacity of 
humans to both perpetuate destruction on an ever-greater scale, and to 
manipulate life at every level, have served to call into question what we 
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understand to be human and its possible vocation, and consequently its place in 
political theory.  Though Dryzick, Honig, and Phillips claim in their introduction 
to The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (2008) that political theorists “share 
a commitment to the humanistic study of politics,” thus placing some version of 
humanism at the heart of political theory, they note that this shared commitment 
comes with “considerable disagreement over what [it] means.”3 
 Concerning this “considerable disagreement,” most broadly we might 
isolate within contemporary political theory three over-arching positions with 
respect to “humanism,” understood not simply as the promotion of human rights 
around the globe, but as the theoretical underpinnings of such a project.  The 
first, and easily largest position, concerns those who understand the vocation of 
politics to be to establish the best framework for humans to be human, one that 
enables activities that promote the flourishing of natural capacities, while 
protecting the space for this flourishing in a regime of rights.  While this position 
encompasses liberals, communitarians, deliberative democrats, and civic 
republicans in a way that might overlook important differences between these 
respective positions, I make the association here not to neglect these differences 
but simply to highlight their common humanism, and to this end it is worth 
                                                     
3 John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Philips, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook to Political 
Theory, eds. John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Philips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4.  I 
thus interpret “humanistic” here to refer not simply to methods of textual analysis or reflection upon current 
and historical events characteristic of those disciplines found in the Humanities, as opposed to more 
empirically inclined methods found in the sciences, but to normative and speculative ideas concerning 
humanity, for the ‘humanistic’ tradition has for the most part always insisted on their inseparability. 
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noting the role philosophical anthropologies play among certain prominent 
theorists within this category. 
 For instance, not only does the early work of MacIntyre and Nussbaum 
illustrate this humanist position in terms of the promotion of humanist politics, 
but each are entirely rooted in philosophical anthropologies from which their 
political programs are an expression: for them, politics is nothing if not the 
practices through which humanity might flourish, and its prescriptions are 
entirely oriented to this end.4  Likewise, thinkers as different from these 
Aristotelians as they are from each other, such as Fukuyama and Habermas, also 
rely on particular conceptions of human nature and dignity in order to promote 
particular political aims, which in their cases concern the political consequences 
of biological engineering.5  Perhaps most stridently, Kateb has also taken up the 
banner not only of a revitalized conception of human dignity, but an explicit 
philosophical anthropology, behind which he rallies to theorize not only the 
human good, but that of the planet as well.6  Though both MacIntyre and 
Nussbaum have in more recent works revised the more ecstatic elements of their 
anthropocentrism, they have done so in order to expand the notion of human 
dignity and the moral consideration bound to it to other kinds of beings, not to 
                                                     
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice,” Political Theory 20.2 (1992): 202-246. 
5 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (New York: Picador, 2002), Chs.8 & 9; Jürgen Habermas, The 
Future of Human Nature, trans. William Rehg, Hella Beister, and Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
6 George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011). Cf. Michael Rosen, Dignity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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displace the fundamental importance or even centrality of their conceptions of 
humanity for political theory.7 Thus, for the aforementioned thinkers, anthropos 
remains the measure, even if anthropos is acknowledged as being constituted 
through its relation not only to itself, but to other animals. 
In contrast to the humanist position which might be said to define the 
mainstream of political theory, we have what might be called the ‘post-humanist’ 
position, descended from the antihumanism of thinkers such as Althusser, 
Foucault, and Deleuze.  Unlike the variations on humanism found among the 
members of the aforementioned group, post-humanists deny the necessary 
centrality of humanity as a concept, focusing instead on the ways in which 
humans are entwined with non-human entities, including the myriad agencies of 
animals, machines, and systems that inform and destabilize the concept of the 
human and the possibility of promoting its self-same ends.8  For post-humanists, 
it is possible to speak of conditions that give rise to what we call humanity and 
with it humanist aims, or a “human predicament,”9 but the integral stability of 
the concept of humanity and its humanistic promotion is considered suspect, if 
not rejected outright.  For post-humanists, then, philosophical anthropology is an 
antiquated relic of the history of political thought which serves only to obstruct 
                                                     
7 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Open Court, 2002); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’: Justice for Nonhuman Animals,” in Frontiers of Justice 
(Cambridge: Belknap, 2006). 
8 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Rosie Braidotti, The Posthuman 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Cary Wolfe, What is Poshumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009). 
9 William E. Connolly, A World of Becoming (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), Ch. 4. 
 
 
12 
more creative ways of understanding our politics and how it relates to the 
material universe. 
The last position I want to outline in contemporary political theory relative 
to humanism is a trend emerging in some sense from the post-human position: 
what is being called by some “agonistic humanism.”  Rather than seeing politics 
as an expression of natural human capacities or directed toward necessarily 
humanistic ends, as the humanists, or rejecting humanism outright, as the post-
humanists, “agonistic humanism” recognizes that defining the human is itself a 
political act: “humanism is,” Honig claims, “implicated in political divisions it 
claims to transcend.”10  In this sense, Honig might be seen to formulate more 
explicitly the kind of practical humanism Rancière invokes against the 
theoretical humanism comdemned by Althusser’s antihumanism.11  For Rancière, 
humanism refers to a set of politically contested concepts that both dominator 
and dominated attempt to appropriate and so marshal to their own aims as they 
struggle against one another.12  Rather than reject philosophical anthropolgies, 
then, agonistic humanists concern themselves with locating the political or 
rhetorical function of such anthropologies, and so their value as political 
practices, rather than make ontological claims concerning their correctness or 
lack thereof.  Practical or ‘agonistic’ humanism, then, strives toward an 
                                                     
10 Bonnie Honig, Antigone Interrupted (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17. 
11 See Louis Althusser, “The Humanist Controversy,” In The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, 
ed. François Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2003), 253. 
12 Jacques Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson, trans. Emiliano Battista (New York: Continuum, 2011), Ch.4. 
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appropriation of humanism that remains mindful of the anti-humanist and post-
humanist critiques concerning the political constitution of the concepts of 
humanism, and so preserves the concept of humanity while cancelling its 
foundational status.   
While these three broad positions do indeed constitute “considerable 
disagreement” concerning the place of the concept of humanity and humanistic 
approaches to politics, it is interesting to note a trend running through each of 
these positions concerning a re-evaluation of the concept of humanity and the 
humanistic commitments to nature.  Not only does agonistic humanism allow for 
the theorizing of a different division of what is considered human and animal, 
while post-humanism seeks to understand how in a sense humans are always 
already subtended by inhuman forces, even Kateb’s revitalization of philosophical 
anthropology and his insistence that human stature is something fundamentally 
different than that of an animal is done in order to endow humanity with the 
stewardship of the natural world and the planet on which it flourishes.13  These 
positions can thus be seen to be connected not merely in their relation to the 
place they see humanity occupying relative to politics and political theory, but 
through their acknowledgement that this place must involve a changed 
understanding of the relationship between human beings and the natural world. 
                                                     
13 Kateb, Human Dignity, 5; 17; 23; 115; 122. 
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 Of those attempting to explicitly reformulate this relation, we might 
identify two broad camps.  The first is made up of those who see it necessary to 
formulate a more expansive conception of humanity such as to render human 
beings morally responsible to other forms of life, especially certain animals.  
Again, though the most prominent approaches vary significantly between the 
utilitarian view advanced by Singer, the modified version of the capacities 
approach championed by Nussbaum, and the rights-driven approach formulated 
by Donaldson and Kymlicka, their respective positions are united through their 
attempts to show an important identity between humans and certain animals, 
which ought thus to endow the latter with analogous basic rights and privileges to 
those enjoyed by humans.14  In attempting to expand the conception of humanity, 
personhood, or selfhood in this manner, these authors are in agreement that the 
change humanity needs is one that can be accomplished through political reform, 
and that the kinds of conscious-raising necessary for such reforms to gain 
popular appeal are more or less in line with how one might go about gaining 
support for any kind of political reform, even if they acknowledge the vastly 
greater scope of animal rights.  In this sense, these authors appear to be in 
agreement with a generalized version of Habermas’s famous critique of Adorno: 
that the philosophy of the subject and of “consciousness” has been exhausted,15 
                                                     
14 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Random House 1990); Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion 
for Humanity”; Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
15 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.I, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon, 1984), 386. 
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and that the question that most urgently concerns humanity is not, in fact, how 
humanity has been constituted through the domination of nature, but rather 
concerns the structural possibilities for the democratic production of consensus 
on substantial issues, such as animal rights, in this case. 
 It is against this general notion that the conception of humanity can 
simply be expanded by fiat in order for violence against other animals to wither 
that I would re-introduce Aristotle and Adorno into this debate.  In downplaying 
the role of violence and the domination of both other animals and other humans 
in the evolution of human constitution and its ongoing reproduction, approaches 
that would simply expand the concept of humanity fail to address the violence at 
the heart of the human subject and its society, attempting to alleviate the 
suffering of some while neglecting its sources and so its continuation through the 
oppression and domination of others.  It is a central contention of this study that 
a re-reading of Aristotle might illustrate the way in which this conception of 
humanity was formulated, and that a reading of Adorno might indicate how this 
conception is reproduced and thus how it might be transformed.  To this end, I 
advocate a return to the philosophy of consciousness whose exhaustion has been 
announced by Habermas, in order to theorize a possible transformation of the 
subject, even if Adorno himself, did not, so they say, “tell stories about a ‘new 
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subject.’”16  If domination is not simply oppression in the sense of external 
control suffered by one individual or group by another, but concerns a 
psychological dimension whereby the oppressed internalize their oppression such 
as to naturalize it and obliterate even the ability to imagine other ways of living,17 
then the transformation of society based on violence to animal others cannot be 
separated from subjective transformation. 
 In this respect, the second broad trend concerning the reformulation of the 
human-animal relation appears to offer more promise, though it too is hampered 
by significant shortcomings.  Works in this trend by thinkers such as Agamben 
and Derrida have attempted to show the manner in which what we call human 
has depended on a corresponding conception of ‘the animal’ whose separation 
from the human is produced and maintained through systematic violence and 
domination, thus placing a focus on the production of the human that is often 
taken for granted by those thinkers identified in the first trend noted above.18  
While this attempt to incorporate the idea that the human is itself a rather 
precarious concept into the question of our relation to other animals, along with 
the attempt to trace the history of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
                                                     
16 Jürgen Habermas, “Theodor Adorno: The Primal History of Subjectivity—Self-Affirmation Gone Wild,” 
in Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 104. 
17 Alkis Kontos, “Domination: Metaphor and Political Reality,” in Domination (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975), 219. 
18 Giorgio Agamben, The Open, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Jacques 
Derrida, The Animal that therefore I Am, trans. David Wills, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008); Jacques Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol.1 & II eds. Michel Lisse, Marie-
Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009; 2011). 
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distinction, are to my mind welcome theoretical innovations in our 
understanding of the political import of the human-animal distinction, the 
manner in which these innovations are made draw heavily on the work of 
thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger.   
As I shall attempt to show below, both Nietzsche and Heidegger 
misconstrue the manner in which the human-animal distinction has been 
inherited in the West by overlooking important aspects of the work of Aristotle.  
While all recognize the importance of Aristotle’s influence on this question, they 
do not sufficiently appreciate Aristotle’s writings on biology or on poetics, both of 
which, I argue, should be seen to modify Aristotle’s more famous statements on 
human capacities and their relation to politics.  If Aristotle can be shown to offer 
a more nuanced appraisal of the political nature of human beings, one that might 
include other animals, as he does in his History of Animals, and nature itself can 
be shown to depend on artifice, then the reversal of the Aristotelian tradition 
attempted by Nietzsche and Heidegger is without the force it might otherwise be 
thought to have, and those drawing too closely upon them might likewise fail in 
their attempts to overcome Aristotle. 
 In returning to the Aristotelian problematic we gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the human-animal distinction: we find that much of what is 
human is also found in other animals, and that drawing and ordering this 
distinction is found to be heavily dependent upon the arts.  There are three 
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important consequences to be drawn from these insights.  The first is that if the 
arts can be seen as serving an integral role in how the human-animal distinction 
is drawn, then the recent resurgence in the interest of the relation between art 
and politics acquires a whole new dimension, related as it is to the kinds of 
philosophical anthropologies that have been employed in the history of political 
thought, and thus divergent literatures in political theory might be found to relate 
to each other in new ways.  Secondly, and perhaps more urgently, this insight 
reveals an important potential aid or obstacle in the democratic consensus 
building necessary for the success of the animal rights and liberation movements.  
If the arts play a part in constructing the subjectivity that informs the moral and 
political decisions involved in supporting these movements, then an important 
dimension of both the movement’s success and the persuasiveness of its theory 
are being neglected—a neglect which can only be remedied through a return to 
the philosophy of consciousness which attempts to grasp how subjects are 
produced in ways that are not effectively addressed through the focus on the 
formal socio-political structures these theorists tend to adopt.   
Thirdly, in the light of the Aristotelian problematic, the argument stating 
‘the animal’ is something like the ur-subject of domination, that is, that people 
oppress and dominate each other in the same way they oppress and dominate 
animals, that we see the oppression of humans by one another worsen when 
oppressors see the oppressed as animal rather than human, and consequently if 
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humans come to treat animals better they will treat each other better, to be 
unfortunately too simple to describe the historical record.19  The Aristotelian 
problematic, as we will see, comes to displace the view of humanity found in the 
world of poetic myth—the world of Titian’s Bacchus and Ariadne—in a way that 
serves to undermine its stratifications with an egalitarian vector which it 
ultimately betrays.  In studying this displacement and betrayal, we find that the 
human-animal distinction can be drawn in a number of different ways that would 
legitimate different human-animal and human-human relations which are not 
inherently part of trajectories of liberation or domination.  Or more bluntly: 
humans are quite capable of relating to other animals compassionately while 
oppressing other humans.  Derrida acknowledges this when he notes—in an 
address on the work of Adorno—that the Nazis not only related Jews, Gypsies, 
and homosexuals to animals, but that the Nazis also loved their animals, “even to 
the point of vegetarianism,” as in the case of the Führer himself.20  Thus, a more 
nuanced appreciation of the human-animal distinction and its relation to 
morality and politics is necessary, one that acknowledges how different ways of 
drawing the human-animal distinction have political consequences that are not 
predictable from their outset, and consequently require the arts to mold and 
                                                     
19 This argument is commonly repeated today, though its sources appear to be as old as Pythagoras.  See 
Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 7. 
20 Jacques Derrida, “Fichus,” in Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005), 181. 
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shape them. Unfortunately, though, Derrida himself does not go on to develop 
this point further in his other writings on animals. 
It is Adorno, I argue, who provides this nuanced re-evaluation of the 
human-animal distinction, while also providing in his writings on aesthetics 
something like a practical moral and political guide to the construction of a 
genuinely posthuman subject.  Though Adorno’s writings on aesthetics are well-
known, he produced no treatise on ‘the animal’ and appears to have made little 
substantial attempt to study them.  And yet, images of different animals appear 
provocatively throughout his writings, marking the points at which humanity 
falters—the points at which the cracks in its veneer become visible, and a 
different set of subjective possibilities are intimated.  The animal is for Adorno 
what is nonidentical to the human; it is those possibilities repressed and excluded 
from human constitution in the different instantiations of its drive for self-
preservation since the time when Aristotle’s conception of the human being 
formulated its systematic difference from and superiority to the animal.   
In this sense, Adorno provides the combination to the lock forged by 
Aristotle, a way of appropriating the promise of the Aristotelian problematic that 
displaced the world of poetic myth without becoming trapped in the logic of 
violence and domination that animates both.  It is this promise, the promise of 
new subjective possibilities, which are invoked in the term aesthetic animal.  An 
aesthetic animal would be a subject constituted through an aesthetic education 
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that might bring about a different relation between animal senses or bodily 
comportment and human reason, one for whom self-preservation is no longer the 
point around which all else must gravitate.  Such a subject, of course, would 
demand a qualitatively different form of society, one likewise no longer 
constituted through violence and domination.  Only in such a society, one 
wherein the relations between humans have been radically transformed would 
the radical transformation of human-animal relations raised by the animal rights 
and liberation movements become a concrete possibility. 
 
A Forecast 
Toward this theorization of an aesthetic animal, my argument proceeds in four 
parts.  The first concerns how some of the more prominent among the recent 
attempts to theorize the relation between art, aesthetics, and politics resonate 
with recent attempts to re-think the human-animal distinction and its legacy in 
the history of political thought in the West.  I argue that despite numerous 
differences between these works and their proponents, they might nevertheless 
be found to fall within a paradigm of thinking defined by Nietzsche on the one 
hand, and Heidegger on the other.  This Nietzsche-Heidegger paradigm, at least 
on the questions of the relations between art and politics and humans and 
animals, take Aristotle as something of the primordial father who must be 
overthrown, and their contributions to these questions can be understood as 
 
 
22 
attempts to overturn the Aristotelian problematic, though the paths each would 
open in this overturning lead in different directions.  Thus a survey of this 
literature and their various connections to Nietzsche and Heidegger illustrates 
how Aristotle has been understood to stand at the nexus point between art and its 
relation to politics, and how we define the human and its relation to the animal; 
however, it is a certain Aristotle who stands there, one who is already in a sense 
the reflection of his interlocutors critiques.  If it can be found that the Aristotelian 
problematic provides resources for understanding these questions Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and their progeny fail to adequately develop, then their attempted 
overturning of the Aristotelian problematic is without the force they would give it. 
 The second and third parts of my argument thus attempt to establish a 
more nuanced understanding of Aristotle’s contributions to questions concerning 
the relations between art and politics and the human and the animal through an 
elaboration of the Aristotelian problematic.  Part II focuses on the human-animal 
distinction and its relation to politics: specifically, how Aristotle’s manner of 
conceiving this distinction displaced its formulation in the world of poetic myth, 
and how his oft-cited claim that the human being is a naturally political animal 
must be understood in the context of his biological writings, which claim that 
humans are one of many different kinds of political animals.  I attempt here to 
give a general formulation of what Aristotle understands to be animal—that is, 
the unity he finds in the great multiplicity of animal life—and in what ways 
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humans must themselves be understood as kinds of animal, continuous with 
other forms of animal life in a wide variety of important ways.  I then turn to an 
account of what Aristotle does claim to be uniquely human, and how the 
capacities that serve to mark humanity out from other forms of animal life are 
not equally distributed among all humans, thus making some individuals more 
human than others. 
 In Part III the other side of the Aristotelian problematic is examined: the 
relation between art and politics and how this relates to the human-animal 
distinction.  Here I argue that Aristotle’s conception of nature depends upon a 
host of metaphors drawn from the arts, without which it is not intelligible.  These 
metaphors point, I claim, to a fundamental aporia in Aristotle’s thinking: the 
relation between nature and artifice.  If Aristotle’s conception of nature is 
unintelligible without artifice, then artifice is necessary to the nature that will 
distribute the capacities that will define human and animal, both in terms of the 
instruments that will allow nature to flourish, and nature as such.  Thus nature is 
artificial twice over: what is called nature is already the reflection of human 
artifice (1), and this nature requires additional artifice in order to be what it is (2).  
Consequently, the natural ends of a human being and the natural capacities it 
requires to meet them must themselves be seen as products of the arts, an insight 
I argue can be found in Aristotle, especially his Poetics, but goes unrecognized, 
for the insolubility of the aporia of nature and artifice in Aristotle means that he 
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does not acknowledge (1).  While Aristotle demonstrates in his Poetics the vital 
importance of art for politics through its role in bringing to fruition and harmony 
the various natures that compose humanity, if nature really is a reflection of 
artifice, then it is to a particular mode of artifice—the ways of doing particular to 
his own society—that art serves to reconcile its participants.  Art thus becomes 
the means to present artifice as nature, and so both creates hierarchical divisions 
between human beings and reconciles them to one another.  
 Despite the violence and domination concealed in the Aristotelian 
problematic, Aristotle at once offers important insights that go unrecognized if 
this problematic is simply or abstractly overturned.  Chiefly among these are the 
ideas that other kinds of animals can be political, and therefore that other 
subjective possibilities might be politically drawn upon that are not, strictly 
speaking, human; that a life of leisure and beautiful activity shorn of the dictates 
of self-preservation is highest; and that art is political in that it might serve a role 
in producing both these other subjective possibilities and a life of leisure and 
beauty.  I argue in Part IV that the work of Theodor W. Adorno enables the 
theoretical recovery of these insights, and so the promise found and betrayed in 
the Aristotelian problematic.  I begin by attempting to sketch out the relation 
between Adorno and Aristotle and so illustrate the challenge Adorno’s theoretical 
innovations offer to Aristotle’s conception of humanity, which I then develop 
through an examination of Adorno’s own uses of the concept of humanity and its 
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related terms.  Adorno’s critique of philosophical anthropology and the 
nonidentical place of animality in human constitution gesture toward a subjective 
transformation of the human being into a different kind of animal, the subject of 
a qualitatively different kind of society.  Thus Adorno can be seen to ironically 
revive the Aristotelian idea of aesthetic education, one in which the arts are 
marshaled not to the cultivation of the human and so the repression of the 
animal, the forced reconciliation of the subject to violence presented as natural, 
but rather to the liberation of human animality and the creation of a nature that 
has never existed.  It is through Adorno, then, that the Aristotelian problematic 
might be appropriated and surpassed, and against this idea of new life dawning, 
the shadow of an aesthetic animal might be glimpsed. 
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Part I:  
Art, Aesthetics, and the Human-Animal Divide 
 
Introduction 
 
Aesthetics as a field of academic inquiry leads a somewhat precarious and 
vagabond life, one whose political ties are not always obvious.  As the formalized 
study of art and of beauty, it has traditionally been a subfield of the discipline of 
philosophy, though the object of its study has enabled it to make a home for itself 
within such fields as Art and Art History, English, and Film Studies, and its 
fortunes have to an extent waxed and waned with those of its hosts.  However, at 
its inception aesthetics was defined in more expansive terms than its various 
academic hosts tend to define it today.  Aesthetics, derived from the Greek 
aisthesis, concerned human perceptions and sensations.  According to the 
formulation first given it by the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten 
midway through the 18th century, aesthetics is a kind of “feminine” alternative to 
reason—a “sister” of logic operating not at the cognitive peak that is reason, but 
at the lower level of sensation.  It is as this sensual complement to reason that it 
has been claimed that aesthetics “is born as a discourse of the body”21 : while the 
divinity of reason allowed it to extend beyond parochial bodily concerns, 
aesthetics was left to manage the more earth-bound of human affairs.  
In terms of its politics, aesthetics has been linked with the ascendance of 
the European bourgeoisie, with Eagleton claiming that in contrast to the 
                                                     
21 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 13. 
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commanding force of absolutism, the bourgeois order is one in which sentiments, 
habits, and affections form the substance of its bond.  That is, power in the 
bourgeois order is aestheticized: it is lived in the sensibility of our unreflective 
customs.22  The modern construction of aesthetic artifacts, as pieces of social life 
that can in some way represent or capture some key feature of it, is thus for 
Eagleton deeply related to “the construction of the dominant ideological forms of 
modern class-society.”23  Whether or not Eagleton is correct concerning the place 
of aesthetics in the development of bourgeois rule in Europe is not an immediate 
concern of the present study.  Rather, the point here is to note that if it is at least 
possible that aesthetics is tied to gender hierarchy, class power, and the more 
general subordination of the body to the mind, then the political side of aesthetics 
begins to come into focus.  In this light, the claim that “our understandings of 
political life are informed by our aesthetic sensibilities”24 seems quite plausible, 
and if this is indeed the case, then one might also voice concern about the degree 
to which such aesthetic sensibilities may inform our political life and decisions 
without our knowing it, potentially for ill.25  At any rate, insofar as aesthetics 
concerns these different forms of power and the order in which these forms of 
                                                     
22 Ibid., 20. 
23 Ibid., 3. 
24 Davide Panagia, The Poetics of Political Thinking (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 2. 
25 Especially for ill, Kateb might say, though he does acknowledge both the complexity of “aestheticism” 
and the possibility of a “democratic aestheticism.”  See George Kateb, “Aestheticism and Morality: Their 
Cooperation and Hostility,” in Patriotism and Other Mistakes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
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power operate, aesthetics seems to be intimately related with at least a few of the 
more well-established concerns of political theory. 
Much of the recent resurgence in work on the relation between art, 
aesthetics, and politics has come from contemporary European thinkers, and has 
taken on a diversity of forms.  While an exhaustive treatment of thinkers 
concerned with the nexus of art, aesthetics, and politics is not possible here, it is 
worth noting a persistent concern among some of the thinkers who make this 
nexus an object of consideration: that is, the problematic status of categorization, 
especially with respect to the possibility of creating something new, and the 
political consequences of such innovation.  For instance, Alain Badiou’s recent 
contributions to the philosophy of art and aesthetics and their relation to politics 
have endeavored to map different forms the relation between art and philosophy 
has taken, and to suggest a new version of this relation, while also offering 
theoretical criteria that might evaluate art.26  In stark contrast to Badiou’s 
attempt to broadly rethink these categorizations, Gilles Deleuze has written on 
the relation between art and politics less as discreet categories under the general 
umbrella of philosophical inquiry, but as variations on processes of “becoming.”  
For Deleuze, the artistic practices that constitute painting or writing are caught 
up in different kinds of processes of becoming that can blur, alter, or otherwise 
                                                     
26 For Badiou’s formalization of past versions of the relation between art and philosophy, along with an 
explication of his own innovation of art as a “truth procedure,” see Badiou’s  Handbook of Inaesthetics.  
Trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 2-9.  For Badiou’s criteria concerning 
how “greatness” might be evaluated in art today, see Five Lessons on Wagner.  Trans. Susan Spitzer. 
(London: Verso, 2010), 130-132.   
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subvert lines of categorization and so create new spaces for thinking and 
desiring.27   
Different again is Jean-François Lyotard’s understanding of politics, art 
and aesthetics: for Lyotard art and aesthetics have come to serve functions 
counter to one another.  While art has historically been ambiguous enough to 
both facilitate the identification between common people and their rulers, and to 
offer them a chance to dream, to change their lives and to transform the world—a 
function Lyotard sees as having been shared with politics—the promise art once 
made has been submerged beneath the conceptual domination of aesthetics.  
Aesthetics is for Lyotard the handmaiden of culture subordinated to industry, for 
like industry, aesthetics reduces the radical promise of an artwork to conceptual 
categories, taming it through classification and compelling it to circulate as a 
commodity, ready for consumption.  For Lyotard, in order for art to escape the 
conceptual domination of aesthetics and potentially contribute to an experience 
                                                     
27 While the themes of becoming and creation, and artistic examples of these, run through all of Deleuze’s 
works, arguably the most sustained attempts at examining processes of becoming in terms of artistic 
practices can be found in Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003), and co-authored with Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a 
Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).  While artistic 
and political procedures are not discreet categories onto themselves for Deleuze and Guattari (indeed, 
Deleuze and Guattari will write: “in no way do we believe in a fine-arts system; we believe in very diverse 
problems whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts.  To us, Art is a false concept”), insofar as 
Bacon’s innovations in painting or Kafka’s “minor literature” serve to scramble and re-articulate the 
dominant codes that structure flows of desire, these artistic processes of becoming can be seen 
simultaneously as forms of what Deleuze and Guattari call “mircropolitics.,” that is, the re-articulation of 
dominant, “macropolitics.”   See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 300; 208-231. 
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that does not enforce subservience to the dominant order, art must strive towards 
the sublime, an experience beyond all aesthetic classifications.28   
 While each of these thinkers approaches the possibility of artistic 
innovation, novelty, and the political status thereof from markedly different 
perspectives, the major concerns of all of these perspectives might be seen 
reproduced in the work of Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben, all of whom link these 
concerns to the constitution of the human and its relation to the animal.  Below I 
will argue that Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben forge a relation between art, 
aesthetics, and politics that reverses the priority of practices with respect to what 
is understood to be the human being, or properly human life.  That is, unlike 
previous notions of art, aesthetics, and politics which see these as outgrowths of 
what human being or human life properly is—“the discourse of the body” 
mentioned by Eagleton—Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben all locate priority in 
artistic, aesthetic, and political practices: the human being for them is not the 
creator of art, but art is the creator of what we call human being—an imagined 
reversal of the Aristotelian tradition I call the ‘posteriority of the human being.’   
I then turn to consider Heidegger and Nietzsche on art and its relation to 
the human being, arguing that this posteriority of the human owes its 
formulation to their forceful articulation of the priority of art.  I argue that the 
posteriority of the human is a correlate of the priority of art articulated by 
                                                     
28 See Jean-François Lyotard, “A Few Words to Sing” in Music/Ideology: Resisting the Aesthetic, ed. Adam 
Krims (Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 1998), 15; 22; and The Inhuman: Reflections on Time.  Trans. 
Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 113; 115; 120; 128. 
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Heidegger and Nietzsche, the consequence of this being that a number of 
influential thinkers who have subsequently taken up the question of human and 
its relation to other animals can be seen to fall somewhere between Heidegger 
and Nietzsche.  These thinkers, while not exactly Heideggerians or Nietzscheans 
in any direct sense, continue to theorize human life in the terms provided by 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, that is, as an artistic creation, an idea that is mistakenly 
understood to be a fundamental break from its conception in the history of 
Western thought, especially from the tradition inaugurated by Aristotle.  I argue 
that this debt to Nietzsche and Heidegger, rather than break with Aristotle, serves 
instead to keep the posteriority of the human within the bounds of the tradition 
inaugurated by Aristotle, for on the one hand the human is brought closer to the 
animal through practices of domination (Nietzsche), and on the other, the human 
capacity for art is what serves to separate it from animals in a way more 
fundamentally than even Aristotle himself conceived (Heidegger).  These poles 
ought to be seen as radicalizations of the Aristotelian tradition, not its 
overcoming.   
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Chapter Two: The Posteriority of the Human 
Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio Agamben all attempt to think a 
break with the inherited tradition of Western thought and its most dominant way 
of conceiving the human-animal distinction through a reversal of the priority 
between human and art: rather than art being the expression of innate human 
capacities, what we call human is itself an artistic invention—that is, the human is 
posterior to art.  In this chapter I outline the manner in which each of these 
thinkers conceives of this reversal by looking at the way they formulate the 
relation between art, aesthetics, and politics and where in this relation they see 
the place of the human being. 
 
Rancière 
Rancière’s interpretation of aesthetics differs from both the tradition of aesthetics 
begun in the 18th century and its current disciplinary uses in that aesthetics is for 
him the particular way of thinking about art that marks the transformation of the 
fine arts as a plurality of distinct arts to “art” in the singular—art as a unified 
field of appearance holding together a variety of otherwise disparate works.  In 
Rancière’s sense, Baumgarten’s inaugural work on aesthetics can be seen as the 
beginning of a break in a particular regime of sensibility—a particular way of 
seeing, hearing, and otherwise sensing the world—and the place of the objects 
that will become “art” therein.  For Rancière, art requires a specific form of 
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thought capable of recognizing the objects proper to it in order for it to exist.29  
When the fine arts were identified as a plurality, Rancière holds that both the way 
of doing these arts (poiesis), and the way of being affected by this doing 
(aisthesis), were related and regulated by a rule of representation (mimesis).30  
Furthermore, this order of representation was linked together through a certain 
idea of human nature.  That is, for Rancière, the harmony of active poiesis and 
passive aisthesis depended upon a certain view of human being as a social 
creature, whose activity giving shape to matter was necessarily limited by the 
particular place it occupied within the community (and more broadly, the 
cosmos).31 
                                                     
29 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents.  Trans. by Steve Corcoran (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 
6.  Rancière will often call these forms of thought “regimes of identification.”  On the three particular 
“regimes of identification” Rancière sees in the Western artistic tradition, see Rancière, The Politics of 
Aesthetics. Trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Continuum, 2007), 20-25.   
30 Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 7.  “Mimesis” should not be understood here simply as a 
relation of resemblance between copy and model, but “a way of making resemblances function within a set 
of relations between ways of making, modes of speech, forms of visibility, and protocols of intelligibility.”  
See Rancière, The Future of the Image.  Trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2007), 73.   
31 On the relation between the representative regime of the arts and human nature, see also Jacques Derrida, 
The Truth in Painting.  Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987).  Though it appears Rancière specifically has Aristotle in mind as the originator of the regime of 
representation, insofar as the regime of representation is a hierarchical division of the arts held together by 
a certain understanding of human nature, Derrida’s inquiry suggests that this regime persists at least as far 
Hegel’s philosophy of art.  In brief, Derrida argues that the “great philosophies of art,” (9) such as those of 
Kant and Hegel and possibly Heidegger as well, all exclude the frame from their discussions (23).  Yet, not 
only is the frame what makes possible a certain way of recognizing and experiencing a given work of art, 
but frames can also be included in the work or be works of art on their own, thus troubling the distinction 
between what is and is not art, and hence the manner in which the decision that marks their divide is made.  
This decision on what is and is not art is made by aesthetic judgment, which Derrida suggests shares a 
relationship to the human body analogous to that of the work of art to the frame.  That is, the human body 
provides the measure that defines the proportions that structure the beautiful (140)—it both makes aesthetic 
judgment possible and structures the judgment, yet is not formally included in the discussions of aesthetic 
judgment by the philosophers in question.  In this manner aesthetic judgment implies a practical 
anthropology (107)—or, put otherwise: anthropology serves as the supplement to aesthetics.  Derrida’s 
argument here seems to corroborate Rancière’s distinctions insofar as we understand the relation between 
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Thus, the aesthetic break that marks the failure of these distinctions 
between the fine arts and the manner they are to perform their roles also 
accompanies a discord between activity and sense, form and matter, and the 
place of human nature.32  Human nature under the aesthetic regime is either lost 
or it is to come, but its present seat is necessarily vacant, for the experience of the 
sensible found in art has in the aesthetic regime become un-moored and set 
adrift, heterogeneous to its old place in the social order. This “aesthetic 
suspension” of the rule that joins poiesis to aisthesis and regulates their relation 
is for Rancière the principle of a revolution more profound than hitherto political 
revolutions insofar as it marks a revolution of “sensible existence itself,”33 not 
simply a revolution in the form of the state.   But if aesthetics marks a 
transformation of sensible experience that ought to be considered revolutionary, 
and this revolution ought to be considered “more profound” than the 
transformation of a state, does this transformation of sensibility have any direct 
political import, and if so, what might that be? 
 In order to understand the relation between aesthetics and politics 
Rancière is attempting to set out, it is important to get a better idea of what art 
means under the aesthetic regime of identification, and how it relates to 
Rancière’s particular understanding of politics.  For Rancière, art in the singular 
                                                                                                                                                              
aesthetics and anthropology Derrida is describing to be part of what Rancière calls the “regime of 
representation”—what Rancière calls the “aesthetic regime” is the disarticulation of artistic practices from 
the anthropological measures that characterized the regime of representation. 
32 Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 8; 12; 14. 
33 Ibid., 32. 
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is “the framing of a space of presentation by which the things of art are identified 
as such.”34  That is, art is a way of dividing space and time such that the objects 
which occupy this space and this time are recognized as works of art, irrespective 
of ways of doing and making or other artistic hierarchies.35 Art in the singular 
relates to politics for Rancière not because of its content or its intent, but because 
these operations of dividing space and time overlap with what Rancière 
understands as politics.  Formulated generally, politics is for Rancière the 
“framing of a particular sphere of experience,” or the “reconfiguring [of] the 
distribution of the sensible which defines the common of a community.”36   
For Rancière politics is thus not the art of governance or the pursuit of 
power, but the contesting of the barriers that shape experience and form the 
contours of what is counted as a legitimate political subject and legitimate 
political activity.  By contesting these barriers, politics seeks to introduce new 
subjects and new actions into the life of a community, and as such is a form of 
activity Rancière calls dissensual.  Dissensus is the gap in the order of the 
sensible through which people relate meaningfully to each other and themselves, 
and is contrasted with consensus, the agreement between sense and a particular 
regime of meaning.37  Politics, as a dissensual practice introducing new subjects 
and their activities into a community, attempts to make visible to that community 
                                                     
34 Ibid., 23. 
35 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 22-23. 
36 Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 24-25. 
37 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.  Ed., Trans. Steven Corcoran (London: 
Continuum, 2010), 144. 
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what has previously been invisible, heard what has previously gone unheard, and 
in so doing transform the relations of meaning that constitute that community.  
In contrast, consensual practices—to which Rancière gives the name police—
attempt to reduce the political gap, to incorporate the unseen and the unheard 
into the established regime of meaning, and in so doing make partners of the new 
subjects introduced by political intervention.38 
 In light of these definitions, the dissolution of the barriers separating the 
various fine arts into art in the singular marked by aesthetics also marks a 
transformation in the relationship between art and politics.  Art in the singular, 
as the space of presentation wherein artworks can be recognized as such, like 
both politics and the police, directly concerns the division of the sensible.39  
Insofar as art, politics, and the police all operate on this same field, the old 
distinction between art for art’s sake and politically motivated art collapses, as 
what makes art political concerns not its content or its intent but the manner in 
which it divides the sensible.40 Art that seeks to make seen the unseen and heard 
the unheard, dissensual art, is at once political art, whereas art that would unify 
sense and meaning is consensual art—the art of the police.  The politics proper to 
the aesthetic regime is thus not really a politics at all, but a kind of metapolitics, 
                                                     
38 Rancière, Dissensus, 43; 71-72. 
39 “I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that 
simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the 
respective parts and positions within it […]The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in 
what is common to the community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity 
is performed” (Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 12). 
40 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 19. 
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for it is not simply another of the many political interventions undertaken by 
political works of art, but concerns the possibilities of art as such, and thus the 
possibility of political works of art in the first place.41   
 Aesthetics for Rancière thus marks the end of the plurality of the fine arts, 
the end of the regime of representation under which this plurality was unified, 
and the end of the conception of the human being which had served to 
underwrite this regime.  However, the new relation between art and politics that 
it inaugurates, and the possibilities framed therein, are deeply ambiguous.  While 
this ambiguity in Rancière’s theorizing is not necessarily a fault, it does raise 
certain questions about possible directions for art and for politics, given this 
change in their relationship.  For instance, the dissolution of the regime of 
representation, as previously mentioned, entails the dissolution of the conception 
of human being tied to this regime, and Rancière, in his more direct moments, 
will even write that the aesthetic state “is the moment of the formation and 
education of a specific type of humanity.”42 But what might this “specific type of 
humanity” look like?   
In his early critique of Althusser, Rancière argues that humanism cannot 
be reduced to the philosophical concept of an “absolute origin” criticized by his 
mentor, but that humanism must also be understood as a “practical political 
ideology.”  To this end, the word “man” must be grasped in the sense it has been 
                                                     
41 Rancière, Dissensus, 133. 
42 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 24. 
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used by workers in the class struggle, that is, as a rallying call enabling the 
independence of workers from the image of themselves presented by the 
bourgeoisie to be transformed into the autonomy of producers.43  The political 
deployment of the word “man” discussed here agrees with Rancière’s later 
insistence that the “fictions” constructed by politics, art, and other forms of 
knowledge enable certain forms of saying and doing, shaping the ways in which 
boundaries are drawn and respected, altered, or transgressed.44  Along these 
same lines, Rancière will argue, against Aristotle and the tradition drawing upon 
him, that politics “is not a fixed given resting on an anthropological invariable”45 
and that democracy is the division of “nature” which “breaks the link between 
natural properties and forms of government.”46  Yet, Rancière also writes that 
“Man is a political animal because he is a literary animal,” that is, that his 
capacity as a political animal depends upon his being diverted from his “natural” 
purposes “by the power of words.”47  It would appear then, that the “specific type 
of humanity” made possible by aesthetics is simply one capable of recognizing 
that what we call “humanity” is always a situated political and artistic operation, 
broadly configured by aesthetics.  What is called “human” or “man” for Rancière 
                                                     
43 Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson.  Trans. Emiliano Battista (New York: Continuum, 2011), 85; 90.  While 
Rancière acknowledges that “humanism” as a discourse on the nature of “man” was also used by the 
bourgeoisie to argue for the dependence of proletarian upon bourgeois, Rancière’s point here is that “man” 
served a rhetorical function in each of these competing vocabularies, and thus that there is not one 
humanism that must be rejected; rather, humanism itself is a site of contestation. 
44 Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, 39. 
45 Rancière, The Politics of Literature. Trans. Julie Rose (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), 4. 
46 Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, Trans. Steve Corcoran (London: Verso, 2006), 54.  
47 Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, 39. 
 
 
39 
is not prior to politics or even to art; rather, what we call human is always 
constructed by art and by politics—the human is a specific relation of experience, 
a certain way of dividing the sensible, made possible by aesthetics, which thus 
serves the role of the transcendental condition of the possibility of the human. 
 
Nancy 
Another version of this posteriority of the human being can be found in the work 
of Jean-Luc Nancy.  According to Nancy, what we call “human” begins with the 
first instances of “art,” which he locates in the cave paintings at Lascaux.  Art “is 
the beginning itself” that makes possible the self-recognition that constitutes the 
human being as homo sapiens—the animal that knows—and yet remains between 
the human and itself, and so inaugurating the human being’s uncanny relation to 
itself as “self outside of self, the outside standing for self, and […] being surprised 
in face of self.”48  Thus for Nancy human being is homo monstrans before it can 
be homo sapiens, and the artistic gesture that inaugurates the human and its 
uncanny relation to itself at once makes possible the recognition of those others 
both similar, a society of fellows—other human beings—and familiar: the 
plethora of animal life.49  This priority of art over the constitution of the human 
and human knowledge suggests the necessity of rethinking the relation of art to 
the philosophical tradition of the Western world, for as Nancy conceives it, 
                                                     
48 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses. Trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 69; 71. 
49 Nancy, The Muses, 69-71. 
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painting was never “a copy of the Idea”; rather, the Idea, that form of forms, was 
not something to be found in the heavens, but in the caves.50  Plato’s progression 
out of the cave is thus a false ascension, for the truth would not exist “out there” 
somewhere, independent of human minds, but is in fact the condition of 
possibility for human thought that humans have given to themselves. 
 What the discovery of Lascaux makes possible is thus a movement beyond 
the “ontotheological” tradition, which conceives of art as an image expressing a 
pre-existing Idea, to what Nancy calls “vestige-art.”  Vestige-art recognizes that 
art is not the presentation of a pre-existing idea, but is rather what we call the 
effects of a sensibility through which we recognize ourselves and our world: it is 
“smoke without fire, vestige without God.” “Aesthetics” in Nancy’s formulation is 
then the domain where this sensibility is reflected upon,51  and Ideas, or the 
conceptual realm, are fabrications of thought that follow these effects and are 
shaped by them.  But what might this re-imagined relation between art and 
thought mean for politics? 
 Like Rancière, Nancy holds that what is political about art is not its 
representation of society (its content); rather, what makes art political is its 
manner of forging relations between people.52  For Nancy, the political “gesture,” 
not unlike Rancière’s conception of politics, is always an intervention which takes 
                                                     
50 Nancy, The Muses, 78. 
51 Nancy, The Muses, 96-97. 
52 Nancy, Multiple Arts: The Muses II.  Transl. Leslie Hill and James Gilbert-Walsh.  Ed. Simon Sparks 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 24. 
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as its goal the breaking of a dominant order, the separating of that which is 
bound.53  Politics so defined thus necessarily presupposes a social bond, and it is 
the task of fastening this bond that Nancy assigns to a certain form of art: 
literature.  The writing of literature is a form of art that relates people in the bond 
that politics takes as its object; thus, literature is the condition of possibility for 
politics, even if their respective functions remain opposed.  These two functions, 
that of fastening, and that of separating, remain incomplete—attempts at their 
complete integration or dissociation are what characterize totalitarian regimes.  
Only where the tension between literature and politics is maintained and their 
distinctness allowed to be can there be democracy, which exists at the limit where 
unity and separation touch.54 
 Though Nancy does not say so directly, perhaps vestige-art is most 
appropriate to this democratic relation sketched between politics and art. Art 
shorn of its ontotheological apparatus is non-totalizing art, art that does not seek 
to subsume its other in the social bond it ties, for vestige-art recognizes no 
greater pre-existing “Idea” to which this other must conform.  The “subject” of 
this democracy, that is, the particular experience of humanity tied up with 
vestige-art, Nancy calls a “passerby”: one who fits the word “man” only 
imperfectly, for the vestige, the trace to which she is tied, does not identify her 
                                                     
53 Nancy, Multiple Arts, 24.  One will note, however, that Nancy does not dissociate politics from power as 
completely as does Rancière.  As mentioned above, Rancière rejects the notion of politics as power, while 
for Nancy politics seeks only to redistribute power on an equal basis, thus allowing Nancy to formulate the 
goal of politics as “the exercise of equal power or of equality as power” (Multiple Arts, 24). 
54 Nancy, Multiple Arts, 33. 
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with the image of what “man” properly is, but is part of a more scattered 
“common.”55  Thus for Nancy, what we understand to be human is shaped from 
the possibilities given in art: art caught up in the ontotheological trajectory of 
Western thought produced human being as the metaphysical “man-image,” but 
now that this tradition has run its course, post-metaphysical vestige-art makes 
possible different kinds of human being, kinds more suited to the democracy 
Nancy envisions—not “l’homme,” but “les gens.” 
 
Agamben 
The priority of art and aesthetics receives a somewhat different treatment in 
Agamben. For him, the Christian theological tradition has bequeathed an 
understanding of speech and life bound together in such a manner that life is 
produced in speech, in the word.  The poet is the one who undertakes this 
production, producing life in language by tying a knot of signification with 
grammar, giving life a particular shape and in so doing making it accessible, 
though at the cost of rendering what is beyond this shape inaccessible.  Life is 
accessible through poetry in that only life expressed in grammatical language, 
language that can be written, can be known and reflected upon and as such is 
distinguishable from animal life and so properly human.56  Life is at once 
inaccessible through poetry in that poetry is for Agamben the “experience of the 
                                                     
55 Nancy, The Muses, 99. 
56 Giorgio Agamben, The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics.  Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 68. 
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letter,” and the letter itself “has its place in death.”57  That is, the sign erected by 
poetry enabling its recognition is at once a barrier between the human life it 
makes possible and the animal life it leaves behind.  Human life is the life made 
possible through poetry, a life that lives the death of itself as an animal.  It is for 
this reason that Agamben writes of the changes wrought by poetry being at once 
“anthropological changes” as decisive for the individual who experiences them as 
was “for the primate, the liberation of the hand in the erect position or, for the 
reptile, the transformation of limbs that changed it into a bird.”58  The human is 
thus in this sense for Agamben a particular shape given to life through poetic 
creation. 
Agamben also finds artistic modes of expression and their categorization 
to lie at the basis of the Western understanding of “personhood.”  Following the 
medieval philosopher Boethius, Agamben notes that the word “person” 
designates not only the juridical and moral category of “person,” but also the 
masks (personae) used in the performances of tragedies and comedies in ancient 
Greece.  This insight leads Agamben to draw the conclusion that the modern 
conception of the person is closely related to the development of tragedy and 
comedy, even to the point of being able to say that “the moral person-subject of 
modern culture is nothing but the development of the ‘tragic’ attitude of the 
                                                     
57 Agamben, The End of the Poem, 71. 
58 Agamben, The End of the Poem, 94. 
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actor, who fully identifies with his own ‘mask.’”59  This mask of the “person” is 
referred to elsewhere by Agamben as that which contains the species so as to 
make possible its identification, a process he takes to be “the original sin of our 
culture.”60   
As a translation of the ancient Greek eidos, Agamben holds the original 
meaning of “species” to be “that which makes visible”; however, through the 
development of certain forms of visibility, namely, comedy and tragedy, that 
which makes visible comes to be hidden by another kind of making visible, the 
mask of personality, which ultimately enables the identification and 
categorization that sacrifices its uniqueness.  The politics, if any, that Agamben 
sees as being potentially capable of responding to such a situation in which the 
unique or the special is hidden by the formal identity issued in categorization is 
perhaps what Agamben calls “the first politics,” the seeking of a relationship with 
the impersonal aspect of others which remains inaccessible to us on our own.61  
Practicing such a politics means to live a life in which a tension is maintained 
between the personal and impersonal—between that mask we wear so as to be 
known and identified and the aspects that exceed identity.  Such a life Agamben 
                                                     
59 Agamben, The End of the Poem, 20.  One is reminded here of Stanley Cavell’s question of whether or 
not what we call “human” (or in this case, “person”) can be thought of as something like a “guise” that 
“we” could don at one point in time in order to play practical jokes—or accrue certain benefits—but that 
after a long period of “inhabitation” we became unable to shed these guises.  See Cavell, The Claim of 
Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 380. 
60 Agamben, Profanations.  Trans.  Jeff Fort (New York: Zone, 2007), 59. 
61 Agamben, Profanations, 16. 
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calls “poetic.”62  Thus we see that for Agamben, artistic practices are prior to what 
we call either human being or personality, and that politics appears to be 
coextensive with these practices: poetry is what makes possible a human life 
distinct from animal life, and it is only by a kind of return to or appropriation of 
poetry that a life that resists the pernicious aspects of identification—which have 
themselves been adopted from other artistic forms—can be resisted.   
 
The Posteriority of the Human 
This posteriority of the human being to art and politics, or put differently, this 
notion that what is called human being is an invention of artistic and political 
practices and not the origin of these practices, is understood by each of the 
aforementioned thinkers to be a break from the received conception of the role 
and relation of art and politics to human being.  Rather than conceiving of art 
and politics to be expressions of human nature and hence bound by the limits of 
human nature, if the human being is an artistic or political invention, then 
artistic and political practices are without anthropological foundation and thus 
without the direction or limits they were previously thought to have.  Though 
Rancière’s “aesthetic regime,” Nancy’s “vestige-art,” and Agamben’s “poetic life” 
differ in the manner in which they outline the history of art in the West and thus 
the particular reasons they see as leading art to these respective points, all share 
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this notion that the human is a fabrication of art and politics, and that this notion 
is contrary to the inherited ways of conceptualizing this relation.  In this way 
their concerns are continuous with those of Badiou, Deleuze, and Lyotard, who 
seek in their reflections on art—again despite numerous particular differences—
the possibility of thinking something new and heterogeneous to the inherited 
conceptual apparatus of Western philosophy.   That is, what these thinkers see as 
new or the consequences of something new in the re-evaluation of aesthetic 
categories and the relation between art and politics is what I have called the 
posteriority of human being, or the priority of art and politics to human being.  
In order to understand how the posteriority of the human being relates to the 
priority of art as it is formulated by Heidegger and by Nietzsche, I now turn to an 
examination of these thinkers. 
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Chapter Three: The Priority of Art:  
Heidegger and Nietzsche 
I have argued that in their work on art, aesthetics, and politics, Rancière, Nancy, 
and Agamben all attempt to initiate a break with the ways in which this relation 
has been conceived in the history of Western thought in a manner that would also 
entail a new conception of the human being and so the possibility of a re-thinking 
the human-animal distinction.  In the following I will argue that this thread I 
have highlighted in their work runs along a conceptual horizon set out by Martin 
Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. Irrespective of the occasionally explicit use 
the aforementioned thinkers make of Heidegger and Nietzsche, their collective 
concern with the manner in which inherited categories disclose certain 
possibilities available to thinking, and the attempt to rethink the vicissitudes of 
these categories through mediations on art and aesthetics resulting in the 
reversal of their relation of priority with what we call human being, are deeply 
influenced by Heidegger and Nietzsche.   
Furthermore, I will argue that this debt to Heidegger and Nietzsche owed 
in this relation between art and human being actually serves to perpetuate ways 
of thinking about the human being that remain very much within the inherited 
conceptual apparatus of the West—namely, one that sees the human being’s 
capacity for art and for politics to fundamentally set it apart from other animals, 
or that casts the relationship between human and animal in terms of domination.  
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Even as an invention of artistic and political practices, human being in this 
conception remains fundamentally distinct from animals in its very status as an 
invention—it remains that being that is radically un-natural—unlike animals, 
whose invention through artistic practice serves only as a figure to human 
thinking, and remains by and large unrelated to the life of the animal.63  In order 
to flush out the way in which the priority of art to the human has taken its shape 
in Heidegger and Nietzsche, I will examine Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” and Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, along with his late writings 
collected in The Will to Power, before developing in greater detail the way in 
which their way of thinking about human being has influenced recent 
theorizations of the subject. 
 
The Origin of the Work of Art 
Due to the notorious complexity of Heidegger’s famous essay, rather than 
attempt a more holistic reading of the piece here, I will focus instead on 
establishing the particular way in which it serves to outline the priority of art to 
the human that has been taken up by thinkers previously mentioned.  Towards 
                                                     
63 I say here “by and large unrelated” insofar as the artistic practices that serve to fix an image or figure of 
an animal in human imagination presumably do nothing to change the way that animal understands its 
activities: I know of no evidence to suggest the image of the beaver on the Canadian nickel has changed the 
way a beaver attempts to make a dam or seek food.  However, we cannot quite say “completely unrelated” 
insofar as the possibility of that animal, say again, the beaver, might be protected from human 
encroachment and thus capable of going about its activities is very much related to the manner it has been 
fixed artistically in human imagination.  The beaver, artistically and politically invented as a Canadian 
national symbol, enjoys a capacity to pursue its life activities very different from that of the cockroach or 
the rat, which at the time of this writing have not being taken as national symbols. 
 
 
49 
this end the essay will be examined in terms of the relay between three major 
points it attempts to convey: 1) that an artwork is something irreducible to its 
status as a sensible object; 2) that this irreducibility concerns the way in which an 
artwork provides access to the Being of beings, that elusive play of light and 
shadow through which what is is and what is not is not; and 3) that the artwork’s 
privileged access to Being serves to fix sensible objects in their being, including 
the artist herself; thus, the things we encounter, and even the very world that 
provides the possibility of this encounter, is itself made possible through the 
artwork.  In this sense it is not the world that gives birth to art, but art that gives 
birth to the world and everything in it.  However, this thesis does not for 
Heidegger serve to de-center the notion of the human being by making it simply 
one being among others; rather, Heidegger uses the relation of art to Being as one 
that serves to set human being apart from animal being in an even more radical 
sense than that conceived in the tradition of Western metaphysics. 
 Heidegger notes near the beginning of his essay that works of art are 
things, like coal or logs, which can and in many cases are treated just as these 
other things, but unlike a log or a lump of coal, artworks exceed their “thingly” 
character: they make public something other than themselves.64  For Heidegger 
we know things as perceived unities of what we are given through our senses, the 
                                                     
64 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), 145.  For Heidegger, “things” are “Lifeless beings of nature and objects 
of use” (147).  As works of art are neither naturally given nor simply pieces of equipment meant for use, 
they are not simply things. 
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Greek aistheton, or object of sense.65  Through sense-perception concepts are 
generated in order to grasp the thing, to bring it into “the greatest possible 
proximity to us.”66  Concepts are constructed and refined like tools according to 
the particular object they are set to grasp; for grasping art, aesthetics names form 
and content the tool-concepts of choice. However, the basis of these concepts in 
human sense-perception—the aisthesis of aesthetics—ensures the failure of their 
task, for rather than grasping what makes the artwork art in the first place—that 
which exceeds its “thingly” element—what is grasped is nothing more than the 
grasping itself.  
That is, sense-perception reports beings only as objects of sense-
perception to a subject of sense-perception, which, in the case of art, attempts to 
categorize the relevant information as either part of an artwork’s form or its 
content. As indicated above, sense-perception is only really capable of generating 
concepts, and so when confronted with the question of what a thing is, its only 
response is to reply with a new concept.  In this manner objects are known and 
categorized under increasingly fine conceptual layers, all of which describe the 
thing in terms of sense-perception, never in terms of why there is something 
available to sense-perception in the first place.  In this way, the attempt to grasp 
what makes the artwork art through the conceptual apparatus of form and 
content (aesthetics) is for Heidegger a kind of grand question begging, for this 
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very approach to art necessarily presupposes the answer to the question it asks, 
and in the process reduces the being of art to its sensible unity, to the “thingly” 
element that it was said to exceed. 
 What exceeds the “thingly” element of a being for Heidegger is its very fact 
of being a being, its disclosedness as a being and consequently the manner in 
which its being is given, its Being.  A being can only be a thing insofar as the 
possibility of being a thing is disclosed in its Being—the being that is can be a 
thing only through the certain manner in which Being is disclosed.  But the 
artwork is more than a thing, and so, insofar as the conceptual apparatus of form 
and content reduces the artwork to a thing, the artwork must be interrogated not 
through form and content but according to its Being, according to the 
possibilities disclosed to it as a being, if one is to know what the artwork really is. 
Thus for Heidegger the artwork’s exceeding of “thinghood” opens up “in its own 
way the Being of beings”67—it points toward the manner in which Being is 
disclosed that allows for a being be what it is.  In pointing toward the Being of 
beings, and thus, toward possibilities not disclosed in the “thingly” character of a 
being, the artwork communicates the Being in excess of the thing, the Being of a 
being that is not grasped by sense-perception, but that makes possible the 
“thingly” character of the thing in the first place.  In this way, the artwork can 
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show not only how things come to be things, but plays a role in fixing beings in 
their being—that is, in making beings what they are. 
 Thus, for Heidegger, “the sculpture of the god” is not a representation of 
the god, not a heuristic aid to communicate what he looks like, but rather the 
sculpture “lets the god himself be present and thus is the god himself.”68 
Similarly, “[t]ree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter their 
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are”69 through works of 
art.  The artwork is thus for Heidegger not like other things, for through it the 
Being that discloses the possible beings available to sense-perception as things is 
itself disclosed.  In order to have access to the beings we are not, and indeed to 
have access to ourselves as beings, we need a path or opening—a clearing wherein 
the encounter between ourselves and beings, or an encounter with ourselves as 
beings, is possible.  For Heidegger, it is the “workly” character of the work of art 
that makes this encounter possible, for “to be a work means to set up a world,” 
and to hold open “the open region of the world,” wherein all things find their 
respective places.70   
Heidegger contrasts the opening of the world through the work with the 
“undisclosed and unexplained” of “the earth.”71  Though the work opens up a 
world and keeps it open, making possible the event of meaning that is the 
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appearance of beings in its clearing, the earth is like the shadow cast by the light 
of this world—it resists all attempts to penetrate it and remains closed off and 
remote.  The “strife” caused by the opposition between the open world and the 
closed earth initiated by the work makes it possible for beings to be: the clearing 
of the world provides beings with a space for appearing, and the sheltering and 
concealing of the earth gives definition to the clearing, allowing for the 
distinction of one being from another necessary for a being to be.  The earth is the 
unintelligible against which an intelligible world can be defined, and both come 
to be through art.  Art establishes beings as beings; it is what gives them their 
fixity or definition, their truth.  It is for this reason that Heidegger writes that art 
“is truth setting itself to work”72: for truth in the Greek is aletheia, the un-
concealed, and it is precisely the work of art that opens the world of un-
concealment and initiates the “strife” in which it will fix beings in their being. 
While Heidegger also writes that “the workly character of the work 
consists in its having been created by the artist,”73 the artist should not for this 
reason be seen as the origin of the work, for the origin is “that from which and by 
which something is what it is and as it is.”74  What makes a work of art what it is 
is not the effort or intention of the artist, but the truth of the beings that appear 
and are fixed in their beings in the artwork.  Thus, it might be said that the 
artwork is actually the origin of its creator, the artist, insofar as the artist is only 
                                                     
72 Ibid., 165. 
73 Ibid., 183. 
74 Ibid., 143. 
 
 
54 
really an artist and creator through the truth that is founded and happens in the 
artwork; or as Heidegger writes, the work “makes the creators possible in their 
essence.”75   
In this manner Heidegger transforms the terrain of philosophical 
reflection upon art—his castigation of aesthetics and its fundamental concepts for 
obscuring the truth of art, and especially his reversal of the priority of artist and 
work, continue to reverberate in the work of thinkers like those noted above.  Yet 
while Heidegger seeks in his reversal of the priority of artist and work to move 
beyond or behind the aesthetic tradition of Western metaphysics, insofar as this 
reversal leaves the human being, as the interpreter of Being, utterly distinct from 
the animal, it does not displace the place of privilege human being occupied as 
the author-creator of the work in this tradition.  The opening of the world in 
which the being of beings becomes possible is denied to all but humans: as 
Heidegger writes, a “stone is worldless.  Plant and animal likewise have no 
world,”76 and “[w]here there is no language, as in the Being of stone, plant, and 
animal, there is also no openness of beings.”77   
This claim represents a revision of the thesis Heidegger put forward in the 
lecture course he gave in 1929-30.  There Heidegger claims that the animal is 
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“poor in the world,” leaving only the stone worldless.78  However, despite 
Heidegger’s insistence that no hierarchy between species can be maintained, and 
that “every animal and every species of animal as such is just as perfect and 
complete as any other,”79 the fact remains that humans alone are thrown into the 
clearing of Being in such a manner as to have access to beings as beings, and thus 
are capable both of penetrating and controlling things in their very being, and of 
being gripped and attuned in their own being.   Thus, “no animal can become 
depraved in the same way as man,”80 and consequently only he must shoulder the 
burden of his freedom.81  In this way, the earlier Heidegger had already 
radicalized the distinction between humans and other animals found in the 
history of Western thought. Without language or a world, animals are left without 
a path to Being and consequently access to beings as beings: they remain 
sheltered or concealed by the earth, and apprehend beings only as things, never 
as beings.   
Insofar as human being is the interpreter of Being, and art is a principle 
vehicle through which this interpretation is possible, art must therefore be seen 
as a key distinguishing feature between human and animal. Though art fixes the 
being of both human and animal in their respective beings, for Heidegger only 
human beings can ever have access to their being, for only through (human) 
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language is this access possible: both “language itself” and “the essence of art” is 
poetry, and the essence of poetry is “the founding of truth,” the “unconcealment 
of beings as beings.”82  Heidegger’s manner of inquiring after art according to its 
being—as opposed to the aesthetic categories of form and content rooted in 
sensibility—actually serves to widen the gap between human and animal as it 
tended to be formulated in Western metaphysics seen to descend from Aristotle.  
Human being is no longer defined in terms of a certain kind of labor, or a certain 
kind of speech, but according to possibilities that are fundamentally of a different 
order than those of animals—those of the order of Being.  As Heidegger writes: 
“Being […] is a call to man and is not without man.”83 
This emphasis on the unique importance of “man” should not be 
interpreted as humanism, however—at least not in the strict sense of making the 
human the central concept of knowledge and origin of its actions and history.  As 
Heidegger writes in ¶ 9 and ¶ 10 of Being and Time, Dasein is prior to 
psychology, anthropology, or biology84—we can attribute characteristics to “man” 
or reflect on his essence only in the terms given through a specific relation to 
Being.  Indeed, the two main sources of traditional Western anthropology from 
which humanism springs, Greek philosophy and Christian theology, have 
according to Heidegger forgotten the question of Being, and thus fundamentally 
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err in their attempts to given an account of man’s essence.85  Put more starkly in a 
later essay, Heidegger writes: “the highest determinations of the essence of man 
in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man.”  Man is not simply an 
animal with language, but the “Shepherd of Being” and the guardian of its truth, a 
being endowed with a dignity of an entirely different register than those of 
animals.86   
While Heidegger’s concern that the categorial distinctions of Western 
metaphysics hide more primordial possibilities, along with his reversal of the 
priority of artist and work, can be seen in the work of contemporary philosophers 
such as Badiou, Deleuze, Lyotard, Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben, it must now be 
asked: does the proximity of the aforementioned thinkers to Heidegger mean that 
they too, in their attempts to reformulate the way in which the human is thought 
to relate to art, serve to widen the gap between human and animal in the same 
manner that Heidegger does?  While a comprehensive answer to this question 
would require an examination of each of these thinkers independently, for the 
purposes of this study it suffices to recall the role of sensibility in certain of these 
thinker’s works.  Heidegger’s repudiation of sensibility as a return to the 
metaphysics of subjectivity is clearly not shared by all of the aforementioned 
thinkers, and consequently, despite the proximity to Heidegger these thinkers all 
share, one might expect a degree of variety in their positions concerning how 
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exactly humans might relate to animals.  That is, they cannot be considered 
straightforwardly “Heideggerian” in all aspects.  Yet if it is the question of 
sensibility that can be said to separate some of these thinkers from Heidegger, an 
account of this sensibility seems in order if we are to better understand the 
horizon within which these thinkers labor.  That is, it must be recognized that 
there is more than one sun illuminating the terrain: we must also look to the 
work of Nietzsche in order to understand this posteriority of the human. 
 
The Birth of Tragedy 
Like Heidegger, Nietzsche attempts to break through certain inherited conceptual 
structures into something more primordial, and also like Heidegger, Nietzsche 
understands the human to be posterior to art, that is, the product of art and not 
its origin.  However, unlike Heidegger, Nietzsche’s manner of conceiving the 
relationship between the human and art does not serve to further the distance 
between the human and the animal.  By conceiving of the relationship between 
human and art in terms of aesthetic sensibility Nietzsche leaves open the 
possibility of a relation between human and animal joined with sensibility, as 
opposed to one wherein human being stands opposed to animal being, separated 
by the abyss of Being. However, as I will attempt to show, the possibility of 
human and animal joined through sensibility does not for Nietzsche preclude the 
possibility of one dominating the other. 
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In Nietzsche’s first major work, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of 
Music (1872),87 Nietzsche argues that the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus 
represent the opposing poles by which Attic tragedy, and indeed all art, ought to 
be understood.88  Apollo represents for Nietzsche the power of the image and the 
arts based around image fabrication (including the linguistic arts), while 
Dionysus represents the more primal, “imageless art of music.”89  The Apolline 
and the Dionysiac find their origin not in human activity, but rather, they “erupt 
from nature itself, without the mediation of any human artist.”90  Apollo, god of 
the image and the principle of individuation, is locked in continual strife with 
Dionysus, god of music and the principle of dissolution: through their strife the 
objects in the natural world come to be distinct, individual objects, and are again 
destroyed, dissolving and so returning to “the womb of Primordial Unity.”91  
Thus, the conceptual opposition of subject and object serves only to obscure any 
understanding of aesthetics, for the individual subject, “can only be considered 
the opponent of art and not its origin.”92  That is, subject and object are 
epiphenomena of the Apolline and the Dionysiac, which spring forth independent 
of human aims; to understand art one must understand this most primordial of 
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oppositions, and likewise, the art form that for Nietzsche represents its pinnacle: 
Attic tragedy. 
The genius of Attic Tragedy for Nietzsche is its ability to capture the primal 
creative strife of Apollo and Dionysus in the rise of the tragic hero and his or her 
spectacular destruction.93  In combining both poetry (spoken by the principal 
characters) and song (sung by the chorus), Attic tragedy offers a glimpse of the 
individual in all his glory while at the same time demonstrating his ultimately 
illusory character, as just another appearance, a superficial instantiation of the 
more primordial, pre-individual, and eternal Will that remains unaltered by the 
destruction of the individual. In this way, Nietzsche argues that tragedy teaches a 
doctrine of cultic mysteries that can be summarized as: 1) “everything which 
exists is a unity”; 2) “individuation is the primal source of all evil”; and 3) art is 
“the joyous hope that the spell of individuation can be broken,” and so unity can 
be restored.94  However, these teachings are, in one sense at least, a lie: art may 
promise the restoration of unity, but this unity can itself only be found in death 
and destruction.  To live a human life is for Nietzsche to live an individual life, 
and thus tragedy finds expression for this primordial unity within the individual.  
Tragedy’s Dionysiac element provides a way for its audience to feel the “original 
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pain at the heart of the primordial unity,”95 as in music, while its Apolline 
element pulls the audience out of this “orgiastic self-destruction,”96 and deceives 
it into living another day.  In this manner tragedy overcomes the wisdom of 
Silenus, by weaving a system of myth that invigorates and sustains a form of 
human life that for Nietzsche remains as yet unrivaled,97 for it manages to 
channel the most primordial of creative wellsprings into individuality. 
Thus human being for Nietzsche is not the origin of art, but rather, both 
human being and art are products of more primordial forces.  Attic tragedy 
dramatically mirrors the strife of these primordial forces, and in so doing makes 
possible the noblest of human lives.  While Nietzsche and Heidegger appear to be 
in agreement in this respect, Nietzsche’s emphasis on sensibility—the sensuality 
of the Dionysiac revel, the pleasure of the intoxicated frenzy, and the feeling of 
oneness and “original pain”—serves to set him apart from Heidegger.  Whereas 
Heidegger sees the sensibility of aesthetics as always already colonized by the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, Nietzsche sees the sensibility of aesthetics as prior to 
the conceptual apparatus of the subject and thus a possible escape route from 
subjectivity; for Heidegger, sensibility offers no such possibility.  Aesthetics for 
Nietzsche is pre-individual, and thus to be a “true aesthetic listener”98 is to be 
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oriented toward that which exceeds one’s individuality in a particular manner—
the manner of myth and of action born of aesthetic sensibility.   
Unlike Heidegger, who sees the origin of all art in poetry, for Nietzsche 
poetry is born from music, and poetic images seek to imitate music.99  The 
downfall of Attic tragedy comes when the link between Apolline poetry and 
Dionysiac music becomes severed by Socratic philosophy: Socrates exploits the 
ambiguity of the Greek logos (both “speech” and “reason”) to submit the poetic 
speech of Apollo to rational reflection.  In transforming poetic speech into 
rational speech, Socrates manages to shift the wellspring of speech from music to 
reflection, and in so doing, replaces Apollo by installing himself as the “deity” in 
opposition to Dionysus. In this manner, Socrates destroys the link between 
tragedy and the primordial creative strife of the world, and in so doing, destroys 
Attic tragedy.100  In isolating the wellspring of myth—music—in this manner, the 
death of tragedy marks the beginning of the end of Greek greatness, for Nietzsche 
holds that action “requires one to be shrouded in a veil of illusion,”101 and that 
without myth “all cultures lose their healthy, creative, natural energy.”102 From 
music is born poetry and the weaving of myth, which gives life meaning and 
makes the great deeds of action possible. It is as the possibility of being the 
creator of new myth-making music that the young Nietzsche praises Wagner; 
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however, only so much can be expected from Wagner the myth-maker.  Only the 
“true aesthetic listener” can, shrouded in myth, possibly act in a manner that 
might oppose the theoretical view of “Socratic, critical human beings”103 and thus 
hope to rejuvenate German culture.   
Irrespective of its relation to the rejuvenation of German culture, 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on a pre-individual aesthetic sensibility in this project is 
important to the present study insofar as it makes possible a different sort of 
relationship between human and animal than that set out by Heidegger or the 
history of Western metaphysics against which Heidegger opposes himself.  
Heidegger understands the relation between human and art in terms of the 
access to Being art makes possible to human being as a being who dwells in 
language, and thus transforms the gap between human and animal conceived in 
Western metaphysics into an abyss that would hide their common corporality.  
Nietzsche, on the other hand, emphasizes the particular possibility art holds for 
human beings as the making possible of an experience of pre-individual aesthetic 
sensibility—an experience that brings human being closer to animal being, not 
farther from it.  Aside from a few remarks about music transforming the listener 
into a satyr,104 however, Nietzsche does not in this work examine the implications 
of his aesthetic views in terms of the human-animal divide.  In order to draw out 
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these implications, then, we must turn to Nietzsche’s late work, The Will to 
Power. 
 
The Will to Power 
As virtually any Nietzsche scholar will make abundantly clear, the first thing to 
note about The Will to Power is that it is not a work of Nietzsche’s at all.105  
Nevertheless, I draw on it here for two main reasons: in the first place I wish to 
demonstrate a certain continuity between Nietzsche’s early and late thought.  By 
“continuity” I do not mean that Nietzsche’s thought remains unchanged over the 
course of his life, I mean only that the philosophical concerns at the heart of The 
Birth of Tragedy remain concerns for Nietzsche even in his last writings, and 
while it is possible that Nietzsche’s views on many of these subjects change, 
certain formulations do indeed remain the same.  The second reason for focusing 
on The Will to Power is that it provides the most concise collection of Nietzsche’s 
views concerning the human-animal divide.  While this conciseness is to some 
extent an editorial fabrication, the point I wish to make does not depend on 
Nietzsche’s authorial intentions (i.e., on the status of The Will to Power as a work 
composed by Nietzsche).  Rather, I will argue that some of the notes collected in 
The Will to Power allow a connection to be made between the views on aesthetics 
expressed in The Birth of Tragedy, and Nietzsche’s views on the human-animal 
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divide, and how Nietzsche’s thought makes possible a certain kind of reproach 
between human and animal being, without, however, doing away with the 
domination that has traditionally characterized this relation. 
Consistent with The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche will continue to hold that 
art and questions of aesthetics really concern what type of human being they 
make possible,106 and that art is the means through which the shape of human 
being in his day might be opposed: art is the “countermovement” to decadent 
religion, morality, and philosophy.107  Likewise, Nietzsche continues to affirm 
that individuals are themselves instantiations of greater, pre-individual forces,108 
and that “the further development of art” remains tied to the antagonism 
between the two “natural artistic powers” of the Dionysiac and the Apolline. The 
Dionysiac is for Nietzsche the urge to unity that overflows the individual in a kind 
of passionate and painful, and sometimes even destructive affirmation “of the 
total character of life,” while the Apolline remains tied to the individual and his 
perfection in a given order.109 Art, Nietzsche writes, is “an intoxication with life, a 
will to life” and “the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to 
life, the great stimulant of life”110; thus, the greatest works of art will at once be 
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the highest affirmations of life, which, given the corruption of the Apolline by 
Socratic decadence, Nietzsche finds in “the tragic-Dionysian state.”111  
Unlike in The Birth of Tragedy, however, Nietzsche will in his late writings 
explicitly link this state of excitation compelled by art to animality. Art now 
“reminds us of states of animal vigor” and excites “animal functions”—it fosters 
an aesthetic state wherein “animal well-being and desires” are blended together. 
112 Thus the pre-individual aesthetic sensibility lauded in Nietzsche’s earliest work 
is now found to be a kind of animal sensibility, an awakening of pre-individual 
instincts, and the Dionysiac man, the true aesthetic listener opposed to the 
Socratic decadent, is found to be an animal.  Unlike Heidegger then, art is not 
that through which human being stands apart from the animal, but that which 
makes the animal reverberate in the human; art is a means of bringing human 
being into a relationship with a more primal sensibility than that that would be 
tamed by Socratic reason.   
Nietzsche seems to be led in this direction through his development of the 
notion that art must affirm life in its most encompassing totality, for if human life 
is but a small piece of this totality, affirming life as such means an extension of 
this affirmation beyond the human, and toward other forms of life.  However, it is 
not simply a matter of affirming life as something common in both human and 
animal alike, for Nietzsche also writes that “[t]he animal functions are, as a 
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matter of principle, a million times more important than all our beautiful moods 
and heights of consciousness” and that consciousness itself can only be 
considered something other than a superfluity when it makes itself into a tool of 
these animal functions.113  Thus Nietzsche urges his readers to “think less highly 
of all that is conscious” for the “conscious, purposive” aspects of human beings 
“are only the smallest part of us.”114  In this manner, what we call human is 
nothing like the crown of creation or the point to which all the natural word 
strives.  Rather, Nietzsche insists that the human “as a species does not represent 
any progress compared with any other animal” and “the individual human being 
is in precisely the same case as the lowest worm.”115   
Yet while Nietzsche’s re-formulation of the relation between what is 
human and what is animal serves to radically undermine the dominance human 
being has exercised over the animal, it does not undermine dominance as such.  
That is, the problem with the human dominating the animal for Nietzsche is that 
the human, like the figure of Apollo under the sway of Socrates, has become 
weak, disconnected from all that made him strong.  The creativity that made 
human being the kind of creature that might dominate the world in the first place 
was its own particular arrangement of animal instincts, its ability to cultivate and 
control a multitude of contrary drives and impulses.116  Only by reconnecting 
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Apollo with Dionysus, the human with the animal, can primal creativity be 
channeled into a new form of life not weighed down by what we call human.   
However, the experience of animal sensibility made possible through art, 
the Dionysiac feelings of pleasure and intoxication, are for Nietzsche the same as 
the “exalted feeling of power.”117  It is the feeling of power that Nietzsche seeks to 
gain through aesthetic experience, a feeling that might spur the human animal to 
create new forms of life, over and against the old.  It is for this reason that 
Nietzsche defines his first problem as “the order of rank of different kinds of 
life.”118 If the necessary consequence of Nietzsche’s insistence that human life 
does not represent progress over animal life is that all species evolve together “in 
utter disorder, over and against each other,”119 and that each of the drives that 
compose a given species is “a kind of lust to rule” that would install its own 
perspective as the norm, then it is no wonder that Nietzsche compares the body 
to an aristocracy.120  For Nietzsche, the turn to animal sensibility is less about 
escaping domination than it is about creating the possibility for a new kind of 
domination. That is, the possibility of overcoming human being and inventing 
new forms of life is for Nietzsche at once a question of inventing new forms of 
domination that might support this new life.121  Whereas the history of Western 
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philosophy to which Nietzsche opposes himself conceived of the human as the 
natural ruler of the animal, Nietzsche seeks to forge a new relation with the 
animal in order to rule over the merely human—the hierarchy that has existed 
between human and animal for thousands of years is reshaped, but the hierarchy 
itself remains.  In this sense, while Nietzsche’s truly aesthetic listener may be an 
animal, this animal is destined to rule over others as the Über-mensch: that 
which stands over and apart from the human being. 
In this way, while both Heidegger and Nietzsche see themselves as 
overturning or overcoming a tradition of Western metaphysics and a particular 
relation between humans and animals begun with Aristotle and culminating in 
the Christian tradition, they do so in a way that appears to offer little hope for the 
amelioration of the plight of animals and their domination by humans.  In the 
case of Heidegger, concepts such as Dasein and his use of poieisis open an abyss 
between human and animal being much more profound than that which exists in 
the Christian and Aristotelian traditions, and though Heidegger does not himself 
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advocate a kind of hierarchy between humans and animals, it is difficult to see 
how ideas of moral duty or even concern for animals could be derived from the 
possibilities of Being wherein the respective places of human and animal being 
are so utterly alien to each other.  An ethic of asymmetrical care for the other 
would be needed, but again, I do not see how such an ethic can be derived from 
an ontology that places so low an emphasis on sensibility.   
In Nietzsche’s case, on the other hand, sensibility is lauded, even a pre-
individual sensibility that allows for a continuity between humans and other 
animals, but this sensibility and the possibilities for individuation it discloses are 
spurred on by a feeling of power and the supposedly inherent drive to express 
this power in the mastery and domination of others.  While it is possible to 
imagine an order wherein this power is expressed in a manner that ameliorates 
the plight of some animals, the amelioration of the plight of some can in 
Nietzsche’s formula only be bought with the domination of others.  How then, we 
must ask, has this paradigm defined between the poles of Heidegger and 
Nietzsche served to inform other work on the topic?  To this question I now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
Chapter Four: Art, Aesthetics, and Animality:  
Between Heidegger and Nietzsche 
After this long march through key selections of Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on the relation between art and human being, it is now possible to more 
clearly formulate the way in which recent work on the relation between art, 
aesthetics, and politics relates to a certain conception of human being and its 
relation to animal being.  It was argued above that these recent thinkers are tied 
together by certain Heideggerian threads—namely, the concern with inherited 
concepts obscuring more primordial possibilities and a reversal of the priority of 
art and artist; however, it was also acknowledged that this proximity to 
Heidegger was not without important deviations, such as the continued emphasis 
on sensibility.  Nietzsche’s understanding of the posteriority of the human in 
terms of a pre-individual sensibility makes it possible to understand how most of 
the aforementioned thinkers (Deleuze, Lyotard, Rancière, and Nancy) continue to 
reserve an important place for sensibility in their thought, despite their reversals 
of the priority of art and artist.  Moreover, Nietzsche and Heidegger’s direct 
linking of art and aesthetics with the human-animal divide makes explicit what 
remains under-theorized in the recent aforementioned works: the crypto-
anthropology smuggled into these discussions on art, aesthetics, and politics that 
remains consistent with the trend in the history of political thought in the West to 
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attempt to answer theoretical questions concerning politics with philosophical 
anthropologies. 
Just as the different ways in which these recent thinkers have thought the 
posteriority of the human can be traced back to Heidegger and Nietzsche, so the 
influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger can be seen in a number of recent attempts 
to reformulate the relation between human and animal.  To this extent, we might 
even see Nietzsche and Heidegger as the two opposing poles defining the 
spectrum of positions along which these recent thinkers can be distributed.  
Closer to the Nietzschean pole, there is an attempt to re-animalize the human 
being, to think of the human-animal divide in terms of sensibility, whereas those 
closer to the Heideggerian pole attempt to think this divide in terms of language 
and being.  This opposition between the sensible dissolution of the human being 
on the one hand, and the ontological elevation of the human being on the other, 
form the theoretical horizon in which these recent thinkers toil.  To give some 
flesh to these general statements and offer particular examples of the way in 
which Heidegger and Nietzsche have to a significant extent defined the horizon of 
inquiry concerning the human-animal divide and its relation to art and 
aesthetics, I will survey below work on the human-animal divide done by 
Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze, and Derrida.122  Again, while significant differences 
                                                     
122 In calling my examination of these thinkers a “survey” it should be clear that this list is not meant to be 
exhaustive; however, it is nevertheless worth making a note about a thinker whose omission from this list 
may seem particularly questionable: Hannah Arendt.  Not only has Arendt been influential in shaping what 
we understand to be human and its relation to politics in the twentieth century, but she has also been called 
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can be seen to animate each of their respective approaches to the problem in 
question, all can nevertheless be characterized as lying along a spectrum 
extended between the work of Heidegger and Nietzsche. 
 
Foucault 
Closer to the Heideggerian pole we might find—despite his own praise of 
Nietzsche and association with “French Nietzscheanism”123—Michel Foucault’s 
early work on the concept of “man.”  In The Order of Things, Foucault 
provocatively argues that “man” is “a quite recent creature” who did not exist 
prior to the 18th century,124 and who may soon be erased “like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea.”125  For Foucault, the view of “man” as the timeless 
origin of the human world is a kind of anthropological myth or fiction, and that 
instead “man” should be understood not as a cause of this world, but as an effect 
of it.  More specifically, Foucault argues that “man” was “the effect of a change in 
                                                                                                                                                              
both a “Nietzschean” and the first liberal Heideggerian, thus apparently making her an ideal candidate for 
inclusion in this survey.  However, in The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
Arendt writes that the “immediate source of the art work is the human capacity for thought” (168).  If for 
Arendt art is something made by humans and so dependent on their innate capacities, then she, unlike the 
other thinkers I will examine, is not a theorist of the posteriority of the human and the priority of art, and 
can thus not be considered Nietzscehan or Heideggerian in the ways I am examining here.  See George 
Kateb, “The Adequacy of the Canon,” in Patriotism and Other Mistakes, 384; and Slavoj Žižek, In Defense 
of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2009), 121. 
123 See Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism.  Trans. 
Mary H. Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990), 68. 
124 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 
1994), 308. 
125 Ibid., 387. 
 
 
74 
the fundamental arrangements of knowledge,”126 that he appears at a particular 
moment when life, labor, and language come to be understood in the terms of a 
knowledge that demands a unifying subject in order to make sense.  “Man” serves 
a kind of rhetorical or axiomatic function in the epistemological transformations 
that the sciences undergo in the 18th century; “he” is invented in order to facilitate 
their modes of inquiry.  Consequently, when the modes of inquiry that required 
the term “man” in order to operate again undergo a transformative shift, the 
resulting new modes of inquiry may—as Foucault speculates—no longer require 
the term “man.”   
 While the notion that “man” is little more than an invention, fiction, or 
myth dependent upon the particular ways in which people speak, think, and 
know at particular moments in history is consistent with the posteriority of the 
human as it appears in both Nietzsche and Heidegger, what brings Foucault here 
closer to Heidegger is the particular emphasis he places on language and being, 
which serves to accentuate the distance between the human being and other 
animals.  As the effect of a certain arrangement of knowledge, “man” exists only 
as a term within a certain kind of discourse, a certain way of speaking, thinking, 
and knowing.  Insofar as Foucault holds that “[t]he verb is the indispensable 
condition for all discourse,” and that “[t]he entire species of the verb may be 
reduced to the single verb that signifies to be,” then it is really the relation to 
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being that structures discourse, and hence determines what appears as “man.”127  
Like Heidegger, Foucault sees the relation to being as what ultimately separates 
the human from the animal, for without a relation to being, “men, like certain 
animals, would have been able to make use of their voices well enough, yet not 
one of those cries hurled through the jungle would ever have proved to be the 
first link in the great chain of language.”128  In this light, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Foucault will add that “Man is a mode of being.”129 
 While it might be tempting to argue that Foucault’s “antihumanism,” that 
is, his attack on anthropology, is also a kind of anti-anthropomorphism that 
could enable a reconciliation between the human and other animals, such a 
gesture appears to run counter to Foucault’s direction in The Order of Things.  
For Foucault, anthropology has played “a constituent role in modern thought,” 
and continues to weigh on the thought of his day as an obstacle to thinking the 
being of language, for the being of “man” and the being of language have never in 
Western culture been able to coexist.130  Bringing thought back “to the 
possibilities of its earliest dawning”131 through an awakening of thought from its 
anthropological slumber is for Foucault a gesture towards the being of 
language—one that is profoundly indifferent to the languageless life of animals. 
Foucault advocates the destruction of the anthropological order, like Heidegger, 
                                                     
127 Ibid., 93-94. 
128 Ibid., 94. 
129 Ibid., 322. 
130 Ibid., 340; 339. 
131 Ibid., 341. 
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to rediscover “a purified ontology or a radical thought of being,”132 which, as in 
Heidegger, remains in a realm radically different than anything that might be 
experienced by an animal. 
 Foucault’s later work on bio-power, however, appears closer to the 
Nietzschean end of the spectrum.  Here Foucault’s analysis of the Classical Age 
emphasizes the methods by which power is invested in the subject it creates, in 
the forms of what he calls an “anatomo-politics of the of the human body,” which 
centers on the body as a machine which must be disciplined in order to optimize 
its capacities, and a “biopolitics of the population,” which works by means of 
regulatory controls concerning the “species body” and its biological processes, 
such as propagation, birth, mortality, health, etc.133  Thus, Foucault argues, 
power comes to be articulated in terms of fostering life and disallowing it to the 
point of death, as opposed to what he calls the ancient right of sovereignty “to 
take life or let live.”134  It is in this sense that Foucault can write that “modern 
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in 
question,”135 for not only do the life processes of “modern man” become subject 
to political regulation in a way that Foucault sees as new, but this particular 
method of exercising power—of fostering life or disallowing it to the point of 
                                                     
132 Ibid., 342. 
133 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley. (New 
York: Vintage, 1990), 139. 
134 Ibid., 138. 
135 Ibid., 143. 
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death—is the kind of power humans have traditionally exercised over animals, 
especially in their domestication.   
If, as Foucault writes, bio-power concerns itself with “distributing the 
living in the domain of value and utility” in order to “qualify, measure, appraise, 
and hierarchize,”136 then it is human-animal relations that have served as its 
model. That is, bio-power is the application of methods of cultivation and 
domestication to human bodies that were previously reserved for animal bodies.  
Moreover, though Foucault does not make it explicit, the rallying point that he 
opposes to bio-power and specifically the normalization it advances through the 
concept of “sexuality,” addresses itself to this terrain in which the human is 
considered a kind of animal. Advocating strategies of resistance around bodies 
and pleasures concerns the sensibility the human being shares with the animal, 
not the language of being whose dream of a “purified ontology” opens a chasm 
between the human and other animals.137  Insofar as the early Foucault 
articulates his thought in Heideggerian terms, and the later Foucault articulates 
is thought in more Nietzschean ones, Foucault’s thought can thus be seen to 
move along the spectrum lying between Heidegger and Nietzsche, while 
remaining all the while within the paradigm they define. 
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Agamben 
Agamben’s development of Foucauldian bio-power and bio-politics serves to 
swing the pendulum away from Nietzsche and back towards Heidegger.  While 
Agamben maintains with Foucault that the politicization of life is of decisive 
importance for understanding modernity and the machinations of power in the 
present, Agamben gives a new twist to Foucauldian bio-power by interpreting it 
in the terms of ancient Greek philosophy. For Agamben, the distinction between 
two different ancient Greek words for life, bios and zoe, indicate the way in which 
the life proper to the human being lived in the polis (bios), was considered to be 
separate from the “bare life” humans share with other living beings (zoe).  
However, like the concealing (lethe) necessary for the un-concealing (aletheia) of 
truth, Agamben asserts that the apolitical “bare life” of zoe is necessary in order 
for the political life of bios to define itself, and as such, zoe ought to be considered 
the constitutive “outside” of bios.  Zoe is related to bios in that it is the outside 
against which bios maintains its own sphere, a relation Agamben calls a “relation 
of exception,” wherein “something is included solely through its exclusion.”138   
What is of decisive importance for modernity then is not so much the 
inclusion of life in the political sphere—as Agamben’s formulation of the relation 
between bios and zoe purports to show that life was always already included in 
politics through its exclusion—but that the way in which politics relates to life has 
                                                     
138 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
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changed.  Rather than occupying the margins of politics as its constitutive 
outside, Agamben claims that through a process whereby the exception has 
become the rule,139 “bare life” has come to coincide with the political sphere, 
allowing for the exclusion and the inclusion, the inside and the outside that 
characterized the mutually constitutive terms of bios and zoe, to “enter into a 
zone of irreducible indistinction.”140  This zone of indistinction that engulfs 
politics and life marks a transformation in the way in which political power is 
exercised, in that the ancient form of distinguishing between living beings in 
order to define political subjects fails to operate. In this manner, the zone of 
indistinction that is becoming characteristic of modernity also troubles the 
human-animal distinction.  However, while in Homo Sacer Agamben devotes 
little time to this problem beyond noting the exceptional existence of the 
“wolfman,”141 in The Open: Man and Animal, the problem, as its subtitle 
suggests, occupies center-stage.142 
                                                     
139 Though the term “process” is here rather vague, it can be inferred that this “process” refers primarily to 
a series of innovations in the Western legal tradition that culminate for Agamben in the laws surrounding 
the definitions of sovereignty and the state of exception in the Weimar Republic, and later, in the Third 
Reich.  Apart from Homo Sacer, see Agamben’s State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
140 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 9. 
141 A being who, neither human nor animal, dwells in both the world of bios and zoe, without properly 
belonging to either and thus exists as a kind of exemplar of this zone of indistinction where the old division 
fails to operate, and perhaps more ominously, serves as an example of a body that is stripped of its status as 
a legal subject, though remaining biologically human.  See Homo Sacer, 105-106. 
142 The relation between Homo Sacer (1995) and The Open (2002) can perhaps be understood by a phrase 
from the former: “What constitutes man as a thinking animal has its exact counterpart in what constitutes 
him as a political animal” (Homo Sacer, 182).  Whereas Homo Sacer concerns itself with the vicissitudes of 
the Western legal tradition in constituting man as a political animal, The Open concerns itself with the 
vicissitudes of the Western philosophical tradition in constituting man as a thinking animal.  In this sense, 
these two works are opposing sides of the same coin. 
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 Like the “relation of exception” existing between bios and zoe that allows 
for bios to define itself as an “inside” opposed to the “outside” of zoe, so Agamben 
writes in The Open that the human being is capable of opposing itself to other 
living things only by first externalizing or locating “outside” an animal life that is 
actually a part of itself.  That is, in order for the human being to define itself as 
the “inside” opposing a world of animal life “outside,” it must continually 
separate itself from the animal life that is part of the human being.143  Insofar as 
this process of separation is responsible for anthropogenesis—the becoming 
human of the living being—Agamben holds that this process is what is proper to 
human life as such: homo sapiens “is neither a clearly defined species nor a 
substance; it is, rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of the 
human.”144  For Agamben, it is this very process of continually separating itself 
from the animal and then recognizing itself in the animal that makes the human 
being what it is as a distinct kind of being—the human being is thus a process: it 
is, more than anything, an anthropological machine.  
While Agamben’s use of terms like “process” and “machine” seem foreign 
to Heidegger’s thought, it is important to note that the process responsible for 
articulating the separation between what is human and what is animal and hence 
the process responsible for generating the human in the first place is “first 
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philosophy.”145  Thus, defining the human in terms of its separation from the 
animal depends in Agamben, as in Heidegger, on the philosophical operation of 
separating something in life that can be related to being, and something that 
cannot, and to the former kind of life is assigned the predicate “human,” while 
the later comes to be known as “animal.”  Insofar as the human is thus a certain 
way of relating to being and beings, how we understand the human cannot be 
divorced from “the epochal destinations of being,” which according to Agamben, 
locate the present at a juncture where philosophy has ended, and thus the 
anthropological machine is “idling.”146 
The idling of the anthropological machine, its inability to draw the 
distinctions between human and animal that had historically constituted its 
operations, like the zone of indistinction in which bare life and politics are mired, 
presents itself as the most pressing danger of our time.  Not only does Agamben 
hold that the total inability to distinguish between human and animal would 
render them and the concepts that underwrite our lives unthinkable, but 
Agamben even speculates that concentration and extermination camps are a 
response to this condition: they are “an extreme and monstrous attempt to decide 
between the human and the inhuman.”147  However, Agamben’s own attempts to 
respond to this condition also seem to follow along Heideggerian paths.   
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In Homo Sacer, Agamben writes that insofar as the paradigm of 
sovereignty that comes to structure the relation of exception and so ultimately 
make possible the zone of indistinction between bare life and politics is derived 
from the Aristotelian conception of potentiality,148 a “new and coherent ontology 
of potentiality” is needed in order to formulate a political theory “freed from the 
aporias of sovereignty.”149  That is, ontology is the key that will unlock the 
conceptual chains foisted upon the present by its past.  In contrast, Agamben 
writes in The Open that the animal lies beyond being, and thus letting the animal 
be would be “to le it be outside of being.”150  To let the animal be outside of being 
would be to refuse the conceptual capture through which the animal is 
constituted as the “outside” against the “inside” of the human, and thus, to refuse 
the constitutive operation of the human being—of the anthropological machine.   
It is difficult to say if this being outside of being is for Agamben the same 
as thinking a new ontology, or if his exhortation to “risk ourselves” in the “central 
emptiness” that “within man […] separates man and animal” is a more poetic 
intervention.151  In the first case Agamben appears to place his hope in a new 
ontology, while in the second he seems to oppose something closer to poiesis to 
the techne of human constitution, yet both cases appear to point in a direction 
that Agamben explicitly rejects: a new constitution of the human.  Agamben 
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83 
holds in The Open that arresting the anthropological machine means no longer 
seeking new, more “effective” or “authentic” articulations of the human.152  
However, if ontology, as first philosophy, is “the fundamental operation in which 
anthropogenesis […] is realized,”153 then it would appear that “a new and 
coherent ontology of potentiality” would also be the re-constitution of the human.  
However, even if Agamben’s gesture in The Open toward a being outside of being 
is interpreted as a poetic renunciation of ontology, recall that Agamben writes 
that “[a]nthropological changes correspond, in language, to poetological changes” 
and that the poet is “he who, in the word, produces life.”154  In other words, it 
appears that to seek refuge from ontology in poetry is still to produce the very 
thing one had hoped to avoid in the flight from ontology: a new constitution of 
the human being which turns upon potentials particular to him as a being 
fundamentally distinct from animals.  In this manner, it would appear that the 
escape routes Agamben would follow out from this most pressing of dangers turn 
in upon themselves like so many of Heidegger’s Holzwege. 
 
Deleuze 
Back toward the Nietzschean end of the spectrum can be found the works of 
Deleuze that address themselves to the human-animal distinction; however, even 
Deleuze’s Nietzscheanism is not without certain Heideggerian inflections.  Like 
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Nietzsche, Deleuze concerns himself with the pre-individual, the forces from 
which individuation springs, the forces capable both of constituting individuals 
temporarily and of “dissolving and destroying” them.155 For Deleuze, 
individuation is accomplished through intensity; consequently, the creation, 
transformation, or destruction of an individual depends upon the varying degrees 
of intensity of which that individual is composed.  Nietzsche’s concepts of “the 
will to power” and the “eternal return” are for Deleuze terms that describe this 
play of intensity or intensities that compose this Dionysian world of anarchic 
dissolution and transformation.  While the will to power is “the flashing world of 
metamorphoses, of communicating intensities,” the eternal return “is the being of 
this world”156; that is, the eternal return expresses “the common being of all these 
metamorphoses.”157  
Unlike animals, humans possess the woeful capacity to privilege their own 
temporary constitution as individuals as something unique to the world or even 
self-caused, and thus engage in what Deleuze calls “a specifically human form of 
bestiality”: stupidity (bêtise).158  The specifically human form of animality is thus 
a kind of error, an inability to grasp the world as it is.  If the goal of philosophy is 
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then to obstruct this stupidity,159 then philosophy sets as its task the thinking of 
the powers of individuation, and in so doing, philosophy aims to free the human 
being of the vanity of the predicate “human.”  Deleuze appropriates Nietzsche’s 
philosophy in order to replace the I and the Self by “an undifferentiated abyss” 
and think “the individuating factors which consume them and which constitute 
the fluid world of Dionysius.”160  These “individuating factors” are “immediately 
and essentially” related to “univocal being,” as this univocal being is for Deleuze 
the being of the individuating factors themselves.  Individuation is accomplished 
through the play of intensities (the will to power), and the being of these 
intensities (the eternal return) is the being that “expresses in a single meaning all 
that differs.”161  Through his concern with the being of the factors of individuation 
and his definition of the human in terms of its relation to this being, Deleuze 
advances a theorization of the human-animal divide that gives a distinct 
Heideggerian spin to Nietzschean concepts.162 
In his later work with Guattari, Deleuze will again take up thinking the 
human-animal relation, and once again, this attempt will remain decidedly 
between the twin poles of Nietzsche and Heidegger.  Deleuze and Guattari reject 
                                                     
159 See the portion of Deleuze’s interview with Claire Parnet, “R as in Resistance.”  Cited in Charles J. 
Stivale, Gilles Deleuze’s ABCs: The Folds of Friendship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008), Ch. 5. 
160 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 258. 
161 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 254. 
162 Heidegger, for his part, also did interpret Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power in metaphysical 
terms, writing that it “constitutes the basic character of all beings.”  See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: 
Volumes One and Two, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1991), 3. 
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the notion that the fine arts can be used to differentiate between human and 
animal: “music,” they write “is not the privilege of human beings.”163  Not only do 
other animals participate in music, but their participation in music cannot be 
clearly associated with their species: there are musician birds, mammals, and 
insects, but not every bird, mammal or insect is a musician.  Even painting, which 
would appear to be a more distinctly human activity, cannot serve as the basis for 
a clear-cut distinction between animals and human beings, due to the ways in 
which hormones can “induce their colors and lines.”164  In all, Deleuze and 
Guattari conclude that “one cannot draw a symbolic boundary between the 
human being and animal. One can only calculate and compare powers of 
deterritorialization.”165  If we understand the term “deterritorialization” to 
indicate a process by which a form is dissolved through the freeing of the 
intensities it had previously bound, then here too, the factors of individuation 
that serve to separate human beings from other animals concern varying degrees 
of intensities.166  Fixating upon the forms of human and animal being as opposed 
to the intensities that flow beneath them and how these relate to each other is to 
be in a sense hypnotized by epiphenomena—it is stupidity.   
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Thus, in the interest of thinking about animals and how they relate to 
human beings in terms of a play of intensities, Deleuze and Guattari categorize 
animals into three different types.  The first kind of animal is the individuated 
animal, the family pet with its own personal history that “belongs” to a person in 
their capacity as person, an appendage to the stasis of family life: these animals 
“invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic contemplation.” The second kind 
of animal is the “State animal.”  These animals are those that figure in divine 
myths, defined in terms of characteristics or attributes used to classify people and 
from which “series or structures, archetypes or models” can be extracted.  Lastly, 
Deleuze and Guattari write of “demonic animals” that always appear as a pack or 
a multiplicity.  These animals spread by contagion as opposed to heredity, cutting 
across the previous distinctions with their capacity to engulf them like an 
epidemic.167  While the first two kinds of animals represent different ways of 
reterritorializing intensive flows, the first by way of the family, and the second, by 
way of the state, only those animals falling under the last category represent the 
freeing of intensities and the dissolution of established forms, and consequently, 
it is to these animals we must look in order to overcome stupidity.168  The 
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particular manner in which humans might enter into relations with these animals 
Deleuze and Guattari term “becoming-animal.” 
 For Deleuze and Guattari, this “becoming-animal” has nothing to do with 
imitating a given animal, of living in a manner “like” a given animal is thought to 
live, but rather involves entering into a relation with an animal that takes one 
beyond oneself.  A favorite example of Deleuze and Guattari’s is Melville’s Moby 
Dick: Ahab enters into a becoming-animal with the eponymous whale not by 
imitating the whale, but by relating to the whale in a way that draws him away 
from the roles assigned by family and state and leads him down a path of 
becoming wherein Ahab will cease to be a man.  Though as the becoming-whale 
of a man, Ahab will never actually become a whale, this gesture towards the 
whale of the man enables him to escape the points of subjectification that hold 
him as a man.  There are two principal consequences of formulating a becoming-
animal in this manner.  The first is that becoming-animal is an extraordinarily 
varied process, capable of a wide variety of both productive and destructive 
routes, and hence, is itself politically ambiguous.169  Secondly, as Deleuze and 
Guattari write, becoming “produces nothing other than itself,” and that what is 
real is “the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms 
through which that which becomes passes.”170  In other words, the point of 
entering into a becoming-animal is to enter into a becoming, the “animal” is 
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simply a facilitator, a point along a path taking one elsewhere.  The actually 
existing sensible and living creatures we call animals remain trapped in their 
“molar form and subjectivity,”171 and are, insofar as the priority of a given block of 
becoming and its reality is maintained, less real than the terms caught up in the 
becoming.   
It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari can merrily write that “for 
the vertebrate to become an Octopus or Cuttlefish, all it would have to do is fold 
itself in two fast enough to fuse the elements of the halves of its back together, 
then bring its pelvis up to the nape of its neck and gather its limbs together into 
one of its extremities,”172 for the physical impossibility of such a process for a 
living individual animal is conjured away along with the materiality of the terms 
caught up in the priority of their becoming.  That is, despite the Nietzschean 
attempt to redraw the barrier between humans and other animals with their 
concept of “becoming-animal,” insofar as the priority is placed on becoming, 
humans and other animals continue to be determined in terms of their relation to 
being.  Though Deleuze will find in the work of the painter Francis Bacon an 
instance of becoming-animal where the line between “man” and “beast” becomes 
blurred through their mutual suffering as “meat,”173 ultimately for Deleuze, as 
with Guattari, animals are forms of intensities that can aid human beings enter 
into a series of becomings, the “immanent end” of which is a “becoming-
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imperceptible,”174 that is, a kind of dissolution of all the forms that would stop-up 
the flow of intensities and allow the human to think individuation as such.  Here, 
in the “undifferentiated abyss” of which Deleuze wrote in Difference & 
Repetition, one can finally grasp the being of becoming, or the eternal return of 
the will to power: the “Being that expresses in a single meaning all that differs.”175  
Like Nietzsche, Deleuze wants to bring the human into a relation with the animal 
in order to create a new kind of individual; however, like Heidegger, this 
individual is defined in terms of its relation to the thinking of Being. 
 
Derrida 
Closer still to the Nietzschean end of the spectrum, and again despite his 
characterization otherwise,176 is the last thinker I would like to examine in this 
survey: Jacques Derrida.  While Derrida’s method of “deconstruction” clearly 
owes much to Heidegger’s destruktion of metaphysics, Derrida rejects the 
priority of ontology in defining what is properly human, seeking instead to show 
the ultimately untenable nature of the divisions that have characterized the 
history of thinking in the West concerning the human and other animals.  For 
Derrida, these divisions ultimately founder on the suffering and death all animals 
                                                     
174 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 279. 
175 Ibid., 254.   
176 Like Foucault’s characterization as the representative of “French Nietzschiansim,” Derrida has been 
seen as the representative of “French Heideggerianism.”  See Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French 
Philosophy of the Sixties, 122.  We will see that, at least concerning the human-animal divide, Derrida 
appears to be closer to Nietzsche than to Heidegger. 
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share, and it is on the basis of these that the animality of the human, along with 
any human obligations to animals, must be thought.  Derrida’s deconstruction of 
the human-animal distinction “begins”177 with an anecdotal account of the shame 
the author felt appearing naked before his cat.178  Derrida notes that as only 
humans clothe themselves, it has conventionally been thought that only they have 
the capacity for nudity, despite the fact that animals are themselves everywhere 
naked.  In accidentally exposing himself to his cat, he feels shame for being 
“naked as a beast,” but also, shame for being ashamed, for feeling shame at the 
nakedness he shares with this animal, yet that is at once denied the animal.179  
This being exposed to the animal, being exposed to the gaze of the animal as an 
animal, and as an animal that denies its own animality, leads Derrida to speculate 
that perhaps this state of exposure is where thinking begins.180  
 The importance of this point of exposure for thinking lies in the way in 
which the human-animal divide has been cast in the history of thought in the 
West: Derrida holds that thinking concerning the animal derives from poetry, for 
thinking concerning the animal is precisely what philosophy has had to deprive 
                                                     
177 By “begins” I mean the episode with which Derrida begins a lecture given in 1997 and later published as 
The Animal That Therefore I am, trans. David Wills, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008).  Derrida claims here that in fact “the question of the living and the living animal” 
has characterized his readings of all the philosophers he has taken an interest in, from his early work on 
Husserl (34), thus potentially relating all of Derrida’s corpus (Derrida would presumably want us to hear in 
this word its double-meaning) to the question of the living animal, making the “beginning” of his work on 
this question much earlier than I indicate here.  For the purposes of this survey, I will examine only those 
recent texts of Derrida which deal with the question most explicitly. 
178 Deleuze and Guattari’s warning that familial animals “draw us into narcissistic contemplation” goes 
unheeded. 
179 Derrida, The Animal…, 4. 
180 Ibid., 29. 
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itself in order to be philosophy.181  Philosophy, in order to separate itself from 
poetry, made itself the discourse of reason, the particular and highest exercise of 
the particular and highest faculty of the human—this animal unlike other 
animals.  In defining the human as the animal possessed of logos and thus, unlike 
all other animals, capable of speech and of reason, Western philosophy 
inaugurated a tradition of what Derrida will call “logocentrism,” running from 
Aristotle to Heidegger, which will see the human, the rational animal, as a being 
fundamentally other than that being without speech or reason, “the Animal.”182  
The otherness of “the Animal,” its lack of speech and reason, has underscored the 
history of animals being ill-treated by humans, a history that according to 
Derrida has over the last two centuries reached such unprecedented levels of 
human intrusion and dominance as to trouble the old concepts that mark this 
very distinction.183 
 It is for this reason, its role in the discourse of domination, that Derrida 
attacks the concept of “the Animal,” pointing out that there is no “Animal” in the 
general and singular, only a “heterogeneous multiplicity of the living.”184  
Reducing this great living plurality to a singular and general term capable of 
indicating its distinction from something called “human” is for Derrida “one of 
the greatest and most symptomatic asinanities [bêtise]of those who call 
                                                     
181 Ibid., 7. 
182 Ibid., 27. 
183 Ibid., 24-25. 
184 Ibid., 31. 
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themselves humans.”185  Thus, Derrida’s goal is to “have the plural animals heard 
in the singular,”186 for releasing the plurality of animals from their conceptual 
capture in the general and singular marks a first step in troubling the great 
division between human and animal. As animals, there are only different kinds of 
living entities, whose activities differ in any number of ways that do not 
necessarily privilege those particular activities traditionally considered to be 
human. 
 With bêtise, as with nudity, just at the moment the human attempts to 
isolate in itself something unique that would separate itself from “the Animal,” 
the human finds itself at its most animal: the valuing of its knowledge and 
intelligence above all else turns out to be among its greatest bêtise, just as the 
capacity to un-clothe and thus expose itself exposes only an animal body.  
Advancing along these lines Derrida takes aim at a number of attributes thought 
to be uniquely constitutive of the human, and attempts to show their untenability 
as uniquely human spheres. Thus, insofar as “the Animal” is nothing more than a 
word humans “have given themselves the right and the authority to give to the 
                                                     
185 Ibid., 41.  In making a certain capacity for bêtise something characteristically human, Derrida comes 
closer to the work of Deleuze.  Though I find Derrida’s attempt to differentiate himself from Deleuze by 
reading Deleuze’s treatment of bêtise in terms of Schelling and his notion of liberty unconvincing, their 
respective ideas concerning the human-animal divide do differ markedly.  Whereas Deleuze understands 
the human-animal divide in the ontological terms of being and becoming, Derrida focuses more on the 
sensible consequences of this divide, hence his greater proximity to Nietzsche.  See Jacques Derrida, The 
Beast & The Sovereign, Volume I, ed. Michel Lisse et al, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009), 153-157. 
186 Derrida, The Animal…, 47. 
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living other,”187 and sovereignty is seen as the right one gives to oneself, then it is 
a kind of sovereignty that confers on “the heterogeneous multiplicity of the 
living” its status as “Animal” in the general and singular, and so makes possible 
the human being who stands over and apart from it.  It is perhaps for this reason 
that Derrida devotes two series of lectures near the end of his life to The Beast 
and the Sovereign.  
 Just as the sovereign knowledge that would confer upon the human its 
unique status among the living is a kind of animality, a bêtise, so is there a kind of 
open secret linking the political sovereign and the beast he would master.188  
Perched atop the political hierarchy, the sovereign rules over his subjects as a 
man over his domestic animals.189  Yet, the sovereign gesture that would establish 
distance from his fellows and consequently confer upon him the power to rule as 
a man over beasts is precisely what makes a beast of himself: the sovereign must 
share his distance from the law, the fact of his being above or outside it, with the 
beast, and so begins “to look like the beast he is supposed to subject to 
himself.”190  The sovereign moment that would make possible the distinction 
between a human who rules and an animal that is ruled is thus at once the point 
                                                     
187 Ibid., 23. 
188 Derrida characterizes the sovereign as a symbol of masculinity and the beast a symbol of femininity.  
See The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. I, 187.  It should also be noted that while Derrida acknowledges the 
different rhetorical affects that can be attributed to different animals (e.g. the dove, the wolf, &c), he makes 
no distinction between “beast” and “animal,” as does Aristotle: a beast is apparently for Derrida another 
instantiation of “the Animal” in the general singular. 
189 Derrida writes, “in place of the beast one can put, in the same hierarchy, the slave, the woman, the 
child” (The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. I, 33). 
190 Ibid. 
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where human and animal are least capable of being distinguished. Likewise, the 
characteristic attributes through which the human would distinguish itself from 
“the Animal,” that is, human liberty or responsibility, are equally untenable.   
Human liberty, like the sovereignty that would raise itself above the beast, 
is thought to be a liberty from the animal drives that determine the actions of 
beasts.  The beast is in a sense imprisoned by its drives, driven along the narrow 
confines of a pre-determined course in a way that makes all its actions simply 
reactions.  The human, as free and sovereign, does not simply react, but rather, 
responds.  This distinction between reaction and response is for Derrida the 
fundamental point in understanding the question of animality: it all “comes down 
to knowing not whether the animal speaks but whether one can know what 
respond means.  And how to distinguish a response from a reaction.”191  For 
Derrida, the so-called unique capacity of the human for responsibility, for taking 
responsibility for its own actions that are something other than simple reactions, 
is itself a question of translation.192  It is less the incapacity of animals to 
respond, than it is the capacity for humans to translate between an animal 
“reaction” and a human “response.”   
However, the untenability of these key distinctions does not for Derrida 
mean that there are no relevant distinctions between humans and animals, and 
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that such distinctions can simply be ignored.193  Rather, the untenability of these 
key distinctions in the tradition of Western thought ought to precipitate their 
transvaluation. Both liberty and responsibility, though they imply “something of 
that indivisible sovereignty accorded to what is proper to man and denied the 
beast,”194 cannot simply be jettisoned.  Instead Derrida would deconstruct only “a 
certain political ontotheology of sovereignty,” for it is not a matter of “indivisible 
sovereignty and individisble non-sovereignty, but between several divisions, 
distributions, economies […] of a divisible sovereignty.”195 The point for Derrida 
is to think a division of sovereignty, and hence a liberty and responsibility, that 
would go beyond the dogmatic and narcissistic ethics that exclude animals, and 
so make possible an extension of “the similar, the fellow, to all forms of life, to all 
species” and so be capable of affirming that “[a]ll animals qua living beings are 
my fellows.”196  This capacity to affirm the commonality of human and beast in 
and despite their differences, is, unlike the powers or faculties that have so often 
been posited to distinguish the human from other animals, the power of the 
“non-power” of suffering.  Suffering is the “non-power that we share with the 
animal, whence compassion.  It is from this compassion in impotence and not 
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194 Derrida, The Beast & The Sovereign, Vol. I, 309. 
195 Ibid., 302. 
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from power that we must start when we want to think the animal and its relation 
to man.”197   
In this manner, Derrida, while drawing upon Nietzsche, would seem to 
turn him on his head: against the feeling of power, of “a certain” sovereignty, 
Derrida champions the “non-power” of suffering. However, insofar as this 
suffering is what is held to be common to both humans and other animals, it can 
be seen as a kind of pre-individual aisthesis.  Like the Nietzschean tragic 
experience of a sensibility that extends beyond or below personhood, Derrida’s 
notion of suffering extends beneath particular entities and their species 
categorization and so affirms a commonality, a deeper fellowship, than the 
distinctions upon which social and political organization are based.  For Derrida, 
as for Nietzsche, the human is a construction, an effect of forces capable of being 
deconstructed.198 In focusing upon the suffering common to both humans and 
other animals—upon the affectivity their mortal bodies share—Derrida attempts a 
transvaluation of values that would bring nonhuman animals into the ethical 
fold, as creatures to whom humans are responsible.   
One might be tempted to ask here whether or not the extension of 
fellowship and the possibility of ethical responsibility to others based on a 
similarity—even one so seemingly basic as suffering—is really sufficiently 
                                                     
197 Jacques Derrida, The Beast & The Sovereign, Vol. II, ed. Michel Lisse et al, trans. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 244. 
198 For Derrida, the unity of the world in which it is possible to designate something like the human is 
“always constructed” through “language in the broad sense” and thus “always deconstrcutible, nowhere and 
never given in nature” (Ibid., 8-9). 
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insufficient a basis for domination.  Is the shared fragility of suffering and death 
enough to undermine the other tendencies in Nietzsche’s pre-individual 
conception of sensibility, given that Nietzsche himself noted the link between 
feelings of power and the “original pain at the heart of the primordial unity”?  Is a 
fellowship based in shared suffering enough to avoid the temptation to power, 
and if not, what then of the new “economies” of sovereignty made possible by this 
fellowship?  For now, it is sufficient to note that Derrida remains, like the other 
thinkers examined in this survey, within the circle drawn by Heidegger and 
Nietzsche, one wherein the human is an artistic invention whose distance or 
proximity to other animals is understood in terms of this artistic fabrication. 
 
Conclusion: Back to Aristotle 
Concerning the relation between art, aesthetics, and politics, it has been argued 
that there exists a thread running through the work of a number of the influential 
thinkers on this topic that ties them to the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger.  The 
principal theoretical innovation to which I directed my attention was what I 
called the posteriority of the human found in Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben. I 
argued that this posteriority finds its correlate in the priority of art found in 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, which states that the human is not the origin of art, but 
that art is the origin of the human.  This priority of art, or the posteriority of the 
human, in turn allowed us to see how a number of recent and influential attempts 
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to theorize the human and its difference from other animals, namely, in the 
works of Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze, and Derrida, owe a similar debt to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger.  Indeed, whether separated by an ontological abyss as 
in Heidegger, or brought together through suffering or the feelings of power 
found in mutual sensibility as in Nietzsche, it would appear that these recent 
attempts to understand the political relation between humans and animals 
remain decidedly within a paradigm defined by Nietzsche and Heidegger.  Yet it 
must now be asked: what is the significance of this paradigm? 
 In linking the first set of thinkers to Nietzsche and Heidegger in this 
manner, the crypto-anthropology of these thinkers is laid bare: while the 
reflections on art, aesthetics, and politics in Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben all 
lead toward a theory of the human being, they rarely make this connection 
explicit.  Even Agamben, whose writings on the question of the human have 
proved particularly influential among political theorists in recent years, makes no 
sustained attempt to link these two aspects of his thought.  These notions of the 
posteriority of the human and the priority of art make it possible to more broadly 
generalize the claim Derrida makes in The Truth in Painting, that Kantian 
aesthetic judgment presupposes a practical anthropology.199  Rancière, Nancy, 
and Agamben cannot be said to espouse the kind of pure aesthetic judgment Kant 
formulates, yet all three seem to smuggle a kind of philosophical anthropology 
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into their writings on aesthetics, thus demonstrating that this relation between 
aesthetics and anthropology is not particular to Kant, and so suggests a more 
tightly-knit relationship between art, aesthetics, and our understandings of 
human being.   
This statement is corroborated by my survey of Foucault, Agamben, 
Deleuze, and Derrida on the question of the human-animal distinction.  In 
demonstrating their proximity to Heidegger and Nietzsche on the question of the 
posteriority of the human, the priority of art is also implied, even if these thinkers 
do not attempt to link these problems directly.  Put differently: while my 
examination of Rancière, Nancy, and Agamben demonstrated their aesthetics to 
imply an anthropology, my examination of Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze, and 
Derrida suggest that their writings on the human-animal distinction imply an 
aesthetic. Yet none of these thinkers attempt to connect these accounts, and so 
they fail to recognize that each side of the equation requires the other: if what we 
know to be human is an artistic creation, the art that creates humans is itself 
defined and created by the human, or at least, some embryonic version of the 
human. 
 A possible reason for this oversight can be found in the way in which these 
thinkers orient their theorizing of these problems to the history of Western 
political thought, and, more specifically, to Aristotle.  For instance, though 
Rancière will write, apparently approvingly, of Aristotle’s claim that poetry is 
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superior to history, to “the unfolding of empirical events,”200 and will also note 
Aristotle’s importance in transforming the political and philosophical roles of 
artistic practice,201 Rancière will ultimately oppose himself to Aristotle and “the 
anthropological foundation of politics.”202  Likewise, Nancy’s politics of 
separation are defined in opposition to a tradition extending back to Aristotle,203 
as are the theorizations of Agamben.  For Agamben, the categories of the comic 
and the tragic, which in modernity are imbued with “the most profound ethical 
conflicts,” are derived from medieval ideas based on Aristotle’s Poetics.204  
Moreover, Agamben’s account of the relation of exception he finds in the 
distinction between zoe and bios is drawn from Aristotle’s manner of 
distinguishing between the home and the political sphere, and Agamben will even 
go so far as to claim that the “paradigm of sovereignty” against which he opposes 
himself was bequeathed to Western philosophy by Aristotle.205 Aristotle is a 
central interlocutor in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, while Derrida places 
Aristotle at the forefront of the “logocentrism” of the Western tradition he sets as 
his task to deconstruct.206  Derrida will even argue that the entire tradition of 
“man” as a rational or calculating animal rises from Aristotle’s definition of the 
human being, and that understanding politics in “the modernity of ‘our time’” 
                                                     
200 Rancière, The Politics of Literature, 174; The Politics of Aesthetics, 37. 
201 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 18; 36. 
202 Rancière, Dissensus, 92. 
203 Nancy, Multiple Arts, 25. 
204 Agamben, The End of the Poem, 7; 9. 
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requires an examination of Aristotle.207  Yet, while these thinkers all make 
reference to Aristotle as the principal figure standing at the head of the tradition 
to which they oppose themselves, none have engaged in the kind of sustained 
treatment of his philosophy that might understand the manner in which the link 
between anthropology, aesthetics, and politics might be illuminated. 
Thus it can be said that while Aristotle weighs heavily upon the work of the 
thinkers I have surveyed, his presence is only slightly better than the proverbial 
elephant in the living room: Aristotle is acknowledged, but otherwise left 
undisturbed. However, given my argument that these theorists all fall within a 
paradigm defined by Nietzsche and Heidegger, that they also relate themselves to 
Aristotle should perhaps not be all that surprising: indeed, Heidegger famously 
pronounced that one need spend ten to fifteen years studying Aristotle in order 
for Nietzsche to be comprehensible.208  While we need not affirm this 
pronouncement, we must note that both Nietzsche and Heidegger oriented their 
projects to, even against, Aristotle, and consequently recent thinkers who have 
taken up their attempts to reverse this tradition have thus taken up a kind of 
struggle against Aristotle.  In fact, the Thomistic-Aristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre 
defines the contemporary state of morality in the Western world in these very 
terms: as a conflict between Nietzsche and Aristotle.  For MacIntyre, Nietzsche’s 
status as “the ultimate antagonist of the Aristotelian tradition” depends upon the 
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historical role of his moral philosophy.  That is, the disintegration of the 
Aristotelian tradition in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, along with the 
subsequent failure of the enlightenment project to find a rational secular basis for 
morality, are for MacIntyre the necessary preconditions of Nietzsche’s moral 
philosophy: only in a world where “all rational vindications of morality 
manifestly fail,” and thus where explanation for moral adherence must be sought 
in the play or conflict of wills, is Nietzsche potentially persuasive.  If the 
Aristotelian position can be recovered in a manner that would restore 
“intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
commitments,” then “the whole Nietzschean enterprise would be pointless.”209  
MacIntyre argues that the Aristotelian position can be so restated, and so 
Nietzsche, presumably, can be tossed into the dustbin of history, but we need not 
agree with him or pick sides at this juncture—I am concerned more directly with 
what this conflict means for how we understand the human-animal distinction, 
its relation to art and aesthetics, and the political consequences of these. 
What MacIntyre and the preceding look at the relation to Aristotle held by 
the above theorists make clear is that Aristotle lies both at the beginning, and 
potentially the end, of a certain trajectory of understanding the political relation 
between humans and animals.  Aristotle’s thoughts on this divide and its political 
and moral implications have served to orient an entire tradition, a tradition 
                                                     
209 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) ,117; 259. 
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which, as we have seen, many influential theorists have made it their task to 
oppose.  However, their opposition actually serves to agree with MacIntyre on the 
point of Aristotle’s importance: while MacIntyre sees Aristotle, or some revived 
version of Aristotelianism, as the only statement of morality capable of filling the 
moral void of modernity, the thinkers I have surveyed above take the possibility 
of overcoming this tradition to be entirely bound to a reckoning with Aristotle.  
Thus it would appear that if the relation between human and animal, politics and 
aesthetics, and the moral implications of these as they are formulated in the West 
are to be better understood, along with attempts to revalue this tradition, it is to 
an examination of Aristotle that we must turn.  Indeed, as MacIntyre writes: “no 
philosopher has taken animality more seriously than Aristotle.”210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
210 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), 5. 
 
 
105 
Part II.  
Aristotle on Animality and the Human Being:  
The Biological Writings 
 
And we speak Aristotle all our lives and ‘don’t even know it.’ 
     --Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics 
Introduction 
Aristotle’s two most well-known statements concerning animals and their 
relation to humans are at once perhaps his most well known statements on 
politics: that “a human being is by nature a political animal” and that only “a 
beast or a god” can live outside the political community.211  These statements, 
repeated in a few variations in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics,212 have 
to a large extent served as the basis for “the anthropological foundation” of 
politics opposed by the thinkers examined above, along with what they take to be 
an anthropological invariant that has also been understood to underwrite the 
possibilities available to art.  However, in opposing the tradition begun with 
Aristotle’s definition of the human as a political animal, these thinkers have 
                                                     
211 Politics (Pol), 1253a1-6; 24-30.  Indeed, Eugene Garver’s Aristotle’s Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011) opens with the claim: “The whole of the Politics thinks through the meaning and 
implication of the idea that human beings are political animals” (p. 1).  All English language citations from 
Aristotle’s Pol. refer to the translation by C.D.C Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).  
212 Cf. Pol. III.6 1278b19-22; Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I.7 1097b11; VIII.12 1162a16-19; IX.9 1169b16-
19.  All English language citations from Aristotle’s  NE refer to the translation by Robert C. Bartlett and 
Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
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focused on what they take Aristotle to mean by political and have failed to ask: 
what, for Aristotle, is an animal?  Would not a radically changed understanding 
of what an animal is change what we take to be the politics available to this 
animal?  Aristotle wrote voluminously on animals and their ways and means of 
living,213 and his work has even been praised by modern biologists.214  Moreover, 
Aristotle’s work on animals, and biology generally, has been considered to 
represent a kind sea change in the Greek world view, transforming also the 
manner in which the human-animal distinction was conceived. 
For instance, G.E.R. Lloyd writes that Aristotle was “the first to institute a 
comprehensive programme of research covering [what we now call] the natural 
sciences,”215 through which the Greek conception of nature underwent the 
“elaboration and systematization” that would genuinely separate it from earlier 
mythical views and make it unique among ancient cultures.216   For Lloyd, 
Aristotle’s was the “most comprehensive physical system of the ancient world,” 
                                                     
213 A little over a quarter of Aristotle’s existent work can be said to fall in this category.  The two volumes 
of The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 
Princenton Univeristy Press, 1995) come to a total of 1,985 pages attributed to Aristotle himself.  I count 
among the biological works On the Soul (OS), Sense and Sensibilia (Sens.), On Memory (OM), On Sleep 
(OSl), On Dreams (OD), On Length and Shortness of Life (LSL), On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and 
Respiration (OYOA), History of Animals (HA), Parts of Animals (PA), Movement of Animals (MA), 
Progression of Animals (Prog.), and Generation of Animals (GA), which amount to 561 pages, or 28% of 
the total.  All references to the biological works refer to the Revised Oxford Translation unless otherwise 
noted. 
214 Evital and Jablonka call Aristotle “that superb and unsurpassed biologist and philosopher.” Eytan Avital 
and Eva Jablonka, Animal Traditions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 45. 
215 G.E.R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),  201. 
216 G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 125.  It is this 
overarching concept of nature that for Lloyd is fundamental in distinguishing Greek science from the 
explanations given for natural phenomena in other parts of the world, for instance, in China (110-111). 
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which not only “laid down the types of question to be asked,” but “the terms in 
which to answer them.”217  In this way, Aristotle and Aristotelianism defined a 
problematic that would reign in European science and cosmology for over two 
thousand years, a problematic which, Lloyd claims, is continuous with the 
scientific project in the West today.218   
While the philosophical, if not necessarily scientific, treatment of animals 
begins considerably earlier than Aristotle, Sorabji argues that Aristotle’s work 
provoked a crisis in how the human-animal distinction was understood, leading 
to a massive re-evaluation of the psychic capacities thought to be distinctly 
human, including perception and appearance, belief, memory, and speech, and 
also a transformation in the concept of reason.219  Though Sorabji frames this 
crisis in terms of specifically philosophical views, there is no reason why this 
crisis might not be seen as affecting Aristotle’s cultural context more generally.  
Among the theoretical innovations Lloyd attributes to Aristotle is a distinction 
between logos and muthos—between reason and myth—that leads Aristotle to 
readily dismiss received wisdom in the face of empirical evidence of its falsity.220  
                                                     
217 G.E.R. Lloyd, Greek Science After Aristotle (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), 8. 
218 G.E.R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970),  99; Magic, Reason, and 
Experience,  264. For more specific accounts of Aristotle’s scientific influence, see Stephen M. Modell, 
“Aristotelian Influence in the Formation of Medical Theory,” The European Legacy 15.4 (2010): 409-424.; 
and Thomas C. Vinci and Jason Scott Robert, “Aristotle and Modern Genetics,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 66.2 (2005): 201-221. 
219 Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993),  7; 12; 103. 
220 Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations, 111-112. Or as Vernant writes: “The Greek word muthos means 
formulated speech, whether it be a story, a dialogue, or the enunciation of a plan,” thus making it a kind of 
 
 
108 
While I think Lloyd, in the interest of crowning Aristotle first scientist, finds a 
harder distinction between these two concepts in Aristotle than the one actually 
advanced, Lloyd is right to note a tension here, between Aristotle’s philosophy 
and the wisdom conveyed in the myths of his day. 
 Though Aristotle has been considered less radical or iconoclastic than 
other philosophers of his day—Plato in particular—for the value he assigns to 
commonly held opinions and received wisdom, we must be careful that this 
valuation does not obstruct our seeing the re-valuation of received wisdom 
happening through Aristotle’s considerations.  While Nussbaum notes something 
“defiant” in Aristotle’s aim of saving “the appearances and their truth,” and of 
using philosophy “to show us the way back to the ordinary,”221 it is not simply 
against other philosophers that we should see Aristotle positioning himself.  That 
is, it would be wrong to see Aristotle as a kind of philosopher of the people, the 
champion of common sense against the abstractions of a detached aristocracy of 
philosophers with their heads in the clouds.  As we shall see, Aristotle’s 
investigations into the nature of animals and their relation to human beings will 
serve to radically undermine the received wisdom of his day, and the world 
bound up with it. 
                                                                                                                                                              
legein, a form of speech, which “did not originally stand in contrast to logoi.”  See Jean-Pierre Vernant, 
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone, 1996), 203-204. 
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While Aristotle takes seriously this received wisdom, in subjecting it to 
scrutiny he transforms it from the inside out, formalizing this wisdom according 
to the categories he observes and the causes he understands to be at work in it, 
while discarding those pieces of wisdom too weak to withstand such rough 
theoretical treatment.  It is only in this light that we can understand Aristotle’s 
claims that “no one fails entirely” in attempting to say something true about the 
nature of things, and that we must also be grateful for superficial opinions.222  
The partial truths hit upon in particular statements, while individually 
inconsequential, together form a picture of the world that can be understood and 
evaluated, just as superficial opinions serve to train that part of us that 
understands and evaluates.  The value of received wisdom, then, is closer to that 
of a sparing partner that we might one day replace than it is to a ruler who must 
be obeyed, and Aristotle’s investigations will serve to transform the world he 
knew into one that is in certain ways much more recognizable to us. 
In Part II, I examine Aristotle’s investigations into the nature of animals 
and their relation to human beings with a particular focus on Aristotle’s 
biological writings, in order to understand what Aristotle means by “animal,” and 
consequently the political animal human beings are supposed to be—the idea 
said to run through “the whole of Aristotle’s Politics.”223  Contrary to the 
numerous thinkers who have taken this passage to be evidence that a capacity for 
                                                     
222 Aristotle, Metaphysics (Meta.), II.1 993a30-b3; 993b12-14.  English language citations refer to the 
Revised Oxford Translation. 
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politics is what distinguishes humans from other animals,224 a closer look at 
Aristotle’s biological writings reveals that certain other animals are also capable 
of living political lives.  Specifically, in the History of Animals, Aristotle defines 
political animals not in the terms he gives in the NE and Pol., as speakers, 
reasoners, and knowers of justice, but rather, as “those that have some work 
[ergon] in common,” in which category he includes humans along with cranes, 
bees, ants, and wasps.225   
Not only does this passage suggest that politics neither serves to define the 
human species nor distinguish it from otherwise very different animals, a closer 
look at the passage noted above where Aristotle contrasts humans with beasts 
and gods also troubles the conventional view.  In the overwhelming majority of 
his comments on animals in the biological works, the word Aristotle uses for 
“animal” is zoon; however, the word commonly rendered as “beast” is therion.  
Unlike zoon, which typically refers to a living being, therion is used to describe 
wild beasts or “game,” often in literature, and is related to theros, which describes 
not only wild animals but also the types of monsters that appear in works of 
literature, such as the sphinx, centaurs, or satyrs.226  In this sense, it is likely that 
                                                     
224 See for example, Arendt, The Human Condition, 27; Alkis Kontos, “Domination: Metaphor and 
Reality,” in Domination, ed. A. Kontos (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 214;  J.G.A. Pocock, 
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as “social.” On the problems of conflating the social and the political for understanding Ancient Greek 
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the “beast” which Aristotle considers self-sufficient like a god, and unlike a 
human, is a reference not to animals like bees or ants—which are also political 
and hence, presumably, not self-sufficient—but a reference to Homer’s Cyclops, a 
literary example Aristotle uses to show a type of self-sufficient, apolitical life.227   
Thus it would appear that the conventional view that Aristotle 
understands politics to be something that serves to distinguish the human being 
from other animals is cast into doubt.  Moreover, the view put forward in the 
HA—that political animals are those that share a common work—serves to 
displace the notion that all politics is necessarily predicated upon logos, and 
instead locates politics in capacities humans share with other animals.  Yet, if 
politics proper is found among a variety of different animals, Aristotle appears to 
hold that what is particular to human politics does concern logos, and 
consequently, as I shall argue, the divinity of nous: human politics only differs 
from the politics of other animals insofar as it strives toward the divine.  Thus, 
while it may be fitting to place Aristotle at the forefront of what Derrida calls 
“logocentrism,”228 this “logocentrism” is only one aspect of Aristotle, one 
Aristotle that suppresses another.  Thus it is only through a more thorough 
understanding of what Aristotle takes an animal to be and how this relates to 
what a human is that the legacy of Aristotle’s politics and the so-called 
“anthropological foundation” of politics in the West can be effectively confronted, 
                                                     
227 See Wolfgang Kullmann, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in A Companion to Aristotle’s 
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and this relation between the human-animal distinction, art, and politics can be 
understood.   
I begin Chapter 4 with a discussion of the received wisdom on the human-
animal distinction in Aristotle’s day, examining how humans are seen to relate to 
animals in Homer, Hesiod, and three of the most prominent tragedians, before 
turning to Plato and his continuity with this tradition, which I call the world of 
poetic myth.  After arguing that despite Plato’s philosophical achievements, his 
dependence on certain poetic tropes serves to undermine his philosophy and 
confine him to the world of poetic myth, I turn in Chapter 5 to an examination of 
animals and humans in Aristotle’s biological works.  Here I reconstruct Aristotle’s 
account of the human-animal relation, first by identifying the myriad 
commonalities Aristotle finds between humans and other animals in terms of 
their psychic capacities, anatomical features, and even modes of life, giving some 
flesh to the idea that politics is not a uniquely human phenomenon.   
Following this look at the various points at which humans and other 
animals intersect, I turn to what Aristotle does understand to be uniquely human: 
namely, thought and the intellectual capacities dependent upon it.  I argue that 
the ways in which Aristotle sees human senses and bodies to differ from other 
animals ultimately depend upon the uniquely human capacity for thought.  I 
follow this with a closer look at human plurality, noting that not all humans are 
human in an equal sense, and might be seen as part of a natural hierarchy, where 
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some are much more animal than others.  However, the extent to which Aristotle 
will go in defining this hierarchy will ultimately include certain aesthetic features, 
thus contaminating this natural order with artifice.  For Aristotle, we will find, 
nature without art is unintelligible.  Just as Aristotle’s politics depend upon 
biology, so we will find that Aristotelian biology depends upon politics.   
In this way, I set out to challenge the ideas put forward by the thinkers 
examined in Part I, that is, the ideas of the posteriority of the human and the 
priority of art.  These ideas were found to be an attempt to reverse the trend in 
the history of western thought inaugurated by Aristotle, where art and politics are 
taken to be the expressions of human nature, an “anthropological invariant” that 
both enables and limits the possibilities inherent in each.  In demonstrating both 
that politics for Aristotle is not an exclusively human activity, and that Aristotle’s 
attempt to identify what is best and most distinctively human is ultimately 
dependent on art, we find that for Aristotle the “anthropological invariant” bound 
up with the possibilities of art and of politics is something more akin to a 
“zoological invariant,” that art and politics depend upon capacities that are 
shared with other animals, and that the human as distinct from the animal 
already to a significant extent depends upon art.  Consequently, the “reversal” 
that Nietzsche and Heidegger would accomplish and which the thinkers working 
within their legacies see themselves as advancing—that is, that art creates the 
human—depends upon a kind of “flattening” of Aristotle, one that would 
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downplay the continuity between humans and other animals while ignoring the 
role art plays in identifying what is unique in humans.  If Aristotle’s account can 
be shown to possess greater “volume” than the flat, one-dimensional reading 
offered by the aforementioned thinkers, then their “reversal” is without the force 
or consequences it was thought to have, and a rethinking of the human-animal 
distinction and its relation to politics and art requires another route.  
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Chapter Five:  
Humans and Animals in the World of Poetic Myth 
From Homer to the Tragedians 
Aristotle’s world is a world of poetic myth, where the received wisdom tending 
beyond the strictly practical is largely transmitted through the memorization and 
recitation of myths in poetic form.  Thus poets stand in an important position of 
authority on matters human, animal, and divine, and perhaps among them none 
stand taller than Homer.  Yet, if we use Homer as an example of received wisdom 
on the human-animal distinction, we will find that this distinction is conceived 
very differently than it is by Aristotle.  The large majority of references to animals 
in the Iliad and the Odyssey fall within four basic categories: 1) in comparisons 
that link an animal or animals with a person or place through a simile, metaphor, 
or title; 2) in prizes or goods; 3) in auguries; and 4) in accounts of sacrifices.  The 
references found in each of these categories illustrate the manner in which 
humans enter into particular relationships with animals, forging particular 
compositions of forces that serve to distinguish them from their fellows and so 
highlight their individuality, but in ways that transcend what we would 
understand as species barriers or the most common lines of categorization today.  
In terms of the first category, we find Menelaus, in attacking Paris, to be 
“thrilled/ like a lion lighting on some handsome carcass/ lucking to find an 
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antlered stag or wild goat/ just as hunger strikes.”229  Here the actions of 
Menelaus serve to bring him into proximity with the lion, a proximity which both 
serves to distinguish Menelaus from other Greeks while at once transforming 
Paris from his appearance as a god only moments before into no more than a 
hunted animal.  Likewise, Odysseus, through the mastery and command of his 
comrades, is described by Priam as a “thick-fleeced bellwether ram—/making his 
way through a big mass of sheep-flocks,”230 and the armies themselves are 
described variously as herds of goats, swarms of flies, or flocks of geese or 
cranes.231  Even in activities thought to be more specifically human than exercises 
of force or gathering in great numbers, humans are individuated in ways that 
bring them into close proximity with certain animals, such as the eloquent 
speakers described as being “clear as cicadas.”232  Humans who have long 
engaged in such acts of individual distinction come to attach themselves 
permanently to animals appropriate to these honors, as the titles of Agamemnon, 
“breaker of horses,” or Nestor, “the noble horseman,” bear witness.233  Lands too 
are distinguished in this manner: Homer writes of the war-like “stallion-land of 
Argos,” and the wealthy “Orchomenos rife with sheep,”234 among many others. 
                                                     
229 Homer, The Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1998), III.15ff. 
230 Il., III.190ff. 
231 Il., II.455-480. 
232 Il., III.145ff. 
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Yet we might note here a difference between the proximity to animals an 
individual exhibits in simile or metaphor, on the one hand, and in a title on the 
other.  That is, while Menelaus does not become an actual lion while stalking 
Paris, Agamemnon’s title “breaker of horses” could, and likely is, meant to refer 
to actual horses, and thus the proximity to animals these two examples display 
differ in terms of their reference: one to the image of an animal, the other to an 
animal actually possessed and at the disposal of the title-bearer. The difference 
between these two types of animal proximity can be understood in terms of the 
second category noted above: prizes and goods.  Animals and goods made of 
animal parts are frequently distributed to characters in Homer’s poems to honor 
them and their deeds.  For instance, among the gifts Agamemnon offers 
Achilles235 in his attempt to assuage the latter’s anger and restore his honor are 
lands “rich in sheep-flocks,/ rich in shambling cattle,”236 and likewise 
Agamemnon honors Ajax for fighting Hector like a lion or boar with the choice 
cuts of meat from a sacrificial ox.237   
Similarly, a distinguished Trojan archer’s bow is noted to have come from 
“the horn of a wild goat he’d shot in the chest,”238 and Paris’s godlike features are 
noted along with his leopard skin cloak,239 and similar goods are displayed or 
offered to Odysseus at various points in his travels.  In this way we might see the 
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role animals or their parts play as prizes as solidifying the tenuous proximity to 
animals established through deeds: in acting like a lion in battle one might be 
rewarded in cattle, and so after be known as a “lord of cattle.” Thus becoming like 
an animal in one’s deeds serves to distinguish one in a manner that one might 
win for oneself prizes that would establish the physical recognition of one’s 
“animality,” and so a more permanent identity with the animal in a personal title.  
The animality recognized in prizes and possessions signifies both mastery of 
animals, and through them, mastery of other men.  In both cases animals serve as 
markers of one’s status in relation to others, indicating the kind of person one is. 
Yet in entering into proximity with animals in such a way as to distinguish 
oneself among one’s peers as a master, one is also elevated above one’s peers, and 
enters into proximity with the divine.  Not only are great deeds frequently 
described as “godlike” by Homer, but we must note that the Greeks also invested 
considerable authority in auguries, thus reading divine import not only into the 
flight patterns of birds, but also the conflicts among different animals, as when a 
snake devouring a sparrow and her brood of eight is interpreted by the Greeks as 
a sign from Zeus that it will be nine years before they secure victory.240  Insofar as 
animals can be sent by gods, and divine judgments can be read into animal 
activities, and insofar as the ferocity of human conflicts can likewise be described 
metaphorically as the conflict between different animals, it might also be possible 
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to read these battles as a divine script, the duel itself becoming a kind of augury 
from which the favor of the gods might be ascertained.   
Indeed, Homer’s texts are rife with examples of victory and defeat being 
attributed directly to divine intervention, and divine intervention can even be 
responsible for the distinguishing proximity to animals noted above. Athena will 
show favor to Odysseus by “making him taller, more massive to all eyes” so that 
he might win honors in the contests organized by his hosts, the Phaeacians, and 
they might treat him with “kindness,/ awe and respect.”241  Likewise, Diomedes is 
granted divine enhancement fighting the Trojans: Diomedes is seized by a fury, 
becoming “claw-mad as a lion,” and proceeds to maul the Trojan “flocks,” 
invoking such awe that the Trojans become confused as to whether or not 
Diomedes is human or god.242  In this way, the proximity one might enter into 
with animals is at once a proximity to the gods—it is the gods that shine through 
the great deeds of men, especially where those deeds make them more like 
animals.   
Yet we must also note here the terror that marks the proximity of humans 
to gods and other animals in the world of poetic myth.  Diomedes in his fury 
attacks even Apollo, who admonishes him while intervening on the part of his 
adversary: “Think, Diomedes, shrink back now!/  Enough of this madness—
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striving with the gods./  We are not of the same breed, we never will be.”243  
Despite celebrating an individual’s efforts to imitate the gods, the Greeks were 
pointedly aware of the disaster brought in thinking oneself their equal.  Likewise, 
the possibility of being permanently transformed into an animal, not simply in 
attaching oneself to one as the marker of one’s status, brought equal terror, as in 
Odysseus’s episode with the witch Circe, who transforms his crew into various 
animals.244  In short, there needs to be some way of regulating the proximity to 
gods and animals humans attain through their individual deeds, and this way, 
this techne that humans will adopt to regulate their tenuous proximity with the 
divine, other animals, and each other, is sacrifice. 
Sacrifices serve a vital role in Homer’s poetico-mythic world.  While the 
sacrifices performed in the Iliad have an obvious enough narrative function—that 
is, to either transform or fortify the fortunes of the Greeks by paying the proper 
respect owed to the gods—the length at which Homer will often describe the 
sacrifices, from the opening rituals and prayers to details of the butchering itself, 
gives these passages a kind of didactic quality.245  Sacrifice extends beyond not 
only the practical concerns of slaughtering and butchering an animal for human 
consumption and divine offering, but as a kind of magic ritual, sacrifice 
transforms the living animal into consumable flesh.  Through the magic of 
sacrifice and the specificity of its procedures, humans conjure away their affinity 
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with other animals, demarcating the boundaries of human, animal, and divine 
that are continually blurred in the heroic deeds described above.   
Thus sacrifice stands opposed to the proximity human, animal, and god 
enter into through their deeds, serving to divide these figures in a way that 
establishes a community of those who sacrifice in opposition to those who are 
sacrificed and those who demand sacrifices.246  In this way the world of poetic 
myth would cope with the terror and anxiety of life lived in the midst of opaque 
and potentially hostile forces, wherein power—or at least prowess of some kind—
may serve to elevate one above one’s peers, or bring about enslavement and 
death.247  In detailing the proper procedures of sacrifice, Homer serves to teach 
his audience how to recognize, draw, and uphold the boundaries of human 
community.  For those who would ignore this ritual, Homer offers terrifying 
consequences. When Odysseus’s crew slaughters and consumes the cattle of the 
sun without observing the proper rites, the magical transformation from living 
animal to consumable flesh is botched: despite the cattle being dead, Homer 
claims their “hides began to crawl, the meat, both raw and roasted,/ bellowed out 
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247 Or as Heath writes, “the Greeks recognized and feared the possibility of animal-human fluidity.”  For 
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on the spits, and [they] heard a noise/ like the moan of lowing oxen.”248  The 
consumers of this polluted non-flesh, having failed to observe the ritual that 
properly separates the human from the animal and so establishes the human 
community, are cursed and ultimately destroyed. 
 In this way we might agree with MacIntyre when he writes, “a man in 
heroic society is what he does,”249 but with a twist: a “man” can make himself 
something other than a “man,” something super or subhuman, as the heroic 
deeds that serve to distinguish him from others and so constitute his individuality 
bring him into proximity with both animals and gods.  The heroic path is thus 
one that leads away from the merely human and its community, and the terror 
and anxiety of this situation is opposed by the institution of sacrifice, which seeks 
to establish the boundaries in which a human “is what he does,” a human 
community in which these deeds have sense.  This basic structure, the opposition 
between individual deeds that distinguish while threatening to efface, and the 
institution of community wherein the deeds have meaning but are consequently 
limited, their greatness leveled-off and made to march with those of others, is 
among the key constitutive relations in the world of poetic myth.  However, as I 
have attempted to show, this structure is bound up with the relation of humans to 
other animals.  That is, this dynamic of individual and community is mediated 
through human relations to animals: the individual allies himself with animals 
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through their imitation, acquisition, and domestication in order to set himself 
above others, at once occupying a position of favor with the gods, whereas the 
community destroys animals through sacrificial rites in order to establish a kind 
of basic equality between its members before these same gods.  Animals in this 
sense are symbols of individuality, and their lawful destruction the assertion of 
the rights of the community. 
 This same basic structure, along with the presentation of the human-
animal distinction found therein, runs through other important texts in the world 
of poetic myth and the received wisdom that shaped the world in which Aristotle 
philosophized.  For instance, Hesiod will also speak of “lion-hearted Achilles,” 
write of men as “swarms of bees clinging to cave roofs,” and compare a king and 
his subject to a hawk and a nightingale, all examples of humans entering into 
poetic proximity to animals and so distinguishing themselves through exertions 
of force or ability, either as perpetrators or victims.250  Auguries are also 
prevalent in Hesiod: they are woven into the very fabric of agricultural life. The 
patterns of animal life are connected to the gods who determine the weather, and 
in observing animals one then knows how to adjust one’s actions accordingly and 
so reap the god’s bounty.  In this way animals provide a kind of measure of 
human activity, and in synchronizing certain life patterns with them, humans can 
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secure good fortune for themselves.251  Yet there remains a limit to this 
regulation: the patterns of animals may reveal something of the gods’ intentions, 
but it is uniquely for humans to establish a community to live in their accord.  
Thus Hesiod will write that Zeus gave justice to humans, and that it is unknown 
among “the wild beasts and winged birds.”252  Entering into too close a proximity 
with animals is to forsake justice and the human community as it has been 
ordained by the gods. 
 This poetic proximity to animals and gods is also found among a number 
of the most well-known tragedies, especially in the work of Aeschylus.  
References to animals in the Oresteia are particularly plentiful: near the 
beginning of the Agamemnon, the brutality of the titular character’s act of 
sacrificing his own daughter like “a goat” is also read into the actions of eagles 
who kill and eat a pregnant hare, along with the unborn fetuses.  In like manner, 
this predatory animal striving will devour the house of Atreus.253  As in Homer, 
humans are brought into proximity with different animals according to the 
nature of their deeds, and Aeschylus will compare his characters to lions and 
wolves as they predate upon each other, oxen when they face death like a 
sacrificial offering or labor beneath the yoke of another,  and crows, cockerels and 
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hens when they flaunt their victories.254  Clytaemestra is repeatedly compared to 
a snake, and she herself dreams of giving birth to a snake, an omen foretelling 
that her son Orestes will also prove her murderer.255  Moreover, the chthonic laws 
transgressed in the murder of his mother will awaken a curse that Clytaemestra 
claims will, “like dogs,” follow after Orestes and “drag [him] down.”256  Indeed, 
hunting is a frequently appearing symbol in the plays, stripping the hunted of 
their humanity as the hunter enters into proximity with a predatory animal: the 
tapestries Clytaesmestra convinces Agamemnon to trample and so commit hubris 
are referred to as the “net” that “ensnared” him like a “beast,”257 and Orestes will 
then hunt down his mother and her fellow conspirator, Aegisthus, only to be 
hunted in turn by the Furies, who are frequently compared to the hounds of 
Clytaemestra’s curse.258 
 Though these kinds of metaphors appear far less frequently in Sophocles 
and Euripides, we still find both these tragedians making use of the Homeric 
human-animal distinction.  In Euripides’s The Trojan Women, Hecuba will 
compare herself to a bird, and, enslaved to Odysseus, describe her new master as 
a “brute, murderous beast,” and Andromache will extol “the young mare torn 
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Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 247-9; 994; 527; 928; 1046-7. 
256 Aeschylus, “The Libation Bearers,” 924. 
257 Aeschylus, “The Libation Bearers,” 493. Cf. 997-9. 
258 Aeschylus, “The Eumenides,” in Greek Tragedies Vol.3, trans. Richmond Lattimore, eds. David Greene 
and Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 131-2; 147-8; 221; 231; 247-8. For 
development of this relation between the Furies and animal metaphors, along with the logic of sacrifice 
dictating their final agreement with Athena, see Stefan Dolgert, “Sacrificing Justice: Suffering Animals, 
The Oresteia, and the Masks of Consent,” Political Theory 40.3 (2012): 263-289.  
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from her running mate” that “will not easily wear the yoke,” unlike “a brute and 
speechless beast of burden.”259  Even Sophocles, perhaps the poet most directly 
concerned with “the human” among the great tragedians,260 and who generally 
avoids such poetic animal metaphors,261 will reproduce the basic structure in 
which we found humans to enter into particular proximity with animals as an 
effect of their deeds.  The famed choral ode in Antigone “praising” the human 
being as the most deinos—the most “wonderful” or terrible and fearful—whose 
power and cunning make possible the great deeds that serve to distinguish 
humans from other animals, are what the play demonstrates to be impossible 
through individual action.   
It is precisely Creon and Antigone’s attempts at self-reliance, their 
attempts to set themselves above the human community in their extreme deeds, 
which seal their fate and demand sacrifice.  Antigone is said to have “the savage 
spirit of a savage father,” and this savage inability to “know/ how to yield to 
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trouble” is shared by Creon.262  Both Antigone and Creon, in placing themselves 
above the community, bring themselves into proximity with the wild animals who 
supposedly know no community—only sacrifice can re-establish the human 
community their deeds would destroy, and this sacrifice is made with the lives of 
Creon’s son Haemon, and Antigone herself.  Thus, even in Sophocles, the great 
poet of human awakening, we find that the human to be perched precariously 
between god and animal: only through the community established in sacrifice is 
human life distinct from others in anything like a continuous or dependable 
sense.  
Thus we find a certain way of understanding the human-animal 
distinction articulated in the Homeric epics to be reproduced in a number of the 
other major poets that shaped the received wisdom of Aristotle’s age.  Yet it is 
worth noting here: though Aristotle may have been known among European 
scholars in the Middle Ages as “The Philosopher,” unlike a goddess in the world 
of poetic myth, Aristotle did not spring, fully-formed, from the head of Zeus.  
That is, while we will find Aristotle’s account of the human-animal distinction to 
differ markedly from that of the world of poetic myth, this should not suggest 
that Aristotle stands utterly alone in this endeavor, without philosophical 
progenitors. Though a thorough examination of these progenitors is beyond the 
                                                     
262 Sophocles, “Antigone,” in Greek Tragedies Vol.1, lines 515-7.  Honig interestingly captures the way in 
which each of these characters is out of step with the community in her discussion of Creon’s “conspiracy” 
with democracy and the aristocratic underpinnings of Antigone’s rebellion.  See Antigone Interrupted, 
Ch.4. 
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scope of the present work, it is worth making note of the human-animal 
distinction as it appears in some of the major political works of Aristotle’s most 
famous mentor: Plato. 
 
Plato the Tragedian? 
While barring poets from the ideal city he constructs in the Republic is perhaps 
Plato’s most well-known act with respect to the arts, Plato’s own poetic prowess 
has not gone unnoticed by his commentators: indeed, it is now widely believed 
that Plato entertained the ambition of becoming a poet in his youth, and some 
have even gone as far as to refer to the Republic as “the last Greek tragedy.”263  
Additionally, it has also been held that part of Plato’s philosophical intention, at 
least in the Republic, was to “expel the Homeric inheritance from the city-
state.”264  Yet, from the perspective of how the human-animal distinction was 
understood in the Greek world of poetic myth, that is, a perspective from which 
there is little substantial difference between Homer and the tragedians, is it 
possible for Plato to be both anti-Homer and the last tragedian?  And if so, what 
becomes of Plato’s conception of the human-animal distinction—will he reject 
this aspect of the inherited wisdom of his day, or affirm it in some manner?  In 
the following I will argue that while Plato’s philosophy is not entirely continuous 
with the world of poetic myth, it nevertheless remains deeply embedded in its 
                                                     
263 J. Peter Euben, Tragedy and Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 269. 
264 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 131. 
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terms.  Though Plato advances a conception of justice that might represent a 
rupture within this world, Plato will remain drifting among its flotsam.  In this 
sense Plato is a kind of philosophical Robinson Crusoe: his insights, like Crusoe’s 
voyage, open up the possibility of a new world, a new beginning, though rather 
than pursing this possibility he instead continues to think through the debris 
salvaged from the world of poetic myth.  Plato thus articulates an idea of the 
relation between humans and animals that remains continuous with the world of 
poetic myth in many respects, even if this relation now finds itself beneath a new 
sun. 
 Plato is routinely taken to stand at the head of the Western tradition of 
political thought as a kind of founding father, with Whitehead’s famous, though 
perhaps now cliché statement, that all philosophy is but a footnote to Plato, being 
perhaps the most exaggerated instance of this trend.  While there is good reason 
to see Plato as representing the dawning of something new in the history of 
Western thought, we must at once be careful not to overlook important 
continuities between Plato and his own forbearers, in particular those responsible 
for weaving the fabric of what I have called the world of poetic myth above.  For 
instance, Nussbaum argues that the Platonic dialogues are a kind of “anti-tragic 
theater”: Plato appropriates different “tragic models” of staging the action in his 
dialogues, yet eschews the rhythm and other artful accoutrements of poetic 
speech, adopting instead a flat, didactic tone in order to artfully repudiate 
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artfulness, to appeal to the intellect and not the emotions.  In so doing, Plato 
“creates a new kind of writing.”265  Yet might the continuities between Homer, the 
tragedians, and Plato’s “anti-tragic theater” be even stronger than Nussbaum 
claims?  Is it not a little odd to praise the creator of some of the most arresting 
poetic images in Western political thought (the Cave, the Line, the Sun, and all 
those animals, to which we will attend in a moment) for his dry, calculated prose, 
the “didactic flatness,” which Nussbaum claims is also found in the philosophical 
tradition that predates Plato?266  Perhaps certain elements of the Homeric and 
tragic traditions—like the Heraclitan world, in Deleuze’s claim—still growl within 
Platonism, “like an animal in the process of being tamed.”267  And if they do, if 
elements of the world of poetic myth remain prominent in Plato’s thought, might 
this change how we understand Plato to be related to the philosophy of his 
forbearers? 
Aristotle, for one, sees a great deal of continuity between Plato and what 
we now call “pre-Socratic” philosophy.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that 
Plato held throughout his life the view that all sensible things (aistheton) remain 
in a perpetual state of flux, a view he adopted from Cratylus and Heraclitus early 
in his life.  Aristotle sees Platonic philosophy as basically a fusion of this doctrine 
of the perpetual flux of nature with Socratic ethical thought: Plato held that the 
universal (katholou) that Socrates sought through his ethical questioning did 
                                                     
265  Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 122-131. 
266 Ibid., 128. 
267 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 59. 
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indeed exist, but not in the natural world of sensible objects, which remains 
constantly changing and unstable.  Rather, the universal was to be found beyond 
the sensible world, in what Plato called Ideas.  However, for Aristotle even this 
fusion was not entirely original. Aristotle claims a close affinity between Plato 
and the Pythagorean doctrine that held the sensible world to be an imitation 
(mimesei) of numbers. Where Plato differs from Pythagoras, according to 
Aristotle, is in how the Ideas and the sensible world relate: sensible objects do not 
for Plato imitate the Ideas, like they do numbers for Pythagoras, but rather 
sensible objects exist by virtue of their participation (methexin) in the Ideas.  The 
originality of Plato thus consists in changing the way in which universals and 
particulars relate, from the Pythagorean mimesis to the Platonic methexis.268  
While there is not space here to dispute the details of Aristotle’s perhaps less than 
charitable reading of Plato and his relative importance in the history of 
philosophy, nor the significance of the transformation from one poetic and 
theatrical mode of relating universal and particular to another,269 what must be 
gleaned from this presentation is the perceived closeness of Plato to the doctrines 
of nature held by certain pre-Socratic philosophers.  From this we might expect 
Plato to reject the structure of the human-animal distinction found in the world 
of poetic myth and instead present a view much closer to those found among the 
natural philosophers, but this is not exactly the case. 
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The view expressed by natural philosophers such as Cratylus and 
Heraclitus that nature is in a constant state of change, where objects ceaselessly 
come into being and pass away, suggests a continuity between human and animal 
life independent of the deeds that characterize their relation in Homer and the 
tragedians.  That is, on this view what makes humans and animals alike is their 
common membership in the natural world, their participation in this state of flux, 
not so much their individual activities and their place in the socio-political world.  
This common membership in the natural world, together with the view that this 
natural world is one of perpetual change, makes it possible to theorize that 
humans are not just closely related to other animals, but may have been much 
more like them at some point in the distant past.  Indeed, Anaximander of 
Miletus claims that given the prolonged period of “nursing” humans require, they 
could not possibly have survived had they come into the world as they presently 
are, but must have been more like some other animal.  Anaximander posits that 
living creatures “came into being from moisture evaporated by the sun,” enclosed 
in “thorny barks,” which they shed as they came out of the water and onto land.  
The first humans were similarly sheltered by fish-like creatures, which they shed 
like shells when they came onto dry land.270  Plato never engages in this kind of 
natural philosophy, nor does he give a similar account in his major political 
works, though the question of human origins is broached repeatedly.  Rather, 
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Plato’s characters speak of these origins in the terms of the world of poetic myth, 
of a world where humans are linked to other animals and gods through the deeds 
they perform, and their consequent place in the socio-political order.  
 Plato’s Republic is rife with references to animals, and notably, 
comparisons between humans and different kinds of animals.  Plato’s characters 
routinely compare political rule to sheep-rearing,271 and political education to the 
training of horses and hounds.272  The first city he constructs along with his 
interlocutors is dismissed as a “city of pigs,”273 while the insatiability of human 
appetites are frequently considered bestial, as is democracy more generally, 
which Plato compares to a “great and multiform beast.”274  Although Saxonhouse 
has argued that Plato’s use of animal metaphors is intended to be comedic, a kind 
of parody of Aristophanes illustrating the undesirability of the Kallipolis as a 
political regime,275 I see Plato’s use of animal metaphors here as continuous with 
those found in Homer and the tragedians examined above, making Plato’s 
understanding of the human-animal distinction consistent with that espoused in 
the world of poetic myth. Saxonhouse takes particular issue with the comparison 
Socrates makes between the guardians (or, strictly speaking, those who will be 
                                                     
271 See, for example, Republic (Rep), 345d. Cf. Plato’s Statesman, 262d; 275b; 275d. 
272 Rep., 335b; 342c; 375a ff; 404a; 459b; Statesman 267d. 
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274 Rep., 590a. 
275 Arlene W. Saxonhouse, “Comedy in Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the Republic,” The American 
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Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic, 1991), 380ff, and Leon Harold Craig, The War 
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auxiliaries) and hounds, especially as puppies, which she takes to be a metaphor 
intended to invoke laughter and even ridicule: there is no possible way Socrates 
could be serious when he claims that dogs are philosophical,276 nor can this 
comparison be seen as continuous with the animal metaphors used by Homer to 
describe Greek heroes.  Achilles and Hector were compared to wild animals—
ferocious beasts—not the domesticated variety used to describe “Socrates’ new 
breed of men.”277    
Yet this is not entirely true, for as we have seen, both hounds and horses 
were held to have aristocratic associations in Ancient Greek society.  Keeping and 
raising horses, along with hounds bred for hunting and certain kinds of birds, 
were the particular pastimes of the wealthy and leisured warrior class.  Proximity 
to these animals indicates the kind of person one is: a master of both animals and 
of other men, distinguished from the many as an important figure in the 
community, and favored among the gods.  Even where “dog” can be said to have 
negative connotations, perhaps most famously when Achilles insults Agamemnon 
by referring to his “dog’s eyes” along with his “fawn’s heart,”278 evidently to 
indicate the latter’s slavish dependence and cowardice, this should not lead us to 
the conclusion that a dog would be an inappropriate animal for auxiliaries to take 
as their model.   
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278 Il., I. 223-225.  Socrates mentions this line at Rep., 389e. 
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Recall that the role of the auxiliaries in the Kallipolis, and arguably, even 
that of the philosopher king, is a supporting role: their prominence in its political 
organization is not so that they might rule simply in their own interest—which 
would allow them to prey upon the sheep as wolves, not dogs—but in the interest 
of the Idea of justice. This Idea, irreducible to its actual manifestations in the 
sensible world, is thus likewise beyond all the machinations of power that 
characterize politics in the sensible world, though it is supposedly approximated 
as closely as is possible in the laws of Kallipolis.  In order to rule according to the 
Idea of justice, the city requires not lions or other ferocious creatures, such as 
Homeric or tragic heroes, but well-bred and trained dogs to serve in utter 
devotion, “like sleepless hounds […] who have the keenest possible sight and 
hearing.”279   
This idea that rulers ought themselves to be devoted to their city to the 
point of being its slaves, like trained hounds, is not unique to the Republic among 
Plato’s major political works.  In fact, in Plato’s Laws, the Athenian stranger 
claims that destruction will surely befall any city where “the law itself is ruled 
over”; consequently, the surest way for a city to flourish is for its rulers to be 
“slaves of the law.”280  Later in the text the Athenian will claim that one can only 
be a “praiseworthy master” if one has first been a slave, speaking of “noble 
                                                     
279 Rep., 404a10-11. English citations of the Republic refer Plato: Republic, trans. C.D.C. Reeve 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004) unless otherwise noted.  
280 Laws, 715d. English citations refer to The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (New York: Basic, 
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enslavement”: first to the laws, “which is really an enslavement to the gods,” and 
then to those perhaps most godlike among humans, namely one’s elders, and 
those “who have lived honorable lives.”281   
This “noble enslavement” may be thought to mimic life in the age of 
Kronos, a myth Plato has his philosopher relate in both the Laws and the 
Statesman.  According to both the Athenian and Eleatic strangers, preceding the 
present age of Zeus was the age of Kronos, wherein the god portioned out the 
earth into regions of governance, where each species of animal was assigned a 
daemon to be its shepherd.  Humans were no exception, and likewise were ruled 
over by daemons, who, superior to humans, ruled “in a way that provided much 
ease both for them and or us,” providing “peace and awe and good laws and 
justice without stint.”282  If the best political regime is to invoke something of the 
peace and justice of divine rule found in the lost age of Kronos, it must establish 
laws that most closely approximate the rule of a divine shepherd, and nothing is 
more useful to a shepherd than a well-trained hound.283 
 Like the roles played by animals in Homer and the tragedians, the rulers of 
the Kallipolis are to imitate the hound in order to orient themselves toward the 
                                                     
281 Laws, 762e.  Cf. Laws 906b-c, where the Athenian speaks metaphorically of “the highest masters” of the 
city being dogs or shepherds, just as in the Republic. 
282 Statesman, 271d, e; 272a; Laws, 713d,e.  English citations from the Statesman refer to Statesman, trans. 
J.B. Skemp, ed. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979). 
283 While Socrates makes the comparison of a person listening to reason to “a dog being called to heel by a 
shepherd” (Rep., 440d), thus placing reason (logos) itself in the role of shepherd, Glaucon equates the 
shepherd to whom the auxiliaries will behave as “obedient sheepdogs” with  the rulers, men who are like 
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gods in the appropriate fashion, and so distinguish themselves from the other 
denizens of their political community.  In so doing they differentiate themselves 
from wolves like Thrasymachus,284 who claims justice is not divine, that it is 
nothing more than a word used by the powerful to sanction that power and so 
advance their own interests, which, as wolves, means to devour the goods of the 
city.285  Likewise it is to differentiate themselves from pigs, whose city is indeed 
laughable to Socrates’ honor-loving interlocutors, and perhaps justifiably so, 
given its lack not only of the markers of aristocratic status, but also of philosophy 
and hence knowledge and justice: Socrates will later describe the soul that “bears 
its ignorance easily,” as wallowing in this ignorance “like a pig.”286  Pigs, like 
sheep or “stingless drones,”287 are like wolves or lions in that they pursue their 
own interests at the expense of others, their difference lies only in that they lack 
the strength of these predatory animals, and so are insufficiently powerful to 
                                                     
284 Rep., 336d. 
285 At Laws, 906c-d, the Athenian also speaks of “wolves” being impious in a similar manner: that is, of 
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numerous negative references appear throughout the Republic.  Cf. Hesiod, Works and Days, 304-5, which 
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accomplish their aims.  It is for this reason that they prove unfit models for the 
guardians: guardians must not only be slaves to their city’s laws, but they must be 
strong enough to uphold them.  Socrates’ question in the Republic of who “would 
choose to fight hard, lean hounds, rather than […] fighting fat and tender sheep?” 
seems to resonate with the Athenian stranger’s unsympathetic statement in the 
Laws that, “it’s appropriate that an idle, soft-spirited, and fattened animal 
usually is ravaged by one of those other animals who have been worn very hard 
with courage and labors.”288   
It is for this reason that democracy appears so dangerous to Plato, for it 
combines all the “fattened animals” whose desires would normally be kept in 
check by their individual weakness, often also enlisting the help of wolves and 
lions—would-be tyrants—to create a “multifarious beast” threatening the peace 
and justice of the city with its “bestial” desires.289  Though the Platonic justice 
towards which Socrates gestures is irreducible to the interests of power, 
ensconced within the vantage point of poetic myth, Plato cannot imagine this 
justice could ever exist in the sensible world without it, and this antinomy—
between the Idea of justice and its real actualization —is the problem to which 
Plato’s hounds would be the solution.  Insofar as all crafts aim at the good of the 
other, and justice is itself a craft, it too must aim at the good of the other—all the 
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others, the good of the whole political community.290  Only well-trained hounds, 
obedient to the laws, are capable of grasping this well enough to defend it, and it 
is for this reason Socrates considers them philosophical.   
Not only does philosophical training serve to distinguish the guardians 
from the “other animals” that make up the city, but it also attempts to absorb the 
role sacrifice played in the world of poetic myth: that is, as the ritual that serves 
to establish a community by drawing a definite distinction between gods, 
humans, and animals.  In the Statesman, the Eleatic stranger teaches the young 
Socrates that making the correct distinction between entities—the groundwork 
for their just ordering—is akin to carving an animal for sacrifice: that is, carving it 
according to its “natural divisions.”291  If philosophy serves to distinguish some 
from others, like the deeds of Homeric and tragic heroes, and also serves to 
define the divisions that make up the community, as did sacrifice, then the 
tension between these two collapses, and the relations of domination established 
in heroic deeds become more firmly established in the political order.  
 While the idea of justice being the good of the other irreducible to power is 
Plato’s own unique discovery, his utilization of the received terms of the world of 
poetic myth, entangled as they are with the machinations of power and 
domination, ultimately serves to obscure the other to whom good is due, and so 
undermine the cause of justice.   That is, insofar as Plato retains the ideas 
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concerning the human-animal distinction of Homer and the tragedians, ideas 
that we have seen involve humans coming into proximity with certain animals 
according to their respective places in relationships of domination, he takes with 
the right hand what he has given with the left: the possibility of a justice beyond 
the interests of power.  Caught in a theater of power where the only available 
roles are dominator and dominated, Plato lapses back into a “second best 
position,” the warrior ethic espoused by Polemarchus at the beginning of the 
dialogue, and that Socrates had labored so extensively, though ultimately in vain, 
to refute: that justice means doing good to friends and harm to enemies.  Plato’s 
philosophical ordering of the terms of the world of poetic myth, despite opening 
up a window from which something new might be glimpsed, serves ultimately to 
make the terms “friend” and “enemy” less fluid than they had previously been, 
perpetuating the rule of one at the expense of the other. 
 It is in this light that we must return to Aristotle, and his path breaking 
studies of animals.  Aristotle’s interest in biology, taken in the context of the 
received wisdom on how humans relate to other animals in the world of poetic 
myth, and Plato’s use of these terms in his philosophical reflections on justice, 
represents a way of turning to the other, to an understanding of the friend to 
whom good is due.  Aristotle, we shall see, takes up Plato’s notion of justice as the 
good of the other, but goes beyond him in trying to shake himself free also of the 
world of poetic myth, by turning to the natural world and attempting to provide 
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an account of all these animals who circulate as currency in games of political 
power and domination.  In attempting to provide an account of these animals in 
their independence from poetic metaphor, Aristotle would alter the course of 
their circulation in these games.  If “the human being” is indeed “by nature a 
political animal,” then Aristotle’s attempt to grasp what an animal really is can 
only be seen as a profoundly political endeavor, one that offers the possibility of 
redefining the limits of politics and what is understood to be justice.  To this 
endeavor, then, I presently turn, and attempt to follow Aristotle in his manner of 
accounting for the animal—or as we should really say, animals—in all their 
manifest plurality. 
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Chapter Six: What is an Animal?  
Aristotle on Human Animality 
 
To grasp what Aristotle understands to be an animal, I will here focus on his 
biological and zoological writings, bracketing for the present his comments on 
animals in his explicitly political works.  In this section I will pay particular 
attention to the manner in which what Aristotle has to say about animals also 
applies to humans, thus examining what I call “human animality.”  Human 
animality is the intersection between what Aristotle takes to be particular to 
animals, and yet also holds for humans, from their souls and their capacities, to 
the structure of their bodies, movements, and the shape of their internal organs.  
I will begin by giving an account of these similarities, both in terms of the 
generalities that both humans and other animals can be seen to fall under, and in 
terms of the particular similarities between humans and certain animals that 
serve to make them alike.  I will then examine in more detail the shared psychic 
capacities that support the kinds of life activities that seem to make politics 
possible, in order to elaborate upon the idea that humans are not for Aristotle the 
only political animals.  
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From the Soul to the Body   
Unlike the human-animal distinction as it is found in the world of poetic myth, 
where specific humans and certain animals enter into proximity according to 
human deeds, Aristotle attempts to grasp what lies behind these deeds, and so 
understand what relates humans and animals at a more fundamental level.  For 
Aristotle, this means looking to what is not just the origin of these deeds as 
movements, but to the life that makes it possible for one to accomplish a deed in 
the first place: one’s soul.  “The soul,” Aristotle writes, “is in some sense the 
principle [arche] of animal life.”292  For Aristotle, the soul (psuche) is both the 
animal’s origin and animating principle, without which it would not be an animal 
at all, but a mere likeness, like an animal sculpted in stone.293  Yet even if its soul 
is what makes an animal what it is, the quality of being ensouled is not particular 
to it alone: for “the principle [arche] found in plants is also a kind of soul.”294  
Soul is thus the common origin of both plant and animal—it is what makes them 
what they are, and what must be studied if one is to understand what it is they are 
and how they are.295  Given the great variety of plant and animal life, however, if 
the soul really is responsible for making living things what they are there must be 
more than one kind of soul, or at least, multiple parts within the soul, in order to 
account for these differences. To this end Aristotle lists five “psychic powers,” or 
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potentials of the soul (dunameon tes psuches): the nutritive, the appetitive or 
desiring (orexis), the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking.296   
While the nutritive and the sensory are passive or receptive powers that 
require external movement in order to be actualized, the appetitive and 
locomotive powers concern movement originating with the organism.297  As the 
organisms commonly called animals are seen to move about and pursue different 
objects relevant to their lives, it is clear to Aristotle that they possess both the 
powers of locomotion and desire.  However, Aristotle holds that an animal is not 
capable of desire without imagination (phantasias), and all imagination is either 
calculative (logistike) or sensitive (aisthetike).298  Insofar as all animals, in order 
to be animals, have a share in desire, they must also have a share in either 
calculation or sensation, and as Aristotle holds that all animals do not have a 
share in calculation,299 they must then have a share in sensation.  In this way, 
sensation (aisthesis) becomes the point at which an animal can be differentiated 
from a plant, for in possessing a sensitive soul (aisthetikes psuches) the animal is 
open to the world in a way the plant is not, for it is able to receive the stamp of 
sensible objects and their movements and respond accordingly.  Sensation 
structures desire, and desire drives movement, and thus the particular way in 
which an animal is animated is owing in large part to sensation.  Thus animals 
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are first and foremost sensory creatures,300 and the structure of their senses will 
play an enormous role in determining how they live. 
 While all animals possess a soul with the power of sensation, the 
organization of sensation is not identical among them. The sensory powers of the 
soul are embodied in the wide variety of sensory organs possessed by different 
animals, of which the sense of touch is held by Aristotle to be the most common, 
for while certain animals may not possess eyes, ears, nose, or mouth, they all 
must necessarily possess bodies.  As touch requires only a body, Aristotle calls it 
the most corporal (somatodes) of the senses, the base-sense shared by all animals 
and for which the varied parts of animal bodies exist.301 While the potentials of 
the soul are only actualized in matter as they are organized in a body—that is, the 
actuality of the soul is found through the body—the body in relation to the soul is 
only potential: the soul is the actuality (entelecheia) of the potential for life of a 
body.302  Thus the unity of the life and habits of a given animal—its actuality—is 
the product of the way in which sensation, appetite, and movement have served 
to shape and be limited by the matter distributed its soul by nature.303  Or in 
other words, the actuality of the animal is the result of the way in which the soul 
                                                     
300 OS, II.2 413b2-3; III.11 434a6; Sens., 1, 436b12; On Sleep, 1, 454b25; OYOA, I. 467b24; GA, II.5, 
741a8ff; V.1 778b33-34.   An interesting account of locomotion (kinesis) as the prime differentiator 
between plant and animal is given by Nederman; however, his account neglects the central role Aristotle 
reserves for aisthesis as I have described it.  See Cary J. Nederman, “The Puzzle of the Political Animal: 
Nature and Artifice in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” The Review of Politics 56.2 (1994), 288.  
301 PA, II.8, 653b29-31; 653b24; OS, II.2, 413b4; HA, I.3, 489a17. 
302 OS, II.1, 412a20ff. 
303 PA, I.1 642a10-13; I.5, 645b15-20.  For further discussion of the way in which the matter must be 
appropriate to the given activity of the soul, see Stephen Everson, “Psychology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 174. 
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specific to that kind of animal intersects with matter, shaping the matter into the 
support for the activity that makes that soul the kind of soul that it is.304  Yet 
while in this sense animals must possess the bodies appropriate to the powers of 
their different souls, insofar as this process is common to all animals, a variety of 
similarities and intersections between species emerge. 
 For instance, Aristotle holds that all animals have a front and a back 
distinguished according to sense, the front part being the part of the animal 
through which it receives its sensations. For animals possessed of movement, a 
further distinction can be made between left and right, the right being the part 
from which Aristotle claims movement to originate.305  “Perfectly formed animals 
[teleia ton zoon]”, that is, animals which have managed to completely shape their 
matter to the ends of their specific kind of soul, are divided into another three 
parts: one for taking in nourishment, one for evacuating excrement, and an 
intermediate region between these two.306  This intermediate region serves as the 
seat of both sensation and movement for the rest of the body. As all animals 
capable of moving themselves have at least four points of motion,307 the limbs of 
quadrupeds can be seen to be in an analogical relationship to those of humans: 
Aristotle notes that the front and back parts of humans correspond to the bottom 
and top parts in quadrupeds, and that the bones of forelegs in quadrupeds even 
                                                     
304 Or as Lloyd writes: “For Aristotle matter or the material is what is informed”; that is, without soul to 
give it shape, matter is “indeterminate.”  See Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations, 69. 
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resemble the bones in human arms.308  Nevertheless, humans are not 
quadrupeds, but bipeds, standing upright with what Aristotle calls their “superior 
[ano]” parts corresponding to the superior (ano) part of the universe, the 
heavens.309  Yet even here, where Aristotle’s other philosophical, and even 
theological, convictions begin to seep through his empirical observations more 
clearly, he does not hesitate to note that humans share this characteristic with 
birds, who likewise stand bipedal and heavenwards.310  Moreover, birds also 
possess tongues capable of being used to communicate, and some birds so much 
so that they appear to impart instruction (mathesin) to one another, much like 
humans.311  In this manner, Aristotle relates humans to other animals more 
specifically—not simply in terms of larger conceptual categories, such as biped, 
but more immediately, in terms of their similar or analogous body parts that on 
their own do not yet constitute such a category. 
 Thus while under conceptual categories like “viviparous” the human is 
related to species as diverse as horses, different kinds of cattle, dolphins, and 
whales,312 the fact of shedding teeth brings humans into proximity with still other 
animals, such as the horse, the mule, and the ass.313  The appearance of the 
human face, along with the shape and position of its ears, nostrils, and teeth, 
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309 Prog., 5, 706b4-5. 
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bring it into close proximity with the ape, as do its arms, hands, and nails.  The 
sexual organs of female apes also resemble those of human females, though 
Aristotle considers the sexual organs of male apes to be more like those of dogs 
than human males.314  Similarly, through diversity of eye color, humans enter 
into proximity with the horse, which unlike other animals excepting certain 
humans, will even occasionally have eyes of different colors.315  Of course, these 
different sets of relations are not mutually exclusive, and virtually any identifiable 
commonality between species can potentially be used to group together otherwise 
very different animals if deemed useful.  The point here rather is to recognize the 
complex array of relations in which Aristotle situates the human being as an 
animal related to other animals.  As conceptual lines crisscross and overlap, 
humans move into closer proximity with some animals and become further from 
others, while from another perspective different commonalities emerge.   
 Likewise is the case with internal organs, for as Aristotle notes: “the inner 
parts of man are to a very great extent unknown, and the consequence is that we 
must have recourse to an examination of the inner parts of other animals whose 
nature in any way resembles that of man.”316  Thus the bodily resemblances that 
brought humans into proximity with certain animals are here taken, along with 
the concept of the human as a kind of animal, as the basis for an extension of this 
analogical relationship between humans and other animals. That is, knowledge of 
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other animals can be taken to fill lacunae in knowledge of humans insofar as the 
human is a kind of animal and can be shown to be similar to other animals with 
respect to certain relevant particularities—in this case, bodily particularities.  
Thus the human proximity to the ape found in the shape of their features and the 
structure of their limbs continues to the internal organs, which are found—in this 
case, under dissection—to correspond to human organs,317 while from the organs 
themselves spring a host of animal relations.  Like other animals with teeth in 
both jaws, such as the pig, the dog, the bear, the lion, and the wolf, the human 
has only one stomach, and that stomach resembles that of the dog, while the 
lower part of the gut is like that of the pig, as is the shape of the human spleen, 
while the human liver resembles instead that of the ox. The human womb, like all 
bipeds or viviparous quadrupeds such as the dog, the pig, the horse, the ox, and 
all horned animals, is situated below the midriff.318   
Beyond the specific animals bound in this network of relations, Aristotle 
argues that the heart (or in bloodless animals, its analogue), placed as it is in the 
intermediate region of the body, is the first principle (arche) of the natural body, 
and likewise the origin (arche) of both sensation and movement.319  While blood 
                                                     
317 HA, II.9, 502b24-26.  This analogical relationship between humans and other animals seems also to have 
been a practical one.  That is, according to Lloyd, dissection of human bodies in antiquity “was only 
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is the most common of animal parts, followed by lymph and fibre, and then flesh 
and bone, these are developed from the heart outwards, as it is the origin of 
sensation and movement, and also, the seat of vital heat or breath (pneuma).320  
Animals develop brains soon after, in order to cool and regulate the heat 
emanating from the heart.321  In this way, different animal bodies are different 
gradations of heat: the powers of a given animal soul find expression in the 
material of the heart, from which sensation and movement spring, giving shape 
to the rest of the body and its organs according to the movement of the body and 
the heat produced therein.  If the body cools beyond a given point, it is no longer 
capable of undertaking its vital activities; if the body is starved of the nutrients 
necessary to feed this heat, it consumes itself.322   
And so in this way Aristotle demonstrates the animality of the human from 
above and from below.  From “above,” the human body is brought into proximity 
to the general concept of “animal” insofar as its vital activities conform to those 
that Aristotle can define in general terms, and from “below” in terms of the 
similarities between human and other animal bodies that serve to bring the 
human into proximity with other specific animals. Thus, the human being is an 
animal in that it possesses an animal body: both in general, and in particular.  
Yet, this is not to suggest that for Aristotle the human being is simply an ape with 
the eyes of a horse and the tongue of a songbird.  As shown above, animal bodies 
                                                     
320 HA, III.2, 511b1-10; GA, II.6, 743b25-31; MA, 10, 703a14-15. 
321 PA, II.7, 652b26-27.  
322 OYOA, 23.17, 478b32-33; LSL, 5, 466b29-33. 
 
 
151 
are not for Aristotle static objects, nor do their various parts and organs 
determine their activity.  Rather, an animal comes to be what it is as the 
actualization of its soul, and the soul is itself life activity.  Consequently, in order 
to grasp what it really means for Aristotle to call the human a kind of animal, we 
must also examine what kind of activities humans and animals have in common, 
not in the sense where humans imitate different animals in great and exceptional 
deeds, but in the life activities that serve to define what each are in their 
individual lives. Grasping this necessarily involves another look at the common 
psychic potentials of humans and other animals. 
 
Life Activity, Psychic Potential, and Politics 
The soul is life activity, and this activity finds actualization through a material 
body, whose potential is to live, but can only do so through the actuality of the 
soul.  The actualization of the activity of the soul through the body means for 
Aristotle that all affections of the soul (e.g. anger, courage, fear, joy) involve 
corresponding affections (pathe) of the body, and should thus be understood to 
be bound to certain ways of moving the body, and thus inseparable from the 
natural matter that supports these bodily movements.323  Thus where bodies 
share similar movements and have similar organs, so they will tend to share 
similar characteristics or qualities.  In this way Aristotle links the similarities 
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between the bodies of humans and other animals noted above with 
characteristics such as courage (andria) or high spiritedness (thumoi), noting 
that humans differ from other animals in these respects more in terms of degree 
than in the characteristic itself.  Even characteristics like wisdom (sophia) or the 
capacity to engage in a craft (techne)—or at least something analogous to them—
are said to be shared by animals.  Thus while Aristotle holds the natural world to 
be ordered along a kind of ascending scale, from the lifeless toward plants and 
then animals, this scale moves by such subtle degrees that it is sometimes 
impossible to determine exactly where a given natural object is situated relative 
to larger categories, i.e. whether it be plant or animal, let alone what kind of 
animal.324 
 The human being, like other animals, is possessed of a soul with the 
powers of sensation, desire, and movement.  The various sources of an animal’s 
movement can be reduced to either desire (orexin) or thought (noun), and as only 
the human among animals is considered by Aristotle to be possessed of thought, 
it is consequently only objects of desire that can be said to initiate movement in 
all animals.325  Animals are impelled to move and to act (prattein) by their desire, 
which in turn arises from their sensory experience of the object of desire.  In this 
way desire can be said to arise from sensation, leading to its actualization in a set 
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of activities independent of thought.326  The movements initiated by desire can 
even run contrary to thought (nous) and to calculation (logismon), for in being so 
closely related to sensation or perception (aisthesis), desire directs itself toward 
the apparent good, not necessarily that which is truly good.  Consequently, desire 
is capable of being either right or wrong, while thought, for Aristotle, is always 
right (orthos).327  
Animals thus pursue the objects of their desire—a variety of apparent 
goods—but they do not all do so alike.  Animals with more refined sensory organs 
are capable of desiring in different ways, as their desire is mediated by a more 
varied array of psychic powers. A greater number of objects of desire produce a 
greater variety of movements, thus instilling in an animal a more varied or 
complex set of characteristics—the human being considered in this regard is the 
most complex and complete.  However, even if Aristotle will, as will be shown 
below, use thought to separate humans and other animals, there remain a 
number of psychic powers that appear to underwrite the particular human 
powers of thought, recollection, and language, while still being shared by other—
if not all—animals: namely, imagination, memory, and voice.328  Together these 
psychic potentials appear to make it possible for an animal so endowed to share a 
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world with meaningful others and to act in concert with them in pursuit of their 
desires, thus giving such an animal the basic capacities necessary to engage in the 
kind of politics described as common to a variety of animals in the HA—sharing a 
common work.  In this sense, we shall see, Aristotle holds that humans are not 
the only political animals. 
 The first of these potentials, imagination (phantasia), is tied up closely 
with sensation and desire, yet reducible to neither.  While Aristotle holds that 
imagination is a movement resulting from the actualization (energeian) of 
sensory potential,329 imagination differs from sense in its lack of immediacy.  
That is, animals with refined sensory potentials and complex sensory organs 
imagine objects in that they do not just perceive them, but they perceive them as 
objects of a certain kind, related to other objects of the imagination in the 
animal’s world.  In this sense the “image” generated by the power of imagination 
is not simply the representation of an object, but an interpretation of that object 
in terms of its meaningfulness to the life of the animal.330  Through this 
imaginative interpretation, the relation between the object and the given animal 
found in sensation unfolds into a space where objects are related through the 
animal.  The immediate relation that existed between the animal and a given 
object of sensation becomes mediated by all the other sensory objects that 
constitute the animal’s life, which are here not simply sensory objects, but 
                                                     
329 OS, III.3, 429a2. 
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imaginary ones also.  The animal possessed of imagination thus lives in a space of 
imagination, a dimension of far greater breadth than the narrow relation between 
animal and object found in immediate sensibility.  Yet insofar as the space of 
imagination is still one dominated by sensation, it remains a world bound to the 
material particularities of the given animal, and is thus for Aristotle still capable 
of leading the imagining animal astray like desire—imagination cannot provide 
the same level of certainty as thought.   
However, in places Aristotle does seem to suggest a closer affinity between 
imagination and thought than the infallible notion of thought would allow.  
Aristotle writes that both sensation and imagination are on “common ground” 
with thought, in that all three are powers of discrimination (kritika), and that 
imagination, like thought, allows the animal a degree of distance between itself 
and the object imagined, much like a person looking at a scene in a painting—a 
spectator (theomenoi) as opposed to one directly experiencing the object or 
action.331  The links between the spectator (theomenoi), the act of viewing 
(theaomai), and theoretical wisdom (theoria), which Aristotle places at the 
pinnacle of knowledge, cannot here be overlooked.332  If the kind of vision made 
possible through imagination gives the viewer a power of discrimination fine 
enough to free it from the overwhelming force of sensory objects in their 
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immediacy, then the power it offers appears very similar to that of theoretical 
wisdom.  For Aristotle, opinions can serve to constrain (anagke) a given opinion 
holder not only through exposure to fallibility, but through the overwhelming 
power of the affective content of an opinion, which can compel its holder to feel 
fearful or threatened.333  While imagination may not provide the imagining 
animal with infallibility, the freedom it finds in this space—the distance opened 
up between it and its sensations—seems to be at the very least a kind of proto-
thinking, and a necessary condition for the theoretical wisdom that will allegedly 
make the human distinct among animals.   
Further, Aristotle will even suggest that thought (noein) is itself composed 
of imagination and judgment (hupolepsis).334  If this were the case, thought 
would not represent a definite break from imagination, but would be rather a 
higher form of discrimination, one that combines the breadth of vision of the 
imagination with the capacity to make decisions and so take up definite courses 
of action, while remaining connected to sensation and the particularities of 
animal matter. However, Aristotle will ultimately arrive at a different position, 
arguing that thought is, unlike sensation, separable from the body.335  Yet even 
here, in the conception of thought as a purely self-sufficient thinking of itself, 
insofar as an animal can have access to this thinking, and thus that thinking can 
happen in the soul of an embodied creature such as the human being, the animal 
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body is never simply left behind.  That is, while thought may think without need 
of a body, or organs, or senses, or images—the human animal still needs these 
things in order to access this self-sufficient thought.  Thus human thought can 
never be completely self-sufficient, never completely divorced from an animal 
body, for only through these supports can its own powers of thinking be made 
actual.336  But as mentioned above, imagination is not the only such “support” for 
what are commonly considered distinctly human activities that are shared with 
animals. 
Like imagination, memory (mneme) is closely bound up with sense 
perception, but also like imagination, it is not reducible to it.  For there to be 
memory there must be an elapse of time; thus, Aristotle holds that only animals 
capable of perceiving time (chronou aisthanetai) have the power of memory.  In 
this way memory is dependent upon the particular organization of a given 
animal’s power of sensation.337  Memory is like the impression formed by a seal 
stamped upon the soul, and the capacity to retain this impression depends upon 
both the power of the soul to receive the impression, and the power of the sensory 
organs to make this impression—thus certain kinds of animals at different stages 
in their lives will have a greater or lesser power of memory.338  At all times, 
however, Aristotle holds that memory implies a kind of mental picture 
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(phantasmatos), even when the memory is a memory of an object of thought 
(noeton), and consequently memory can be an aid to thought, but is necessarily 
bound up with imagination, and thus with sensation.339   
Insofar as an animal capable of imagination is also capable of memory, the 
dimension of the animal’s experience added through the mediation of sensory 
objects by one another in imagination now becomes extended in time.  That is, if 
the power of imagination gives space to the imagining animal, then the power of 
memory gives time to the remembering animal, and the breadth of the space of 
imagination acquires the depth of the movement of memory.  An animal whose 
powers of sensation are refined enough to perceive breadth and depth—space and 
time—perceives a distance between itself and others such that it can be said to 
relate to itself and others through its life activity: in this manner it can be said to 
possess a world.  Sensory objects are now not only mediated by others present to 
the animal and related by it, but by past objects that bore some relation to the 
animal.  An animal possessed of memory is thus capable of sensation along an 
entirely new axis, one where the sensory objects that form its life no longer need 
to be directly present in order to be sensed and so inform life activity.  Living and 
moving in a space of these dimensions—a world—thus allows an animal to 
discriminate between sensory objects according to both space and time, to 
compare objects and responses in the present and to remember outcomes for the 
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future.  Insofar as these capacities allow an animal to be worldly in this way, to 
live and move in a world composed of meaningful others, it is perhaps less 
surprising to find that Aristotle holds an animal possessed of such powers to be 
capable of forming opinions and even exercising practical wisdom, or “prudence” 
(phronesin), activities which cannot, in this light, be considered exclusively part 
of the human domain.340 
 Just as sensation is held to separate plant and animal life, so language is 
often thought to be the line of demarcation between animal and human life. But 
here again, the picture Aristotle paints is more complex, acknowledging that 
humans share many of what might be called the “component parts” of language 
with other animals.  Aristotle distinguishes between sound (psophos), voice 
(phone), and speech (dialektos).  While psophos can be virtually any sound, from 
the sound of two inanimate objects knocking together to the sounds made by 
insects, phone is the sound made specifically by an animal’s soul, using the 
breath in the windpipe to knock against its inner walls.341  Thus, if an animal is to 
have a voice it must also have a throat and lungs.  More importantly, however, 
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Aristotle holds that voice has meaning (semantikos) and consequently that the 
act of soul that produces voice must be accompanied by imagination.342   
Imagination, as both the distance between the animal and the sensory 
objects that compose its world, and the relation of these objects to one another 
through the senses and life activity of the animal, provides the interpretive 
framework that makes voice possible.  Voice depends upon interpretation in that 
it does not simply represent an object as the object is, but rather provides a kind 
of aural code for the object, an audible expression of the animal’s interpretation 
of the sensory object.  In this way voice might be thought of as part of a chain of 
interpretation: a kind of translation of the object between the different sensory 
registers of the animal.  The animal’s perception of the object through particular 
sense organs (e.g. eyes, ears, etc.) is interpreted as an “image” that relates the 
object to other objects and the life activity of the animal, before being interpreted 
again in the sound made by the animal as an expression of or response to this 
“image.”  This sound is then interpreted again by the animal’s own sensory 
perception of the sound it has itself made in response to the “image,” and again in 
the consequent “image” generated from this perception.  Insofar as voice serves 
as a relay in these translations between the animal and itself—between its 
different sensory and imaginary capacities as it goes about its life activity, voice 
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possesses a reflexive quality that sharpens the animal’s awareness of itself and its 
surroundings, bringing its world into clearer focus.  The animal is, in a sense, 
“tuned” through the use of its voice—that is, the complex of relations in which it 
exists are made to resonate, to “fit together” as the means by which the animal 
has to perceive these relations are refined. 
This vocal refining of the senses is not simply or necessarily accomplished 
by an animal in isolation, however: the voice is also a means of communication.  
That is, some of the objects that resonate with an animal’s voice are the voices of 
other animals.  Thus Aristotle will write of birds communicating with each other, 
some to such a refined degree as to appear to impart instruction (mathesin).343  
Yet while Aristotle does not refer to even the more perfectly tuned resonance of 
animal voices as dialektos, his means of distinguishing between dialektos and 
phone appears to rely much more on material characteristics than on psychic 
ones.  That is, while the difference between mere psophos and phone was not 
only the organization of matter involved (i.e. throat and lungs), but required also 
an activity of soul and of imagination such as to give the sound meaning, Aristotle 
writes simply that “language [dialektos] is the articulation of voice [phones] by 
the tongue.”344   
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If possessing a tongue that is capable of finely molding different sounds, a 
tongue that is “freely detached [apolelumenen],”345 is what makes an animal 
capable of differentiating its speech from voice, then it would appear the 
difference is a material one.  Insofar as Aristotle thinks that soul and its 
potentials are what give form to matter, then a less perfectly formed tongue 
might be taken as evidence of some kind of deficiency in the soul.346  However, 
even in this case, insofar as certain birds are more adept at using their voices 
than others, the subtle differences between sub-species and species of animals on 
Aristotle’s ascending scale are here so fine that the difference between human 
speech and birdsong is perhaps more akin to differences between languages than 
between two utterly different capacities.  In all it would appear that with respect 
to voice and speech, there are more commonalities between humans and other 
vocal animals than there are differences.  In this light, it is worth noting again 
how unsurprising it should be when Aristotle notes that cranes appear to be 
prudent (phronima)—this insight should not be seen as the expression of 
personal eccentricity or a simple repetition of folk-wisdom, but a consequence of 
Aristotle’s theorization of the aforementioned capacities.347 
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capacities such as imagination, memory, and voice can serve as a philosophical basis for such folk-wisdom.  
We might perhaps liken this basis to what Nussbaum refers to as Aristotle’s attempt to “save the 
appearances and their truth” and so use philosophy “to show us the way back to the ordinary.” Martha C. 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 242; 260.  However, as we shall see, Aristotle’s attempt to formalize 
such folk-wisdom and shape it into theory will have potentially radically consequences for his world. 
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In this way, imagination, memory, and voice all demonstrate the rich and 
complex set of relations that compose the life activities of animals, all of which 
humans and animals share.  But what of political life?  If imagination, memory, 
and voice together show the ways in which certain animals are capable of 
interacting with their surroundings and others in a reflexive manner, such as to 
be said to share a world and to act together in it, to such an extent that they might 
even be said to be possessed of prudence (phronesis), would it not then be 
possible for at least certain kinds of non-human animals to engage in forms of 
politics?  Contrary to much of what is thought about Aristotle, as I have already 
noted above, his answer to this question is “yes.”  In his History of Animals, 
Aristotle writes that some animals are gregarious (agelaia), while others are 
solitary (monadika), and that others still dualize (epamphorterixei)—that is, they 
“partake of both characters.”  Aristotle makes a further distinction among 
gregarious animals, noting that some are political (politika), while others are 
scattered (sporadika). While Aristotle categorizes the human being as a 
“dualizing” animal, he also includes humans among other political animals, such 
as the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the crane, as those who together share a 
common a work (koinon ergon).348   
While it is clear from the above account that humans are not, according to 
Aristotle, the only political animals, these overlapping categorizations have led to 
                                                     
348 HA, I.1, 487b33-488a14. 
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some controversy concerning the sense in which Aristotle understands humans to 
be political. Is it that humans are naturally city dwellers, and that what is most 
important to city life is the common work they share in order to make this life 
possible, a capacity shared with certain other animals?349  Or does this 
categorization allude to the great diversity of organization of human life, wherein 
politics is but one actualization of human potential, a “discontinuous act” that 
does not occur everywhere, and is no more human than familial association?350  
Or is the political nature of the human animal an intensification of 
gregariousness lying along a continuum of possible forms of human life (bioi)?351  
For our purposes here, however, the important point is that however humans 
live, whether as solitary wanderers,352 in dispersed rural communities, or in 
crowded cities, none of these forms of life are distinctly human in and of 
                                                     
349 John M. Cooper, “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, eds. 
Richard Kraut & Steven Skultety, 65-89 (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), 65; 68; 69. 
350 Carnes Lord, “Aristotle’s Anthropology,” in Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science, 
eds. Carnes Lord & David K. O’Connor, 49-73 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 60. 
351 David J. Depew, “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s History of Animals,” Phronesis 
40.2 (1995): 156-181. 
352 When Aristotle writes that humans are also solitary (monadika), it is not clear exactly what he has in 
mind. While the word monadika implies units independent of one another, it is still unclear as to what 
would constitute a “unit” or “independence” here.  Must a human being live entirely alone to be considered 
monadika, or could “solitary” refer to the independence of one family unit from others?  And must the 
individual or family live a solitary life all the time, or can it still be considered monadika if it only lives this 
way part of the time? Or does Aristotle include monadika among the possible forms of human life out of 
the belief that humans once lived that way, sometime in the distant past?  While Aristotle suggests in the 
Politics that humans form cities out of a wont of self-sufficiency, i.e. that they cannot sustain themselves as 
monadika (I.2, 1252b26-30), perhaps this ought to be taken as a more specific statement concerning the 
development of political life in Greece than a more general one concerning the human condition.  If modes 
of animal life (bioi) vary according to characters (ethe) and sustenance (trophas) (HA, VIII.1, 588a14-15), 
and characters (ethe) can vary according to geography (topoi) (HA, VIII.29, 607a9), then perhaps Aristotle 
believes there are parts of the earth so abundant that humans do not need to organize themselves politically 
to survive, but instead live as monadika.  That is, it is possible that Aristotle sees politics as a response to 
scarcity, and that where scarcity does not prevail, neither would politics. 
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themselves—that humans live in all these ways is consistent with their status as 
animals. Each of the above modes of living represents a different material 
instantiation of the powers humans share with other animals.  Even the political 
life, which requires a degree of cooperation perhaps seen as uncommon among 
non-human animals—a diversity of tasks united in a single common work—is still 
a mode of life that cannot, from Aristotle’s perspective at least, be seen as 
distinctively human.  Bees, wasps, and cranes are for Aristotle, like human 
beings, political animals—city life is just the shape politics takes, or can take, 
among humans.353 
 Thus in terms of souls and their capacities, bodies and their organs, modes 
of life and their organization, the human being is, for Aristotle, an animal.  
Aristotle’s theorization of animal life is both rich and complex, demonstrating the 
myriad ways in which the particularities of the human are found to correspond to 
the particularities, and in some cases the generalities, of other animals, thus 
making him not only perhaps the greatest of early biologists and zoologists, but 
one of the preeminent thinkers of human animality.  With Aristotle, the poetic 
and analogical relationship to animals found in earlier Greek thought is 
transformed and regularized into similarities that can be known and to an extent 
at least, categorized.  Thus the human-animal distinction acquires a degree of 
                                                     
353 Contra Clark again, who concludes that without language, “beasts” can be neither practical nor political 
(Clark, 24).  However, as it has been shown, while animals may not have dialektos, those with phone can 
be said to be both practical and political (cranes), and even some without phone are said to be political 
(bees, wasps).   
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stability that it lacked prior to Aristotle, whose inquiries serve to draw the 
boundaries in which human life can be comprehended as animal life without the 
frenzy of the Dionysiac revel, or some other intervention of gods or supernatural 
beings.  In this sense, Aristotle’s understanding of human life as animal life 
serves to demystify both, situating humans and animals upon the common 
ground of knowledge.   
Given the role animals played in the world of poetic myth—as facilitators 
of aristocratic distinction, on one hand, and as the lives whose sacrifice makes 
possible the degree of equality necessary for community, on the other—Aristotle’s 
detailed excursus into the many and profound similarities between humans and 
other animals can be seen as a political challenge to the basic structure of this 
world.  Against the aristocratic distinction earned by the warrior, Aristotle’s 
demonstration of the animality of any and all human beings has a decidedly 
egalitarian edge.  If the human being is a particular kind of animal, and thus 
shares certain psychic and bodily features with other animals, then the poetic 
proximity of great warrior-heroes to certain animals becomes more like rhetorical 
flourish than statements concerning a given hero’s being—a distinction of style, 
not substance.  That is, the poetic myths that sung the praises of heroes and in so 
doing served to establish a certain distinction between humans and other animals 
lose their place as arbiter of this distinction, and their hegemonic position among 
the received wisdom of this world is weakened.   
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However, the relative equality between humans as distinct from gods and 
animals established through sacrifice—that is, the human community—is also 
undermined by Aristotle’s investigations.  If humans are just another species of 
animal, one to whom even politics is not unique, then why is it that they are party 
to a community ruled according to justice, and not other animals?  Why are other 
animals excluded from this community, and even sacrificed in its name?  Or 
conversely, what is there to stop one from treating other humans as one does 
other animals?  If humans are simply another kind of animal, taboos that served 
to draw the boundaries that delineated acceptable and unacceptable human 
actions—such as human sacrifice and cannibalism—seem to lose their force, and 
the boundaries of the community become blurred.  In short, Aristotle’s biological 
reflections have far-reaching political consequences, and if the most basic feature 
of the political communities that Aristotle knew is to persist—that is, if humans 
are to continue to be defined in some sense as distinct from other animals—then 
Aristotle needs some conception of what makes the human being unique.  
Thus, despite the lengths Aristotle goes in demonstrating the animality of 
the human being, this animality does not exhaust what it means to be human.  
Rather, for Aristotle there remains something in excess of the animal that makes 
it possible to identify the human as a kind of animal different, and, in some ways, 
separate from, other animals.  It is toward these “excesses,” the different ways in 
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which the human animal is decidedly unlike other animals, that we must now 
turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
Chapter Seven: 
 What is Humanity?  The Human Excess 
 
While the previous section focused on the similarities between humans and other 
animals that serve to make the human being a kind of animal, in the following 
chapter I take the opposite tack, and pursue instead what Aristotle considers to 
be uniquely human.  I argue that it is the intellectual powers, predicated upon an 
ability to access divine and eternal thought (nous), that are ultimately what make 
the human being a qualitatively different kind of animal in Aristotle’s eyes.  The 
unique capacity to access divine thought makes possible a whole host of unique 
intellectual capacities that serve to displace the importance of the capacities 
humans share with other animals, orienting them according to the exigencies of 
thought.   
In orienting the psychic capacities of the human animal to the divine, both 
the human senses and even the human body can be understood as supports of 
this divine thought—they exceed the abilities of other animals precisely in ways 
suited to intellectual activity.  In this sense, we might see the human as a kind of 
“excessive” animal, that is, an animal that exceeds all others due to its particular 
relation to the divine.  Yet, while this excess and consequent uniqueness of the 
human animal might suggest it to be some kind of monster, Aristotle instead 
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makes the exceptional character of the human the exception that proves the rule, 
and the human being is set up as the standard against which all other animals are 
measured, making the “excess” of the human into a “deficiency” in other animals.  
Thus while Aristotle’s inquiries into the nature of animals served to redefine the 
human-animal distinction upon which a certain form of community was based, 
and thus undermine this community, Aristotle’s insistence upon the uniqueness 
and even superiority of humans among other animals will provide the basis for a 
new form of human community, one that excludes other animals in its 
orientation to the divine. 
 
Thought and the Intellectual Powers 
Near the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle famously claims that human 
beings “by nature desire to know.”  It is this desire for knowledge that underlies 
the value we place on the senses, and consequently sight is valued most highly, 
for it is most (malista) capable of bringing us knowledge and allowing us to make 
differentiations between objects.354  However, while the senses are particular 
material organizations of the power of sensation found in the soul, insofar as they 
require the body and its organs to sense, the power of sensation is limited by the 
particularity of its bodily organs.  Aristotle notes that not only do the appearances 
of the imagination differ among animals, but that even the sensory perception of 
                                                     
354 Meta. I.1, 980a21-27.  The word Aristotle first uses here for knowledge, eidenai, is linked to both oida, 
to know, and eido, to see. Thus sight is foremost among the senses in that all senses aim at knowledge, and 
sight is most like knowledge. 
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objects by different individual members of the same species frequently differ.  For 
this reason, sensation and imagination offer no clear way of differentiating 
between the true and the false355—the knowledge obtaining in both is bound by 
the particularity of the sense organs.  If human beings, in their desire for 
knowledge, would pursue it beyond the animal confines of sensation and 
imagination, they would thus require a knowledge farthest from the senses 
humans share with other animals.  The form of knowledge Aristotle holds to be 
farthest from sensation is the most (malista) general knowledge (katholou 
epistemen).356  Among the powers of the soul (nutrition, desire, sensation, 
movement, and thinking), Aristotle holds only thinking to be possible without a 
body, and in this sense it can be said to be farthest from sensation.  Thus, the 
most general knowledge will be that acquired by thought, and only animals 
possessed of the power of thought will be able to lay claim to such knowledge, 
under which all particulars lie. 
 Human beings are, according to Aristotle, the only thinking animals.357  
However, unlike the other psychic powers, which in some sense can be said to 
“dwell” in the soul, thought does not—or at least not in the same way.  That is, 
nutrition, desire, sensation, and movement are known to be potentials of the soul 
in that they are made apparent through bodies.  Though bodies on their own are 
held by Aristotle to be inert, it is still only through them that anything can be said 
                                                     
355 Meta. IV.5, 1009b6-10. 
356 Meta., I.1, 982a21-25. 
357 OS, III.10, 433a11-12; PA, I.1, 641b7-8. 
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about souls, and the two are so closely intertwined that Aristotle compares their 
relation to a piece of wax and its shape.358  Thought, however, stands alone in 
that it can be separated from bodies.  While the actualization of other psychic 
powers depends upon the objects of the material world—there must be an object 
of sensation that is sensed, an object of desire that is desired, and objects that 
move and are moved—thus ensuring their embodied nature, thought for Aristotle 
depends only upon thought.  This is not to say, however, that human thinking is 
generated by humans.  Thought as such precedes the thinking that happens in the 
human soul: it comes from without (thurathen) and enters (epeisienai) the 
human soul, divine (theion) and without any commonality with bodily activity.359  
Thus the potential for thought in the human soul, that is, the “psychic 
power” of thought, is the capacity to be open to this thought, to think “with it” in 
a sense.  Unlike the world of sensible and desiring bodies, always in need and 
dependent on other bodies for life, incorporeal thought is self-sufficient: thought 
thinks itself, and thus it needs nothing, depends on nothing but itself—it is 
divine.  Thought thus exists as if on another plane than the material world, 
offering as it does a view of self-sufficiency—of freedom from material 
boundaries—utterly unlike those experienced among animals.  In this way we 
                                                     
358 OS, II.1, 412b3-8. 
359 GA, II.3, 736b27-28.  For an alternate account of this passage, see Victor Caston, “Aristotle’s Two 
Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” Phronesis 44.3 (1999), 215-216. Caston’s argument, however, does not 
detract from the three points I am highlighting here and subsequently: 1) that thought is separable from 
matter; 2) that thought is divine; and 3) that among animals only humans have access to thought, and are 
consequently oriented to the divine in a way other animals are not (211-212; 224). 
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might think of the human power of thought as analogically similar to the animal 
power of sensation. Just as sensation opens up an entirely new dimension to the 
sensible soul, such as to make possible a qualitative difference between the soul 
with sensation, the animal, and the soul without sensation, the plant, so thought 
opens an entirely new dimension to the thinking soul, such as to make possible, 
for the first time among the powers we have examined above, a qualitative 
distinction between human and animal.  
Yet, as one commentator writes, while “in thinking, we access a divine 
activity[,] we do not become God.”360  Though the divine realm of thought to 
which the human animal, uniquely among animals, has access, makes it possible 
for the human being to be a qualitatively different kind of animal, it does not 
mean that the human is no longer some kind of animal.  Human beings do not 
live by thought alone, but still live as embodied creatures, subject to sensation, 
imagination, and desire and wholly dependent upon the material world.  In this 
sense the particularity of the human animal appears to be found in the nexus of 
the divine and the animal, as the capacities humans share with animals come to 
be ordered, interpreted, and mediated by the divine.  Indeed, thought serves to 
organize the human animal in a fairly literal sense for Aristotle, as we shall see.  
In a sense, human life is an attempt to accommodate the divine within the 
confines of the animal, and in so doing the human being can be identified as 
                                                     
360 Gerson, “The Unity of the Intellect,” 370.   
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possessing a number of unique powers concerning the translation of thought into 
the animality of everyday human life.  In order to better understand these 
powers, and thus what Aristotle considers to be uniquely human, we must look to 
how they relate to this first of human powers, thought, and the various words 
Aristotle uses to describe intellectual activity. 
The condition of human thought, the self-sufficient thought that comes 
from without in order to think in the human soul, Aristotle calls nous.  While 
Aristotle will also frequently refer to thinking as it happens in the human soul by 
nous and its various cognates, the other words he uses for intellectual activity 
appear to be restricted to specifically human activity, without possessing a 
separate existence.  In this way, when Aristotle writes that thought (noun) is “that 
whereby the soul thinks [dianoeitai] and judges [uppolambanei],”361 we ought to 
understand thinking (as dianoia) and judging to be specifically human 
articulations of the divine nous. The human capacity for thought—the human 
receptivity to the divine nous—makes thinking and judging possible, and thinking 
and judging are themselves bound in a web of other intellectual powers.  Logos, 
often translated as “reason,” is perhaps the most important among these, and 
along with the related logismos (calculation) and sullogismos (inference), makes 
possible intellectual activity involving chains of reasoning relating diverse objects 
in both the present, past, and future.   
                                                     
361 OS, III.4, 429a22-24. 
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Thus the thinking and reasoning soul is able to draw conclusions about the 
relations relevant to its life in all of these tenses, which itself involves yet another 
capacity, bouleusis (deliberation).  While a version of this capacity was found 
above in animals possessing memory and imagination, bouleusis allows for a 
greater degree of “mobility” among the objects being related—objects of 
deliberation do not impose themselves upon the human with the same force as 
objects of sensation or imagination do upon the animal.  That is, deliberation 
might be seen as opening up still more space between the deliberator and the 
senses, in much the same way as imagination does for other animals. 
Deliberation serves as another layer of mediation for the desire of the deliberator, 
and makes it possible for the subsequent actions of the deliberator to be initiated 
by choice (proairesis), as opposed to simply being driven by desire.362   
 In this way nous, through reason, calculation, inference, deliberation, and 
choice, serves to displace and re-orient the power of the imagination humans 
share with other animals, extending the distance it affords the given animal from 
sensation through additional layers of mediation, and adding to the complexity of 
psychic life.  Likewise, the power of memory that works together with 
imagination in forming the world of certain animals is in the human displaced, 
re-oriented, and extended by the particularly human power of recollection 
                                                     
362 This is not to suggest that deliberation is opposed to or even completely separable from desire. 
Nussbaum, following Aristotle at OS, III.10, 433a21-23; b1-4, points out that deliberation is a form of 
orexis, and orexis is involved in all animal movement.  See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 275.  
Yet while deliberation might be a form of desire, it is not present in all desiring animals (OS, III.11, 
434a12). 
 
 
176 
(anamnesis).  Just as memory extends sensation and imagination in time and so 
gives a kind of presence to objects not immediately present to a given animal, 
recollection opens up the temporal dimension to the complex web of intellectual 
powers found in humans.  Aristotle holds recollection to be a kind of 
investigation (zetesis), which is in turn dependent upon deliberation and 
inference.363  Thus recollection does not simply give a kind of presence to objects 
not immediately present, but it gives this pseudo-presence over to the power of 
human thinking.  Through recollection, the human can “move” through the 
collection of past sensations, “appearances,” and thoughts and bring them to bear 
upon present deliberations in a much more directed and concerted manner than 
animals possessed only of memory. 
 As recollection is for Aristotle a form of reason directed toward the past, 
we might see a similar temporal direction in Aristotle’s understanding of belief, 
or trust (pistis).  Aristotle holds that we never find pistis among beasts,364 for to 
trust someone, that is, to believe or have faith that they will do or accomplish a 
certain thing or behave a certain way in the future, requires one to be persuaded, 
and persuasion (peithoi) depends upon reason (logos), which as we have seen, is 
                                                     
363 OM, 2, 453a6-13. 
364 Rather than use the typical word for animal found in the overwhelming majority of his discussions of the 
topic, zoon, Aristotle instead uses the word ‘beast,’ or therion, to describe the creature without trust.  While 
the difference does not affect the immediate point I am trying to make—that zoa other than humans are by 
Aristotle’s definition incapable of trust—we should read therion as being less expansive than zoon.  That is 
to say, while the human being is one kind of animal among many, possessing certain natural powers by 
virtue of being the kind of animal that it is, therion  refers to a human that in some way fails in its natural 
capacities as a human: one who is a ‘beast.’ While all humans are animals, only some are beasts.  Cf. NE 
VII.1 1145a30-32. 
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among the intellectual capacities particular to human beings.365  Thus trust 
serves along with recollection to highlight the way in which the human being, 
despite being a kind of animal, exceeds other animals also in the powers it has at 
its disposal to orient itself in time.  Animal memory and imagination, while still 
present and active in humans, come to be mediated by reason through 
deliberation, recollection, and trust, re-orienting the human to the world and 
making the human capable of exceeding the cognitive powers of other animals.  
Insofar as humans, through the power of thought, appear to inhabit a 
much richer world than that of other animals, one would expect that the voice 
that proved to be so important for orienting vocal animals to their world and each 
other, and in so doing making possible in them a kind of reflexivity, is different 
again in humans.  This is indeed the case; however, as we have seen, while 
Aristotle reserves the term dialektos for human speech, he seems to equate its 
difference from animal phone in terms of the shape of the tongue and mouth 
parts actually making the sounds.  However, relying only on material differences 
in this way seems to present a problem for Aristotle’s account.  If the activities of 
the soul serve to make a living thing the kind of thing that it is, that thing is like 
and unlike other things in terms of its activities, which in turn depend on the 
likeness or unlikeness of the psychic capacities that make these activities 
possible.  Thus, if speech is to be truly unique to humans—that is, if human 
                                                     
365 OS, III.3, 428a21-24. 
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speech is to be qualitatively different from birdsong—it requires a corresponding 
psychic capacity unique to humans.   
Insofar as Aristotle takes nous and its related intellectual capacities to be 
what is most unique and definitive of human beings, it would appear that a likely 
candidate for the psychic capacity of speech might be found there, perhaps in the 
word logos.  Logos is used in a variety of ways to mean not only reason, but also 
“account,” “speech,” and “language.”366  If we read logos as the psychic capacity 
(dunamis) for speech or language, and dialektos as the actual activity (energeian) 
of speech, then the problem dissolves: we can explain why Aristotle lists only 
material differences when differentiating between dialektos and phone, for 
dialektos is itself the material actualization of a psychic capacity, while at the 
same time locating a unique psychic capacity for language related to divine 
thought in logos.  Phone, in line with the account given above in terms of its 
relation to the world of imagination, would be the vocal articulation of a 
phantasmatos, an image impressed upon the senses through the power of 
imagination.367  
Thinking of logos as the potential for human language and dialektos as its 
activity allows us to see speech from the two different perspectives that inform 
Aristotle’s understanding of human life.  As logos, human language is a psychic 
                                                     
366 These are but a few of the many meanings and usages of logos. See Liddel and Scott, Greek-English 
Lexicon, abridged (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 416-417. 
367 Psophos, as un-intentional and meaningless sound that can emanate from lifeless objects, is without 
psychic potential.  The possibility of sound resides entirely in the material of the object responsible for the 
sound.  
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capacity or potential made possible by the specifically human relation to the 
divine. As dialektos, human language is an activity involving a more finely 
ordered series of vocal sounds than other animals are capable.  Logos may be 
divine, but only through its relation with nous, just as dialektos is animal if seen 
only as the sounds made possible by the vocal organs. Both serve to show the 
particularity of the human animal, in that dialektos exceeds animal voice, while 
logos, as language, is irrelevant to divine thought on its own terms, which is self-
sufficient in its own thinking and without need of human language.  In this way 
we ought to think of logos-dialektos as divine thought reverberating within the 
animal voice.  Like the animal use of voice that served to refine the vocal animal’s 
senses, speech can be used to clarify human thinking and so free it of errors, thus 
bringing humans closer to the self-sufficiency of divine thought. But one might 
ask at this juncture: what of the human senses?  If the animal voice can be used 
to refine the senses, can logos-dialektos also serve such a function, or is it 
entirely oriented to thought?  What is the relation between thought and the 
senses?  In order to answer these questions, we will have to examine the senses in 
what Aristotle takes to be their particularity; that is, the way in which human 
senses differ from the senses of other animals. 
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The Human Senses 
We have seen that the human soul, in possessing a part that is receptive to 
thought, makes possible a host of intellectual capacities particular to the human.  
In this way other psychic capacities humans share with animals, such as 
imagination, memory, and voice, are transformed in their mediation by the 
various human powers of thinking.  That is, thinking in humans serves to 
displace the centrality of imagination, memory, and voice found in other animals.  
While all are still present in the human and required to translate the divine 
thought that comes from outside into animal terms relevant to animal life, the 
animal life that is mediated by thinking—the life that reaches out to the divine—is 
no longer simply animal life, but human life.  Indeed, insofar as the particularity 
of human life is found in the attempt to accommodate the divine within the 
animal, the entire constellation of powers that constitute the animal is 
transformed.  Thus it is not simply imagination, memory, and voice that are 
displaced and exceeded by the intellectual powers that constitute thinking, but 
the psychic power that serves to constitute the animal as such: sensation 
(aisthesis).   
Insofar as human sensation is mediated by thought and thinking, human 
senses will differ from those of other animals in terms of their ability to support 
thinking and thought.  For this reason human senses are not each superior to 
those of different animals, but rather, human senses will be superior or inferior to 
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other animals to the degree that they support human intellectual powers.  Thus, 
while Aristotle claims that humans are inferior to many other animals in terms of 
sensory perception (aisthesis), and perhaps the worst among animals at 
perceiving things at a distance, humans are still the best at differentiating 
between objects, thanks to their possession of the best sense of touch.368  While 
perceiving objects at a distance has no clear link with intelligence—in fact, it may 
even serve in certain animals to substitute for intelligence, by encouraging the 
animal to rely instead on the distant appearances generated by such senses and 
the imagination—a refined sense of touch allows the animal so endowed to make 
finer sensory distinctions and discriminations (kritika).  As Aristotle also 
considers thinking to be a form of discrimination, the refined sense of touch 
found in humans actually brings them closer to thinking, making them also the 
most intelligent (phronimotaton) of animals. 
The relative strengths and weaknesses of other human senses serve also to 
contribute to human intelligence: the human sense of taste is also considered by 
Aristotle to be highly discriminating, as it is a form of touch, whereas smell is the 
least developed of the human senses, again, as it is without any clear link to 
intelligence.  The capacities of seeing and hearing lie somewhere between these 
extremes.  While Aristotle, as we have already seen, claims sight to be valued 
most highly (among humans, presumably) for its ability to impart knowledge and 
                                                     
368 OS II.9 421a20-23; Sens. 4 441a2; HA I.15 494b15-18; GA V.2 781b17-21. 
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make distinctions, thus implying close links to both thought and knowledge, he 
says little about the superiority of human sight, noting only that human sight is 
superior to those animals with hard eyes.369  Hearing, on the other hand, is held 
to have direct links to intelligence (phronesis), as it is primarily through sound 
that instruction (matheseos) is possible.370   
Like birds and other animals possessed of a voice, the human sense of 
hearing, while not necessarily greater than other animals, allows humans to 
communicate with others and so situate themselves reflexively in their world.  
For humans especially, insofar as thought becomes sound through logos, the 
sense of hearing allows humans to engage and refine the activities that make 
them different from other animals.  In this way the five senses humans possess, 
mediated as they are by the human intellectual powers, all serve to make humans 
the most intelligent of animals.  While intelligence, or “practical wisdom” 
(phronesis), depends upon the senses and is thus shared by other animals, 
insofar as the capacities of the human soul are oriented by thought, the human 
senses that make up the human capacity for sensation will likewise be oriented to 
supporting thought.  In this way, humans are distinguished from other animals 
not only in terms of being the only thinking animals, but also of being the most 
intelligent animals.  Yet if this is indeed the case, we would expect to find that the 
human organization of sensation, that is, the particular bodies and sense organs 
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humans possess would also be most suited among animals for thought.  We thus 
now turn to the material organization of the human being, and the way in which 
Aristotle holds human bodies to differ from the bodies of other animals. 
 
The Human Body 
In the first book of On the Soul, Aristotle dismisses the Pythagorean view that any 
soul could be adequately “clothed” in any body as absurd—for a given soul to 
engage in the activities that make it the soul that it is, it needs a material 
structure capable of supporting these activities.371  Yet to understand what a thing 
really is, we must look not to these material proprieties, but to its form (eidos), as 
it is the form that serves to impart to a thing its particularity as that thing.372  
Though we might be tempted here to read in Aristotle’s insistence on the 
dominance (kuriotera) of form over matter the faded letter of Platonic 
philosophy, for Aristotle the forms of enmattered things cannot exist without 
their matter, and he roundly dismisses the doctrine of the Forms.373  The bodily 
parts of humans, then, will be determined by those activities which serve to 
distinguish the human from other animals, but these parts will nevertheless be 
necessary for the actuality of that distinction.  As we have already seen that it is 
the receptivity to thought and the intellectual powers bound up with thought that 
serve to differentiate humans from other animals, human bodies will then be 
                                                     
371 OS I.3. 407b22-26. 
372 PA  I.1 640b22-29. 
373 See for example, Meta. III.6 1002b30; XI.1 1059b3; XIII.4 1079a5-7. 
 
 
184 
organized according to the requirements of thought, and individual parts will be 
either necessary for the existence of the human being as a thinking animal, or at 
least conducive to intellectual activities in some manner.374  As Aristotle sees the 
bodies of living things (zoa) to be structured according to six points (superior and 
inferior, right and left, front and back), we can use these points to better grasp 
how the human body differs from other animal bodies, and how these differences 
relate to the unique human capacity for thought. 
 To grasp the ordering of the superior and the inferior in the human body, 
the posture of the human body, unique among animals, might be taken as the 
first or at least most immediately visible piece of material evidence of the human 
intellect and its relation to the divine.  As it is the work (ergon) of the “god-like” 
(theotatou) to think (noein) and to be intelligent (phronein), Aristotle holds that 
the human is either the only animal to have a share in the divine (theiou), or at 
least the animal with the greatest (malista) share in the divine.375  That is, from 
the perspective of thought, the human is the only divine animal, and from the 
perspective of intelligence, the human is the most divine animal.  In both ways, 
however, Aristotle holds that being physically close to the ground would impede 
both thinking and sensation, confining both to a narrower range of possibilities. 
Thus for Aristotle it is only fitting that the human being should stand erect, with 
its superior parts upward, for in this way human senses are freed from immediate 
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contact with the ground, and so opened to developing in different and more 
complex ways more appropriate to the body of a thinker.   
Yet, as we have already seen, in his account of animals, Aristotle noted that 
certain birds also could be said to stand erect.  But here Aristotle makes a 
distinction: birds cannot be considered to stand erect in the same way as humans, 
for the distribution of their weight is such as to favor their wings.376  That is to 
say, birds stand erect to facilitate flight, not thought.  If the ergon of the bird is to 
fly, then it must be that this capacity is the dominant capacity of a bird’s soul, 
whose movements then serve to give shape to its matter in such a way as to 
support this capacity.  That certain birds, such as cranes, are also highly 
intelligent might thus be seen as a kind of externality of their capacity for flight: 
insofar as being bipedal is conducive to flight, it also happens to free the bird’s 
senses from immediate contact with the ground, thus making it possible for them 
to move and develop in the complex ways that facilitate intelligence. This 
intelligence is not, as we have seen, the same as being receptive to divine thought. 
 Thus humans stand alone among other animals, with their superior parts 
elevated, because they are thinkers, and standing in this way facilitates thought in 
the same way as the structure of a crane’s body facilitates flight.  However, while 
this may give us an answer as to why humans stand erect, Aristotle will also give 
an explanation of how humans stand erect.  Aristotle holds that certain animals 
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are, according to their place on the great scale of life, “higher,” or more valued or 
honorable (timiotera) than others, and that this value corresponds with the value 
of the given animal’s soul.  Higher souls are allotted by nature more heat than 
others, and surely as heat rises, so does the heat of a soul affect the growth of the 
material body and its organs in this direction.377  As the heat rises from the 
hottest region of the human body, the area around the heart and lung, it elevates 
the body along with it, pushing upwards toward the heavens and so holding the 
head aloft.  The heat rising up from the body and out through the head is also the 
reason the human skull is shaped in the manner than it is: Aristotle holds that 
due to the evaporation of heat from the heart and lung, the skull is the last bone 
to become solidified.  Sutures upon the skull are the remnants of the time before 
its parts had joined to become a single bone.378  The skull also serves to protect 
the human brain, which is not the seat of thought, but rather serves to cool the 
excessive heat of the human body, and is thus larger, cooler, and moister in 
humans than in other animals.379  The lower or “inferior” parts of the human 
body also differ from other animals according to the necessities of standing erect.  
Unlike other animals, humans have fleshy lower parts, including the buttocks, 
thighs, and calves, which help make the mature human being 
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heavier below than above, giving its posture additional support.380  Humans also 
have the largest feet among animals of comparative size, again to facilitate 
standing erect.381   
 Of course, the human body is not simply structured around being able to 
stand erect, but being capable of moving in this position, and it is here where the 
next two points, right and left, can be seen at work in the human body.  Aristotle 
claims that the movement of all animals begins on the right side; the right side is 
more dexterous than the left, and consequently better (beltion).  As there is a 
greater discrepancy between the right and left sides in human beings than other 
animals, with most humans heavily favoring their right sides while the left side in 
humans is “freer” or more (malista) “detached” (apolelumena), humans are 
capable of a finer and more differentiated set of movements than other 
animals.382  The flexibility and dexterity of the human body, together with its 
capacity to stand erect, complement the highly refined powers of sensation in the 
human soul.  As humans stand and move they expose their senses to new and 
varied objects, training and refining their senses through varied organs that find 
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their actuality in the world as experienced through this bodily structure.  In this 
way human skin and flesh is also refined, becoming through the movements of 
the human body more finely tuned to the objects with which it has contact, and so 
serving the human capacity for touch, which as the most discriminate sense of 
touch among animals, requires the most delicate skin and softest flesh as its 
material support.383 Aristotle has the blood also playing a similar role.  As 
Aristotle considers blood that is thickest and hottest to be most conducive to 
strength, while the coolest and thinnest blood most conducive to sensation and 
thought, insofar as human blood is held to be the thinnest and purest it is suited 
to sensation and thought, yet heated enough by the natural heat accorded to the 
human as a “higher” animal, remains appropriate also for strength and so also 
facilitates movement.384  In this way human organs facilitate the kinds of 
movements of which humans are capable, ultimately to accommodate their status 
as the most intelligent of animals, and indeed, the only one possessed of the 
capacity for thought. 
 But as we have seen above, not only do humans tend to pursue their life 
activities with others, but their capacity for thought is, unlike the self-sufficiency 
of divine thought, articulated through the animal voice as human speech.  In this 
way thought depends on the particular organs of the human body, which can be 
seen now to differ from other animals also in terms of the last two structuring 
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points: front and back.  As noted above, an important means of distinguishing 
between phone and dialektos was through the human tongue: its shape, breadth, 
and dexterity, that is, its “freedom,” or “detachment” (apolelumenen) from the 
rest of the mouth.  Here we find that it is not simply the particularities of the 
human tongue that serve to shape phone into dialektos, but also the lips, which, 
being composed of the soft flesh and delicate skin characteristic of humans, helps 
not only protect the teeth but shape the sounds of language.385  Human teeth are 
also held by Aristotle to play a role in forming the sounds particular to letters 
(grammaton), and thus their number and character are also for the most part 
determined by speech.386   
In this way the requirements of logos can be seen to a considerable extent 
to have made the human face what it is: insofar as the capacity for thought in 
humans is refined and perfected through speech, through dialogue with each 
other, this activity has formed the matter and organs of the face in such a way as 
to support this activity.  It is for this reason that Aristotle can claim that the word 
“face” (prosopon) is only used for humans,387 despite his own comparison of 
human facial features to those of the ape: like the birds who were found above not 
to stand as erect as humans for the fact that they do not do so for the sake of 
thought, so is the face of an ape not really a face insofar as it only emits voice, and 
                                                     
385 PA II.16 659b32-660a3. 
386 PA III.1 661b13-16. 
387 HA I.8 491b9-10. 
 
 
190 
not language.  Just as humans are the only animals that stand erect, so they are 
the only animals that look directly in front, and articulate in this direction.388  
Thus it is logos that determines the front and back of the human, through the 
formation of the human face.    
 In this way the superior and inferior, the right and left, and the front and 
back of human beings are structured according to the necessities of thought and 
its intellectual capacities, and thus the particularities of the human body are 
found to be expressions of the dominant aspect of its soul: the capacity for 
thought.  In this manner Aristotle is also able to dismiss the rival claim that it is 
the matter that determines the work, and not the opposite.  As we have seen, it is 
the psychic capacity for thought that forms and organizes matter in a manner 
conducive to its own actualization.  As Aristotle claims, it is easier to give a flute 
to a flute player, than to teach someone how to play the flute.  Or put more 
bluntly: humans have hands because they think; they do not think because they 
have hands.389  Humans stand erect and bipedal, moving as they do and facing in 
the direction as they do in order to enable their intellectual capacities to flourish.  
While this flourishing may spring from the soil of animality, it blossoms into a 
creature that, while still animal, nevertheless stands apart from other animals.   
Yet one might ask here: if what makes humans different from other 
animals is the possession of a power particular to it alone, a power that brings 
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this one animal into relation with the divine, and in so doing, re-orients the other 
capacities of the animal so as to exceed all, or at least most others, what stops this 
animal from being a kind of deformity?  Aristotle’s repeated use of the word 
malista (most, more) to describe the human in relation to other animals implies 
that the human is in excess of the animal—the human is the animal’s psychic 
capacities, senses, and body mutilated by an alien capacity and ordered according 
to the service of this capacity.  That is, if the human is a kind of excess of the 
animal, an animal marked as distinct among others, why is it not considered a 
kind of monster?  It is not difficult to conjugate the human within the grammar of 
Greek mythological creatures: a birdlike ape of cities and fields, ferocious, 
omnivorous, and like a plague, spreading across the earth.  To understand how 
Aristotle avoids the threat of monstrosity, installing instead the human as 
paramount among animals, we must now turn to Aristotle’s treatment of 
monsters. 
 
Monsters 
Aristotle calls “monsters,” or “monstrosities” (teraton) those which are contrary 
to nature (para phusin), including both the deficient and the excessive. Things 
can be contrary to nature insofar as nature is conceived as that which holds for 
the most part or in general, not as eternal and necessary.390  That which deviates 
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from nature is thus monstrous, and a thing is more or less monstrous in terms of 
the degree to which it deviates from nature.  In this sense, humans might appear 
to be monstrous in three senses: 1) in the human capacity for thought, which, 
being entirely unique among all other living things, is contrary to nature in terms 
of being unlike what holds for the most part among animals; 2) in terms of 
humans exceeding all other animals in certain of their shared capacities, thus 
making the human a kind of excessive animal; and 3) in terms of the unique 
features of the human body, which in supporting capacities that are either 
completely unique or excessive, give the human a monstrous shape.  In all these 
ways the human appears to be a deformed, monstrous animal. 
However, unlike, say, a sheep with a swollen gall-bladder,391 the 
characteristics that might be used to identify “the human” as monstrous do not 
necessarily serve to distinguish it from other humans.  “The human” does not 
simply exist as a solitary creature, born of animals to which it bears only a 
passing resemblance, but rather, “the human” is just a more general way of 
referring to humans, who consistently reproduce themselves as humans, as 
animals possessed of all these “monstrous” characteristics.  The consistency of 
this reproduction is what makes it possible to identify the human as a kind of 
animal, endowed with its own range of possibilities considered to fall within its 
nature, and against which monstrosity can be measured.  Thus the human as 
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such, insofar as it is its own kind (eidos) of animal, can only be monstrous 
relative to this kind, and not in comparison to other animals. 
Humans are human—or at least potentially so—by virtue of their 
parentage: humans are not generated at random by a variety of different animals, 
but only by other humans, to whom they share a resemblance.  While in failing to 
resemble one’s parents one goes contrary to nature and is therefore already in a 
sense for Aristotle a kind of monster, such a monstrosity is still recognizably 
human.  Yet further deviation is possible: Aristotle makes reference to cases in 
which a child is born that appears “to be not even a human being, but some kind 
of animal.”392  In such cases people will associate various animal features with the 
child, saying it has the head of a ram or a bull, or some other mix of different 
animals, and even suggesting that it is the result of such mixed animal parentage.  
Aristotle dismisses this piece of folklore, less due to the belief that different kinds 
of animals cannot be mixed, than due to the uneven periods of gestation in these 
animals.393  In focusing on the periods of gestation for different animals, Aristotle 
also alludes to what he will offer as an explanation for the existence of monsters 
as such: material differences, especially the deviation of matter from form.   
The form of an animal is to be found in its soul, which is imparted to the 
animal through the seed of the male of the species, in those species divided by 
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sexes.  The matter is supplied by the female, and it is in this way that animals 
develop: as we have seen, the capacities of the soul shape the matter with which it 
is endowed, so that the particular organization of that matter will support the 
activities of the soul that make it a soul of a certain kind (eidos). Monstrosity 
results when the matter does not yield to the form in the manner that it ought; 
when the powers of the soul shape the matter only imperfectly, then the 
particularities of the given soul fail to leave their stamp in the matter.  What 
results is a monster, such as the child that is not human, but only “some kind of 
animal.”  In this case, the power of the soul most particular to the human has 
failed to impart its form upon its matter, and consequently the child is never 
developed beyond the raw material potential humans share with other animals: it 
is perhaps like a ram, or a bull, or a sheep, or an ox—but certainly not the human 
equipped with all the characteristics enumerated above. In this way Aristotle 
reduces monstrosity (tera) to deformity (anaperia).394  No longer a mythical or 
divine creature occupying the fringes of human society, with Aristotle the 
monster becomes a fact of animal reproduction.  
If monstrosity is a condition relative to the eidos of a given animal and not 
to the genos “animal,” then monsters are only ever deformed animals, robbed of 
the necessary particularities of their kind by unruly matter—they do not exist as 
their own distinct kind.  In this way the particularities of humans that serve to 
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distinguish them from other animals cannot be considered monstrous, for they 
are part and parcel of the human eidos.  But if what saves the human from being 
considered a monstrosity, a kind of accident of nature, is in a sense the 
incommensurability of the different animal species, how then can we account for 
various comments Aristotle makes comparing animals to humans in a manner 
that suggests they—not humans—are a kind of deformity?  Aristotle writes that in 
humans alone do “the natural parts hold their natural position,” extending up 
toward the heavens, and that all animals excepting humans are “dwarf-like.”395  
Indeed, Aristotle holds that humans are not only the most natural bipeds, but 
that humans are more (malista) natural than all other animals.396  On the great 
scale of living beings, animals that birth live young are the “highest” in that they 
are the most perfect (teleia), and among these, the human being is the “first” 
(proton).397  To be “first” in this sense is to be the standard from which all other 
kinds deviate, the most complete of animals.   
Humans serve as this standard precisely because of the unique capacities 
they possess: insofar as humans are animals that can think, the capacity to think 
must be considered part of the animal soul.  As only humans think, they are the 
only animal that makes actual all the capacities of the animal soul—they are thus 
the most complete of animals, and insofar as it is nature that has assigned the 
power of thought to the animal soul, humans are likewise the most natural.  
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While different animals may appear to possess capacities that humans do not, 
these are ultimately only particular material instantiations of powers organized 
otherwise among humans.  It is the soul that moves, that imparts to the animal its 
manner of being, and the most complete actualization of the soul in a manner of 
being is that of the human.  By making particular human capacities the standard 
of all animal souls, Aristotle transforms human excess into animal deficiency.  As 
animals do for the most part live, reproduce, and die within the range of 
possibilities enabled by their particular eidos, their deficiencies qua animal are 
no more monstrous than human excess was found to be, yet the kinds of lives 
they are able to live are still held up in contrast to the human.   
In this sense, Aristotle can be seen to extend and transform the view of 
Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things.”  While Aristotle himself rejects 
what he takes to be Protagoras’ view, it is not due to the apparent 
anthropocentrism of the claim.  According to Aristotle, what Protagoras means by 
humans being the measure of all things is that what appears right to each 
individual must be right for that individual—for another to dispute what is right 
for that individual is to attempt to impose one’s own understanding of apparent 
right upon them.  Hence, there is no external arbiter of right, only a world of 
appearances among which humans must decide their own course, and the threat 
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of relativism looms large.398  However, if like Aristotle we hold that appearances 
concern the provinces of imagination and sensation, and what differentiates 
humans from other animals is not these but the capacity for thought, a capacity 
that exceeds the bodily world of appearances and extends toward the divine, then 
the problem with Protagoras’ claim is not that it places humans at the centre of 
the world, but that it places animals there.399  In order for the human being to be 
the measure of all things, or at least, the standard from which all other animals 
are thought to deviate, there must be some fixed point to which the position of 
the human can be anchored.  This point is the divinity of thought, which we will 
recall is for Aristotle infallible.  As only humans are receptive to the thought that 
comes from the outside, not only are they possessed of the fullest range of animal 
capacities, but only they are capable of measuring according to a standard free 
from the particularities of their bodily organs, from their perceptions.  Only 
humans have access to divine thought, and thus only they can strive towards 
infallibility, even if its actual attainment is perhaps impossible.  It is for this 
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reason that “man is the measure of all things”: because of his relation to the 
divine. 
In this manner Aristotle can be said to have tamed to some extent both the 
terrifying power of the gods, and their occasionally monstrous and unruly 
children.  In elevating a kind of pure thought to divine status, Aristotle re-orients 
human beings in their relationship to their world, both natural and supernatural.  
But here it must be asked: at what cost?  That is, there is a certain egalitarianism 
to Protagorean relativism, in which one can discern a possible support for 
democratic practices,400 and perhaps even a kind of accommodation between 
animal species.  With Aristotle, however, the terrain has shifted.  While humans 
are indeed animals, the kind of animal they are makes their place in the natural 
world fundamentally unlike other animals.  We might then ask: are all humans 
equally unlike other animals?  That is, while we might assume from the preceding 
exposition that all humans are capable of being human by virtue of their capacity 
for thought, insofar as there are different kinds of humans, might there be 
different capacities for thought?  Human bodies also differ—to what extent can 
these material or physical differences be said to be evidence of psychic 
differences, and how far can a human deviate from the norm before it must be 
considered monstrous, sharing perhaps more with the animal than with the 
human?  To these questions we presently turn. 
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Chapter Eight: Human Plurality and Inequality 
 
The most well known distinctions drawn between human beings in Aristotle’s 
writings are perhaps those drawn between freemen and slaves, and within this 
distinction, slaves by convention and slaves by nature.  While I would not deny 
the importance of these distinctions to Aristotle’s understanding of politics, in 
keeping with the discussion of Aristotle’s works this far I will place these 
distinctions aside and instead focus upon distinctions between humans that are 
discernible in Aristotle’s non-political writings: specifically, the distinctions 
Aristotle understands to exist between women and men, and between men of a 
“high” and “low” sort. While Aristotle does not organize any of his treatises along 
these lines—that is, he has no treatise “On Women” or “On Higher and Lower 
Sorts”—the particularities of women and other people Aristotle takes to be 
naturally inferior make frequent appearances in Aristotle’s attempts to grasp 
what is proper to human life.  I have consequently set to organizing this chapter 
around what Aristotle has to say about these people in order to better evaluate 
how Aristotle casts the relationship between humans and other animals in terms 
of human plurality.  If humans differ among themselves, do these differences 
have a bearing on that which is held to differentiate humans from other animals 
in general, namely thought and the intellectual capacities?   
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I argue that yes, indeed, Aristotle does not consider humans as an 
undifferentiated block sitting at the apex of the scale of animal life.  Some 
humans are, for Aristotle, more like animals than others according to their 
relation to thought and the intellectual capacities, and in examining these 
different shapes of human life we gain a glimpse of what Aristotle takes to be the 
ideal human being.  This glimpse also reveals the extent to which Aristotle has 
performed a kind of transformation of the values of the world of poetic myth.  
Whereas the great heroes of that world were those who were brought into 
proximity with the gods through their imitation and mastery of animals, for 
Aristotle the divine and the animal are at opposing ends of a hierarchy of the 
living.  Thus according to Aristotle one cannot become godlike by imitating an 
animal, but rather, only by striving toward that which is most divine in human 
beings; that is, by striving toward the knowledge attained through the access to 
divine thought and the actualization of its related capacities. Only through 
thought are humans most divine, and those who are most divine are, unlike in the 
world of poetic myth, least like other animals.  In this way Aristotle’s ideas appear 
to resonate with the Eleatic Stranger of Plato’s Statesman: philosophy comes to 
serve the role played by sacrifice in the world of poetic myth, which we will recall, 
was to establish and uphold the distinction between gods, humans, and animals 
that made possible a certain kind of community.  In occupying the position of 
sacrifice, philosophy thus takes up the mantle against poetry and its blurring of 
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the boundaries drawn and upheld between gods, humans, and animals; however, 
unlike sacrifice, or at least publicly proclaimed sacrifices made on behalf of the 
city, philosophy does not appear to be equally available to all.  That is, the 
divisions between god, human, and animal sanctioned by Aristotelian philosophy 
allow for a hierarchy of humans, between those that stretch closer to the divine, 
and those that wallow or prowl closer to other animals.  Understanding these 
distinctions and the way in which they lay the foundations of political inequality 
is the task of this chapter. 
 
On Sexual Difference 
Aristotle’s thoughts on women and how they differ from men are perhaps as 
notorious as his thoughts on slavery, and like his thoughts on slavery, there is no 
definite consensus on where Aristotle stands.  While most contemporary 
commentators acknowledge a clearly sexist dimension to Aristotle’s biology, there 
is disagreement over how exactly his sexism works, and consequently, how 
deeply it ought to be seen to stain other aspects of his thought.401  Despite these 
differences, however, it is possible to discern a certain prominent tendency, 
wherein Aristotle’s biology is seen as “both misogynist and silly,” yet not a real 
                                                     
401 See Devin M. Henry, “How Sexist Is Aristotle’s Developmental Biology?” Phronesis 52 (2007): 251-
269; and Karen M. Nielsen, “The Private Parts of Animals: Aristotle on the Teleology of Sexual 
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is in fact the basis for his insistence on evaluating the dignity and importance of women more highly than 
did the culture in which he lived” (201).  See Finding the Mean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
199), Ch. 4. 
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threat to other laudable aspects of his thought—only a “grossly flawed application 
of methods” that would, properly applied, reveal the essential similarity between 
both female and male capacities.402  Indeed, it is not Aristotle’s methods or his 
metaphysics that are seen to be at fault, but an inability to adequately separate 
these from his own personal biases and those of his society.403  Moreover, the 
overwhelming majority of differences Aristotle observes between females and 
males—and women and men especially—are differences of material, which 
Aristotle considers less important than differences of soul or form.  In this way 
those that would seek a feminist dimension in Aristotle’s works tend to argue for 
the fundamental similarity of human capacities, while downplaying the relevance 
of differences in material (i.e. bodily differences) and the possible relation of 
those differences to other habits and characteristics Aristotle takes to differ 
between women and men.404  Or in other words, Aristotelian feminism is a 
dimension of Aristotelian humanism.405 
                                                     
402 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Aristotle, Feminism, and Needs for Functioning,” in Feminist Interpretations of 
Aristotle, ed. Cynthia A. Freeland (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 249-250.  
See also The Fragility of Goodness, 371. 
403 Marguerite Deslauriers, “Sex and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Biology,” in Feminist 
Interpretations of Aristotle, 140; Charlotte Witt, “Form, Normativity, and Gender in Aristotle: A Feminist 
Perspective,” in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, 130. 
404 Deslauriers, 155. 
405 “Aristotelian feminism ceases to be concerned with gender issues solely […] I think that American 
feminism is too much propelled by questions of narrow self-interest, too little by a more generous and 
general concern for human functioning” in Nussbaum, “Aristotle, Feminism…”, 256-257.  See also Larry 
Arnhart, “A Sociobiological Defense of Aristotle’s Sexual Politics,” International Political Science Review 
15.4 (1994): 389-415; and James Bernard Murphy, “Aristotle, Feminism, and Biology: A Response to 
Larry Arnhart,” International Political Science Review 15.4 (1994): 417-426. 
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However, as we have already seen, Aristotle’s understanding of the 
relationship between soul and body, between form and matter, and between the 
actual and the potential, knits these terms too closely for there to be the kind of 
distance the above position requires in order for material differences to indicate 
nothing of kind.  While we might agree with Nussbaum that for Aristotle “the 
body is the scene of all our ethical achievements,”406 the body is not a neutral 
support of these achievements, for the very shape and organization of the body 
bears the imprint of the powers of the soul.  Just like the aforementioned child 
that is nothing more than “some kind of animal,” so is the sexless subject of such 
humanism not a human at all: it is rather, by Aristotle’s lights, a monster.  As we 
have seen, monsters are for Aristotle those instances where, contrary to nature, 
the matter is unable to adequately reflect the form—where the body has been 
unable to convey the powers of the soul in their minute particularity.  In this 
sense, women evade monstrosity only by being consistently reproduced, but if 
they are not monsters, but a natural kind of “deformity,” then the implication is 
that they are either of another kind (eidos) than men, or that within the same 
human eidos there are souls that more closely conform to that eidos, and those 
that do not.  If some souls can be considered better actualizations of the form 
than others, we can expect the bodies of those souls to differ also. 
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In his biological writings Aristotle gives an account of a great many 
physical differences between women and men: here I will examine only a small 
number of these, choosing those that I think reflect important structural features 
in Aristotle’s account of the human body and that imply differences of the soul.  
Women, according to Aristotle, have more blood than any other animal, and their 
blood is thicker and darker than the blood of men.407  Women are less muscular, 
have thinner bones, less resilient flesh and are generally smaller and more 
delicate than men.408  Women also have smaller brains than men, and fewer 
sutures on their skulls.409  Females develop more slowly in the womb than males, 
and more quickly than their male counterparts after birth, ultimately living 
shorter lives.  Moreover, women pregnant with females tend more frequently to 
suffer pain and various complications with their pregnancies.410  These 
differences cannot simply be dismissed as “silly,” even in cases where their falsity 
can more or less easily be demonstrated,411 as the point is not their veracity, but 
rather, how these material differences serve to compose the particularity 
necessary to be a human being, and in so doing, inscribe this human into a set of 
relations that is anything but politically irrelevant.   
                                                     
407 HA III.19 521a23-28. 
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For instance, recall that in differentiating humans from other animals, 
Aristotle held that while hot, thick blood was conducive to strength, cool, thin 
blood was conducive to intelligence.  Human blood is a kind of balance between 
the two, being both hot and thin, and in this manner conducive to sensation, 
movement, and intelligence.  If women have thicker blood than men, then in this 
way they are, like beasts of burden, more sluggish than men, a little less well 
equipped for dexterous movements and sensation.  These points are underscored 
by other bodily traits: soft muscles and thin bones are poor supports of 
movement and activity,412 just as flaccid flesh does not stimulate sensation and 
the powers of discrimination.   
That women are held to have smaller brains is also significant to the 
translation of psychic capacities into matter, though not in the way we might 
think today.  Recall that brains for Aristotle do not think, but serve to cool the 
body.  Women are naturally cooler than men, and consequently do not require 
brains of the same size; for this same reason, their skulls have fewer sutures, for 
less heat emanates up from the region of the heart and lung before exiting 
through the top of the head.413  This last point is the most important: the skull 
and the brain are as they are in women due to their lack of heat, and it is precisely 
the heat in the soul that serves to differentiate “high” and “low” along Aristotle’s 
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scale of animal life.414  As the soul moves the body, and heat is a motive force, 
bodies that are larger or more dexterous must have souls with more heat.  As it is 
through the soul that the form of a living thing is imparted to its matter, material 
differences between living things can be taken to suggest differences in soul.  
Insofar as women and men have consistently different levels of vital heat, then it 
would appear the only explanation within the edifice of Aristotle’s biology is that 
they possess psychic differences, and that their bodily differences are something 
like the effects of these differences.   
As Aristotle treats both women and men as anthropos, making them 
variations of the same kind (eidos) of animal, that there are identifiable 
consistencies between women and men linked to the heat of the soul suggests a 
range of unequal psychic possibilities within the sphere of a single eidos.415  In 
this way we might think of Aristotle’s distinction between women and men to 
mirror the distinction between humans and other animals: just as humans are 
animals possessed of souls which most perfectly express animal possibilities, so 
do men, according to Aristotle, more perfectly express human possibilities than 
do women.416  The great scale of animal life does not simply stop at humans as 
one undifferentiated block, superior to all other animals, but rather, certain 
                                                     
414 Recall OYOA 19.13 477a18-20.  See also LSL 5 466b15; GA II.1 732a16-20. 
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humans are higher—and thus more unlike other animals—than others.  Just as 
humans possess bodies more attuned to the needs of thought and the intellectual 
capacities than other animals, so do men, though presumably to a lesser degree, 
possess bodies more attuned to the needs of thought and the intellectual 
capacities than do women.  This point is further emphasized by the idea that 
women develop unevenly and are generally less healthy when pregnant with 
females rather than males: being pregnant with a female is almost like being ill, 
for females are, as Aristotle puts most brutally, a kind of mutilated 
(peperomenon) male, a natural deformity (anaperian).417  For this reason 
Aristotle will also compare women to boys, for both are, following this logic, 
underdeveloped men.418  Yet while children are, like other animals in comparison 
to humans, “dwarf-like” in their disproportioned bodies and their inability to 
stand properly erect, boys will one day be men, while women, presumably, will 
not.  Thus the “footprints” (ichne) or seeds of the fully developed human can be 
found in the animality of the child, especially a boy, while a woman represents a 
different instantiation of the human animal.419 
Aristotle also uses character traits to reinforce the distinction he draws 
between female and male, and in the History of Animals he gives a fairly 
extensive list of these traits.  Though Deslauriers argues that Aristotle offers no 
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theoretical account of these differences and gives no evidence that they have any 
connection with organs or capacities,420 a certain consistency between these traits 
can be deciphered and related to Aristotle’s more general definition of “female” 
that suggests otherwise.  For instance, Aristotle holds that the females in most 
species tend to be less “spirited” (athumotera) and less courageous than their 
male counterparts, while also being more impulsive, mischievous, and “softer in 
disposition” (malakotera).  These differences are most visible in animals with the 
most developed characters, and, unsurprisingly at this point, Aristotle holds that 
human beings possess the most (malista) developed of animal characters.  In 
addition to these character traits women are thought to be more compassionate, 
more tearful, more jealous, more querulous, less hopeful, less moved by shame, 
more prone to lying and deception, less active, and possessed of better 
memories.421   
While these traits might seem to be little more than a catalogue of the 
gender stereotypes prevalent in Aristotle’s society, like Aristotle’s comments on 
female anatomy, they cannot simply be dismissed.  What all these traits have in 
common is their passivity: they are all changing reactions to or impressions 
received from the mutable objects of the sensual world, concerned with the 
spheres of sensation and imagination, and to varying degrees distant from 
thought and the intellectual powers.  As Aristotle defines the male as “that which 
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generates in another” and the female “that which generates in itself,” he thus 
assigns an active or creative principle (poietikon) to the male, whose semen is 
thought to bear the form as psychic principle, and a passive (pathetikon) 
principle to the female, whose discharge serves as the matter that the soul will 
use to form itself.422  Aristotle will even compare this process to the arts: the male 
is the demiourgon, the craftsman or artist, whose activity serves as the 
appropriate techne in shaping the female matter into a human being.  Male 
activity and female passivity represent different capacities (dunamin), and it is 
according to these capacities that one is male or female.423  As humans are male 
or female according to these capacities, then it must be that they are male or 
female according to differences in the soul, as bodily and character differences 
are expressions of the soul, and the soul is the seat of the capacities.  Thus when 
Aristotle equates the first principle of movement in generation with the male, and 
claims it to be better (beltion) and more divine (theioteron) than female 
matter,424 he is not simply repeating the stereotypes particular to his society, but 
rather, he is refining them into a coherent system of thought.  While this system 
remains rough in many places—as noted by Deslauriers, Aristotle does not 
explicitly connect female characters to female organs and capacities in one and 
the same text—he leaves a well-defined gestalt that strongly implies their 
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relation, and which to deny seems something akin to refusing to see the forest for 
the trees. 
That Aristotle’s biology outlines a natural basis for sexual inequality does 
not, however, mean that women are for Aristotle utterly incapable of partaking in 
the activities that define men as men.  The “higher” animals are for Aristotle 
more “independent (autarkestera) in their nature (phusin),”425 the implication 
here being that activities of certain “higher” animals are more complex and to a 
greater degree open to contingencies than “lower” animals.  Or in other words, 
the activities of “higher” animals at least are not prescribed in a determinate way 
by nature; moreover, as we have already seen, “nature” itself is frequently used by 
Aristotle to mean something akin to “that which holds for the most part” and not 
“that which is necessary in all cases.”  In this way we might expect the activity of 
certain animals to vary, not only within their own natures, but even to the point 
of being capable of living in ways contrary to nature.  Such is the case with certain 
domestic animals, which come to breed in all seasons, like humans, owing to the 
availability of food and shelter.426  Similarly, Aristotle writes of the change in 
gelded animals: through the mutilation of only one organ, the entire bodily 
nature of the animal is changed, and the male takes on a female nature.427  And 
perhaps most surprisingly, Aristotle also notes that certain hens, through changes 
in their activities (prattein), come to change their characters (ethe) to such an 
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extent as to be almost identical to males.  According to Aristotle, if a hen beats a 
cock in a fight, she will imitate the cock by crowing and attempting to tread him—
Aristotle even claims that the crest on the hen’s head and the tail-feathers on its 
rump will rise up, and in some cases the bird will even grow spurs.428   
While Aristotle’s account here seems again to sound much like a folktale, it 
is not without basis in his philosophy.  Aristotle writes that actuality is logically 
prior to potentiality429: it is the actual that determines the potential, and the 
actual is form, the potential the matter, and in living things, the form is conveyed 
to the matter through the soul.  The soul thus stands on the side of actuality, and 
as we have seen, the soul is activity.430  Consequently changes in the activity of 
the animal compel, at least in the case of hens, a change in the matter necessary 
to support this activity, just as an absence of the necessary matter to support a 
given activity makes that activity impossible (i.e. the case of gelded animals).  It is 
unclear how broad the conclusions from these examples might range.  While 
Aristotle is clear in his example of the hen that this account concerns birds, and 
no explicit attempt is made to connect such changes to humans, if humans are 
indeed “higher” animals and these animals have greater “independence” from 
their natures, then one might expect an even greater degree of variety in forms of 
life that serve to confuse the natural categories in which human life is organized, 
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even those apparently so basic as female and male.  Then again, the opposite also 
seems plausible.  Insofar as humans have the most developed characters of any 
animal, making the differences between female and male more complete and 
visible in humans, the perfection of the human eidos, as the standard of all other 
animals, might actually serve to impede further transformations.   
Regardless of the potential fluidity of the categories of female and male 
according to changes in the activities undertaken by the soul, for Aristotle, 
women and men are unequal instantiations of the human form and their 
inequalities stem from capacities in the soul.  Thus, while humans are capable of 
a wide variety of forms of life, they are not all capable of the same things in equal 
measure, and for Aristotle, some are decidedly better than others.  Specifically, 
those that are better, those that live more in-keeping with the possibilities 
available particularly to humans as humans, are closer to thought and the 
intellectual capacities, while others are closer to other animals.  In order to better 
understand the inequalities among humans and how these relate to the human 
animal distinction, we must consequently look to other kinds of human beings. 
 
‘Low Sorts’ and the Physical Features of the Best Human 
We have seen that Aristotle takes the bodily differences between women and men 
to indicate differences in their respective psychic capacities.  However, while 
sexual difference is clearly an important distinction for human life as Aristotle 
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understands it, not all of the great variety of bodily differences that compose 
human beings can be attributed to differences of sex.  We must now ask: if the 
particular physical traits that serve to distinguish a female body from a male one 
can indicate, at least in humans, a psychic difference, do all, or at least other, 
physical differences between humans likewise indicate psychic differences?  In 
the following I will attempt to show that while Aristotle does not take every 
physical particularity among human bodies to indicate a difference in psychic 
capacity, he does link a number of such differences with character traits.  Using 
these pairings of physical and character traits, it is possible to build a kind of 
“physical model” of the good person; that is, it is possible to construct archetypes 
of what a bad and good person ought to look like, and so gain a more detailed 
picture of the Aristotelian ideal, and how this relates to thought and animality. 
 We will recall that the human face, though similar to the face of an ape, 
must for Aristotle be considered unique thanks to the human capacity for 
thought, which, through the articulation of thought through the voice in 
language, serves to give the human face its particular features.  In a similar vein, 
Aristotle associates certain general differences between faces with character 
traits.  People with large foreheads are considered “slow” (braduteroi), while 
those with small foreheads are quick (eukinetoi); those with broad foreheads tend 
to be easily distraught (ekstatikoi), while those with rounded foreheads are likely 
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to be spirited (thumikoi).431  While green eyes are a sign of both good vision and 
the best disposition (beltistou), narrow eyes are a sign of a bad disposition 
(kakoetheias), particularly if where the upper and lower eyelids meet near the 
nose is fleshy.  Moreover, eyes that blink repeatedly are a sign of indecision, while 
eyes that stare indicate impudence—the best (beltistou) is the mean between 
these two, neither blinking excessively, nor staring.432  People with large ears that 
stick out are prone to “irrelevant talk” (morologias) or “chattering” (adoleschias), 
while the best people (beltistou) have medium-sized ears sticking out from their 
heads at a medium position.  Likewise, the best tongue, capable of the clearest 
articulation, is that which is medium in size and width.433   
In addition to these descriptions of the face, Aristotle also adds that people 
with flat feet are prone to wickedness (panourgoi).434  Aristotle also links the 
pitch of the voice and its development in boys to their sexual habits, even 
claiming that men who fail to moderate their lusts never reach their full bodily 
development, and tend to age more quickly than other men.435  Voices that break 
too quickly thus never develop in the manner appropriate to men, which is to be 
deep, and this depth Aristotle considers superior to the high-pitched.436  Lastly, 
just as the superior intelligence and powers of discrimination of humans were 
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seen above to depend upon our superior sense of touch, which were in turn 
supported by our soft flesh, so among humans, Aristotle holds that those with the 
softest flesh are better equipped for the activities that constitute thinking 
(dianoian) than those whose flesh is hard.437  Again, while Aristotle’s account 
appears to compile a list of culturally specific stereotypes, before such an 
accusation can be leveled, we must first look at the physical differences Aristotle 
does not appear to consider relevant indicators of character or psychic 
differences. 
 Regardless of whatever racial stereotypes may have prevailed in Aristotle’s 
day, and quite unlike modern racism, Aristotle appears to invest very little 
meaning in skin color.  Though Aristotle, in the general comments on human 
beings that appear throughout his works, will frequently refer to “white” (leukos) 
as a common human property,438 and thus serve to communicate his own idea of 
what color a human typically is, there is little evidence to suggest a kind of 
hierarchy of skin colors like the hierarchies he establishes between other 
differences.  To begin with, leukos is used not only for white, but also to indicate 
that something is more generally “light;” its opposing term, melanos, more 
typically indicates “dark” rather than “black,” though Aristotle will also make 
specific reference to Ethiopians as melanon anthropon.  At any rate, the 
gradation of shades existing between light and dark does not map itself onto 
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distinctions like Greek and barbarian, and Aristotle’s references to Ethiopians are 
used as evidence concerning general human traits, such as the color of bones, 
teeth, and semen439—he says nothing about Ethiopians in terms of any psychic 
differences they may possess as Ethiopians. 
Aristotle does, however, correlate other physical properties with light and 
dark.  For instance, he claims people with lighter skin, both male and female, 
produce a greater quantity of discharge during sex.  Given that Aristotle considers 
humans to emit the greatest discharge of any animal relative to its size, we might 
be tempted here to see in this claim an attempt to justify lighter skinned people 
as the standard of what is properly human. However, Aristotle claims that this 
quantity can be made to vary through diet, thus making the difference external 
and contingent, as opposed to a difference in capacity that would indicate a 
psychic difference.440  Moreover, he claims that women with darker skin produce 
healthier milk,441 which seems to be out of a step with a notion of people with 
darker skin being a kind of deviance from the norm of light skin.  We can find the 
reason for these assertions in what Aristotle takes to be the cause of whiteness: 
vaporous air.442   
According to Aristotle, when the matter that composes a thing, even 
something like human skin, has a high water content, it tends to be lighter in 
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color, while objects with lower water content tend to be darker.  It is for this 
reason that lighter skinned people emit a greater discharge, and that this amount 
varies according to diet, as lighter skinned people are held to possess a greater 
amount of water in their bodies to begin with, and this amount can be augmented 
by eating foods with high water content.  It is likewise for this reason that the 
people in hot and dry regions have darker skin, and why Ethiopians have curly 
hair, for the sun and the wind darkens the skin, and dryness curls the hair.443  
Thus, while heat determines the nature of the skin and the hair, Aristotle seems 
to hold that these differences between the color of skin and the texture of hair are 
not differences of the heat in the soul, which would indicate a difference of 
position along the animal scale, but differences of heat in the external 
environment, which are contingent and variable in a way that does not 
necessarily effect the movements of the soul.  In this light, despite his frequent 
pairing of leukos and its cognates with “human,” it is unsurprising that Aristotle 
will claim that being leukon is “accidental” to human beings, for it does not 
appear to have a bearing on human nature.444  
 Aristotle’s thoughts on hair and skin color serve to give some perspective 
to his pairing of certain physical and character traits. That is, Aristotle’s 
comments about the shape of eyes and ears ought not to be dismissed as the 
repetition of his society’s stereotypes, for he is quite willing to reject received 
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wisdom where he can satisfactorily demonstrate it to be false.445  Rather, it would 
appear that insofar as human activities that are directed by and compose the soul 
must occur in a certain environment, they are subject to the variety of material 
contingencies of that environment.  These contingencies are capable of physically 
altering bodies, and in so doing, altering the capacities of a soul as we have seen 
above, but not all physical alterations alter the soul. The shape and position of 
eyes, ears, and tongue, along with the resiliency of the flesh, are all important 
material supports for the psychic powers of sensation, discrimination, and 
intelligence, bending as they do toward the divinity of thought.  Even flat feet, 
which to an extent inhibit movement, and the shape of the forehead, which takes 
it shape from the skull and which we have seen to be molded by the heat rising up 
from the heart and lung, suggest psychic differences.  Skin color apparently does 
not suggest a psychic difference, for Aristotle notes no evidence that it either 
limits or enhances some capacity.   
Insofar as a physical trait is seen to be caused by a psychic capacity, it can 
be paired with a character trait.  Characters are the products of habits, and habits 
are particular tendencies in activity.  The soul, as we have already is seen, is 
activity.  Thus character traits concern the habitual activity of a soul, which is 
both caused by and causes in turn psychic capacities.  That is, Aristotle thinks it 
likely that a good character follows from a good soul, for a good soul is one 
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endowed with the fullest capacities available to a human, which for Aristotle 
means to be most attuned toward thought and the intellectual capacities.  Insofar 
as the activity of a soul is directed by thinking it will produce the kind of 
character most likely to engage in the fullest activity of the soul: like the body that 
is shaped by the soul in the manner best suited to support the activity that makes 
that soul the kind of soul that it is, so is character shaped by the soul in order to 
support the kind of activity that makes the soul the kind that it is.  Both a good 
body and a good character are necessary for a good soul to be a good soul, and 
therefore a defect in body or character can, to an extent, serve to inhibit the 
powers of the soul, denying it the fullest range of activity available to a soul of its 
kind.  In this way, certain physical traits can be seen to indicate particularities of 
character, and these can be seen as expressions of the quality of a given soul.446   
From the above descriptions we can therefore begin to discern the 
appearance of Aristotle’s ideal human: male, with a low voice, rounded forehead, 
green eyes, ears of medium size and position, a medium sized tongue, soft flesh, 
and arched feet.  Though this list is short, vague, and presumably open to some 
variation—nowhere to my knowledge does Aristotle make these traits actual 
criteria for anything—it nevertheless does paint a picture of what Aristotle thinks 
the best pupil, and perhaps also philosopher or ruler, should look like.  In giving 
such a particular outline of what Aristotle takes to be the best human being, we 
                                                     
446 On this point see Judith A. Swanson, “Aristotle on Nature, Human Nature, and Justice,” in Action and 
Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, eds. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan 
D. Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 227-228. 
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may here get the feeling of having painted an ancient Greek statue—accustomed 
as we are to seeing Aristotle’s best human being stripped down to practice and 
habit, work and virtue, it may offend our aesthetic sensibilities to see the grey on 
grey of the soul clad so garishly in the colors of bodily matter.  Yet, just as statues 
were in Aristotle’s time painted, so is his ideal of the best human being so 
physically adorned, and to deny or trivialize this is to overlook the bodily 
dimension of his thought—that is, the aesthetic dimension of his thought— and 
the way in which the activities of the soul serve to distinguish themselves among 
others. 
 
Conclusion: Knowledge, Sensation, Animality, and Art 
Before I might conclude Part II, one more dimension of Aristotle’s thought 
concerning the best kind of human being remains to be examined in order for our 
portrait to be complete: the particular relation of the best humans to thought, 
and the kind of relationship this legitimizes between different human beings.  In 
his Metaphysics, Aristotle makes a distinction between people with experience 
(empeiroi), and people with knowledge (eidotos).  While experience may often 
have the appearance of science (episteme) or art (techne), Aristotle holds it to be 
different in that the capacity for experience is produced by memory: experience is 
a kind of narrative forged out of “many memories” (pollai mnemai), and as such, 
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does not extend to the “why”—it cannot grasp causes.447  Knowledge, on the other 
hand, like art and science, concerns causes, and as such, is turned toward the 
most (malista) general (katholou), attempting to know all particular things in 
this general way.448  Herein lays their key difference: experience depends on 
memory, and memory on sensation (aisthesis), while knowledge of the general is 
farthest from sensation.  Unlike experience, then, knowledge possesses a kind of 
life independent of the knower, and as such can be taught, while experience 
remains bound up with the senses of the person.  It is thus the mark of the 
knower to be capable of teaching; one without knowledge can, at best, hope to 
become a pupil. 
However, the inequality between the person of knowledge and the person 
of experience goes deeper than simply teacher and pupil.  Though Aristotle 
appears to suggest in the Metaphysics that the chain of “many memories” needed 
for experience is particular to human beings, writing that animals other than 
humans “have little connected experience,”449 we have seen above that in other 
writings Aristotle indicates otherwise: memory, imagination, and sensation are 
all capacities humans share with numerous other animals.  In the light of these 
writings, nothing that Aristotle says about experience in these passages from the 
Metaphysics suggests it to be a power particular to humans. Moreover, Aristotle 
does not appear to hold memory in such high regard: it is the power of 
                                                     
447 Meta. I.1 980b26-981a5; 981a27-28. 
448 Meta. I.2 982a21-25. 
449 Meta. I.1 980b26-27. 
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recollection (anamnesis), not memory (mnemne), that is particular to humans—
not only does Aristotle assign a greater power of memory to women, but he also 
claims that “slow people” (bradeis) have better memories, while the “quick-
witted and clever” tend to excel at recollecting.450  Thus it would appear that the 
activity of the experienced person has much in common with other animals, 
drawing upon basically the same capacities as they do, while the activity of the 
knowledgeable person, being farthest from the senses, leads away from the 
animal toward independent knowledge, and is thus more properly human.  Like 
manual workers (cheirotechnon), the experienced people act without knowing 
what they do, just “as fire burns,” following their habits as the inanimate follow 
natural compulsion, while knowledgeable people, like master-workers 
(architektonas), act in light of the causes, and thus know in the truer sense.451  As 
one can only ever be a pupil, and so receive the instruction of a knowledgeable 
person, if one is properly habituated to do so,452 insofar as the experienced 
blindly follow their habits many lack even the capacity to learn: instead, they 
must obey.453 
 In this manner Aristotle draws a distinction between people according to 
their relation to knowledge, making the knowledgeable the rulers of those 
possessing only experience.  Moreover, the knowledgeable are more completely 
                                                     
450 OM 1 449b6-8. 
451 Meta. I.1 981a27-981b4. 
452 “The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits” (Meta. II.3 994b31). 
453 Meta I.2 982a18-19. 
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or distinctly human than those who possess only experience, as their knowledge 
is closer to the independence of divine thought, while human experience remains 
within the sphere of capacities humans share with certain other animals.  We 
must then see Aristotle’s earlier pronouncements on the physical appearance of 
the best human in this light: there is a certain animality in the large forehead, the 
narrowed eyes, and the large and turned-out ears of some people—it is as if what 
is human in them has not mastered what is animal, unlike the features of the best 
sort, which clearly indicate the distinction of the human.  And indeed, this is the 
conclusion we ought to draw concerning the major distinctions between human 
beings Aristotle examines in his non-political writings: some humans are more 
perfectly human than others.  These are more perfectly human thanks to their 
relation with the divinity of thought, which depends not only upon good habits 
and education, but the quality of their souls, which, to a certain extent, is revealed 
in their physical appearance.  Those who can be called less than perfectly human 
bear a greater resemblance to animals than their betters, and like animals, must 
accept their rule.  But how are they to be ruled?  Such a question would appear to 
be answerable only by appeal to notions of justice, which are not broached either 
in the Metaphysics, or in Aristotle’s biological works. 
 So it is that we must return to Aristotle’s more conventionally political 
works, and the statement with which my examination of Aristotle began: that “a 
human being is by nature a political animal.”  In asking after what Aristotle 
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means by an animal, and consequently, by a human being, and reconstructing 
Aristotle’s discussion of the natural differences that serve as marks of distinction 
between human beings and between humans and other animals, we must note 
the extent to which these distinctions have depended upon analogies to the arts.  
It is the capacity of sensation (aisthesis) that separates an animal from a plant, 
and it is its dependence on sensation (aisthesis) that separates experience from 
knowledge.  That is, it would appear animal life is aesthetically bound, and the 
knowledge that exceeds the animal in the direction of the divine is itself a kind of 
art: it is as a kind of master-worker that the wise are able to grasp causes and so 
transcend the experience of the simple laborer, and it is as a kind of demiurge 
that the male is in principle superior to the female.   
These differences are natural for Aristotle in that nature too, is a kind of 
artist, and to be more natural, as the most perfectly developed human is, is to 
imitate this artistic capacity.  In this way, we are thrown back upon the claim I 
made in the first chapter, that surely as aesthetics imply a kind of anthropology, 
so does anthropology imply a kind of aesthetic.  Aristotle’s attempts to separate 
what is uniquely human from what humans share with other animals, and the 
way in which what is uniquely human is thought to shape virtually everything 
about what is human, right down to numerous physical details we might 
otherwise consider trivial, are deeply dependent on aesthetics, not only in the 
literal sense of aisthesis, but in the sense as that which pertains to the arts.  
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Aristotle’s considerations of art in his Poetics, along with the various practices 
that compose political life, also deeply concern themselves with the production of 
men most like Aristotle’s ideal type, and that the best life is as such inseparable 
from a beautiful life.   
In this sense, while Aristotle’s biological works serve to turn the world of 
poetic myth upside down through a radical re-conceptualization of the human-
animal distinction, what has persisted through this overturning is a certain 
relation between the human-animal distinction and the arts.  While we have seen 
how Aristotle would, like Plato, challenge poetry as the authoritative mode of 
knowledge, unlike Plato, Aristotle systematically applies his philosophy to the 
knowledge available to him concerning humans and other animals, thus making 
philosophy the arbiter of their distinction in a way Plato never does.  In this sense 
Aristotle moves decisively beyond Plato on the question of the human-animal 
distinction; however, the influence of the arts return in the metaphors he uses to 
describe the world he articulates in his philosophy.  Thus, while the natural world 
may be according to Aristotle ordered from best down to worst, from god, to 
humans, to less complex animals, down to plants, the intelligibility of this world, 
and even the roles played by different creatures therein, are thoroughly woven 
together with ideas taken from the arts and the artifice they represent.  Thus 
questions of how to establish a community within this world, who to include and 
exclude among these animals, and how to rule them—namely: the urquestions of 
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politics—are inseparable from questions of the arts and the ways of doing, 
making, and judging of which they are composed.  Aristotle’s statement that the 
human is by nature a political animal designates the human as a being whose 
nature points toward artifice, and thus whose politics are inextricable from art.  
In this light, in Part III I will consider Aristotle’s Poetics along with his 
conventional political works in an attempt to grasp how Aristotle’s particular 
theorization of the human-animal distinction and its relation to art can be seen to 
translate itself into political thought. 
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Part III.  
Art, Politics, and the Best Human Life in Aristotle 
 
Introduction 
In Part II, the anthropological invariant thought to lie at the base of the Western 
tradition and its understanding of both art and politics exemplified in Aristotle’s 
claim that “a human being is by nature a political animal,” provided the impetus 
to re-examine Aristotle’s biological writings and ask what, for Aristotle, is an 
animal in the first place?  Here it was found that most generally, an animal is a 
living creature bound by sensation or aisthesis—it is through sensation that 
animal life surpasses the potential of plant life, and it is through the inability to 
move beyond this realm of sensation, to know more than what might be made 
available to a soul through sensation, that merely animal life falls short of human 
life.  Insofar as humans are themselves constituted through sensation in myriad 
ways, they too, are animals.  
However, what Aristotle considers to be most uniquely human is a 
particular relation to divine thought, which endows humans with capacities that 
allow them to reach beyond other animals, making them privy to knowledge that 
surpasses the realm of sensation.  Thus politics or art would be exclusive to 
human beings only insofar as they might be based on this divine thought.  Yet 
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Aristotle does not consider politics or the arts as they are usually practiced to 
exceed the realm of sensation in this way; rather, without specific intervention, 
they remain bound up with capacities humans share with other animals.  Thus, 
the thinkers who take Aristotle to lie at the source of a tradition where politics is 
based on a philosophical anthropology—that is, on a theory of human capacities—
have neglected important aspects of his thought.  Political activity is not for 
Aristotle an exclusively human activity: politics itself is possible among a wide 
range of animals and can be said to be human politics only where it is directly 
related to the uniquely human capacities.  Thus, we might say that politics for 
Aristotle appears to lie on a zoological invariant, in that it is always practiced by 
some kind of animal, but this alone does not make politics human.  
Yet here we might ask: if what is most human is divine thought and the 
capacities most closely associated with it, and politics and the arts (that is, the 
different crafts concerned with the performance of the activities that compose 
human society) are for the most part not based on divine thought, then the 
majority of human beings are not, by Aristotle’s lights, as human as they take 
themselves to be—or more pointedly, as human as some.  That is, most humans 
spend their lives engaged in activities that are only human in an indirect sense, 
actually bearing in many cases greater similarity to other animals than to what is 
most uniquely human. This fact becomes a problem when seen next to Aristotle’s 
claim that the knowledge that surpasses sensation ought to be authoritative—that 
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it must be in a position to command or to order (epitattein), and not be 
persuaded by those lacking such knowledge.454  Truly human politics, then, 
would need to incorporate the human relation to divine thought, and not all 
humans could be expected to participate in it—at least not all to the same extent.   
This claim seems to imply that the best community would be one where 
knowledge is enthroned, not unlike Plato’s Kallipolis.  Such a view would run 
contrary to much of the literature on Aristotle and the understanding of his 
politics: Aristotle is by most accounts taken to be the more practical or pragmatic 
of the two philosophers, a thinker eminently concerned with actually existing 
regimes and the possibilities available to each in their own specificity, not “castles 
in the sky” like Kallipolis.  Recent work has even gone to some lengths in 
appreciating the democratic elements of Aristotle’s political thought, though 
most stop short of arguing that Aristotle was himself a supporter of democracy.455  
However, these positions do not, to my mind, sufficiently account for what 
Aristotle has to say about biology, or about art.  This is not to say, however, that 
Aristotle is in fact advocating a regime quite like Kallipolis.  Rather, as I shall 
argue, it is the regime Aristotle calls “polity” (politeia) that proves itself most 
suitable to what is best in human life, and this is a life of contemplation, for it is 
                                                     
454 Recall Meta. I.2 982a18-19. 
455 See for instance, Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
David Keyt, “Arsitotle and Anarchism,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, ed. Richard Kraut & Steven 
Skultety (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005); Josiah Ober, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in 
Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays; Steven C. Skultety, “Competition in the Best of Cities: Agonism and 
Aristotle’s Politics,” Political Theory 37.1 (2009): 44-68; Jeremy Waldron, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: 
Some Reflections on Book III, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays. 
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contemplation that most completely actualizes the human capacity for divine 
thought.  Yet polity only makes this life possible by using the arts to integrate the 
natural inequalities Aristotle discovers in his biology in a manner that allows 
each to flourish to the extent their natures allow.  In this sense, it is the arts, 
specifically those of tragedy and of politics, which make the life that is naturally 
best for a human being possible. 
Aristotle’s biology, as we have seen, suggests that humans are only unique 
among animals due to their relation with the divine.  This relation not only makes 
possible the other capacities that Aristotle understands to be uniquely human, 
but serves even to organize the human body, to give shape to the matter of which 
the human body is composed.  Thus the particularities of human anatomy have 
their source in the human capacity for divine thought.  Yet insofar as humans do 
not all share equally in this capacity for divine thought, that is, that better and 
worse souls exist within the sphere of a single eidos, defects or deformities of this 
anatomy can be considered evidence of a worse soul, evidence that one is 
naturally phaulos. One who is “base” in this manner, a “low sort,” bears more in 
common with other animals than what is best in humans.  In this way, it appears 
Aristotle imports aesthetic judgments into his biology, with political 
consequences: physical features considered beautiful or ugly according to 
aesthetic standards can be said to indicate something of the soul, and so one’s 
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relation to divine thought, and consequently one’s humanity, and with these one’s 
place in the political community.   
The consequences of this are potentially far-reaching in terms of the 
direction of contemporary political thought.  While it is easy to dismiss what 
Aristotle considers the best physical features as no more than either a quirk or a 
reflection of the standards of physical beauty of his society, if art is not simply the 
product of human capacities, but the nature of human capacities is likewise 
recognized through art, then the reversals of the priority of art and human 
attempted by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their progeny—that humans do not make 
art, but art makes humans—are without the force they were thought to have, for a 
version of this idea is already contained within Aristotle.  In this sense, rather 
than overturning the place of “Man” in the Western tradition and ridding it of the 
“anthropological invariant” upon which it was built, these thinkers have instead 
brought to light an un-recognized aspect of this tradition, one that does not so 
much as go beyond or behind Aristotle, but rather attempts to radicalize certain 
elements of Aristotle’s thought. 
 If art and standards of beauty distilled from artistic practices already 
shape what Aristotle understands to be to an extent innate to the best human 
being—i.e., his physical features—then art and its standards must also be 
understood to shape the source of these features and the best human being: they 
must shape nature.  That is, if “a human being is by nature a political animal,” 
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and what is known of nature and its workings is impossible to grasp without 
reference to artifice, the nature that makes humans political, and the arts that 
serve this same function, come to coincide.  While the statement that “a human 
being is by nature a political animal” suggests that the human is among the 
animals naturally in need of or at least prone to the artifice of politics, if nature is 
itself a reflection of our arts, then to say the human being is naturally one way or 
another is already to say that the human being has been created to be one way or 
another: in this way human nature is inseparable from artifice, its condition of 
intelligibility.  If all that can be known and conceptualized of the workings of 
nature is mediated through our understandings of our own arts, then what we 
call nature is a kind of reflection of artistic practices, which is then taken as an 
autonomous power upon which the arts are modeled.456  The arts thus create and 
subsequently alienate that which will become their own standard and limit: it is 
really art that posits the nature upon which the arts are modeled, and in this 
sense art in Aristotle is the most sovereign creative force, as it is in Nietzsche and 
in Heidegger, only that in Aristotle this artistic power goes unrecognized.  
In this light, Aristotle’s conception of nature, which has proved so 
influential in the development of western thought, can in fact be seen to conceal 
within it the creative power of the arts: this autonomous and overarching 
conception of nature is in fact a kind of reification of artistic powers, a point 
                                                     
456 For Aristotle, that nature both tends toward some purpose (eneka), and the fact that it can fail in 
achieving its purpose, are ideas taken from art (techne): as art has purpose, yet makes mistakes, so does 
nature.  See Physics (Phys.) II.8 199b30; 199a33-199b1. These points are further developed below. 
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betrayed by Aristotle’s reliance upon metaphors drawn from the arts.  While one 
might be tempted to dismiss these metaphors as ornaments Aristotle adopts in 
order to better communicate with his perceived audience, that poetic metaphors 
in Aristotle’s work are otherwise relatively infrequent ought to give one pause.  If 
the Aristotle we encounter in his writings is one who appears to address his 
audience directly, then we might understand his use of metaphors to reflect a 
difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, of conveying his ideas in any other way.457  
Moreover, Aristotle claims in his Poetics that good metaphors allow one to “see” 
or theoretically grasp (theorein) similarity within difference, and that poetry 
itself, like philosophy, attempts to express universals.458  If metaphors serve an 
important role in poetry, and poetry can express universals, it does not seem like 
such a leap to think universals might be grasped through metaphor.  In fact, we 
might consider this an important difference between poetry and philosophy: that 
poetry seeks to grasp indirectly through metaphor what philosophy would grasp 
directly through argumentation.  While philosophy for Aristotle remains the 
higher of the two disciplines, this general superiority should not preclude the 
possibility of there being spheres of knowledge in which poetic expression is 
more appropriate, or in some cases, the only possible form of expression.  
  Thus it might be said that the metaphors drawn from the arts that 
Aristotle uses to describe natural processes are constitutive of these processes—
                                                     
457 NE I.3 1094b12-14. 
458 Poetics 22, 1459a6-8; 9, 1451b5-10. 
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not simply ornamental speech “tacked on” to natural phenomena for the 
purposes of communication.  In this sense it is possible to claim that rather than 
grasp the degree to which humans create themselves through the activities that 
compose their societies, Aristotle associates this creative force with a power that 
stands beyond humans, a force which they can at best try to imitate in order to 
mold it to some degree toward their own aims (aims which this force has itself 
given them).459  In this way, the overarching conception of nature that 
underwrites both Aristotle’s studies of biology and of politics is ultimately 
dependent on the arts: it is the arts that serve to create the human animal in the 
way that he is created, and so it is the arts that serve both to make the human 
being political, both naturally, and, as we shall see, “artificially,” through their 
use in political education.  While nature, like a good craftsperson, makes humans 
to be political, as we have seen, this is true of a good many other animals as well.  
Consequently, it is up to humans to imitate the creative powers of nature, and 
employ various arts in order to make humans political in the manner suited to 
the particularities of their cities, and to facilitate the flourishing of what is 
naturally best in human life. 
Defending these claims will require that I show three things: 1) that 
Aristotle understands what I have called the “zoological invariant” of politics, that 
                                                     
459 Or as Castoriadis claims, as he wrestles with the antinomy of physis and nomos in Aristotle: “society 
presupposes society—which is tantamount to saying that society is its own creation; something which 
Aristotle does not, and cannot say.”  See “Value, Equality, Justice, Politics,” in Crossroads in the 
Labyrinth, trans. Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 304. 
 
 
235 
is, the animal capacities necessary for politics, and here by extension, their 
movements and the bodies that support them, in terms of human arts; 2) that 
nature, or at least what can be known and so conceptualized of it, is for Aristotle 
itself a kind of art or artist, and that human arts are best when they most closely 
imitate nature; and 3) that Aristotle requires the arts in order to distinguish the 
best possible human life and the most likely candidate to live it, and these in turn 
require a certain form of political organization, which I identify as polity.  The 
first two of these claims will be argued in chapter 8, while chapters 9 and 10 will 
develop and defend the last claim.  
In light of these three claims, Aristotle’s statements that “a human being is 
by nature a political animal” says that human politics is bound to the arts twice 
over: insofar as the human is a creation of nature, the purpose of the art of 
politics will be to imitate nature in bringing forth what is best, and this imitation, 
or mimesis, will require the use of a variety of other arts (including what we call 
today the “performing” arts, or more specifically, tragedy) to accomplish this end.  
In this way, the human being is an “aesthetic animal,” not only in the literal sense 
in which all animals are defined as such through aisthesis, through their capacity 
for sensation, but through their relation to the arts.  What is natural for the 
human being is for Aristotle created through artistic practices that provide the 
measure of what is best and worst in this nature, and these are enabled or 
obstructed by political organization. 
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In arguing that both Aristotle’s conception of the best human life and the 
nature that ensures this life is best are in fact creations of the arts, I conclude that 
the reversal endorsed by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and others that would overturn 
the place of “Man” relative to politics and the arts is found to be less a reversal of 
the tradition inaugurated by Aristotle than different mutations of it, mutations 
that perpetuate certain modes of domination found therein.  If one would liberate 
the aspects of Aristotle’s thoughts on humans and animals, and art and politics 
that would go beyond these forms of domination, we must turn, I claim, to the 
work of Theodor Adorno on the human-animal distinction and its relation to 
identity, nature and history, and the role of art and aesthetics.    
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Chapter Nine:  
Natural Artifice and the Artifice of Nature 
 
In attempting to show the dependence of Aristotle’s concept of nature on the arts, 
in this chapter I argue the first two claims cited in the above introduction: that 
Aristotle’s understanding of the nature of animal bodies and their movements 
depends upon metaphors drawn from various human arts; and that nature is 
itself conceived by Aristotle as a kind of artist whose work provides the measure 
of the arts as they are practiced by humans.  In this sense, humans are naturally 
disposed to engage in artifice, and human artifice is best where it is most like 
nature.  Aristotle gives an account of the nature of animal bodies and their 
movement which is profoundly technical, in that its intelligibility is dependent on 
the various technai that this account draws upon in metaphor.  Yet while an 
account of the nature of animal bodies and their movement in terms of artistic 
practice and organization might seem to imply an historical dimension, no such 
dimension is to be found in Aristotle.  Nature may be wed to techne through the 
metaphors upon which Aristotle’s account depends, yet as practices emerging 
from nature and striving towards its imitation, it is nature that comes to stand in 
the place one might expect history to be, as both their origin and their regulating 
power.  Nature itself is thus seen as a kind of artist, the producer of natural 
works, binding together the different human arts, from the crafts and the 
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performing arts to politics, while at once concealing the history of their 
development and thus their artificiality. 
 
The Artificial Body 
Aristotle’s biology has been considered a response to mechanistic theories of 
nature that had become popular in his own day;460 however, Aristotle himself 
uses a significant number of mechanical, and more broadly, technical, analogies 
in describing the structure and functioning of the body.  That is, Aristotle draws 
upon metaphors and comparisons to various technai, or the arts that compose 
the activities that organize the life of human society, in order to grasp 
conceptually the workings of animal bodies, and more broadly, as we shall see, 
the workings of nature.  For instance, Aristotle compares the movements of 
animals to those of mechanical puppets: like automata which have something 
like the potential for movement stored in them, requiring only an external touch 
to begin their motions, so does the act of procreation serve as the external touch 
that sets the semen to work in the embryo, beginning the chain of movements 
that constitute the given animal.461  Yet the analogy goes beyond this generality, 
to touch on particulars.  Aristotle will compare particular organs to pieces of 
technical equipment, thus adding “flesh” to this idea of automata, presenting the 
                                                     
460 Etienne Gilson, “Aristotelian Prologue,” in From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again, trans. John Lyon 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 5. 
461 MA 7 701b2; GA II.1 734b10-17. 
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animal body as a kind of technical wonder—a composite of tools that is at once 
natural and artificial.462  
The heart, as the body’s “central source of heat,” is like a hearth, the vessel 
of the kindling flame that is in the natural body the breath or spirit (pneuma).463  
Along with the lungs, the heart is “constructed like the bellows in a smithy,” so 
that these not only serve to house the vital heat, but to distribute it throughout 
the body.464  Like pottery clay, bodily matter is heated by the “bellows” of the 
heart and lung, hardening as it cools into flesh, bone, and sinew.465  The bones 
thus become like pegs and iron, and the sinewy tendons like strings connecting 
them, exerting pressure with their tightening and slackening so as to give 
movement to the body.466  Yet Aristotle’s automaton is not only composed of 
such explicitly mechanical parts: he also uses the products of the agricultural 
arts, such as dykes and irrigation networks, to describe the operation of blood 
vessels.467  In this way, the general metaphor connecting the movements of 
animals and the movements of automata is supplemented by metaphors that 
establish a connection between particular organs and tools, making the human 
animal technical in both a general and a particular sense, similar to the manner 
Aristotle relates humans to other animals by analogy in his biological works.   
                                                     
462 Or as Pratt writes in a similar vein, Aristotle’s “approach to the animal,” resembles “that of a design 
engineer.” See Vernon Pratt, “The Essence of Aristotle’s Zoology.” Phronesis 33.3 (1984): 271. 
463 PA III.7 670a23-27. 
464 OYOA XXVII.21 480a20-21. 
465 GA II.6 743a8-11; 18-21. 
466 MA 7 701b6-10. 
467 PA III.5 668a28-668b1. 
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The political implications of this union or harmony between the general 
automaton and its particular organs, along with the range of arts drawn upon to 
give this account, are perhaps best understood in a passage from the Movement 
of Animals: 
And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a city 
with good laws [polin eunomoumenen].  When order is once established in 
a city there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each 
several task.  The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered, 
and one thing follows another because of habit.  So in animals the same 
thing happens because of nature, each part naturally doing its own work as 
nature has composed it.  There is no need then of a soul in each part, but it 
resides in a kind of origin of the body, and the remaining parts live by 
being naturally connected, and play their parts because of their nature 
(MA 10 703a29-703b2). 
 
Here we see that the technical harmony of the animal body is at once a political 
harmony. That is, not only can the animal body be understood in terms of human 
handiwork such as mechanical puppets or the craft of pottery, but in terms of that 
most important of human constructions: the city.  Just as a city with good laws 
serves to synthesize the diverse interests of its various denizens, allowing each to 
pursue their different ends for their common good, so must the organs of an 
animal exist for the sake of the animal, according to its natural designation.  The 
technical skill that brings together different tools in order to create a single 
automaton, like the good crafting of laws that hold a city together, are not only 
forms of art that produce an artificial object, but they are for Aristotle at the same 
time natural.  That is, it is natural to engage and develop the skills that produce 
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artifice, and the best artifice will most precisely imitate nature.  Nature is thus 
made both the source and the goal of artifice.  
Insofar as the various particular arts and the manner of their development 
in Aristotle’s world serve to shape the language and images Aristotle has at his 
disposal to conceptualize the workings of nature in animal bodies, so the nature 
of the workings of animal bodies are conceptualized according to this artistic 
development and its organization.  In this sense, the conceptualization of the 
animal body is a projection of the artistic organization of society, or more 
precisely, as the above quotation makes clear: of the city, the political regime and 
its ways of doing and making.  Yet in alienating this organization and its creative 
power in the concept of nature, which is in turn seen as both the source of these 
arts and the goal toward which they strive, the arts come to arbitrarily limit the 
possibilities available to them by making themselves subject to a power whose 
own artificiality they cannot recognize.  To recognize the artificiality of nature 
would be to recognize the way in which what is understood as natural has itself 
come to be in the manner that is at least in part through the arts.  Though 
Aristotle’s descriptions of nature suggest its artificiality, he himself will not make 
this claim.  Insofar as what is understood to be natural is a projection of a way of 
doing and making particular to Aristotle’s society, in becoming a regulative ideal 
of this doing and making, nature itself comes to be seen as a kind of artist, the 
greatest artist whose creative prowess is to be imitated if a human artist is to 
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excel at her or his art.  To grasp this relation between nature, artist, and artifice 
as Aristotle sketches it, we must examine in greater detail the manner in which 
Aristotle conceives nature to be a kind of artist. 
 
Nature as Artist 
Nature as an overarching concept distinct from natural things has been 
considered an important feature of ancient Greek thought, and this concept 
underwent considerable “elaboration and systematization” in Aristotle’s 
hands.468  For Aristotle, nature is a kind of self-moving creative principle whose 
work is always directed toward some end, and whose work is itself always best.469  
However, the term “creative principle,” while not inaccurate if we think of 
principle in terms of arche, both the source and guiding rule of the creative 
process, nevertheless describes nature at a greater degree of abstraction than 
Aristotle himself frequently does.  For Aristotle, the creative processes of nature 
are very much like the artistic processes undertaken by craftspeople: in focusing 
                                                     
468 Recall G.E.R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations, 110; 125. 
469 Meta. V.4 1015a13-19; Phys. II.8 199b16-18. Or as Collingwood writes, for Aristotle, “Nature as such 
is process, growth, change,” but where this change tends to transpire in “certain definite ways.” See R.G. 
Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 82-83.  That nature’s work is always 
directed toward an end, and consequently does not do things without purpose or ‘in vain,’ is a common 
theme in Aristotle’s writings, as is the idea that nature’s works are always best. See OS II.4 415b15-17; 
OYOA IV. 469a29-30; PA II.13 658a9; II.14 658a24-25; IV.11 691b4-5; IV.13 695b19-20; Prog. 2 
704b14-17; 8 708a9-11; 12 711a16-17; GA I.1 715b15-16; II.4 739b19; II.5 741b4;  IV.6 775a20-21.  
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its efforts toward the realization of the ends of that which it creates, nature is like 
an intelligent (eulogos) craftsperson (demiourgei).470   
Like the carpenter with his timber and the potter with his clay, nature 
must consider the matter upon which its movements impart form, sometimes 
using the same organ or part for multiple purposes, while other times specializing 
in order to bring about the best end of the work.471  In this way different works 
require nature to practice different arts: in some cases nature uses the breath 
(penuma) as a tool in the same way that a smith uses hammer and anvil, while in 
others nature is more like a potter, foregoing tools and using instead its own 
parts (autes moriois).472  This view of nature further reinforces the connection 
between artistic processes and political ones, for not only is nature like an 
intelligent craftsperson, but nature also, in seeking a harmony of form and 
matter, acts as would any “prudent man” (anthropos phronimos).473  That is, 
nature seeks to balance excesses, subtracting from one part and giving to another, 
ensuring always that one has what is necessary to be what one is—no more, and 
                                                     
470 GA I.23 731a24-25.   Salkever disputes the relevance of the demiurge metaphor, claiming instead that 
nature is like a doctor doctoring itself.  However, I see no good reason for the doctor metaphor to displace 
or even contradict the notion of nature as demiurge. Salkever bases his claim entirely on Phys. II.8 199b30-
32, though Aristotle uses metaphors drawn from the arts to describe nature both in Phys. II and in many 
other places throughout his work, as I will show below.  Moreover, both doctor and demiurge are for 
Aristotle artists, practitioners of techne, and as such there is no clear basis for a rigorous distinction 
between them.  See Salkever, Finding the Mean, 49. 
471 GA I.22 730b5-8; OYOA 17.11 476a16-19; PA III.1 662a19-20; IV.6 683a22-26. 
472 GA V.8 789b9-12; I.22 730b29-31.   
473 PA IV.10 687a12-23. 
 
 
244 
no less.474  In this way nature is also a kind of law-giver to the world, for it is only 
within the bounds set by nature that there can be harmony between form and 
matter, and things can be what they are.   
Yet just as art can only create within the bounds given in the matter, that 
is, just as the law-giver is limited by the habits of the people, and the potter is 
limited by the quality of the clay, so nature appears for Aristotle to be limited by 
what is in being (ontos).475  While nature is both matter (hule) and form 
(morphe),476 its place in giving definition to that which is should not lead us to 
mistake it for the primary substance (proten ousian), or being as such.  Nature 
for Aristotle is “only one particular genus [genos] of being [ontos]”: the being or 
substance (ousia) of self-moving things.477  Even nature, it would appear, while 
something like the ideal craftsperson or law-giver, is not without its limits, and 
being appears to be both nature’s limit and its condition of possibility.  As 
Aristotle writes: “For neither will that which exists potentially be made except by 
that moving agent which possesses the actuality, nor will that which possesses the 
actuality make anything out of anything whatever; the carpenter would not make 
a box except out of wood, nor will a box be made out of the wood without the 
                                                     
474 PA II.7 652a31-34; II.14 658a36; III.2 663a17-18; III.14 674b30-3; GA III.10 759b3; 760b28; IV.2 
767a16. 
475 Or as Hankinson writes: “nature is circumscribed in what it can achieve by material constraints, but 
within those constraints it always strives to produce the best available design-solution.” See R.J. 
Hankinson, “Science,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 159. 
476 Phys. II.8 199a31-32. 
477 Meta. IV.3 1005a33-1005b1; V.4 1015a13-19. 
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carpenter.”478  In this manner, it appears that Aristotle considers the work of 
nature to be the actualization of the potential of being.  Nature is both craft and 
craftsperson, the principle of creation and movement necessary to actualize the 
potential of a thing given in its being.  It is for this reason that Aristotle considers 
natural that which tends to hold in most cases, and why it is possible for things to 
exist contrary to nature: nature may be the perfect craftsperson, but that which is 
in being and so given to nature to work upon can still remain obstinate before it, 
and where nature fails to perfectly impart form to matter, so are things generated 
that are contrary to nature.479   
 Nature, then, is for Aristotle a kind of artist—the ideal artist that most 
capably brings to flourishing that which is.  This conception of nature binds 
nature both to art and to politics, in such a way that craftspeople and law-givers 
are best where they most closely approximate the designs of nature.480  As it is 
the work of nature that serves to distinguish humans from each other and from 
other animals, and establish the prevailing hierarchy between them, and nature is 
itself a kind of art for the actualization of being, it would appear that in 
understanding the political implications of the natural distinctions Aristotle 
makes between humans and between them and other animals, we cannot divorce 
art from politics.  That is, in examining the biological basis or context of 
                                                     
478 GA II.6 743a22-26. 
479 GA IV.10 778a6-9.  
480 “One should be guided by a natural division, since every craft and every sort of education is intended to 
supplement nature” (Pol. VII.17 1336b41-1337a2). 
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Aristotle’s famous statement that the human being is a political animal, we have 
gained an understanding of what kind of animal Aristotle has in mind, but the 
manner in which the distinction is drawn indicates that what is political about 
this animal is also the product of art. That is, to understand human politics, we 
must also understand human art.  Just as nature is the craft that serves to shape 
the human from animal matter, further refinement of this natural endowment 
can only be accomplished by a like craft: consequently, if the human being is 
political, it must also be artistic. 
 In this way the first two points of the three announced in the above 
introduction have been satisfied: the animal body and its movement shaped by 
the soul are understood by Aristotle in the terms given by various arts—they are 
in this sense “artistic” or “technical,” in that they are made intelligible through 
the arts, the various technai of Aristotle’s day.  Further, these artistic metaphors 
cannot simply be discounted as modes of communication Aristotle employs for 
the sake of his audience, but rather these artistic metaphors must be understood 
as constitutive of the manner in which the objects of study are understood, for 
nature is itself an artist whose creations are the objects of the natural world.481  
Animal bodies can be understood as the products of techne because they are 
natural, and nature itself is a kind of artist.  Nature is the artist that shapes the 
various possibilities given in being into what they naturally are, and their 
                                                     
481 Recall the importance of metaphor and poetry as an expression of universals: Poetics 22, 1459a6-8; 9, 
1451b5-10. 
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functioning is like the products of human arts, only to a far more perfected 
degree.  This conception of nature stands in place of history, for rather than give 
an historical account of the development of techne as a means to understand 
animal bodies and their movements, Aristotle need only show the degree to 
which they are natural or not.  Following this presentation of the first and second 
points outlined in the introduction, it remains to examine the third: that Aristotle 
requires the arts to distinguish the best possible human life, both to the extent 
that this life is natural, and to the extent that humans must themselves employ 
various arts to realize the potential given in this nature, a task which, as political 
animals, cannot be divorced from political organization. 
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Chapter Ten: Art and the Most Choiceworthy Life 
 
What Aristotle regards as the best and most choiceworthy for human life 
continues to be a matter of debate.  I have argued that Aristotle’s biological 
writings attempt to define the human in terms of a capacity for divine thought 
absent in other animals, and superior to those other capacities humans and other 
animals share.  This definition suggests that the best human life would be one 
where this capacity is most fully actualized, and insofar as the best in humans is 
their capacity for divine thought, it would appear the best for human beings is 
some kind of contemplative activity.  Yet the human is also, of course, by nature a 
political animal, and as noted above, Aristotle’s conception of nature is 
unintelligible without artistic metaphors. In this way, “nature” is a kind of 
reflection of these arts, a great artist as opposed to a power operating in a manner 
qualitatively different from human beings.  Thus, if humans are naturally 
disposed to politics, and have a naturally good end or best possible life, these are 
not possible or intelligible without the arts.   
Below I will argue that the importance of the arts in understanding nature 
means those with the best natures, and consequently those examples of the best 
human life, must live a beautiful life, which for Aristotle means to live a life 
devoted to activity that is an end in itself.  Such activity must be leisured activity, 
and insofar as political activity is without leisure, this suggests that the best life is 
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indeed one of contemplation, a claim that would appear to be supported by 
Aristotle’s biological writings.  Yet, I argue, politics cannot be simply forgotten, 
for contemplation as a way of life cannot come about without the city, in the 
sense that the city provides an individual with a greater arena in which to practice 
virtues related to contemplation, and so attain this best life.  The city thus offers a 
third way of sorts, a form of life that is at once political and contemplative, and 
this is the most completely virtuous human life.  I find this third way in Aristotle’s 
Poetics, wherein Aristotle offers a philosophical reinterpretation of tragedy that 
enables him to claim that the tragic hero is an imitation, or mimesis, of the best 
human life.  In this sense, the arts, both in terms of politics and the performing 
arts that compose tragedy, are not simply the expression of human nature, an 
anthropological invariant, but rather serve an integral role in creating the very 
life that Aristotle will consider most choiceworthy.  
 
Beauty, Labor, and Leisure 
For Aristotle, life is activity, and so the best human life will be that constituted by 
the best kind of activity.  The best among the various goods toward which human 
activity aims will be the most complete and self-sufficient good; consequently, 
one will need a complete range of activities, along with their virtues and supports, 
in order to live the good and excellent, that is, the best human life.  In the Politics, 
Aristotle writes that there are three things through which one becomes good 
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(agathoi) and excellent (spoudaios): Nature, habit, and reason (phusis ethos 
logos).482  While scholars have spilled much ink developing the ways in which 
habit and reason relate to living the good life, far fewer, at least among modern 
commentators, have chosen to focus on nature.  Perhaps a reason for this 
concerns the view that, while habit and reason seem malleable insofar as one can 
through practice become better, it is thought that one can do little about one’s 
nature.  Nature is thus ignored on this view because there is nothing worthwhile 
to say about it: a focus on nature’s role in relation to what is best in human beings 
is either deterministic or trivial.  Indeed, the role Aristotle claims that nature 
plays in making one good and excellent is through the fact of one’s birth as a 
human and not some other animal, and so to have the body and soul of a certain 
sort (poion).   
Yet while contemporary readers might perhaps see nothing in this passage 
to contradict the modern notion of natural equality between humans, in light of 
what has been shown of Aristotle’s biology, this distinction here between humans 
and other animals requires a second look.  If some humans are more animal than 
others, then the line drawn here between human and animal is not where 
moderns would tend to draw it: being human and animal here too, concerns one’s 
relation to divine thought, and Aristotle’s subsequent remark about having the 
                                                     
482 Pol. VII.13 1332a39-40. 
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body and soul of a certain sort serves to underline the point.483  Furthermore, if 
nature is for Aristotle, as I have claimed, a reflection of the arts of his day, then 
we can expect that to focus on how nature relates to the good and the excellent 
will reveal how the good and excellent are themselves only possible through the 
arts, thus upsetting the view that Aristotle sees the arts as simply expressions of 
an already-constituted human nature—an anthropological invariant, as noted 
above. 
As we have seen, some souls are naturally better than others, and these 
natural differences in psychic capacity also to an extent make themselves visible 
in bodies.  In this sense, certain individuals are naturally more disposed to being 
good and excellent than others, and these individuals can, to an extent, be 
identified through their physical appearance.  However, this is not to say that 
one’s nature is absolutely determined for Aristotle, nor is it to say that physical 
features are the most important factor in identifying the best dispositions.  
Rather, as we are naturally the kind of creatures to form habits and use reason, 
we are naturally changeable to some, difficult to determine, extent. As we have 
seen, the quality of one’s soul is known through one’s physical appearance and 
through one’s actions: where our actions become habits that shape our bodies, so 
these indicate the quality of our souls, and the nobility of our lives.  “The noble,” 
                                                     
483 Cf. Eudemian Ethics (EE) VII.2 1236a4-6: “as the child or brute [therion] is to the adult [anthropon 
kathestota], so are the base and foolish [phaulos kai aphron] to the equitable and wise [epieike kai 
phronimon].” Translation modified.  See “Eudemian Ethics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol.2,  
Oxford Revised Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).  
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Aristotle writes, “is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy 
of praise.”484  But the noble (kalos) is also the beautiful—moral correctness and 
physical beauty unite in this term, making the noble life one characterized both 
by beautiful deeds and physical beauty.  The best life for a human being, then, is a 
beautiful life, one devoted to activities which are ends in themselves.  Yet what 
kinds of activities might be considered ends in themselves, and how might beauty 
be recognized through them? 
While Aristotle does not in the Politics offer a list of best physical features 
when discussing the best human life like the one gleaned above from his 
biological writings, this point concerning the beauty of different bodies in relation 
to the best human life is made earlier in the Politics in Aristotle’s discussion of 
natural slavery.  For Aristotle, nature makes the bodies of slaves and free people 
different according to the different activities to which their souls are best suited—
the natural slave, like a domestic animal, is made to labor with his body, and thus 
built in a manner suited to these strains, while the free person stands without 
back bent for hard labor, but upright, in order to engage in political life.485  This 
distinction should not suggest that Aristotle thinks that those who labor do so 
because their backs are crooked; rather, certain bodies are more capable of 
withstanding the punishment of labor, while others are more capable of 
persuading others in a political assembly.  Just as the body of a human is built for 
                                                     
484 Rhetoric (Rhet.) I.9 1366a33-34. 
485 Pol. I.5 1254b22-31. 
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thought, and the body of a bird for flight, so human bodies shaped by souls less 
apt to engage in divine thought are defined instead in terms of the work most 
appropriate to them.  In this sense, the mutilations of labor cannot be separated 
from the natural activity of the inferior soul.  However, it is precisely these 
mutilations—the physical features formed through base activities such as manual 
labor—which serve as the marks by which one might recognize a base soul. 
It is for this reason—that labor is the activity of the inferior soul—that the 
mere fact of political freedom is not enough to indicate a natural separation of the 
citizen from the animal condition of natural slavery.  Only a soul free from labor 
can be seen to flourish in the manner most appropriate to a human being—only 
such a soul and body are as beautiful as a human being can be.  For Aristotle it is 
thus not only the natural slave, but also manual laborers who betray their natural 
baseness in their physical demeanor.  Though Aristotle claims that slaves exist by 
nature and craftspeople do not,486  he also claims that “vulgar craftsmen”487 used 
to be slaves or foreigners and only became citizens with the rise of “extreme 
democracy” (prin demon genesthai to eschaton).488  The connection between 
labor and the inferiority of a soul shows that the rise in status from slave to 
craftsperson in the “extreme” (eschaton) form of democracy indicates a 
                                                     
486 Pol. I.13 1260b1-2. 
487 Though Reeve’s rendering of banausos as “vulgar craftsman” effectively captures the normative 
dimension of this term, Lord’s “manufacturing artisan” is perhaps clearer from a strictly descriptive 
perspective: that is, the art performed by the banausos is manual labor.  The natural suitability to manual 
labor is where the vulgar craftsman and the natural slave overlap. 
488 Pol.III.4 1277b1-2. 
 
 
254 
continuity between the natural slave and the manual laborer found in their 
natural suitability to labor, not that the craftsperson was only a slave by 
convention.   
Both the natural slave and the manual laborer are constituted as such by 
nature insofar as their souls and bodies are most appropriate to the activities that 
accord with this station.  However, while one might get an idea of a slave or 
laborer’s baseness through their physical appearance, it is primarily through the 
labor performed that the nature of the slave or the “vulgar craftsperson” is found 
to be of the sort that it is.  That is, nature may make some souls base, but the 
appropriateness of their labor or servitude to the quality of their soul and hence 
its status as natural is only confirmed through the activities themselves.  It is only 
through engaging in labor that one is a laborer, which then serves to confirm the 
baseness of one’s soul, now easily recognized in the laborer’s mutilated body, 
which bears the evidence of its activities.  Likewise, it is one’s willingness to serve 
another in the manner suited to a slave that serves to confirm one’s status as a 
natural slave489—nature here is recognized through the activities appropriate to 
one for whom they would be natural. 
                                                     
489 Or as Bodéüs writes: “The person who is naturally a slave by definition is not such because of a law that 
condemns him to slavery and deprives him of the rights of citizens—but rather because of a strictly 
personal inclination not to share the aspirations of human beings as citizens.  Indeed, as we have seen, the 
natural slave is recognized by the fact that he does not have any goals in life except to survive—
comfortably, if possible.” See Richard Bodéüs, “The Natural Foundations of Right and Aristotelian 
Philosophy,” in Action and Contemplation, eds. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999), 96.  Garver echoes this position, claiming that “Organizing one’s life 
around living rather than living well produces slavishness that goes deep enough to disqualify one from 
Aristotelian citizenship.”  For Garver, Aristotle’s account of slavery is meant to separate the relation of 
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In this way, the harmony between nature, habit, and reason Aristotle sees 
as being necessary to achieve goodness and excellence is one without labor.  Not 
only does Aristotle write that certain forms of labor shape the body and soul in a 
manner that makes them less suited to a life of virtue,490  but as we have seen, a 
life of labor serves to shape the body according to the dictates of labor, according 
to the dictates of activity directed to ends other than itself, as opposed to those of 
self-sufficient thought.  Though leisure is necessary for an individual to have the 
time to pursue virtuous activities and so instill in oneself a noble character, it is 
also necessary to free the body from the shape imposed upon it by labor, the 
shape imposed upon it by ends lacking in nobility. One who is free by law but not 
free from labor, then, cannot live a noble life, for the movements that constitute 
such a person’s activities and shapes his body and his character will all bear the 
stamp of necessity.  Bound by labor, the bodies of such people will bear its scars, 
and so fall short of a noble, self-sufficient life.  The noble life, choiceworthy for its 
own sake, must be one where the body is liberated from necessary labor, devoted 
instead to the flourishing of its own beauty.491 
                                                                                                                                                              
master of slave from politics, allowing politics to function according to a different logic of rule.  See 
Garver, Aristotle’s Politics, 24; 18.  In a different vein, Schofield writes that “Aristotle’s theory of natural 
slavery is at least potentially a critical theory.  A slave owner who pondered it seriously would have to ask 
himself: ‘Is my slave really a natural slave?  Or is he too shrewd and purposeful?’” See Malcolm Schofield, 
“Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, 100. 
490 Pol.VIII.2 1337b9-13 
491 In this way, insofar as Athenian democracy can be seen as based on the free labor of its citizens, this 
aspect of Aristotle is indeed anti-democratic.  See Ellen Meiksins Wood, “Labour and Democracy, Ancient 
and Modern,” in Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 181; 
183; 185; and Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1978), Ch. 5. 
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In marking the distinction between the noble and the base body, Aristotle 
opposes the hunched and animal-like body of the natural slave to the upright 
human body of one suited to politics; however, here we must ask: is politics really 
the art most suited to bring about the noble—that is, the beautiful—life Aristotle 
considers most choiceworthy?  In his considerations of the best possible human 
life, especially in the NE and the Pol., Aristotle considers with considerable 
seriousness both the active or practical life of politics and the contemplative life 
of philosophy as possible paradigms of the best human life, defending each in 
different passages of those works.  Consequently, there remains considerable 
debate among contemporary interpreters as to which of these forms of life ought 
to be seen as best.  For instance, MacIntyre’s espousal of Aristotelian 
communitarianism against liberal individualism is not so much a revival of 
philosophy or a turn toward the life of contemplation, but to a life of activity 
made coherent through the unity of the virtues, one devoted to “the construction 
of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral 
life can be sustained.”492   Even more forcefully, Nussbaum argues that “the 
solitary life is insufficient for us,” and that “if eudaimonia is to include every 
                                                     
492 After Virtue, 263. Intellectual life in this sense should be understood to mean less a life of contemplation 
than one devoted to intellectual virtues, which in the Nicomachean Ethics includes those which can be 
taught, opposed to habituated.  See NE II.1 1103a14-20. 
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value without which a life would be judged incomplete, it must include the 
political as an end in its own right.”493   
But can such a political life coincide with the life of leisure?  For Aristotle, 
the politics to which the upright human body and soul are suited concern both 
those activities concerning peace, and those pertaining to war.494  If for Aristotle 
the politics of community building and virtuous activity are bound up with the 
activities of war, then they are hardly features of a life of leisure worthy of the 
name.  Even were we to consider that in warrior cultures the warrior must 
typically have sufficient leisure to practice his arts—that he must be free of 
“vulgar” labor in order to devote himself to the “noble” arts of war—to posit that 
politics, including the practices of war, are an end in themselves would be for 
Aristotle to claim that the human is what and how it is because of war.  Such a 
claim would make war and its associated virtues those that define the human 
being and so distinguish it from other animals—the human being would stand 
erect and move in the way it does not to facilitate thought, but to subdue its 
adversaries.  But Aristotle does not so elevate the place of war in human life, or 
even the martial virtues.  “Nobody chooses to wage war, or even prepares for war, 
                                                     
493 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 350.  Nussbaum will even go as far as entertaining the idea that 
the passages in Book X of the NE where Aristotle extols the contemplative life as the highest form of 
human life were inserted by a later editor. See The Fragility of Goodness, 377. 
494 Pol. I.5 1254b25-32.  Concerning ancient Greek society more generally, Vernant writes: “Politics can be 
defined as the city seen from the inside, the public life that the citizens share within the domain of whatever 
is common to them above and beyond their individual family differences.  War is the same city facing 
outward, the activity of this same group of citizens now confronting something other than themselves, 
something foreign to them, in other words—as a rule—other cities […]The warrior and the man of politics 
are completely identified together.”  See Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, 36-37; and also Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 62. 
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for the sake of waging war,” writes Aristotle: such a person “would seem 
altogether bloodthirsty.”495  As we have seen, it is a capacity for divine thought 
that makes the human what it is: war is for the sake of peace, as labor is for the 
sake of leisure, and unless politics can be definitively separated from war and the 
array of instrumental activities with which it is bound, it cannot be part of a life of 
leisure.496  
Against the position exemplified by MacIntyre and Nussbaum, 
interpreters such as Bartlett, Lord, and Salkever all insist that politics for 
Aristotle is not an end in itself, and that the contemplative life is best, though 
each has a slightly different idea of what constitutes a contemplative life.  For 
Bartlett, contemplation, or theoria, is “transpolitical,” and the philosophic life 
itself represents the fulfillment of the aim of politics, the good life, that goes 
“beyond any political association” or best regime.497  For Lord, on the other hand, 
the leisured life of philosophy, though higher than the practical or political life, is 
itself unattainable to most, and consequently a leisured life devoted to the arts of 
music and poetry represents a kind of second sailing that would provide political 
                                                     
495 NE X.7 1177b9-11.  For an account of how making contemplation higher than politics can be seen as a 
critique of warrior culture and the prevailing ideal of masculinity in Aristotle’s Greece, see Salkever, 
Finding the Mean, Ch. 4. Koziak likewise finds in Aristotle a critique of the masculinity of his day, though 
in a different vein.  See Barbara Koziak, “Tragedy, Citizens, and Strangers: The Configuration of 
Aristotelian Political Emotion,” in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, 263. 
496 NE X.7 1177b4-16.  Cf. David J. Depew, “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal 
State,” in A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, eds. David Keyt and Fred J. Miller, Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991), 364. 
497 Robert C. Bartlett, “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science,” in Action and Contemplation, 304; 
309. Cf. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 49. 
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men with a reward for their service akin to a life of contemplation.498  Salkever’s 
view, it would seem, makes it possible to reconcile Bartlett and Lord.  For 
Salkever, the human being can only be said to be a political animal insofar as he 
is a rational animal: the “political character” of human beings is less fundamental 
than their “potential rationality.” Consequently, the end of politics is to establish 
the kind of order in which humans can become rational animals, developing the 
habits that would allow them to live a “thoughtful life.”499  Insofar as the potential 
for rationality is the condition for human political life, it can be said to transcend 
the particularity of any given political regime, and thus be considered 
“transpolitical.” Yet Salkever also claims that music education “is the most 
significant though not the most pressing part of political life.”500  Though the 
distinction here between “significant” and “pressing” is not as clear as it might be, 
we might say that while the most pressing part of political life is ensuring that 
one’s city has good laws, only with the right education—a musical education—can 
one hope to instill the kinds of habits in the populace that would allow them to 
live in harmony with such laws.501  Thus the rationality that is both the condition 
of distinctly human political life and the goal toward which it strives will 
                                                     
498 Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press: 1982), 197-198; 200. 
499 Salkever, Finding the Mean, 180; 185. Cf. Strauss, The City and Man, 17.  
500 Salkever, Finding the Mean, 82. 
501 Aristotle claims at Pol. II.9 1269a20-21: “the law has no power to secure obedience except habit; but 
habits can only be developed over a long period of time.” 
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necessarily involve artistic education, a kind of proto-philosophy and aid to 
reason. 
In this way, the trend in interpretation that understands the life of 
contemplation to be higher than the political life appears to better account for the 
role the arts play in making the best kind of human life possible, especially with 
regard to the idea that this life is a beautiful one, that is, one farthest from the 
reaches of labor and tasks devoted to less than noble ends.  How then, can we 
understand the role of politics in this life?  Is it, as Bartlett, Lord, and Salkever all 
argue, possessed only of a certain—though immense—instrumental value, as the 
art most capable of establishing the conditions in which a noble life can be 
cultivated?  Yet if this were the case, then it is difficult to see how exactly 
philosophy can exert any influence on politics, and so ensure that politics actually 
serves ends conducive to philosophy.  While philosophy needs politics to secure 
the conditions of its existence, so long as politics operates according to ends 
uninformed by philosophy, there will be a disjunction between the political life 
and the beautiful one.502  For readers such as Strauss, this gap between politics 
and the best life is insurmountable.  Strauss writes that Aristotle’s “cosmology” is 
“unqualifiedly separable from the quest for the best political order,” and that the 
idea of “ascent” that characterizes Socratic philosophizing differs qualitatively in 
                                                     
502 Or as Strauss writes: “the peak of the city and the peak of philosophy belong to entirely different times.” 
Strauss, The City and Man, 37. 
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Aristotle.503  If the highest excellence might only be achieved by individuals and 
not cities, then the best politics might offer is to secure the conditions for 
individuals to flourish as they will beyond politics, which is to say, privately.   
Yet if the role of politics is to secure private life, and let those who would 
be philosophers become philosophers as they will, then it appears the possibility 
of the best human life is left to chance.504  Aristotle himself rejects the notion that 
happiness could be a matter of chance,505 and from this we might argue that 
insofar as the contemplative life is the best human life, it requires a more active 
political dimension. That is, to see politics solely or even primarily as an 
instrument for securing private, individual ends is for Aristotle to forsake the 
most complete justice, justice as the good of another,506 in favor of justice as 
doing good to one’s self, and thus risk faction and the dissolution of the city.507  
Such politics is not fit for a proper citizen, let alone the most noble and virtuous 
human being, but is characteristic rather of politics dominated by the base.   
                                                     
503 Strauss, The City and Man, 21. 
504 Or as Socrates claims in Plato’s Republic, “the sort of nature that possesses all the qualities we 
prescribed just now for the person who is going to be a complete philosopher, is seldom found among 
human beings, and there will be few who possess it.”  Consequently, if this nature “is not sown, planted, 
and grown in a suitable environment, it will develop in entirely the opposite way, unless some god comes 
to its aid.”  This last clause should be seen less as an endorsement of the principle of divine election, than 
as an explanation for Socrates’ own philosophic nature.  See Rep.VI 491a-b; 492a. 
505 At NE I.9 1099b24, Aristotle claims that to “entrust the greatest [megiston] and noblest [kalliston] thing 
to chance [tuche] would be excessively discordant,” a point echoed at EE I.3 1215a11-19, where Aristotle 
claims: “For if the good life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many 
cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it 
depends on the individual and his personal acts being of a certain character, then the supreme good would 
be both more general and divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine 
because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who makes themselves and their acts of a 
certain character.” 
506 NE V.1 1129b30-1130a5. 
507 NE IX.6 1167b10-15. 
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If the best life is to be possible, that which is public must be maintained, 
and so all citizens ought to have an education suited to public life.  For Aristotle, 
this education involves the performing arts, i.e. music and poetry, to serve as a 
kind of proto-philosophy that might instill in common pupils the disposition 
necessary to become philosophical, at least to the extent that they will appreciate 
philosophy enough to not want to kill philosophers.508  Yet even a citizenry 
educated in music and poetry is on its own not enough to render politics 
sufficiently philosophical for it to take as its aim the securing of the conditions of 
the best possible life.  Aristotle is clear that music and poetry also have the power 
to make humans worse, and without philosophy it is unclear how the difference 
between noble and base forms of music and poetry might be discerned.509  Thus 
what is needed is an account of the best life for a human being that both 
demonstrates its dependence on the arts, and shows how philosophy, or the life 
of contemplation, can inform and even shape political life.  Such an account may 
perhaps come from an unlikely source: Aristotle’s Poetics.   
 
Tragedy and the Best Life in the Poetics 
While turning to the Poetics is not strange in terms of our attempt to grasp how 
the arts relate to Aristotle’s conception of the best human life, their relation to the 
Politics, and politics generally, has often been overlooked.  Praise for Aristotle’s 
                                                     
508 Pol. VIII.5 1340b11-14. 
509 Pol. VII.17 1336b27-33; VIII.5 1340a13-22; 1340b11-14. 
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Poetics has often been ambiguous: crowned for its status as the text in which we 
can see the birth of art criticism as a distinct realm of academic inquiry (thus 
making it the ancestor of what we today call aesthetics),510 it is at once dismissed 
for being a collection of analytic categories whose relevance has long passed, of 
possible interest only for its historical value.511  Those who do see a political 
dimension to the Poetics tend to be no more sympathetic to its aims: in his 
detached, “biological” approach to different forms of poetry, Aristotle is accused 
of attempting to neutralize or efface their political dimensions—especially those 
of Greek tragedy.512  My account of the Poetics will take a slightly different tack: 
while I agree with certain critics of the Poetics that the highly unusual account of 
tragedy therein is politically motivated—perhaps even antidemocratically so, in a 
certain sense—Aristotle’s account of tragedy serves to align it with his own 
account of the best human life, thus making the tragic hero not an example of 
                                                     
510 Angela Curran, “Feminism and the Narrative Structures of the Poetics,” in Feminist Interpretations of 
Aristotle, 291. 
511 “Unless you have these particular historical interests,” Barnes writes, “the Poetics will be a 
disappointment.”  See Jonathan Barnes, “Rhetoric and Poetics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 284. 
512  See for example, Edith Hall, “Is there a Polis in Aristotle’s Poetics?” in Tragedy and the Tragic, ed. 
M.S. Silk (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 296; 304-305; and David Wiles, Theatre and Citizenship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 47.  However, the degree to which tragedy was itself 
political in anything like a direct sense is itself disputed.  For interpretations that focus on the political and 
even democratic dimensions of tragedy, see Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Greek Polis and the Creation of 
Democracy,” in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, ed. David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 117; J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory; Simon Goldhill, “Collectivity and 
Otherness—The Authority of the Tragic Chorus,” in Tragedy and the Tragic; Jean-Pierre Vernant, 
“Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy,” in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, eds. Jean-Pierre 
Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, trans. Janet Lloyd  (New York: Zone, 1988); P.J Wilson, “Tragic 
Rhetoric,” in Tragedy and the Tragic; and Victoria Wohl, Law’s Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  For dissenting views of Greek tragedy, see John Gould, “Tragedy and Collective 
Experience,” in Tragedy and the Tragic, and P.J. Rhodes, “Nothing to do with Democracy,” The Journal of 
Hellenic Studies 123 (2003): 104-119. 
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monarchical, aristocratic, or oligarchic hubris brought low before the gods of the 
city, but an example of the good and excellent man, the one who most closely 
approximates what is godlike in human life. 
 It has been claimed that the aim of the Poetics is to counter Plato’s 
treatment of poetry, and especially tragedy, in the Republic, and so re-appraise 
its place relative to the best human life.513  For our purposes, this will be true in 
the sense that while Plato was found above to set his philosophy against tragedy 
while remaining deeply embedded in its terms, Aristotle affirms a certain version 
of tragedy that goes well beyond what tragedy likely meant to most Greeks of his 
age.  That is, while Plato poetically rejects poetry, and so, in one important sense 
at least, remains within the sphere defined by the poets, Aristotle works through 
the terms of poetry with the eye of an anatomist, breaking them down into their 
component parts and putting them together again in a way that serves to 
transform them from within, and so force poetry to conform to standards that are 
his own.  In this way poetry, and especially tragedy, become in Aristotle vehicles 
for his philosophy, illustrating the best life toward which humans might strive, 
and thus also the way in which the arts are bound up with defining the human, 
both in its best and worst instantiations.   
                                                     
513 See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 381; Michelle Gellrich, Tragedy and Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 102; 124; Charles Segal, “Catharsis, Audience, and Closure in Greek 
Tragedy,” in Tragedy and the Tragic, 156.  For an alternate interpretation of the relation between Plato and 
Aristotle expressed in the Poetics, see Elliot Bartky, “Plato and the Politics of Aristotle’s Poetics,” The 
Review of Politics 54.4 (1992): 589-619. 
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Aristotle begins his account of poetry by noting that what is common to 
the plurality of poetic forms is mimesis, or imitation. Aristotle claims that poetic 
forms are more than anything modes of imitation, and thus that they differ from 
each other according to the means of their imitation, that is, the kinds of tools 
they draw upon in order to carry out their imitation, the object of imitation, or 
the kinds of things they set to imitate, and the manner in which they set about 
this imitation—the kinds of crafts that inform their performance.514  The 
commonality found in imitation that binds together the different forms of poetry 
seems for Aristotle to be based in human nature: humans are naturally prone to 
imitate, and indeed Aristotle claims they are the most imitative of all animals, 
making use of their mental and physical dexterity to imitate their world from the 
time of childhood onwards.  Moreover, engaging in imitation is how humans first 
begin to learn.515  Human beings “by nature desire to know,”516 and so they 
naturally derive pleasure from learning,517 which in turn binds them to poetry all 
the more, for poetry provides both an outlet for this power of imitation, and a 
means to learn and so gratify human intellectual desires.   
In this sense, poetry appears to be an outgrowth of natural human 
capacities and inclinations, and so the claims examined above by Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and others concerning the anthropological invariant lying at the root 
                                                     
514 Poetics, 1, 1447a14-17. 
515 Poetics, 4, 1448b5-9. 
516 Recall Meta, I.1, 980a21-27. 
517 Poetics, 4, 1448b13-15. 
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of the conception of art beginning with Aristotle seem to be justified.  If 
Aristotelian poetics really are based on an anthropological invariant whereby 
“Art” is created by “Man” and is thereby a reflection of human nature, then a 
reversal that finds human nature to be a kind of artistic fiction would indeed 
appear to overturn this tradition and the place of “Man” therein.  But here it is 
worth asking: exactly what is imitation?  Is poetic imitation a kind of 
reproduction or representation of actually existing things, or does it serve to 
create these very things through its own activity?   
On this point, Barnes writes: “Gibbon represented a degenerate Empire—
and there was a degenerate Empire which he represented.  Manet represented a 
lunch, but there was no lunch which he represented.  To imitate, let us say, is to 
represent not in the Gibbon fashion, but in the Manet manner.”518  Or in other 
words, mimesis is not a simple imitation or representation of the world as it is, 
but of the world as it might be—it imitates and so gives flesh to objects of the 
imagination, which, though based in the sense-experience of a given animal, are 
in the human case mediated by divine thought and those capacities closest to it.  
In this sense to imitate is to construct an image of the world refracted through the 
prism of human imagination, logos, and divine nous—it is to make the world 
human, which is to say, to endow it with an openness to human knowledge, aims, 
and desires so as to make it the means of their realization.  But this is not to say 
                                                     
518 Barnes, “Rhetoric and Poetics,” 275. 
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that the human existed as human prior to this human world.  Through poetry, 
the world becomes a stage—a theatre for human life—but this should not suggest 
that what is human exists prior to this performance.  Rather, we might say that 
mimesis serves to crystallize certain potentials, potentials shared with other 
animals, giving them shape and so organizing them in a particular manner, which 
then only subsequently come to be understood as human. 
It is to this poetic or mimetic transformation of the given, of pre-human 
potentials, into the human world which Aristotle refers when he claims that “the 
poet’s function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing 
that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable [eikos] or necessary 
[anagkaion],” and so distinguishes the poet from the historian, placing him next 
to the philosopher as one concerned with “universals [ta katholou].”519  In this 
way, poetry appears to be more than simply an expression of human potentials, 
but rather also appears to be endowed with the creative capacity to transform 
those potentials into properly human potentials, and so to fashion not only the 
world but the human being according to a certain image.  That is, mimesis serves 
not only to create the world as a human world, but to create the human as the 
kind of animal that might populate this human world.  In this sense, mimesis is 
not simply the expression of human potentials, but the activity that gives shape to 
that which is recognized as human potential in the first place. 
                                                     
519 Poetics, 9, 1451a36-1451b10. 
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But is this creative dimension of mimesis really enough to free poetry from 
an anthropological invariant that would limit it to an expression of human 
capacities?  As we have seen, Aristotle considers all poetry to be modes of 
mimesis, differing according to the means, object, and technique employed.  Yet 
Aristotle does not claim these differences in mimetic mode are themselves 
completely artificial: they appear to owe their origin to the character (ethe) of the 
poet.  That is, while Aristotle claims that the distinction between tragedy and 
comedy concerns primarily the object of their respective mimetic endeavors—that 
tragedy concerns the imitation of the good or serious person (spoudaios) and 
comedy the base (phaulos)—it was originally the spoudaios that sought to 
poetically imitate noble or beautiful actions and the phaulos who likewise sought 
to imitate the base, or the ugly.520  Insofar as one instills in oneself a base or 
noble character according to the actions one performs, and one can be naturally 
more suited to certain kinds of actions than others—i.e. some are naturally suited 
to be noble, and others base—then it appears a natural kernel remains, buried 
beneath the layers of artifice that shape and inform the actions that come to one 
as natural.  In this sense, the anthropological invariant thought to lie at the root 
of the arts is more like a zoological invariant, insofar as the potentials in 
question—those laying “beneath” these layers of artifice—are shared with other 
                                                     
520 Poetics, 4, 1448b24-28.  The base individuals imitated in comedy are, Aristotle claims, not necessarily 
base in every sense, but they are base specifically in the sense that they are ridiculous (geloion), a species 
of the ugly (aischrou), which Aristotle defines as a mistake or deformity without specific harm or pain.  Or 
in other words, to be ridiculous in a comedic sense is to be ugly in a way that causes neither pity, nor fear—
the watchwords of tragedy.  See Poetics, 5, 1449a32-37; 9, 1452a2-3. 
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animals.  The properly human only distinguishes itself through human activity, 
which is the set of animal potentials crystallized through mimesis.  Thus it is only 
through artifice that human nature comes to be and is called natural.  It is only 
through artistic practice that the natural becomes intelligible as such, and in this 
way we might say that nature too is a function or even creation of artifice, if we 
accept that this creation is not ex nihilo, but more of a shaping of the given, even 
if what is intelligible in the given is only its shape. 
In this same way, it is the arts that create the standards of beauty or 
nobility through which the good is recognized as good.  The natural bearing of the 
best human being, including his physical features, are all recognized as such only 
by those with the right education in music and poetry, and so to dismiss the 
relevance of physical features in recognizing the noble and good is to overlook the 
place of the arts in giving these shape.  Tragedy, as an imitation of the good and 
excellent, serves as a kind of moral education to its audience, illustrating for them 
the human being as he might be, a human being better than those encountered 
everyday, and so an ideal toward which they might strive.521  Yet here it may be 
objected that the moral ideal portrayed in tragedy is one focused on the deeds of 
the tragic hero in such a manner that the physical bearing of this hero is 
irrelevant—that, while Aristotle may claim that tragedy teaches moral excellence, 
this excellence is about action and choice, not one’s physical appearance.  As 
                                                     
521 Or as Aristotle claims at Poetics 15, 1454b8-11: “As tragedy is an imitation of personages better than 
the ordinary man, we should follow the example of good portrait-painters, who reproduce the distinctive 
features of a man, and at the same time, without losing the likeness, make him handsomer than he is.” 
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evidence, one might note that perhaps the greatest and most paradigmatic of 
tragic heroes, Oedipus and his daughter Antigone, are both deformed: Oedipus, 
whose name refers to his feet being pierced as a baby before he was exposed and 
left for dead, and Antigone, insofar as she is a woman, and as such, according to 
Aristotle, a kind of natural “deformity,”522 and deviation from the human ideal. 
It is true that Aristotle claims that the principal object of tragic imitation is 
not the various characters of human beings as such but “action and life” (praxeon 
kai biou), whose connection to such details may not be immediately clear.  
Aristotle writes in the Poetics that the beautiful is found in a certain magnitude; 
that is, something that is too small or too large becomes indistinct and so lacks 
perfection or completion in our eyes, and so the beautiful must be a certain 
arrangement of the parts such as to form a complete and intelligible whole.523  
Insofar as tragedy sets to imitate the best and most beautiful actions, so it must 
imitate complete actions.  Actions are complete in a tragedy when they convey the 
passage of the hero from bad fortune to good, or good fortune to bad, and are 
bound together such that this passage would not be possible without each of its 
parts.524 This synthesis of incidents, or objects of action (pragmaton), is what 
Aristotle calls the muthos, the “myth,” or story or “plot” specific to a given 
tragedy, and which is the end or purpose (telos) of the tragedy.  Thus, while both 
character (ethos) and thought (dianoian) are expressed in tragedy, they are done 
                                                     
522 Recall GA II.3 737a27-29; IV.6 775a14-15. 
523 Poetics 7, 1450b34-1451a2. 
524 Poetics 8, 1451a31-36. 
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so in actions, and it is the particular concatenation of actions that serves to 
convey nobility.   
Insofar as tragedy might serve as a form of moral education, this emphasis 
on action is unsurprising, for while we might strive to become a person of noble 
character, characters are only accessible to us indirectly, through the actions we 
might imitate.525  Human animals instill in themselves certain characters through 
the actions they perform and the decisions they make, and these characters in 
turn serve to support the kinds of actions they will perform and decisions they 
will make in the future.  In this sense, actions both precede the identities marked 
by character as part of the causal structure that gives them life, and follow these 
identities as their expression. The fragile or tenuous nature of such identity, 
dependent as it is on the performance of actions that are themselves subject to a 
variety of external factors beyond the control of the performer, has been noted by 
scholars,526 yet the particular factor of physical appearance is typically 
overlooked.  Both Oedipus and Antigone are the children of royalty, each 
possessed of the pride and even ferocity of those of noble lineage: their actions 
serve to convey this identity, and as such, their physical “deficiencies” are 
properly tragic.  That is, these deficiencies evoke pity or even fear as individuals 
who are or ought to be noble but through chance are unable to realize their true 
                                                     
525 NE III.5 1114b31-1115a3. 
526 See Patchen Markell, “Tragic Recognition: Action and Identity in Antigone and Aristotle,” Political 
Theory 31.1 (2003): 6-38; and Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), Ch. 3; Cf. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 382.  
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nature—thoroughly unlike comedic deformities that are without harm.527  Were 
Oedipus or Antigone to be portrayed in an undignified or ignoble manner—that 
is, were they not beautiful in some sense that ensured their respective deformities 
be interpreted not as constitutive of their characters, but as aberrations—their 
actions would not be tragic, for their deficiencies would color their actions and 
render them laughable, and their lives comedic.   
In fact, it is not terribly difficult to imagine the great tragedies made 
comedies through a transformation of the physical bearings of the heroes 
according to the best and worst features Aristotle highlights.  We can imagine a 
short, stocky Oedipus, with bent back and limping gait, his high-pitched voice 
impotently attempting to command the elderly but upright Teiresias to tell him 
precisely what he ought not to know, or a slight and effeminate Creon raging 
against a taller, bulkier, Antigone that he is “no man and she the man / if she can 
win this and not pay for it,” and insisting that so long as he lives, “no woman shall 
rule.”528  That is, while the actions may be the heart of what tragedy would 
imitate, the perceived nobility of these actions depends upon certain conditions 
that include the physical features of the hero: if the conditions of the actions 
                                                     
527 We should not then, as Barnes does, dismiss Aristotle’s claim that tragedy evokes pity and fear because 
we do not fear murdering our fathers and sleeping with our mothers—it is the fragility of the good life that 
is conveyed in tragedy and that causes the spectator to fear the myriad contingencies that might rend his 
own life, not the particular contingencies that serve to destroy a particular tragic hero.  See “Rhetoric and 
Poetics,” 278. Cf. Lear, “Katharsis,” Phronesis 33.3 (1988): 314; 321. 
528 Sophocles, Antigone, 528-29; 578.  Cf. Markell, Bound by Recognition, 74. 
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conflict with the actions themselves, the mimetic effect is transformed, and 
tragedy becomes comedy—the good and excellent individual becomes ridiculous.  
Thus it is essential that the individual who performs the noblest actions be 
also gifted by nature with the “supports” of such action, and these include 
physical beauty, for without such supports the actions risk misrecognition, and 
the noble becomes the base.  Or as Markell writes: “for Aristotle, people are not 
virtuous or vicious in the abstract, but in relation to whatever is appropriate or 
fitting to them, as the sort of people they are.”529  It is not simply that actions 
define who one is, but who one is perceived to be defines one’s actions, and who 
one is perceived to be cannot be divorced from beauty. The ugly are ill-equipped 
to perform noble deeds, for in doing so, they risk extending beyond the range of 
activities appropriate to what their physical appearance tacitly claims them to be, 
and the discrepancy or disharmony between what they are and who they present 
themselves to be is the object of comedy. 
  Thus while action and its emphasis serves to bring into focus the way in 
which even the best lives are ultimately fragile achievements, the actions that so 
give shape to identity are creative in the sense that this identity is a crystallization 
of pre-exiting potentials that would fail to cohere without these actions.  While it 
might be said that action in the Aristotelian sense does not serve to create new 
possibilities or new identities from nothing, it nevertheless serves to continually 
                                                     
529 Markell, Bound by Recognition, 76. Cf. EE III.5 1232b36-38: “He then who is worthy of the small but 
thinks himself worthy of the great is blameable; for it is stupid and not noble that he should obtain out of 
proportion to his worth.” 
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mold an identity from the possibilities available in the matter given by nature.  
Like nature, actions mold this identity to varying degrees of success depending 
both on the degree of their virtuousness and the conditions that make such virtue 
possible, but one cannot choose the material with which one is to act, the quality 
of which is not the same for all.  
Yet if Aristotle holds tragedy to be an imitation of the life and actions of 
the best kind of human being, can tragedy likewise be said to be responsible for 
creating the best kind of human being?  And if this is indeed the case, does this 
not mean that the hero tragedy reveals to be an example of the best human life 
must himself be a kind of philosopher, insofar as it is the philosopher who 
devotes himself to what is best in human life, namely, contemplation as the 
realization of divine thought?  How, then, is it that the actions portrayed in 
tragedy can be understood in terms of contemplative activity? And what of all 
those who will never approach the greatness of the tragic hero—what is the 
philosophical and political import of tragedy, if any, for its spectators? To these 
questions, we presently turn. 
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Chapter Eleven: Tragedy and Contemplative Action 
 
As we have seen, the good and excellent individual as he (or, as Aristotle ought to 
admit, she)530 is presented in tragedy seems to be a man or woman of action, a 
practical person.  In this way, the Poetics can be said to illustrate a relation 
between art and the best human life, however, this portrayal as it has been 
discussed this far says little about the life of contemplation—rather than build on 
the relation between the arts and the life of contemplation noted above, it 
appears to give credence to the view that the best life for human beings is the 
practical, political life.  However, a closer look at Aristotle’s interpretation of 
these actions reveals a different story, one wherein the possibility of a kind of 
reconciliation between the practical and contemplative lives seems far less 
remote.   
In Politics VII, Aristotle begins his discussion of the best political regime 
with the claim that we cannot clearly know this best regime without first knowing 
what life is best, or most “choiceworthy”531 for human beings, for without 
knowing to what end human life ought to strive, we cannot know what kind of 
regime would facilitate or obstruct this striving.  Aristotle thus begins to outline 
the best human life, which he finds to be a life of action (bios praktikos), where 
                                                     
530 That is, Antigone is very clearly a tragic hero on par with any other tragic figure; however, even here 
Aristotle claims that “it is not appropriate in a female character to be manly, or clever” (Poetics 15, 
1454a22-24).  What, then, are we to make of Antigone? 
531 Pol.VII.1 1323a14-16 
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“action” is defined broadly enough to extend beyond those actions that directly 
“involve relations with other people,” or that “we engage in for the sake of action’s 
consequences.” Action, we find here, includes the self-sufficient activities of 
“study and thought [theoria kai dianoeseis].”532  In applying this expansive 
definition of action given in the Politics to the actions that make up the central 
object of imitation in tragedy, both the relation between the practical and the 
contemplative lives, and thus how it is that tragedy can display an imitation of the 
best human life, come into sharper focus.  In order to grasp the relation of these 
forms of action to tragic action, it is worth focusing on each of these terms in 
turn. 
I begin by examining thought as it is presented as an action in tragedy, 
arguing that for Aristotle the nobility of actions represented in tragedy can only 
be identified as such insofar as they are seen to be the expressions of thought.  
Thought is made manifest in tragedy through the speech of the hero, which 
serves to establish the nobility of the hero and consequently the nobility of his 
actions bound to the muthos of the play.  In this sense, it is the “speech act” of the 
hero as it is framed in the context of tragedy that reveals the excellence and 
goodness of the hero as the best kind of human being, thus separating him qua 
human from other animals.  Yet while on one hand tragedy serves to so define a 
best kind of human being in relation to a lower, animal sort, it at once provides a 
                                                     
532 Pol. VII.3 1325b13-23. 
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possibility for a kind of reconciliation between them.  While tragic speech serves 
to identify the hero as the best and most noble human being, tragic spectatorship, 
I argue, provides an avenue for even the base to reach toward what is best in 
them, by exercising their own capacities for “theory” or contemplation (theoria) 
as spectators of the play.  Insofar as these actions and the sphere of their 
possibility require a certain political organization, I argue that it is Aristotle’s 
polity, providing as it does official roles for both noble individuals and the base 
multitude, that is most conducive to the best life made possible through tragedy.  
In defending the place of polity as a condition of the best life, I argue that 
equitable and just activity are necessary to round out the political dimension of 
the contemplative life, and these are again best facilitated by the political 
integration of noble and base found in polity. Thus the best life as it is made 
manifest in tragedy reveals polity to be the best political regime, and so the role of 
the arts of politics and tragedy in making possible the best life are reinforced. 
 
Thought as Action: Tragic Speech 
Aristotle claims that after the action and the actor, the third element of tragic 
imitation is thought (dianoia).  Thought, as it is expressed in tragedy, is “the 
power of saying whatever can be said, or what is appropriate to the occasion. This 
is what, in the speeches in tragedy, falls under the arts of politics and rhetoric.”533  
                                                     
533 Poetics 6, 1450b3-5. 
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There is much to be untangled in this brief passage.  If, following the Politics, we 
can understand thought to also be a kind of action, then thought as it is expressed 
in tragedy as speech seems to become a kind of supplementary action to the main 
actions that tragedy serves to imitate and whose synthesis constitutes a tragedy’s 
muthos.  That is, while the actions imitated in tragedy are said to be noble and so 
convey the nobility of the one acting, without speech these actions appear to be 
incomplete, and as such, even ambiguous.  As Aristotle holds that the right 
actions will vary significantly depending on the circumstances, it is thus the 
thought behind them that serves to make them complete and definitively 
establish their nobility.  Thought, as it is expressed in the tragic speech, thus 
serves to give an account of the actions, and so convince the audience of their 
nobility, and of the goodness and excellence of the character of the one acting and 
speaking.534  Secondly, if thought as it is expressed in tragedy, or tragic speech, is 
“the power of saying whatever can be said,” it seems to coincide with logos, which 
was argued above to be the rational potential of language in contrast to its 
actuality, dialektos. Dialektos without logos is akin to the chirping of birds—it is 
sound produced by bodily organs, rooted in sensation and imagination but 
without the rational link to divine thought that serves to separate human 
language from the sounds made by other animals.  Insofar as tragic speech is the 
expression of thought, it is unique to human beings.  While this statement may at 
                                                     
534 We get a hint here of the link between tragedy and legal proceedings.  See Rhetoric (Rhet.) I.2 1358a2-
10; Cf. Wohl, Law’s Cosmos, xii; 17; 22; 115-116. 
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a glance seem obvious—other animals do not stage tragedies, and consequently 
we might expect that everything involved in them is uniquely human—however, 
we must recall that not all humans share equally in thought.  Thus not all are 
equally suited for tragic speech—some must be content to listen, regardless of 
whether or not they get a turn to speak.   
Yet this power of saying is not sovereign in anything like an absolute sense, 
for “whatever can be said” is limited by “what is appropriate to the occasion.”  
That is, the nobility of the speech can only be judged in the context in which it is 
given, and so requires considerable powers of discrimination and practical reason 
on the part of the speaker, and perhaps also on the part of the listener. While the 
speaker is charged with speaking in a manner worthy of thought, of choosing the 
appropriate words to express in human terms that which is mediated by the 
divine, the listener must also exert himself so as to be able to hear the divine 
reverberate in these words.  Where the divinity of thought is successfully 
conveyed from speaker to listener, the speaker reveals his excellence and the 
listener recognizes it as such—this is a political speech in the properly human 
sense, that is, it is politics rooted in logos.535  Where the speaker fails to convey 
the divinity of thought, and his words are understood simply as expressions of 
some particular interest, then they remain bound by imagination and sensation, 
                                                     
535 Pol. I.2 1253a6-18. Cf. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, 49-50. 
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and fall short of properly human speech.  These words are simply rhetoric.536  In 
this sense we can understand Aristotle to be noting a decline in the quality of 
tragedy with the advance of “extreme” democracy when Aristotle claims that the 
poets of old made their characters like citizens (politikos), whereas contemporary 
poets make their characters more like orators (retorikos).537  Moreover, we ought 
to see here in the distinction between the good and excellent man and the 
ordinary one a distinction between what is closest to the divine, and so most 
human, and what is closer to the animal. 
In this way, tragedy’s role in moral education is also made clearer, for the 
performance of tragic action serves to make the actor a good human being, and in 
so doing, serve as an example for others of what a good human being must be.538   
Put differently: if thought is an action, and tragic speech is the expression of 
thought, then tragic speech is also an action—the kind of action particular to the 
                                                     
536 Aristotle defines rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion.”  Focused as it is on persuading a given audience, this definition does not preclude the 
possibility of rhetorical speech being true and rational, given one’s audience finds such things persuasive.  
However, in focusing on persuasion in this manner, rhetoric concerns itself primarily with appearances, 
and consequently the senses and the imagination, rather than divine thought.  One might use rhetoric to 
appear to be a good person, and make another appear to be bad.  To call something “simply rhetoric,” then, 
is to say it is speech concerned with appearances before truth.  See Rhet. I.2 1355b27; III.7 1408a20-23; 
III.19 1419b17-18.   
537 Poetics 6, 1450b5-7. 
538 Contra Lear, who contests the centrality of pedagogy in Aristotle’s conception of tragedy.  Though 
Lear’s discussion of tragedy concerns primarily the role of catharsis, whereas mine focuses on the 
philosophical and political important of tragedy more broadly, a key objection Lear brings against the 
pedagogical reading of tragedy more broadly is that the spectator of tragedy is a  “virtuous man” and thus 
has no need of such education.  However, while Aristotle does think that tragedy is a mimesis of the actions 
of the best sort of person, there is little evidence to suggest that Aristotle thought that only the best kinds of 
people would form the audience, and this was certainly not the case in Aristotle’s Athens.  As I will show 
below, it is precisely tragedy’s ability to appeal to the best in both good and bad spectators that lends it its 
importance.  See Lear, “Katharsis,” 315; 321. 
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politics practiced by the good and excellent, and through which one is recognized 
as such.  This connection brings us close to contemporary theories of the “speech 
act.” The words of the tragic speech, similar to the pronouncement of a legal 
verdict, serve to make the good and excellent man what he is: good and 
excellent.539  Without pronouncing the words he remains unknown, and if they 
miss their mark he becomes ridiculous: he reveals himself to not have been good 
and excellent in the first place.  Tragic speech thus serves as a kind of speech act 
marking the passage of the hero from an unknown or at least ambiguous state to 
one of being good and excellent—in this way tragic speech is the action that 
imbues the speaker with the kind of character that might support similar noble 
deeds in the future.  Read in the context of Aristotle’s biology, we might see this 
unknown or ambiguous state of the hero’s character prior to his deeds to play 
upon the ambiguity of human life: the hero is apparently human, but whether or 
not he tends more towards the animal side of human nature or stretches out 
toward the divine will only be revealed in his actions.  In this sense, the actions, 
in revealing the hero to be noble, serve to separate him from the animal condition 
of the base, and so serve as an imitation of the best human, as a kind of poetic 
fiction, not unlike Manet’s lunch as Barnes noted above, yet which now serves as 
                                                     
539 According to Ober, “Athenian politics operated quite overtly according to pragmatic, discursive, speech-
act principles.  By making proclamations in the Assembly and in the law courts, the Athenian demos self-
consciously establishes and reiterated social and political realities, and it did so without much worrying 
about the ontological status of the realities so created.”  See Josiah Ober, The Athenian Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 11.   
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a standard to be expressly emulated, and implicitly, serves to shape the evaluative 
measure of human life. 
However, like a legal judgment, the possibility of revealing one’s excellence 
or nobility through speech requires a number of conditions.  According to Austin, 
in order for such speech acts to “work,” that is, in order for a performative 
utterance to have the effect it is meant to have, it generally requires that “the 
circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, 
appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or 
other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or 
‘mental’ actions.”540  That is, tragic speech is linked to the other actions that 
constitute the tragic muthos and whose character it serves to clarify.  While the 
main actions are incomplete without the account given in tragic speech, tragic 
speech itself requires these actions to animate the words spoken. Moreover, the 
words themselves require a certain context: not only must the right words be 
spoken, but they must be spoken by the right person, at the right time, and in the 
right manner in order for the desired effect to be made manifest. Certain 
conventions are required to give order to the context and so clarify the conditions 
or standards that permit one to identify and evaluate the utterance, and with it 
the person making the utterance.  Thus we must consider what Austin calls the 
“total situation” of the “total speech act” in order to understand how utterances 
                                                     
540 J.L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 8. Original emphasis. 
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and statements either achieve their desired ends or go wrong.541 In the case of 
tragic speech, the conventions that directly order the context of the speech and 
establish conditions that make identifying and evaluating possible are those of 
Greek tragedy itself, of which the Poetics is an account.  Thus for Aristotle, the 
success of the tragic speech in making thought manifest depends on how it 
relates to the elements of tragedy: foremost, the other actions that make up the 
overall muthos of the play, and the character giving the speech and to whom they 
speak, and, to lesser degrees, the melody and the spectacle.542   
Thus we might say that tragedy for Aristotle is an art that allows for the 
organization of language and gestures such as to represent an image of the 
human being that might serve as a normative ideal worthy of imitation, one that 
strives toward what is most divine and so best in human life.  Yet this ideal 
human being is precisely that—an ideal, if not an Idea: even if we grant that, 
unlike Platonic Ideas, this human ideal is rooted in actually existing things, it 
represents an image of humanity that is not simply an expression of anything 
already existing in the human world.  It is only in striving toward this ideal, and 
the particular capacities it is seen to express, that something like this human and 
its capacities comes to exist and distinguish itself from the animal.  We might 
thus see tragedy as a kind of “human guise” that teaches the human animal to be 
                                                     
541 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 52. 
542 These latter two conditions Aristotle sees as being less important, for while they provide pleasure to the 
spectator, they address particulars that can be changed without the core of the tragedy being altered, and 
involve crafts that are farthest from poetry.  Aristotle will even go as far as claiming that the effect toward 
which tragedy strives is possible without these elements.  See Poetics 6, 1450b15-20. 
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human through assuming a human role,543 either directly as the actor on stage, or 
indirectly, as a spectator identifying with the actions performed.  While the 
speech and gestures may be nothing but “play-acting” at first—nothing more than 
a kind of game of gestures—Aristotle’s insistence that it is divine thought and its 
related human capacities that shine through these actions, and not the gods 
themselves, would serve to transform the reasons for acting in the way that one 
does, supplanting the logic of the world of poetic myth with Aristotle’s own 
philosophy.544  
In this way Aristotle would use tragedy to rewrite the human-animal 
divide as it prevailed in the world of poetic myth and from which even Plato was 
unable to extract himself.  Aristotle’s account of tragedy, and of poetry more 
generally, thus serves as the other side of the coin whose tail was revealed in 
Aristotle’s biological writings.  Poetry, and tragedy most specifically, would 
according to Aristotle’s account serve the same role in the sphere of moral 
education as his biology would in the sphere of natural philosophy: to radically 
redraw the boundaries between human and animal.  Whereas tragedy was 
previously seen as a continuation of the mythic relation between human and 
animal, wherein a human will enter into proximity with an animal in order to 
distinguish himself from other humans and identify himself as a hero or master, 
                                                     
543 See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 380. 
544 Thus Aristotle’s exclusion of the gods from his discussion of tragedy is a result of his philosophical and 
political project, and probably not, as Vernant claims, that Aristotle and his contemporaries “no longer 
understood tragic man.” See Vernant, “Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy,” 29. Cf. Edith Hall, 
“Is there a Polis in Aristotle’s Poetics?” 296; Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, 117. 
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in Aristotle’s account tragedy serves to separate the human from the animal by 
offering an image of the noblest human actions. The tragic hero for Aristotle is 
thus not one who forms a kind of pact with an animal or animals to establish 
himself as a hero, but one for whom the distance between himself and other 
animals is greatest. 
Like Aristotle’s biology, his poetics appear to cut both ways on the 
question of equality: while both Aristotle’s biology and his poetics appear to 
undermine the particular manner in which aristocratic distinction was 
established in the world of poetic myth, they at once establish a new hierarchy, 
one arguably even more rigid than the one they would replace.  In terms of 
biology, this hierarchy concerns the idea that some humans are more human 
than others: that they are naturally better equipped for practicing what is best for 
a human being.  What we have seen of Aristotle’s Poetics does not contradict 
this—in fact, it would appear that insofar as recognizing those kinds thought 
naturally to be higher or lower depends upon the appearance or the physical 
features of the higher and the lower, then what is “natural” conceals within it 
aesthetic standards of beauty derived from the arts.  The existence of tragedy and 
comedy attest to a higher, more divine kind of human, and a lower, more animal 
kind, and these serve as archetypes of the human form.   
Politically speaking, then, it appears that the arts accomplish and 
perpetuate a division between higher and lower human types, but here we might 
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ask: what then, holds these two types together?  It was found that while the life of 
contemplation may be higher than the political life, it requires an active political 
dimension in order to be possible.  While tragedy displays the best human life, a 
life that is at once active and contemplative, it is less clear how tragedy as the 
expression of this life might relate to those unsuited to live it.  If politics also 
concerns, as Aristotle claims, the production of friendship, and the friendship of 
the best kind of human being is the friendship based on excellence or virtue,545 
then insofar as tragedy represents the actions of the best human being and in so 
doing serves an important role in the education necessary for citizenship, we 
might also expect it to facilitate the building and maintaining of bonds of 
friendship based on virtue.  Thus we must turn now to what might be called the 
“popular” dimension of tragedy: tragedy as moral education not only for those 
who might aspire to the best in human life, but for those who are naturally ill-
suited for this life.  We must turn then, away from a focus on tragic heroes, and 
focus instead on tragic spectators. 
 
Theory as Action: Tragic Spectatorship 
My account of tragedy in the Poetics to this point has focused primarily on the 
relation between thought and speech as forms of action performed within the 
play itself; in this way, I attempted to elucidate the relation between thought and 
                                                     
545 EE VII.1 1234b23-25; VII.2 1236b1-2. 
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practice, and thus philosophy and politics, which in Aristotle’s account is a 
central function of tragedy. However, this account suggests a passive role with 
respect to philosophy and politics for most citizens: as spectators, they learn to 
recognize who is noble and who is not, but not necessarily to be noble 
themselves, or even to be as good as they might be.  Yet if tragedy is to serve a 
role in moral education to more than the few who actually perform in tragedies, 
then it must also provide spectators themselves with a chance to act nobly, or the 
rough analogue of noble, particular to the individual spectator.  Put more bluntly: 
why teach spectators to recognize the noble, if they are without avenue for acting 
themselves?  Is Aristotle’s goal simply to use tragedy to teach compliance—to 
make the base obedient to the noble? Or is it possible that tragedy might also 
provide a stage for the base to be as good as they are able, and thus make a kind 
of friendship between them and the best sort possible?  I turn here to the first 
part of this last question, contending that Aristotle does indeed see tragedy as 
providing a venue or serving as an example of how “the many” might also act as 
well as they might, but in order to understand how, we must return to the 
expansive idea of action in Politics VII. 
Recall that for Aristotle, theory or “study” (theoria) is among the highest 
contemplative activities, and in Politics VII, Aristotle writes that it is an action, 
thus suggesting that theoretical activity can be both political and philosophical.  
Moreover, as both Vernant and Euben have noted, theoretical activity is 
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intimately related to the performing arts, as both theory and theater share a 
common root.  Euben writes that the Greek “thea means see, sight, gaze, look 
upon, behold, admire, and contemplate.  As a feminine noun, thea suggests a 
view or thing seen, a sight or a spectacle.  It is related to the verb theaomai, to 
gaze at, to behold, especially with a sense of wonder and admiration.”  Here 
Euben relates this definition of theaomai to its use in texts by Plato and Aristotle, 
noting that it “is not limited to physical vision but can include mental activity.”546  
Euben further notes that theoria “is the normal Greek for official attendance as a 
spectator in the political and religious rites of a city,” which included the 
performance of tragedies.  In this way, the “[t]heater provided a place and 
moment when citizen spectators could judge refracted versions of themselves 
onstage,” thus contributing to “the self-reflexivity that characterized fifth-century 
Athens.”547   
Yet in drawing indiscriminately upon the philosophical texts of Plato and 
Aristotle and the role theory is known to have played historically, Euben moves a 
little too quickly in his associations.  That is, if the common meaning of theoria 
was to participate in the political and religious rites of the city as a spectator, to 
view (theaomai) and judge the spectacle accordingly, this would indeed suggest 
that theoria and theaomai are political and religious terms, but it does not 
necessarily mean that they were considered philosophical to anyone other than 
                                                     
546 Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory, 50.  Cf. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, 120. 
547 Euben, Platonic Noise, 42; 59. 
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Plato, Aristotle, and their disciples.  Given their at best enigmatic relations to 
democracy, the use of theoria by Plato and Aristotle to mean contemplative or 
philosophical activity cannot be seen as innocent, and so conflated with the 
“normal Greek.”  Taking a hard interpretation of Plato and Aristotle as anti-
democrats, one might argue that in locating an honored political and religious 
activity not in its formal role in the civic life of Athenian democracy, but in 
philosophical activity not accessible to all, Plato and Aristotle would undermine 
these public rites, claiming that they can only properly be performed by a group 
of people far more exclusive in membership than the number of citizens who had 
legal access to their performance in democratic Athens.   
In this way, Plato and Aristotle would make a public rite a private one. 
Rather than allow citizens to judge for themselves what is good, bad, just or 
unjust in the context of spectatorship, Plato and Aristotle would be saying that 
only philosophy can properly define these terms and answer the questions 
associated with them, questions whose consideration were otherwise considered 
part of the public life of any citizen.  In attempting to define a sphere of specialist 
knowledge properly suited to questions that were previously considered matters 
of public interest, Plato and Aristotle would thus be effectively narrowing the 
definition of citizen, rendering the poets and common citizens that ignore this 
boundary guilty of a kind of pleonexia, of overreaching their appropriate 
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station.548  Thus, while it is possible that tragic theoria contributed to Athenian 
“self-reflexivity,” Plato and Aristotle’s appropriation of the term would be an 
attempt to replace tragic spectatorship with philosophy as the bearer of this 
reflexivity.  In this sense, the philosophical theoria advocated by Plato and 
Aristotle is antagonistic to the tragic theoria practiced by the common citizens of 
Athens. 
Though Aristotle’s suggestion that the public performance of a tragedy, 
and so its actual role as a politico-religious rite, is unnecessary to accomplish its 
tragic effect—that the effect can be experienced from reading the play all on one’s 
own549—appears to corroborate the notion that Aristotle is party to a 
philosophical high-jacking of tragic theoria, I do not believe Aristotle’s intention 
was to place theoria beyond the grasp of the common citizen.  Rather, the 
philosophical dimension Aristotle, following Plato, considers part of theoria, 
allows Aristotle to, perhaps unlike Plato, theorize the possibility of something 
akin to mass or public contemplation —a form of philosophical activity that the 
many can practice despite their natural deficiencies and unsuitability to 
becoming philosophers individually.  It is important, however, to draw a 
distinction between the philosophical and tragic or political meanings of theoria 
as it is done above in order to recognize that Aristotle does indeed see two 
                                                     
548 Cf. Castoriadis, when he writes that the definition of the democratic citizen in Athens and elsewhere 
“ought to include all those who, irrespective of their profession, try to go beyond their sphere of 
specialization and actively interest themselves in what is going on in society.” See Castoriadis, 
“Intellectuals and History,” in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, trans. David Ames Curtis, 5.  
549 Poetics 6, 1450b15-20. 
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different dimensions of theoria and is trying to reconcile them to the degree he 
thinks possible—a project that is not intelligible if we follow Euben in conflating 
the philosophical and politico-religious dimensions of theoria in the very 
definition of the word.  Thus, while I agree with Euben in his presentation of the 
politico-religious dimension of theoria, its philosophical dimension, as the 
activity Aristotle takes to be most definitive of the best human life, requires 
further elaboration if the relation between it and politics that Aristotle is trying to 
advance is to be understood.  Perhaps the most concise statement of the 
philosophical dimension of theoria, the life of contemplation as the best life, 
comes to us in Book X of the NE. 
In Book X of the NE, Aristotle provides his famous account of 
contemplation as the best possible human life, an account that appears to some 
to jut from the flow of arguments in a work otherwise devoted to the centrality of 
the practical, political life.  Indeed, given her focus on precisely this centrality of 
the practical, political life in Aristotle’s thought, Nussbaum sees Book X to be 
fundamentally at odds with the rest of the work, and even goes as far as 
speculating that it was inserted by a later editor.  In this way, Book X is seen as a 
fragment likely composed by a youthful Aristotle still under the sway of “ethical 
Platonism,” and opposed to the views expressed by Aristotle “in the bulk of his 
mature ethical and political writings.”550  For Nussbaum, the divinity of the 
                                                     
550 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 377. 
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contemplative life extends beyond the practical concerns of human life and 
Aristotle’s deliberate anthropocentricity to the point that “we cannot have a 
harmonious fusion of the human and the divine.”551  In this respect Nussbaum 
appears to be in agreement with Strauss concerning the decisive separability of 
the cosmological and political dimensions in Aristotle.552  Yet this concern for 
hubris is perhaps a more appropriate description of the tragic poets than it is of 
Aristotle.   
As we have seen in the examination of Aristotle’s biological writings above, 
the human only is human in relation to the divine—it is only the divine nous and 
its related capacities that set the human animal apart from other animals, and 
what we call “human” is really the attempt to accommodate the divine within the 
boundaries of the animal.  Human life is itself a fusion of the divine and the 
animal, and while the degree of harmony really possible for humans might be 
debated, it is clear that Aristotle thinks some degree of harmony in human life is 
possible and worth striving toward, and this degree of harmony is inseparable 
from what is divine in human life.  That is, all the practical, human things are 
only intelligible as such in the light of divine nous. Aristotle’s claim that only 
humans have the capacities necessary to live a practical life, the uniquely human 
dimension to these capacities Aristotle gives them in the NE as opposed to in the 
                                                     
551 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 377. 
552 Recall Strauss, The City and Man, 21.  For a critique of their respective positions and the implications of 
their approaches to Aristotle’s thought from a methodological viewpoint, see John R. Wallach, 
“Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory 20.4 (1992): 613-641. 
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biological writings, thus necessitates an account of nous and its relation to 
practical life.553  Furthermore, we should see the account of contemplative life 
Aristotle gives in Book X to profoundly separate him from Plato, for it is precisely 
Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas—that Ideas conceived as 
distinct entities from the practical world of things become irrelevant to it554—that 
compels him to offer an account of the practical dimension of contemplation.  In 
this way, we must see Book X as a necessary part of the practical life the NE takes 
as its object of study.   
Thus the claim made in Politics VII that theoria is an action finds 
resonance in Book X of the NE.  Aristotle writes that happiness is virtuous 
activity, and that the virtue of what is best would be the activity appropriate to 
the most “complete happiness” (teleia eudaimonia), and this activity is 
contemplative (theoretike).  Yet Aristotle vacillates here on the divinity of this 
life: is this best thing whose virtuous activity would be the best human life divine 
nous, or some other thing that seems naturally to rule and to command, and “to 
possess intelligence concerning what is noble and divine [kalon kai theion]”?  
That is, is the best life one defined by activity that is actually divine (theion), or 
activity of “the most divine of the things in us [theiotaton]”?555  This difference 
                                                     
553 For example, while at HA, IX.10 614b19 Aristotle refers to cranes as being phronimon, in NE VI 
Aristotle claims phronesis involves logos and is thus an exclusively human activity.  See NE VI.5 1140b2-
8; 19-21; 25-28; VI.7 1141b8-9.  An account of the practical dimension of contemplative life as given in 
NE X allows us to reconcile these apparently opposing positions, rather than simply reject one of them. 
554 Recall Meta. III.6 1002b30; XI.1 1059b3; XIII.4 1079a5-7. 
555 NE X.7 1177a12-18. 
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between the divine and the most divine for a human should be seen not as 
suggesting doubts on Aristotle’s part about the supremacy of nous, but rather to 
indicate the difference between particular humans in their ability to perform 
noetic activity, along with the precarious nature of this performance in the first 
place.  As we have seen above in the discussion of leisure, Aristotle insists that 
what is best—what is most noble and divine—is what is most self-sufficient, and 
consequently the best activities must be leisured activities—they must not be 
shaped by ends beyond themselves, but devoted instead to the flourishing of the 
beauty of their own performance.  Political activity is bound to the activities 
associated with war, and war is for the sake of peace, and consequently these 
activities are not ends in themselves, and thus cannot represent the actualization 
of what is best in human beings.   
Contemplation, on the other hand, aims at no end beyond itself, is more 
continuous an activity, and even at first glance appears to require fewer external 
supports than the activities of politics and war—it is how the best person would 
choose to occupy themselves were they free of the web of instrumental activities 
that sustain life.  In this sense the complete happiness of the human being tends 
beyond what is merely human, toward the divine.  While humans will never 
actually become divine through contemplation—that is, Aristotle does not think 
that any en-mattered life could actually be so blessed as to spend its every 
moment in contemplative activity—that the divine as such is beyond human 
 
 
295 
grasp does not, as we have seen, preclude divinity from animating what is best in 
human life.  Insofar as one might devote oneself to contemplation, one might 
through contemplation become more divine than one otherwise would be; that is, 
one might come closer to actualizing the fullness of one’s human potential.  
Insofar as the human can be said in this way to be the animal that reaches beyond 
itself, beyond its animal sensibility and toward the divinity of thought, it would 
be insufficiently human to dwell only upon human things, to allow the divine 
thought to which humans have access to be limited by the mortality or transience 
of human animality; one must instead strive “to make oneself immortal, insofar 
as that is possible.”556  Making oneself “immortal” to the extent humanly possible 
means to live a life in accord with divine thought (noun bios), and it is this life 
that is the happiest, and the most human (malista anthropos).557 
Yet what does it actually mean to live a life most in accord with divine 
thought, a life of contemplative activity, to animals that live together and that are 
not all equally blessed with an aptitude for this activity?  To whom is the 
contemplative life really available?  Aristotle’s biological writings paint a picture 
of humans unequal in their respective capacities to engage in the most human of 
activities, and in the Politics, Aristotle writes that while everyone strives toward 
happiness and the good life, not everyone will attain these things, on account of 
                                                     
556 NE X.7 1177b30-34. 
557 NE X.7 1178a6-8. 
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either fortune or nature.558  Further, Aristotle insists that arguments559 are 
“incapable of exhorting the many [pollous] to nobility and goodness,” for they are 
accustomed to living according to their passions (pathei) and pursuing their 
pleasures.  They only ever abstain from these not from a sense of shame, that is, 
from a sense of falling short of the goodness to which they might be capable, but 
only from fear of reprisal.  Such people have no conception of the noble, Aristotle 
continues, for they have never tasted it (ageustoi) for themselves.560   
These statements seem to suggest that only a very small number of people 
can ever hope to even try to make themselves “immortal,” even only to the small 
extent possible for a human being.  And indeed, Aristotle’s discussion of the best 
possible regime in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, the “city of prayer,” as it is 
sometimes called, appears to corroborate this notion.  There Aristotle excludes 
most of those who would have made up the ranks of Athenian citizenship from 
political participation, including craftspeople and farmers, leaving political 
activity to only a small number capable of living a life of leisure, who, beyond 
their purely civic duties, devote themselves to the leisured activities of music and 
                                                     
558 Pol. VII.13 1331a40-1332b1. 
559 Though Bartlett and Collins render logoi as “speeches,” here I follow Irwin and the Revised Oxford 
Translation in rendering this term as arguments, for it seems to be the rational component of such speech to 
which Aristotle thinks “the many” will be indifferent, not necessarily speech that makes its appeal in some 
other manner.  See Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terrence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999) and 
“Nicomachean Ethics” in The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume 2, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, 1729-1867 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
560 NE X.9 1179b4-17. 
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contemplation.561  For all these reasons, commentators such as Wood and Wood 
write that “the total picture” of Aristotle’s political thought that emerges “is of an 
aristocratic conservatism diametrically opposed to Athenian democratic values, 
one going somewhat beyond the commonly held opinions of educated men of his 
own class, on some points even exceeding the positions of Socrates and Plato.”562 
However, we might ask here: to what extent, if at all, is this “city of prayer” 
considered by Aristotle to be an actual possibility?  Moreover, is this “city of 
prayer” and the radical exclusion it promotes a necessary political consequence of 
Aristotle’s notion of natural inequality, even in light of comments, such as those 
also made in the NE, that “perhaps even in the base [animals] [phaulois], there is 
something naturally good that is superior to them and that aims at the good 
proper to them”?563 Aristotle’s study of regimes in the Politics appears to be 
driven by the tension existing between the fact of there being a best possible life 
for human beings, and the fact that everywhere this best life is obstructed by 
politics— that the existing regimes of his political world are “not in good 
condition,”564 and so fail to promote the best human life.  While some 
commentators take this state of affairs and the discrepancy between political life 
and the best human life to be an eternal fact of politics for Aristotle, and so make 
                                                     
561 Pol. VII.8 1328b34-1329a2. See also Depew, “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal 
State,” 347; 357; 359. 
562 Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, 215. Cf. Dorothea 
Frede, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics,” in Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays, 176. 
563 NE X.2 1173a5. 
564 Pol. II.1 1260b33-34. 
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the superiority of philosophy to politics dependent on a kind of “falleness” of 
humankind and the impossibility of a truly good city,565 Aristotle seems here to 
be more concerned with pragmatic political reform than to fatalistic resignation 
to what he understands as human animality.   
As we have seen, the properly human aims that make up political life are 
only intelligible in the light of divine nous, and so the power of contemplation is 
in part due to its ability to steer politics toward higher aims than those it would 
otherwise take as its own, toward actions that reach toward the “immortal.”  In 
this sense, “the city of prayer” is not to be taken as a model to be implemented, or 
even, at least primarily, as evidence of Aristotle’s opposition to democracy, but is 
instead, as Bodéüs claims, a kind of reminder to legislators that they may not 
choose the conditions in which they legislate.566  This does not mean to forsake 
the best for a safer, “second-best” alternative, but rather, that what is best for 
humans can only ever develop out of actually existing conditions.  There is a best 
life for human beings, it is a real possibility, but it depends upon certain political 
circumstances that always exceed the range of one’s own power, and so these 
circumstances must be taken into consideration as one strives toward the 
“immortal.” 
                                                     
565 A Straussian point echoed by the Woods when they write: “For Aristotle man is fundamentally wicked, 
and this evil nature is responsible for the troubles and disorders occurring under existing systems of 
government.”  See Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory, 215. 
566 Richard Bodéüs, “Law and the Regime in Aristotle.” In Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian 
Political Science, eds. Carnes Lord and David K. O’Connor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), 248. 
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It is in this light that we must interpret Aristotelian “polity,” the mean of 
the regimes he outlines in the Politics, combining both elements of aristocracy 
and democracy.  Polity is not a second-best alternative to the impossible “city of 
prayer,” or even to a monarchy ruled by a kind of god-king, but is rather a form of 
political organization that might promote the best human life within political 
conditions very similar to those existing in democratic Athens.567  Of course, for 
polity to promote the best human life, it must incorporate or facilitate 
contemplative activity of some kind, and it is here where we might return to the 
role of tragedy and the form of contemplation it promotes.  Just as Aristotle 
provides a justification for a limited form of democracy in what scholars today 
refer to as the “summation argument,” whereby the many can be seen to 
collectively possess or even exceed the virtues of the few, and so might rightfully 
claim a share in ruling a city devoted to virtuous life, so might the many claim a 
share of the contemplative life through tragic spectatorship.  While individually 
the base might be ill-suited to becoming philosophers, overwhelmed as they are 
by emotions such as fear, driven by their desire for pleasure, and indifferent to 
feelings of shame or the exhortations of reason, if they might collectively aim at 
                                                     
567 Although in the Pol. Aristotle claims that monarchy is the best regime for a populous where one 
individual or family is so much more virtuous than the rest that it would be unjust to submit them to the 
rule of others (Pol.III.13 1284b25-33; III.17 1288a7-10), it seems unlikely Aristotle thought such a 
situation described any Greek city.  Of the five kinds of monarchy outlined in the Pol., only the second, 
“non-Greek” kingship, and the fifth kind of kingship, which bases itself on household management, seem 
to be reconcilable to the notion that their kings possess godlike virtue. The second kind of kingship is 
appropriate to a multitude of slaves, and the fifth kind to a multitude that is at once a family, and thus both 
deny their populaces a share in the virtues Aristotle clearly thought adult Greek males possessed, and which 
qualified them for some degree of political participation.  See Pol. III.14 1285b20-33.  Cf. Pol. I.2 1252b5-
8. 
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some good that exceeds them, then it is not impossible that they too might strive 
to make themselves “immortal” by aiming at the good whose divine excess serves 
to separate the human animal from other animals.   
In this way, just as in the summation argument Aristotle claims that when 
the multitude comes together they are “like a single human being, with many feet, 
hands, and senses, and so too for their character traits and wisdom,” thus making 
them “better judges of works of music and of the poets,”568 so in the actual act of 
this judgment does the multitude approximate an individual philosopher 
engaging in contemplative activity.  It is for this reason that the capacity to 
correctly judge works of music and of the poets is thought by Aristotle to qualify 
one for citizenship, for this activity requires the recognition of the noble and the 
base, and so the good and the bad, and these are part and parcel of the justice 
that characterizes the organization of human political communities.569  Laws, 
Aristotle claims, “are like works of the political art,” and so one judges correctly 
where one has the appropriate experience, just as in music.570  While experience 
itself (empeiria) is an organization of sensation and imagination shared with 
other animals, insofar as the act of judging is itself contemplative activity 
(theoria), and so related to the capacity of divine thought (nous), this animal 
experience is mediated by the divine and so becomes properly human, and the 
                                                     
568 Pol. III.11 1281a41-1281b9. 
569 Pol. I.2 1253a6-20. 
570 NE X.9 1181a17-1181b1. 
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properly human things—such as an example of the best possible human life—can 
be recognized.   
Tragic spectatorship is particularly well suited to this activity insofar as the 
specific pleasure bound up with tragedy concerns pity and fear.571  Insofar as 
pleasure and its pursuit serve to shape the activities of a given animal, so it plays 
a role in constituting that animal, and indeed, a particular kind of human 
being.572  While the multitude may be, according to Aristotle, indifferent to 
rational argumentation or aristocratic notions of shame, tragic spectatorship 
incorporates the pleasure for which the multitude thirst, and which might be said 
to positively shape their actions, with the fear that serves to negatively shape 
their actions, making these both objects of contemplation, and part of 
contemplative activity.  Through tragic spectatorship, the multitude comes not 
only to contemplate the sources of their own pleasures and fears as these are 
dramatically displayed before their eyes, but they come to experience pleasure in 
the activity of contemplation.  Moreover, insofar as the tragic hero identifies 
himself as such through speech, and this speech is itself thought, the 
contemplative activity of the tragic spectator allows for a kind of identification 
with the hero: despite their differences, both spectator and hero become in a 
sense united through their respective contemplative activities.  It is this degree of 
similarity between spectator and hero made possible through contemplation that 
                                                     
571 Poetics 14 1453b11-14. 
572 NE X.5 1176a3-12. 
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enables the spectator to feel pity for the hero and his or her tragic fate, and to 
plant the seeds of friendship between them.573  In habituating themselves in 
contemplative activity, tragic spectators learn to recognize noble and base, good 
and bad, just and unjust, and so receive an education that is at once political and 
philosophical. 
In this sense, tragedy might serve an important role in political and 
philosophical education, giving to its spectators the same kind of share in what is 
best for human life—that is, contemplative activity—as it does in giving these 
spectators a formal place in the civic and religious rites of the city.  A city or 
regime that enables such activity thus serves to incorporate philosophical activity 
into its political life, and so promote what is best in human life through the 
particular conditions available to this activity.  More boldly, we might say, only a 
city that manages to incorporate contemplative activity into its political life can 
be said to practice politics fit for a human being—all other forms of politics 
remain continuous with those of other political animals.  In this sense, the arts 
instituted in such a manner actually serve to create the human being as human, 
affecting the separation between humans and other animals accomplished 
through divine thought.  Thus it can be said that Aristotle would use the 
performing arts, especially tragedy, and the political institutions of the city that 
promote them, to create human beings as qualitatively different from other 
                                                     
573 Rhet. II.8 1386a18-19; 25-27; EE VII.5 1239b16-21. 
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animals in the manner made possible through divine thought.  Insofar as polity is 
the regime that seeks to bring together noble and base in its institutions, yet 
remain oriented toward the virtuous life, then polity appears most suited to the 
institution of tragedy as public performance, and so the regime most likely to 
bring to fruition what is best in human life. 
 
Equity and Justice in Polity 
Yet there remains one last piece to be placed for this puzzle to be complete and 
the question of the role of art in the best life to be answered: we must consider 
once more the place of the best individual human being in this regime.  We have 
seen that tragedy provides both a stage for the mimetic dramatization of the best 
human being, and an avenue for the multitude of the baser sort to at once 
recognize what is best and exercise what is best in themselves, thus suggesting 
that a regime where participation in such performances forms an integral part of 
civic activity would be the best and most fitting for human beings.  In the case of 
Athens, a city formed of an unequal Greek multitude, and thus to Aristotle’s mind 
a multitude wherein the gap between best and worst is not so great as to place 
some share in the best utterly beyond the worst, polity, as the regime which, in 
combining aristocratic and democratic elements, integrates the flourishing of the 
best sort with the virtuous activity of the multitude, seems to represent an ideal 
toward which Athenian lawmakers might strive.   
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Yet, it is not difficult to imagine opposition to Aristotle’s polity from two 
sides. The democratic side is perhaps the most obvious, in that while polity 
reserves a role for the multitude in civic life, it clearly represents a less directly 
democratic form of political organization than the “extreme democracy” that 
existed in the Athens of Aristotle’s day.  One can expect these democrats would 
have opposed reforms that would have excluded most citizens from direct 
participation in lawmaking, and limited their role to one of choosing lawmakers, 
rulers, and sitting on juries.574  But we might also imagine opposition from one 
who takes Aristotle’s ideas on natural inequality and the supremacy of leisure and 
contemplation seriously in that polity appears to require that the best sort of 
human being spend considerable amounts of time devoted to activities whose 
ends are less than noble.  That is, life in Aristotle’s polity, even for the best sort, 
would be less leisurely than it otherwise might be, especially with regard to 
politics, where the old identification between citizen and warrior is maintained.575 
Consequently, the best sort will not be able to completely devote themselves to 
contemplation, and so not be as happy in polity as they otherwise might be.  By 
ensuring a share in the contemplative life for the multitude, one might argue, the 
                                                     
574 Indeed, polity seems like an attempt to return to a bygone time, past the reforms of Pericles or 
Cleisthenes, to something very much like the constitution credited to Solon, whom Aristotle claims gave 
the people “only the minimum power necessary, that of electing and inspecting officials.”  The officials 
themselves were drawn from “among the notables and rich” (Pol. II.12 1274a14-21).  Though its 
authorship is now disputed, more on (what might have been) Aristotle’s views of Solon can be found in the 
Constitution of Athens, para. 7-11, with a concise overview of the eleven changes to the constitution of 
Athens that brought about its particular form of democracy at para. 41.  See Aristotle, “Constitution of 
Athens,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
575 Pol. III.17 1288a13-15. 
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best and most suited to the life of contemplation find that they are not able to 
flourish to the fullest of their natural endowments.  Who, then, is polity really 
for?  If contemplation really is the best activity for human beings, and some are 
more apt to it than others, then perhaps it is not polity, but a regime like 
Kallipolis that would best facilitate what is best in humans after all. 
Incidentally, in the construction of the Kallipolis, Adeimantus brings a 
similar complaint to Socrates, claiming that the best in his best city do not seem 
to be flourishing to their fullest extent.  Socrates’ response is well known: that the 
goal of legislation is not to ensure that only one part of the city—even the best—
flourishes, but to ensure that the city as a whole flourishes.576  Regardless of the 
sincerity of this claim, or possible contradictions with what Socrates will 
subsequently tell his interlocutors, we might note that Aristotle’s response to our 
version of this problem is not to simply subordinate the good of the individual to 
the good of the whole, but rather, to find a way of reconciling their respective 
goods.  Just as Aristotle sought through tragedy to reconcile both the lower and 
higher types of human being in common though differing degrees of 
contemplative activity, so Aristotle would attempt to reconcile the best individual 
with the whole.  Polity is not a regime that is best for the whole, yet shortchanges 
the most virtuous of human beings; rather, polity especially provides the best and 
most virtuous human beings the greatest opportunities to practice their virtues.  
                                                     
576 Rep. IV 419a-420c. 
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To understand exactly how polity serves the best human beings in this way, we 
must turn to Aristotle’s conceptions of justice and equity. 
In the NE, Aristotle claims that justice is the greatest (kratiste) and most 
complete of the virtues (teleia malista arête), for it concerns virtue related not 
only to one’s own flourishing, but to the flourishing of another (heteron)—justice 
is the good of others, of all who share in the community (koinono).577  However, 
as Aristotle notes, justice is also politikon, a “political matter”: it concerns the 
“organization” (taxis) of political community, wherein justice itself judges (krisis) 
what is just.578  Thus, how the good of these others is understood will vary 
between different forms of political organization.  Each different regime, whether 
organized around the rule of one, few, or many, depends on an idea of justice 
particular to it, which then serves as the measure against which different aspects 
of its organization, particular laws, the deeds of its citizens, or possible changes 
are evaluated: it is in this way justice judges what is just.  Likewise, justice will 
also concern the distribution of offices and resources among the members of the 
community, based on the particular merit (axian) espoused by the regime: for 
democracies, Aristotle claims the merit according to which office is distributed is 
freedom, for oligarchy, wealth, and for aristocracy, virtue.579  Justice in each of 
these regimes, then, is the fittingness of the good of their citizens with the good of 
the regime—it is the cultivation of virtues that support its form of organization.  If 
                                                     
577 NE V.1 1129b27-1130a5. 
578 Pol. I.2 1253a37-1253b; NE V.6 1134a31-32. 
579 NE V.3 1131a24-29. 
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polity is indeed the best regime for the best human being, it must accord the best 
human being with goods suited to his complete flourishing.  If the needs of the 
best human being for his flourishing are not met in polity, that is, that his 
capacity for virtuous activity, especially contemplative activity, is limited by the 
lesser members of this community, then polity would in this sense be unjust.580 
As we have seen, polity seems to be reconcilable with Aristotle’s 
philosophical interpretation of tragedy, and so allow for a kind of activity that is 
at once political and philosophical.  However, this kind of political activity is not 
the only kind required of the best people in polity, and insofar as political activity 
is askolia, activity that is without leisure and devoted to ends beyond itself, such 
as those concerning war, it requires that the best people spend considerable time 
away from that to which they are naturally most suited, contemplation.  In this 
sense, by compelling the best people to accept a share of the goods of their city 
that does not allow them to flourish most completely, while at the same time 
allowing for the baser sort to reach beyond their animality through a share in 
contemplation, polity does indeed appear to go contrary to what is proportional 
for each, and is thus unjust and potentially unstable.581  Yet such an 
interpretation forgets what Aristotle has to say about equity and its relation to 
justice.  Aristotle’s conception of equity, I will argue, can be a virtuous activity 
                                                     
580 NE V.5 1134a1-6; V.3 1131b16. 
581 Pol. V.1 1301b2632; V.7 1307a25-27. 
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involving taking less than one’s share, and so makes it possible for even the best 
human type to flourish to the utmost of their natural capacities in polity. 
Equity, we might say, is the other side of justice.  Aristotle claims that the 
equitable (epieikes) is like the just, and in many ways they are the same thing, yet 
where they differ, equity is in fact superior (kreitton).582  Where justice and 
equity differ, concerns primarily their relation to law.  Both justice and law 
concern the general (katholou)—they attempt to formulate in broad strokes what 
is good and so regulate human actions accordingly.583  However, the complexity 
of particular events does not always allow for harmony with the general case to 
which law is addressed.  If things can for Aristotle exist contrary to nature, how 
much more so can they exist contrary to the justice humans would enact through 
law—not simply in the sense of actions breaking the law, but in actions being 
concatenated in such a way as to disjoin the law from the justice of its intention.  
In this way, particulars might fail to coincide with the general such that to follow 
the letter of the law in some cases would be to prescribe actions or solutions that 
are in fact unjust, and so make the law accomplish the opposite of its aim.   
It is for this reason, the complexity of particular events and the actions of 
which they are composed, that equity is higher than justice: equity is, Aristotle 
claims, “the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law.”584   Faced with the 
complexity of particular events, the necessarily general nature of law can compel 
                                                     
582 NE V.10 1137b10-12. 
583 NE V.7 1135a6ff. 
584 Rhet. I.13 1374a36-37. 
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justice to err, and so justice requires equity to correct the “legally just [nomimou 
dikaiou].”585  In this sense, while equity reaches beyond the general case and so is 
greater than the justice of the merely written or positive law, it is not greater than 
the justice animating the intention or aim of the law, which Aristotle calls 
“unqualified” (haplos) justice.586  Yet, in so discussing the relation of equity to 
justice and law it appears justice has been split in two, for we have now a 
distinction between the imperfect justice that may result from following the 
prescribed letter of the law in certain cases, and the perhaps closer to perfect 
justice whose aims are thought to animate the letter of the law.  This distinction 
between justice as it exists in any given city’s laws, and a kind of ideal justice, is 
apparently given greater weight in the Rhetoric. There Aristotle claims that “the 
principles of equity are permanent and changeless and that the universal law 
does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do 
change.”587  Though the distinction Aristotle draws here between natural law and 
positive law will prove influential on law and jurisprudence in the Western 
tradition, given Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, we ought to 
be wary of any interpretation of Aristotelian justice that would place it beyond the 
realm of actually existing things. 
Indeed, Yack argues that the word “haplos,” or “unqualified,” is 
contextually specific, such that what is haplos is distinguished only from the 
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particular qualifications earlier introduced in the discussion in question, and so 
does not suggest that the haplos exists independent of any qualifying conditions 
whatsoever.  In this sense, to speak of “unqualified justice” is to speak of justice 
beyond the qualifications Aristotle earlier used to discuss it, such as the legal 
qualifications mentioned above, but this should not be understood to mean that 
unqualified justice exists beyond and independently of actual instantiations of 
justice.  Rather than indicate some higher order of justice than that found in 
positive law, unqualified justice is meant to indicate justice in the more general 
sense in which it is usually discussed—something more like the sum-total of 
judgments made concerning justice, rather than an ideal existing apart from such 
judgments.588  Insofar as justice concerns political organization and the way in 
which offices and resources are distributed in a city, and these are done in a great 
variety of ways, natural justice or “natural right,” Yack claims, refers to all the 
different judgments concerning justice humans are capable of making in 
accordance with their nature.589  Unlike the written laws of a city, which are 
subject to as many changes as its citizens are capable of bringing about, natural 
right does not change because it is based in human nature, which, while subject 
to all the vicissitudes of its particular instantiations, remains for Aristotle the 
                                                     
588 Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 
135. 
589 Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal, 143. 
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actualization of an eternally given set of animal potentials.590  On this reading, 
natural and positive or “conventional” right do not represent higher and lower 
forms of justice, but simply justice viewed from different perspectives.591  Equity, 
for its part, cannot then be higher than justice as it is found in written laws, but 
rather attempts to offer corrections to legal justice according to the aims of the 
laws.592  
Yet while this view of natural and conventional right effectively dispels any 
notion of justice as an Idea existing independently of just things, such as laws, 
and just practices, such as the interpretation and application of laws, it ignores in 
the process Aristotle’s claim that equity is greater than merely legal justice—that 
is, that activities that would bring about the justice to which the laws aim in 
circumstances where they would otherwise fall short are better than literal 
applications of the law. This tension between the laws of a regime and their 
equitable interpretation can perhaps best be understood in light of Yack’s claim 
that Aristotle “never distinguishes a science of ethics from a science of politics, 
nor does he treat ethics and politics as subdivisions of a more comprehensive 
science.”593  If Yack is correct, then we would expect the equitable to concern at 
once political and ethical activity, in the sense that insofar as we might make an 
                                                     
590 For an argument against the changlessness of natural right, see William Clare Roberts, “All Natural 
Right is Changeable: Aristotelian Natural Right, Prudence, and the Specter of Exceptionalism.” The Review 
of Politics 74 (2012): 261-283. 
591 Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal, 144. 
592 Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal, 194; Bodéüs, “The Natural Foundations of Right and 
Aristotelian Philosophy,” 73. 
593 Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal, 18. 
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analytical distinction between ethics and politics, and Aristotle does not, we 
would expect the Aristotelian concept of equity to be both ethical and political.  
And indeed, it does appear that the equitable concerns both political and ethical 
activity in this sense, though Yack does not pursue these implications.  
Aristotle discusses equity primarily in terms of the equitable (epieikes), 
being both a kind of activity and a kind of person.  As activity, the equitable 
concerns the interpretation of a city’s laws in a given context such that justice will 
be preserved.  As a kind of person, the equitable is one possessed of an equitable 
character (ethos) and equitable habits (hexis) that mutually reinforce one 
another, making the equitable person one who is “disposed to take less for 
himself even though he has the law on his side.”594  The equitable in this sense are 
more just than the laws in that while justice aims at the good of others, of the 
entire political community, the laws always represent an interpretation of this 
good according to the way the political community is organized.  The laws always 
represent the interests of the ruling part of the city, whether it be the one, the 
few, or the many,595 whereas equity involves one attempting to go beyond the 
justice as it is expressed in the laws.  In this sense, the equitable person, through 
their activity, reaches beyond the justice expressed in the laws and toward the 
justice that would enable the flourishing of the entire community.   
                                                     
594 NE V.10 1137b36-1138a1. 
595 Pol. III.5 1278b8-13. 
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It is thus equity that enables the best human being to find his place in 
polity, a city whose citizens are unequal in virtue, for equitable activity represents 
a domain of virtue denied to those who live only among those equal to 
themselves.  The inequality of the virtue of the citizens of polity allow for both the 
worst citizens and the best to reach beyond themselves and so attempt to make 
themselves “immortal” through the practice of virtuous activity they would 
otherwise be denied.  All excellent or “serious” (spoudaiai) activities arise from 
virtue and divine thought (nous), and these do not, Aristotle claims, require that 
one hold power (dunasteuein).596  Through equitable activity, the best human 
being is able to relinquish the claims most tempting for his kind: the claim that 
he ought rightly to rule lesser human beings as a god-king, beyond the confines of 
the political community, or to exempt himself from service to the political 
community through complete devotion to divine contemplation.  Both roads 
involve striving to make oneself “immortal,” but in each one is led to forsake the 
political community, and so deprive oneself of the opportunity to practice the 
particular virtues associated with it, and so narrow the range of virtuous activity 
and thus happiness.   
Polity allows for its citizens to reach toward the “immortal” in the manner 
most appropriate to their natural disposition to virtue while remaining political 
animals.  Thus the lower sort might extend beyond their animal desires and up 
                                                     
596 NE X.6 1176b18-19. 
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toward the divine through a share in contemplation, while the best kind of 
human being might, in obedience to nous, recognize that only through the city, as 
a political animal, might he reach toward the divine, and so actualize his fullest 
potential as a human being.  As a member of a city, then, he may be called upon 
to defend both its laws and its walls, and while the activities involved in such 
defense are less than noble in the sense that they possess ends beyond 
themselves, that he engages in these not by mistaking them for goods in 
themselves, or for the honors associated with them, but for the sake of making 
the contemplative life possible for both himself and his fellow citizens, serves to 
bend these activities toward the immortal as far as is possible.  Put differently: in 
subordinating the ends of less than noble activities to those of the noblest activity 
and end-in-itself, contemplation, less than noble activities are elevated—they 
reach up toward the divine.   
It is for this reason that Aristotle claims that the equitable relates to the 
entire city and the good of all of its citizens, both better and worse.597  Equity 
keeps the best devoted to a city that accords citizenship to baser sorts in that it 
transforms this apparent liability into a strength: only in a city where citizenship 
is shared by those unequal in virtue can the noble demonstrate his nobility by 
justly serving the good of those lacking his nobility.598  That the justice of polity 
                                                     
597 Pol. III.13 1283b36-1284a1. 
598 Contra Frank, who sees in polity the possibility of creating a middle class wherein the substantial 
differences articulated in proportionate equality are dissolved beneath a more fundamental equality and 
similarity (homonoia).  While polity and the institution of tragedy make possible enough similarity between 
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allows both noble and base to flourish in the manner appropriate to their natures 
facilitates friendship between them, for in sharing in tragic performance and 
spectatorship they share both in the civic and religious rites of the city and in the 
highest activity available to humans, contemplation, and so likewise adopt the 
same ideal of the best human being against which they will measure themselves.  
Bound to this ideal of the best human being, not only can the best and the worst 
share in friendship, but this friendship is what Aristotle considers the best kind of 
friendship, as it is one based on the virtuous activity of what is best in human life, 
and so enables these friends to flourish in the way particular to human beings, 
thus separating them from other animals.599   
Equity thus allows the noble to overcome the gulf separating them from 
the base that might obstruct such friendship not by making the two identical, but 
by allowing the noble to preserve their nobility, and so a degree of distance, from 
the base.  The friendship expressed from the best to the worst goes beyond the 
friendship based on utility that tends to characterize the friendship between 
citizens, and which is found among other animals, for the friendship expressed 
from the best to the worst seeks nothing in return: as self-sufficient as a human 
being can be, the best human seeks others to share his enjoyment, others whom 
                                                                                                                                                              
the best and worst in order to facilitate a community of justice and friendship between noble and base, they 
must remain noble and base in order for this order and the best life it makes possible to exist.  See Frank, A 
Democracy of Distinction, 175. 
599 EE VII.2 1236b1-12. Cf. NE IX.9 1170b11-13. 
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he might benefit.600  The only reward the equitable receive from equitable activity 
is the demonstration of their own nobility—the flourishing of the beauty of their 
lives as good in themselves.  Insofar as there are forms of justice and friendship 
particular to different regimes,601 the justice of equitable activity and the 
friendship it makes possible is that specific to polity.  That polity facilitates the 
flourishing of both its best and worst citizens makes it the happiest city, and this 
happiness it owes to the arts of politics and of tragedy. 
 
Conclusion: From Aristotle to Adorno 
For Aristotle there is a zoological invariant lying at the root of politics and other 
arts: that is to say, the practices of these arts are expressions of animal potentials 
rooted ultimately in aisthesis.  In chapters 9 and 10, it was argued that in order 
for politics to be practiced in a manner that can be considered specifically human, 
its practice must integrate the activity that is most definitively human, that is, an 
activity in accordance with divine thought.  It was found that for Aristotle activity 
that is at once political and contemplative can be found in tragedy—tragedy 
provides thought with a stage, and compels contemplation from its spectators, 
both in the context of civic and religious rites.  To participate contemplatively in 
tragedy is thus to engage in political activity worthy of both a citizen and a 
philosopher: this is the activity that is political in the specifically human sense.  It 
                                                     
600 EE VII.12 1244b10-18. Cf. NE VIII.7 1159a9-13. 
601 EE VII.9 1241b12-17. 
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was further argued that polity provides the political conditions conducive to 
tragedy, for each share similar aims: to integrate both the best and the worst into 
a common life devoted to what is best in human beings.  In this way, the best 
human life is only made possible through the arts, and so what is natural for 
humans requires the arts. Or put differently: human nature can only flourish 
mediated by art.  Yet as it was argued in Chapter 8, the arts are also mediated by 
nature.  
In Chapter 8 it was found that the movements of animal bodies and their 
parts through which animal potentials are understood are described by Aristotle 
in terms of human arts.  Insofar as these metaphors between various human arts 
and animal bodies and their movements serve to facilitate what is known of these 
bodies and their movements, it can be said that the various human arts, by way of 
poetic metaphor, serve to constitute what these bodies and their movements are 
at the conceptual level.  In this way, artistic activity can be seen as the model for 
natural processes, and Aristotle will even go as far as claiming that nature is itself 
a kind of artist, the greatest artist, and so by analogy human arts ought to strive 
to imitate natural processes. Thus it can be said that the arts serve to create the 
standard, nature, that will mediate their own activity and serve as the standard by 
which their excellence or baseness are judged.  In this way the creative powers of 
the arts are sovereign: they create both the standard and its realization, though 
this sovereignty remains obscure and unrecognized in Aristotle.   
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Thus what is best in human being, the individual who most closely 
approximates a life that exercises what is best, and the characteristics associated 
with his nature, are created by the particular manner in which the arts of his 
society are organized, and their realization is either enabled or obstructed by 
these same arts.  That Aristotle fails to recognize the radically constructed nature 
of his concept of nature means that he mistakes the limits of politics: Aristotle 
would use politics to enable the flourishing of what is best in human nature, 
without realizing that this nature could itself be otherwise.  In this way, 
Aristotle’s attempt to reconcile the unequal plurality of human life to a system of 
rule that would insist each flourish to an unequal extent actually serves to 
perpetuate a constructed inequality, rather than accommodate this plurality.  The 
reconciliation promoted through polity and tragedy between the naturally best 
and worst human beings can be seen as forced reconciliation, for the natural 
inequality that is being accommodated is itself the product of politics and the 
other arts.   
Perhaps most emblematic of the violence wrought through this conception 
of nature, the forced reconciliation it enables, is the claim that thought would 
conceptualize the world in the same manner as one carving up a sacrificial 
animal: according to its “natural” divisions.602  Just as nature is only intelligible 
through the arts, here what is natural is known only through the practice of 
                                                     
602 Though it is Plato that makes this claim, it was found in Part II that this view metaphor is adequate to 
Aristotle’s philosophy as well.  See Plato, Statesman 287c. Cf. Pol. VII.17 1336b41-1337a2. 
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cutting flesh and bone at the points of least resistance. This lack of resistance, the 
acquiescence of the corpse to the skill of the one wielding the knife, is natural and 
so without violence, as it is only through the acquiescence of matter that the skill 
of the form-giving activity is displayed.  But just as an animal body will no more 
fall into pieces convenient for human use without butchery, that is, just as 
animals only become meat through the art of butchery, so does the potential 
known as human only come to be through the arts of politics and tragedy.  
Insofar as the artificiality of nature goes unrecognized, so does its role in 
facilitating arts whose practice depends on the domination of some by others, for 
the very symbol of non-violent relations, natural relations, is itself predicated on 
the violence of domination.  Thus the flourishing of both the best and worst sorts 
of human being that Aristotle would make possible through tragedy and polity 
depends upon the construction and maintenance of their inequality, on their 
unequal share of what is properly human. 
Insofar as the Aristotelian conception of nature can be seen as the product 
of the arts, one that would camouflage the oppression of some by others and so 
facilitate their domination, one might perhaps welcome a break from this 
tradition, embracing instead the artificiality of nature and the socio-political 
relations it would sanction.  However, the main philosophical sources of the turn 
against Aristotle and the tradition he inaugurates fail to recognize the way 
Aristotle’s conception of the human being and his nature depends upon the arts, 
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and so they fail to effectively confront the domination this conception of nature 
carries.  Insofar as  Aristotle does not conceive art and politics as simple 
expressions of human capacities, thus underwritten by an anthropological 
invariant, but rather that human potentials are themselves the product of the 
creative powers of the arts, both explicitly, in the sense that they need tragedy 
and politics to be realized, and implicitly, in that the very nature that is being 
realized is at once an artistic production, so it can be said that the great reversal 
of the Aristotelian tradition attempted by Nietzsche and Heidegger is without the 
force these thinkers would like it to have.  Nietzsche and Heidegger, rather than 
overturning or breaking from the Aristotelian tradition, represent instead 
different kinds of radicalization of this tradition in response to Aristotle’s 
conception of the human being.   
Nietzsche’s attempt to go behind or beyond the human through pre-
individual aesthetic experience is one that would attempt to forge a creature that 
is more animal than the human, a radicalization of Aristotle’s conception of the 
human as a political animal.  Yet while Aristotle’s political animal expressed an 
egalitarian vector in identifying all humans as political animals, thus 
undermining the relation between human and animal that characterized the 
world of poetic myth, while suggesting, in this moment, the artificiality of 
particular political regimes, the animality that Nietzsche would revive seems to 
bear more in common with the human-animal divide as it was found in the world 
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of poetic myth.  That is, the Nietzschean overman’s relation to animality seems to 
recall how warriors would distinguish themselves in the world of poetic myth: 
through deeds that served to bring them into proximity with a given animal, the 
warrior would establish himself as a master, one who might rule human beings as 
one does animals.  In this respect Nietzsche seems to be more necromancer than 
innovator, in that his radicalization of Aristotle is indeed a return to the root, or 
a root, of Aristotle’s conception of the human being, but it cannot be said to be 
altogether new.  From the perspective of the human-animal distinction and the 
relation between this distinction and the creative powers of art, Nietzsche’s 
insights appear to be the reaction of myth to the egalitarian vector expressed in 
the Aristotelian conception of the human, one that would revive the myth of the 
tragic hero in order to rule over the chaotic masses of post-Christian Europe. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, moves in the opposite direction.  For him, it 
is not that the Aristotelian political animal was not animal enough, but rather 
that the divine thought that serves in Aristotle to separate humans from other 
animals is not divine enough—that the divinity of thought as it is actualized in the 
human remains too poor in the world to really be called thinking.  For Heidegger, 
what we call human is bound up with the metaphysics of subjectivity and 
experience, which are themselves dependent upon the senses and so continuous 
with the animal, while the poiesis of thinking is prior to anything so creaturely.   
If one were to address oneself to what is given to the senses to shape into subject 
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and object and so call human, one must turn toward that which gives, the Being 
that is prior to the beings that we are.  While Heidegger claims that Being is not 
higher than beings, and that the human, as the shepherd of Being, is not as such 
higher than animals, the human is, as shepherd, other than animal in a more 
radical sense than he is in Aristotle.  Thus, while Heidegger would apparently 
undermine the hierarchy of the living established by Aristotle, he does so by 
placing the human on a different plane than other animals, thus transforming the 
human-animal divide into an abyss.  What does one feel for another, on the other 
side of an abyss prior to feeling?  Though Heidegger does not advocate the rule of 
“Man” over “Animal,” he strips the human of all that relates him to others beyond 
Being’s play of light and shadow, reducing questions of ethics to so many koan to 
be bandied between shepherds as they dine on their flocks. Domination remains 
unperturbed.   
  Yet, if the main philosophical attempts to decisively move beyond the 
Aristotelian paradigm of human-animal relations have failed to reformulate this 
relation in a manner that might seriously challenge the domination sanctioned 
therein, rather than break from this tradition, might it be possible to instead 
draw progressively on Aristotelian resources?  Indeed, there appears to be a 
growing appreciation of the complexity of Aristotle’s thoughts on the relation 
between humans and other animals,603 perhaps best exemplified, again, in the 
                                                     
603 See Frank, A Democracy of Distinction, 38n51. 
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recent work of MacIntyre and Nussbaum.   Though MacIntyre was initially 
dismissive of Aristotle’s biology,604 he has since sought to recover elements of this 
aspect of Aristotle’s thought, even claiming it an “error” to think that a complete 
account of moral life might be separable from the biological conditions of its 
possibility.  Moreover, MacIntyre claims the biological conditions of human 
moral life concern human continuity with other animal life, both in terms of 
human animality, that is, a relation to ourselves and our animal past and its 
remnants, and in terms of human relations to “other intelligent animal 
species.”605  Yet MacIntyre’s turn to biology, though perhaps serving to better 
authenticate his Aristotelianism,606 has done little to address the domination I 
have claimed is harbored within the core of Aristotle’s conception of human 
being.   
While MacIntyre contends that “[h]uman identity is primarily, even if not 
only, bodily and therefore animal identity,” and that “[m]uch that is intelligent 
animal in us is not specifically human,”607 this way of searching for human 
capacities in animals and so elevating their status as creatures approximating 
ourselves serves only to expand the ranks of second-class citizens.  Where 
similarities can be found between the capacities of other animals and our own, so 
                                                     
604 See After Virtue, 162. 
605 See Dependent Rational Animals, x. 
606 Salkever claims that the idiosyncrasies of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism in After Virtue, including his 
rejection of Aristotle’s biology, serve to align him closer to the Nietzsche against whom MacIntyre 
mobilizes Aristotle, rather than Aristotle himself.  See Finding the Mean, 32. 
607 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 8; 40. 
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those animals are admitted to the moral community, to the degree to which they 
can be called similar.  MacIntyre’s phrase, intelligent animal species, is telling, 
for insofar as the apex of human capacities is the human susceptibility to divine 
thought, only those animals possessed of some kind of recognizable intelligence 
exert any moral weight.  While this greater appreciation of animal life might 
encourage more humane treatment of other animals, it does not shake the 
foundation upon which domination in Aristotle is based: the identity of the best 
human being, which serves as the measure of what is valuable in the lives of both 
humans and other animals.  This basic problem can likewise be found to run 
through Nussbaum’s recent work on the moral community we share with 
“nonhuman animals,” despite her more thorough account of the problem. 
Like MacIntyre, Nussbaum’s consideration of the limits of the moral-
political community and the admission of other animals to it serves to revise her 
early Aristotelian stance, which, while largely dismissing the role of 
contemplation in human happiness and emphasizing instead the practical life, 
espoused an explicit and even celebratory anthropocentrism. Chastened by an 
apparently logical conclusion of her capabilities approach—that “nonhuman 
animals” also deserve moral consideration—Nussbaum has sought not so much 
to reject her earlier anthropocentrism than to revise it in a manner that 
recognizes the capabilities of “nonhuman animals,” according them some degree 
of moral standing as creatures who, like humans, require certain conditions if 
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they are to flourish in the manner specific to their natures.  Indeed, the 
Aristotelian conception of justice as the good of others will here inspire 
Nussbaum to claim that “the point of justice is to secure a dignified life for many 
different kinds of beings.”608 Yet while Nussbaum does away with the divinity of 
thought, this attempt to facilitate the flourishing of different forms of life, to do 
justice to others, makes another similarity, sentience, the “threshold condition of 
membership” in the community of those who have claims to be treated justly.609   
While sentience is indeed a far lower threshold for community 
membership than access to divine thought, we cannot forget here that the 
plurality of human life organized under the similarity that is the common 
capacity for thought allows for a hierarchical organization of plurality beneath 
that similarity, and this same basic structure prevails under the similarity of 
sentience.  For Aristotle, those who excel in the capacities most definitive of 
membership in a community can rightly claim a greater share of authority in that 
community.  Just as some humans can be said to have greater access to divine 
thought than others, so is sentience organized more complexly in some beings 
than others, and those with the most complex organization of sentience have 
more complex forms of flourishing, and consequently more complex ways of 
suffering impediments to their flourishing. 610  If the point of justice is indeed to 
                                                     
608 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’: Justice for Nonhuman Animals” in 
Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap, 2006), 350. 
609 Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’,” 362. 
610 Ibid., 361. 
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facilitate the most complete flourishing of different forms of life, then it would 
appear that the moral claims of beings with more complex forms of flourishing 
would have more weight than those with less complexity.  Insofar as humans can 
be considered the most complex beings,611 then their claims would outweigh 
those of other animals, thus allowing humans, despite “the respect and even 
wonder” they feel for other animals, to engage in their “humane killing” and 
forced sterilization.612   
Yet this gap between humans and nonhuman animals is perhaps to be 
expected, for the similarity between humans and other animals found in 
sentience must also be separated by fundamentally fixed “species norms,” if 
Nussbaum is to avoid conceding that different human individuals have more or 
less complex organizations of sentience.  If different human individuals could be 
found to require fundamentally different things in order to flourish according to 
their different natures—that is, if there were varying degrees of sentience within 
human nature—then on Nussbaum’s view, just as humans and nonhuman 
animals do not have equal moral claims, so would an inequality persist between 
the moral claims of different humans.613  Though Aristotle does not consider this 
                                                     
611 On the arbitrariness of biological “complexity,” see Richard Levins and  Richard Lewontin, The 
Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 17. 
612 Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’,” 328; 371. 
613 Partly to avoid this problem, Donaldson and Kymlicka object to Nussbaum’s static notion of species 
norms, claiming that their own theory of animal rights is independent of any “account of the essence of 
being human” (33). Donaldson and Kymlicka identify instead “selfhood” as the necessary condition for 
being accorded inviolable rights, a way of experiencing the world from the “inside” they claim to be 
common to humans and many other animals (25-33).  Yet in simply identifying in other animals that which 
in humans demands moral consideration, Donaldson and Kymlicka would expand the community of 
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natural inequality between humans a problem—rather, it is a condition of human 
flourishing—if the Aristotelianism of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is to 
indeed be “a form of political liberalism,”614 then humans must be fundamentally 
equal among themselves, and so they must require the same basic things to 
enable the flourishing of their common human nature.  Yet if the complexity of 
human sentience is equal between humans according to a shared “species norm,” 
then it is of a fundamentally different character than that of nonhuman animals, 
who would have norms specific to their own species.  Insofar as there can be no 
conception of cross species norms beyond the basic demands of sentience, and 
humans are more sentient than nonhumans, nonhumans will forever be 
measured against a standard that is not their own, and so beneath human yoke.  
Despite Nussbaum’s best attempts to argue that justice for nonhuman animals 
would mean the enabling of the flourishing of their natural capacities, the 
recognition and evaluation of these capacities remains according to human 
standards. 
In her joint emphasis on sentience and species-norms, Nussbaum would 
thus attempt to make nature the basis on which both membership in the moral-
                                                                                                                                                              
individuals to whom justice is due without changing the way in which justice relates these individuals.  In a 
society characterized by formal equality and substantial inequality, according, say, dogs, equal rights to 
human beings allows for certain individuals to use their animal companions to advance their own interests, 
especially with regard to the use of public space.  Donaldson and Kymlicka cite approvingly a case where 
dog-owners collectively organized to illegally walk their dogs without leashes in order to chase off drug 
users and prostitutes from a public park.  In identifying the rights of humans and animals in the manner 
they do, rather than seeing a quasi-aristocratic use of animals to bring other humans to heel, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka see only the salutary enabling of animal citizenship (115).  See Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka, Zoopolis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
614 Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’,” 388. 
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political community is recognized, and the goals toward which the moral-political 
community is oriented.  Like Aristotle, Nussbaum recognizes that nature requires 
artifice to both establish the conditions in which it might flourish and to aid its 
cultivation, but also like Aristotle, she does not recognize that this nature is itself 
artificially produced.  Rather than recognize the degree to which what is 
understood to be expressions of sentience among animals depends on the ways in 
which human beings have been constructed in their own respective political 
communities, and thus, that not only species-norms, but the creation of the 
boundaries between species, is an ongoing production, a political and artistic 
work, Nussbaum instead opts to attempt to place these outside the realm of 
politics, making politics something more like the bureaucratic implementation of 
what we would all know to be natural for human beings, if only we were to 
sufficiently reflect upon it, rather than an ongoing contest concerning the very 
limits of the game and the eligibility of the players.  In this sense, Nussbaum 
envisions right politics as a “humanocracy,” as one commentator refers to it615: 
the flourishing of an idea of human capacities incarnated in the power of political 
institutions. Thus the oppression of other animals by humans, and the 
domination of human by human, is in Nussbaum given human face. 
Yet I contend that the progressive potential of Aristotle’s insights has not, 
for all the efforts of his champions, been exhausted.  Despite the inability of 
                                                     
615 Wallach, “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” 629. 
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contemporary Aristotelians to shake the anthropocentrism that would ensure the 
value of all others is measured against a certain human standard, as I have 
attempted to show, their attempts at re-thinking the relationship between 
humans and animals have inherited Aristotle’s conception of nature with little 
variation: none recognize the degree to which this conception of nature can be 
said to be the reflection of the arts of Aristotle’s day, and so none recognize the 
creative power of the arts harbored therein.   
Aristotle’s insights that humans are political animals, and that political 
animals are those that share a common work, or life activity, without being 
identical to one another, and so might flourish in a plurality of ways; that justice 
is the good of others, even beyond the laws and the power enshrined therein; and 
that the best life activity is leisured activity divorced from self-preservation, all 
point toward an image of reconciliation, of animal life lived free of its most 
destructive tendencies.  It is these insights that are worth preserving, insights 
that together appear to make up a life lived in common, devoted to one another 
and the myriad ways in which each might flourish above and beyond the 
necessities that would enslave one to others or even the baseness of a life devoted 
only to its own persistence.  Yet Aristotle’s conception of nature ties these 
insights together in a manner that subjects certain animals to others, making the 
greatest expression of this life available only to a few.  An alternate conception of 
nature, one that might release from their entombment the creative powers of the 
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arts, and thus the radically artificial conception of this nature, might liberate 
these insights from the ties of domination that bind them. 
It is in the light of this hope that I turn to the work of Adorno.  Adorno’s 
own conception of the human-animal distinction and its relation to identity and 
non-identity, his theorization of the relation between nature and history, and his 
work on art and aesthetics, specifically with respect to the constitution of a 
collective subject and the relations of this subject to politics, all might be 
mobilized to transform the Aristotelian tradition.  In this way, both the elements 
of Aristotle that would be overcome by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their progeny, 
and the elements of Aristotle promoted by contemporary Aristotelians, might be 
superseded.  Adorno’s work, I shall argue, makes possible this supersession, and 
consequently a new relation to the tradition and the way in which we think about 
its future trajectory, and the animals we might become. 
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Part IV. Enter Adorno, Stage Left 
Introduction:  
Adorno and Some Assorted Technical Problems Concerning Time-Travel 
 
But the aporia of our thinking points to a knot in the object. 
 
                                                          -Aristotle, Metaphysics 
 
To go from Aristotle to Adorno in a single bound, we find ourselves now, as 
Rousseau put it, “flying like an arrow over the multitudes of centuries”616—we are 
time-travelling again, and the world we find upon arrival, despite certain 
uncanny similarities, is profoundly different from the one we leave behind.  The 
“excessively unpleasant” and “peculiar” sensation of time-travel as described by 
Wells in 1895 is fitting for one living on his side of the First and Second World 
Wars, but for us it takes more than a “switchback” to conjure the feeling of horror 
suited to this world’s legacy.617  Pynchon’s time machine in Against the Day is 
perhaps more appropriate.  Old and worn, this time machine does not so much 
propel itself into the future as sink into it: its passengers are swallowed by an 
image of the world as it might be, as they experience “a kind of vibration, less 
                                                     
616 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men,” in Basic 
Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 62.  
617 Wells, The Time Machine, 77. 
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from the physical chamber itself than from somewhere unsuspected within their 
own nervous organizations.”618  This reduction of human agency and the meaning 
that sustained it to a corporal reaction is the world in which we live, one wherein 
the promise of Aristotle’s philosophy is stranded.  Adorno, however, in taking as 
his starting point the mangled state of this agency, offers a theorization of how 
this world might be otherwise. 
 I am not alone in highlighting Adorno’s relevance to the questions 
concerning the relation between the human and the animal, politics, and art as 
Aristotle posed them, but transformed in our world.  A number of the 
contemporary thinkers examined in Part I for their connections to Nietzsche and 
Heidegger acknowledge the importance of Adorno’s contributions here, though 
mostly to crown him with laurels and send him on his way.  Though passing 
mention to Adorno can be found in Foucault and Nancy,619 Derrida gives some 
focus to the place of animals in Adorno’s work, while Lyotard, Rancière, and 
Badiou all engage with Adorno’s thoughts on art and aesthetics.  For his part, 
Derrida reads along with Adorno, noting how his indictment of Kant based on 
Kant’s view of animals brings Adorno closer to Nietzsche.620  Though for Derrida 
these insights on the place of animals in idealist philosophy will lead him to 
formulate his own theory of an expansive, non-anthropocentric humanism as 
                                                     
618 Thomas Pynchon, Against the Day (New York: Penguin, 2006), 403. 
619 Nancy, Multiple Arts, 27. As for Foucault, it is really no more than a brief reference to the ‘left 
Weberians’ of the Frankfurt School.  See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, trans. Graham Burcell, 
ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 105-106. 
620 Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, 100-103. 
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noted in Part I, in Chapter 13, I argue that both these prongs of Derrida’s reading 
fall short of the radical nature of Adorno’s project with respect to ‘the philosophy 
of consciousness’ and its possible transformation.   
 Concerning art and aesthetics, though Lyotard’s uses of Adorno in The 
Inhuman are occasionally salutary,621 elsewhere he criticizes Adorno’s adherence 
to dialectic as a theological hangover from Hegelian idealism,622 and a version of 
this argument is echoed by Rancière.623  For Rancière, it is not so much dialectic 
as such that is the problem, but rather what he calls the “theology of time” that 
underwrites Adorno’s “ethical configuration” of the aesthetic.  Interpreted in 
terms of a “primordial trauma or a salvation to come,” the role of art becomes one 
of maintaining its distance from society and hence its purity so as to bear witness 
to the world as it is while waiting for the world to come—this is art’s ethical 
imperative.  Against this imperative and its claim to purity Rancière would give 
back to art its “ambiguous” and “litigious” character—its fundamental 
contamination with society, politics, and their negotiation.624   
However, as I shall attempt to show in Chapter 14, Adorno’s 
understanding of aesthetic autonomy is never pure, for artworks are always 
semblance, illusion, and hence are never free from ideology—though this does 
                                                     
621 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 32; 103; 109. 
622 See Lyotard, “Adorno as the Devil,” trans. Robert Hurley, Telos 19 (1974): 127-137. For a critique of 
Lyotard on this point, see Dan Webb, “If Adorno Isn’t the Devil, It’s Because He’s a Jew,” Philosophy & 
Social Criticism 35.5 (2009): 517-531. 
623 Though Rancière considers Lyotard and Adorno both guilty of this charge.  See Rancière, The Future of 
the Image, 134-138. 
624 Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 132. 
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not mean that all art is ideological in the same way or to the same degree.  
Moreover, Adorno’s aesthetic theory is not, strictly speaking, ethical, but moral, 
and in its morality, deeply entwined with politics.  Thus not only is the “fantasy of 
purity” Rancière opposes in Adorno indeed a fantasy, but Adorno’s conception of 
aesthetic autonomy allows us a more precise understand of how different 
artworks are ambiguous and litigious in different ways and to different degrees, 
rather than in the shadowless light of Rancière’s theoretical noonday wherein all 
paintings are white.  
 Lastly, in his Five Lessons on Wagner, Badiou praises Adorno for “having 
invented something new” in the philosophical project to be found in Negative 
Dialectics, which he credits with having anticipated many of the major theoretical 
trends which rose to prominence in the 1980s.625  However, we must view such 
praise to be something like the ‘black-ops’ which precede the official battle’s 
opening salvo, for it is precisely the theoretical trends that rose to prominence in 
the 1980s—for Badiou, chiefly post-structuralism and the philosophy of 
difference—against which Badiou positions his own philosophy, pre-occupied as 
it is with ontology, truth, and a re-furbished conception of the subject.  By 
making Adorno the precursor to the sophists his own brand of Platonism has 
already overcome, Adorno’s philosophy is introduced into Badiou’s text stillborn, 
                                                     
625 Badiou, Five Lessons on Wagner, 28. 
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and he need only catalogue its parts as a kind of administrative exercise, rather 
than directly confront it as a living philosophy.   
Thus Adorno is accused of making a fetish of the suffering body, which 
Badiou associates with victimhood rather than lived experience,626 and the 
innovations Adorno makes to such concepts as the subject and truth are 
conveniently passed over.627  Below I argue that although Adorno’s philosophy 
does indeed understand itself to be thoroughly entwined with suffering bodies, 
the expression of this passivity is always bound to active moments related to 
truth and necessarily subjective, thus denying any attempt to reduce it to a 
generic ‘philosophy of difference’ unconcerned with truth or subjective 
transformation.  In this way, many of the contemporary thinkers laboring within 
the Nietzschean-Heideggerian attempted reversal of the Aristotelian problematic 
see Adorno to be an important interlocutor, but all misrepresent his 
contributions.  Part of my goal in Part IV is thus to demonstrate that Adorno’s 
work reaches beyond these criticisms, and offers a truly novel way of 
understanding and responding to the Aristotelian problematic, though I often opt 
to do so more in the greater context of this problematic, rather than direct 
consideration of the aforementioned thinkers. 
                                                     
626 Ibid., 38. 
627 On the difference between Adorno and post-structuralism more generally, see Peter Dews, “Adorno, 
Post-Structuralism, and the Critique of Identity,” in The Frankfurt School Vol.IV, ed. Jay Bernstein 
(London: Routledge, 1994). 
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As for the manner in which my own discussion of Adorno’s work will 
proceed, I treat Adorno’s oeuvre as more or less a coherent whole.  I do this not 
in alliance with the view that sees Adorno’s philosophical concerns, from his 
earliest work until his last, to be “monolithic, hewn of a single block,”628 nor in 
necessary opposition to the view that sees a break between his early and late 
work,629 and certainly not to ignore the objective contradictions Adorno’s 
individual works attempt to articulate which may be said to resist their reduction 
to a systematic or even non-contradictory whole.630  Rather, I aim to examine 
Adorno’s work as constellated around the Aristotelian problematic I have 
attempted to elucidate in Parts II and III above, such as to reveal a way to unbind 
the knot found therein.  I aim to theorize a way of transforming the relation 
between human and animal, art and politics, such as to think the possibility of 
the subject transformed, one no longer constituted by and through the violence of 
self-preservation and the domination that frequently accompanies it—one for 
whom the word ‘human’ would be an anachronism.   
In this way I broadly follow Adorno in his ‘method’ of arranging a 
combination of concepts around a center that will, through their combination, be 
opened up to the patient reader.  I do not, however, adhere to these dictates as 
rigorously as does Adorno, for the reader will find, perhaps to her or his relief, 
                                                     
628 Robert Savage, “Adorno’s Family and Other Animals,” Thesis Eleven 78 (2004), 105. 
629 Jane Bennett, “Modernity and Its Critics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, eds. John 
Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Philips (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008), 219. 
630 Martin Jay, Marxism & Totality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 266. 
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that I proceed much more linearly and progressively than does Adorno, making 
no sado-masochistic attempts to ensure that each line is equidistant from the 
constellation’s center.  Moreover, the center has been explicitly stated, another 
luxury Adorno denies his readers.  In this way I have perhaps made too many 
concessions to the instrumental necessities of communication at the expense of 
truth: it might be objected that aping Adorno’s ‘method’ in this manner 
fundamentally misunderstands him, for what I am calling Adorno’s ‘method’ is 
not a method at all, but a technical response to the taboos placed on 
communication by society itself, colonized as it is by violence and domination.631   
If thoughts, actions, and the identities to which these are tied are all the 
expressions of a social whole organized around the requirements of domination, 
then simply stating one’s aims and pursuing them is to fall precisely into the trap 
laid by domination, and so to articulate oneself in ideological terms.  In refusing 
to state the center to be revealed, and by rigorously attempting to bring each 
statement into line with this center such as to grind the progression of the 
argument to a standstill, the constellated statements of which the text is 
composed remain open to reinterpretation, for their grounding center must be 
posited anew by each successive interpreter, who in so positing casts new light on 
the constellated statements.  In this way Adorno attempts to use the cunning of 
reason to outwit himself, the ideological self which is the expression of socio-
                                                     
631 Cf. Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Suggested Reading,” in Things Beyond Resemblance (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 225; 230. 
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political domination.  This is what it means to structure one’s philosophy as a 
‘message in a bottle’: a note for future time-travelers that might, in revealing the 
historical contradictions captured in the message, reveal the distortion in their 
own time, and so the necessity of transforming it.  For my part, I am simply 
trying to read this message in light of the Aristotelian problematic I have outlined 
above, and so offer a way of theorizing a response.  I leave it to the reader to 
decide whether or not these half-measures undermine my attempt to such a 
degree that it might no longer accomplish its aim. 
 Another theoretical problem arising through the use of Adorno’s 
philosophy concerns the individual status of his concepts.  The importance of 
concepts such as dialectic, non-identity, or mimesis for Adorno is difficult to 
underestimate, not only because of their frequent appearance throughout his 
writings, but for Adorno’s own tendency to resist giving his concepts independent 
treatment or definition.  It might even be said that individual concepts are so 
deeply woven into the texture of Adorno’s thought that to attempt to isolate any 
one of them—to pull at them, as if they were loose threads—might threaten to 
unravel the fabric in which they are found.  Consequently, the discussion of 
individual concepts is something of a delicate process: too analytic an approach 
will only serve to isolate discreet threads, telling us little about the coat Adorno 
weaves, while too diffuse an approach will give us only a glance at this coat, and 
so deny us the opportunity to grasp it and get a feel for its texture.  
 
 
339 
Adorno provides a clue for solving this problem in his discussion of the 
émigré in a foreign country learning to speak its language: overwhelmed by the 
ubiquity of strange words, one must learn to read without relying upon appeal to 
the definite authority of a dictionary or the rules learned in school, which serve 
only to formalize and inhibit direct contact with the foreign.  Instead one must 
learn to recognize correspondences between words, combinations of words, and 
their different contexts.  Despite the inevitable errors and blind alleys such a 
passage will entail, only through this kind of groundless engagement with 
particulars might the meaning of words in their interrelation begin to take 
shape.632  I thus propose to place my treatment of Adorno’s concepts in relation 
to other statements in Adorno’s work, and additionally to those of a variety of 
other authors as well, in order to weave these threads into similar garments, 
though slightly different to the one Adorno presents, and so test its durability in 
smaller, more concentrated articles: more of scarf here, and a pair of mittens 
there, to continue with this metaphor, which, hopefully, will complement 
Adorno’s coat.   
It will be remarked that the various articles I weave here downplay some of 
the most prominent of Adorno’s materials: Marx, Freud, and Weber, along with 
other members of the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer and Marcuse.  While 
I would not deny the importance of these figures for Adorno’s ideas, or even their 
                                                     
632 See Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” Notes to Literature, Vol. 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann,  trans. Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 13.NL1 hereafter; Adorno, Hegel: Three 
Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993) 107. HTS, herafter. 
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relevance to the Aristotelian problematic, their relation to Adorno’s thought has 
been much commented upon, and while that in and of itself does not necessarily 
indicate its saturation, I opt instead to illuminate other aspects of Adorno’s 
thought, and thus bring him into contact with a few of the numerous other 
thinkers Adorno references in his writings, along with a few others which, as 
noted above, have either sought to engage directly with Adorno or whose work 
relates thematically or conceptually to Adorno’s project.  In interweaving 
discussions of these various thinkers I intend no definitive statement about what 
is of canonical importance in Adorno’s thinking; instead, I use each only to help 
illustrate more localized problems as they emerge in my discussion of the 
concepts in question. 
 I begin my discussion in Chapter 11 with an account of Adorno’s possible 
relation to Aristotle and the way in which his ideas of dialectic and negative 
dialectic, identity and non-identity, thinking in constellations, and solidarity with 
metaphysics all can be seen to be bound to the Aristotelian problematic and what 
they might intimate as a possible response.  I attempt in Chapter 12 to apply 
Adorno’s theoretical innovations to the concept of humanity by examining 
different ways in which ‘human’ and its related terms appear in Adorno’s work, 
arguing that Adorno uses humanity in multiple senses, and that it is only his idea 
of a ‘reconciled humanity’ that represents for Adorno genuine progress, which is 
for Adorno the possibility of a subject constituted through objects not beholden 
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to self-preservation, violence, and domination.  Yet insofar as humanity was 
constituted by and maintains itself through violence and domination, Adorno’s 
‘reconciled humanity’ must be understood as a subject that is not, strictly 
speaking, human.   
Chapter 13 aims to develop this claim that reconciled humanity would not 
be human by examining the different roles animals play in Adorno’s thought, 
attempting to show that animality is the non-identity of the human which the 
human must repress in its self-constitution, and thus that if this future subject is 
to be one not constituted through the kind of repression bound up with violence 
and domination, it would become some other, new kind of animal. Chapter 14 
attempts to show how one might strive toward this future animal subject by 
attempting to live as if one were a good animal, and thus concerns the moral and 
political dimensions of this subjective transformation.  It is here that the 
importance of art in moral-political education is ironically revived by Adorno, no 
longer to be used to produce what is human out of the animal and reconcile that 
within an ordered, hierarchical whole as it was in Aristotle, but instead to liberate 
the animal from the human through aesthetic experience.   
In this way Adorno’s solution to the Aristotelian problematic is the 
production of an aesthetic animal, an animal constituted not simply through its 
senses (aisthesis), but through its relation to artworks, such as to build the kind 
of solidarity between subjects that might make possible the kind of socio-political 
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transformation that could displace the centrality of violence and domination, and 
usher in new forms of life.  This is the future toward which Adorno’s theoretical 
contributions gesture, constellated around the Aristotelian problematic.  In this 
way, Aristotle appears less as a figure from which Western philosophy descends, 
but a messenger from its possible future, one wherein humanity has become an 
animal for whom life is no longer constituted through its breaking upon the 
wheel of its history. 
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Chapter Twelve: Jewgreek is greekjew: Aristotle, 
Hegel, and Adorno on the Perils of Dialectic 
 
Adorno’s Aristotle 
Adorno is not known as a reader of Aristotle, or as a scholar of the Ancients.  
Though affinities between Adorno and Aristotle have begun to be noted,633 
Aristotle and the Greeks are still largely seen to be at best peripheral to the 
concerns that animate Adorno’s work.634 The use made of Homer in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, or Minima Moralia’s “ironic inversion” of the teaching of the 
good life in Aristotle,635 are less attempts to elucidate antiquity as with most 
classical scholarship than they are attempts to understand modernity.  It is 
modernity, not antiquity, which fascinates Adorno.  Geuss goes as far as claiming 
that for Adorno, “relevant ‘history’ starts with Haydn in music, Goethe in 
literature, and Kant in philosophy.”  Apart from occasional mentions of Bach or 
Homer, or “isolated throw-away remarks about Plato and Aristotle,” readers will 
find “no discussion of any work or figure before the middle of the eighteenth 
                                                     
633 The most sustained study of this affinity to date is Fabian Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Ch. 9.  See also Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, Theodor W. 
Adorno, trans, James Rolleston (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 49; Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 40. 
634 Indeed, a number of the major works that introduced Adorno’s thought to the English-speaking world 
make no particular reference to the possible importance of Aristotle or the Greeks.  See for instance, Susan 
Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Martin Jay, Adorno 
(New York: Fontana, 1984). 
635 J.M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
40-41. 
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century.”  Indeed, Geuss claims, “it was precisely the absence of the Greeks from 
Adorno’s mind and philosophy” that gave him the freedom to focus on the 
themes that he did.636   
Geuss’s claim, that a kind of productive forgetfulness lay at the heart 
Adorno’s thinking, is provocative.  Such a reading would make Adorno’s 
philosophy structured around the absence of the Greeks, the very origin of 
philosophy, thus emphasizing the anti-foundational aspects of his thought along 
with his attempt to think “the new,” both in music and elsewhere.637  However, 
such a reading might also risk making the Greeks into the repressed that must 
return, a vast reserve of vital drives upon which Adorno’s philosophy perches 
precariously, unconsciously following their directives.  If Adorno’s philosophy is 
only possible through the absence of the Greeks, then their appearance in 
“isolated throw-away remarks” are like nervous tics, or symptoms, perhaps, of 
the repressed trauma of origins that Adorno would all-too-happily escape, if he 
could.  The return of the Greeks then, would spell either Adorno’s destruction, or 
his reform, as the therapeutic intervention he needs to overcome the damages of 
life, to put down roots, and to cultivate virtue.  In other words, the introduction of 
the Greeks into Adorno’s thought would make a good Greek of Adorno—they 
might give foundation to his thought and system to the moral and political 
                                                     
636 Raymond Geuss, “Outside Ethics,” in Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
61n56. 
637 In his early essay, “The Idea of Natural History,” Adorno provisionally defines history not as a search 
for origins, but as the movement in which that which is qualitatively new appears.  See Adorno, “The Idea 
of Natural History,” trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos 60 (1984), 111. Cited as INH hereafter. 
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practices Adorno claims have been set adrift.  In this vein, reading Adorno in 
light of the Greeks is either to dismiss him outright, or to find in him a reluctant 
colleague of MacIntyre, Nussbaum, and Salkever.  Yet another view of this 
relationship to the Greeks, and to Aristotle in particular, is possible. 
We might say that antiquity for Adorno is not forgotten at all, but 
alienated—the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, are appropriated less as the 
sources of philosophy, and so necessary precursors from which Adorno’s own 
thought organically grows, than as objects foreign to it.  The Greek thaumazein, 
or “wonder” that precipitates philosophy in Aristotle, is in Adorno a “shock” that 
serves not as origin but as disruption and re-orientation of thinking around the 
object that impinges.638  As “isolated throw-away remarks,” references to Plato 
and Aristotle in Adorno’s work are like the scattered contents of a thief’s pockets: 
torn from their own context and placed into one they could have scarcely 
fathomed, Plato and Aristotle are alienated from their traditional place of 
authority in the history of philosophy, becoming foreigners in Adorno’s texts.639  
As such, references to them might be treated as Adorno does foreign words.   
In an early text, Adorno claims that against the “purism” that sees 
language as a natural or organic growth, foreign words must be defended as 
                                                     
638 Aristotle, Meta., I.2 982b12-13; for an equation between thaumazein and shock, see Adorno, INH, 118. 
639 Cf. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” in The Adorno Reader, trans. Benjamin Snow, ed. Brian 
O’Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 35. 
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“foreign bodies assailing the body of language.”640  True words are not “buried ur-
words” that can be “mythically evoked,” that is, they do not lay at the origin 
through which what is has come to be, and whose discovery is therefore necessary 
in order to understand what has come to be.  Rather, true words can for us only 
be “the artificial words,” the “made words,” which serve to express the alienation 
of language from itself, the alienation of language split between the demands of 
communication, and the possibility of a true name.641  For Adorno, 
communication mobilizes words as tools to work upon things, and is ruled by an 
authority which assigns its means and ends, while the possibility of a true name is 
the possibility of a peaceful accord between words and things, and so a language 
not treated as an instrument.  It is this later conception of truth, an excess 
irreducible to the exigencies of communication, which gives foreign words their 
force.  Foreign words capture this division at the heart of language, but the 
antagonism they express toward the body of a language can only be legitimated in 
a different conception of language, the true naming that for us exists only in 
negative, in the fragments of the disintegrating body of language. These 
                                                     
640 Adorno, “On the Use of Foreign Words,” in Notes to Literature, Vol.2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 288. Cf. Adorno, “Words from 
Abroad,”  NL1, 186. 
641 While Benjamin’s influence has been noted here, one can also find Hegelian reasons to praise foreign 
words.  In his Science of Logic, Hegel notes that Latin terms often serve as technical terms in philosophy 
due to their less immediate, and more “reflected” character. The dual pull Benjamin and Hegel exert on 
Adorno’s thought will be further discussed below.  See Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Exact Imagination 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 67; Lisa Yun Lee, Dialectics of the Body (New York: Routledge, 2005), 64; 
Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Humanities, 1976), 107. Cited hereafter as 
SL. 
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fragments continually undermine and threaten to overtake this language, as 
though they were “the language of the future” germinating.642 
If references to Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle in Adorno’s 
texts can be treated as he does foreign words, then they are not meant simply to 
point backwards, to what philosophy has been, and so to explain the present as 
their descendents.  If foreign words exist as fragments at the fraying edges of a 
language, and stand, as Adorno claims, not for a past from which this language 
has organically grown, but for the possibility of the language transformed, of its 
future incarnation, then Plato and Aristotle appear in Adorno’s writings as 
messengers from the future.  But for what future might Adorno’s references to the 
Greeks possibly stand?  Ironically, it is in an attempt at communication that a 
possible answer to this question is given clearest definition.  Adorno gives his 
most sustained treatment of any Greek thinker in a series of lectures he delivered 
on metaphysics in 1965: for a good portion of the first two thirds of these lectures, 
Aristotle is Adorno’s object of study.   
For Adorno, the relevance of Aristotle’s Metaphysics revolves around two 
interrelated issues: 1) the manner it relates the universal to the particular, or 
form and matter; and 2) the possibility of change.643  Neither of these are for 
                                                     
642 Adorno, “On the Use of Foreign Words,” 288-291. Cf. Adorno, “Words from Abroad,” 190. For a more 
thorough consideration of Adorno’s ideas on language than is possible here, see Samir Gandesha, “The 
‘Aesthetic Dignity of Words,’: Adorno’s Philosophy of Language,” New German Critique 97, Vol. 33.1 
(2006): 137-158. 
643 See Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 25; 81.  Hereafter cited as MCP.   
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Adorno purely theoretical questions, but have strong moral and political 
implications.644  With respect to the first issue, Adorno claims that Aristotle 
rejects the Platonic separation between universal Ideas and the world of 
particular things, attempting instead to bring these two together and so attempt 
to think the universal through instances of particularity.  In thus insisting on the 
necessity of particulars to grasp the universal, Aristotle opens up the question of 
mediation, the question of how exactly it is that a universal inhabits something 
particular, and can be known through it.  Adorno will hold, however, that despite 
posing the problem of mediation “with extreme clarity,” Aristotle nevertheless 
fails to achieve a genuine concept of mediation.645  Without a concept of 
mediation, Aristotle ultimately remains unable to grasp how change is possible.   
For Adorno, change happens through extremes: it is only in surpassing the 
limit that binds a thing, the point at which a given object defines itself, that 
something can be said to change.  Dialectic, as the thinking of passage, of the 
movement between terms, thus presents itself as the means of thinking change.  
A dialectical understanding of mediation would be one capable of grasping the 
unity of opposites—the identity of extremes. Only by pursuing these extremes 
past their limits might a third term, something new, appear. Aristotelian 
                                                     
644 In an earlier lecture series on moral philosophy, Adorno claims that “the central problem of moral 
philosophy” is the relation between the particular and the universal, and that moral philosophy is itself 
closely connected with practical activity and the political sphere.  See Adorno, Problems of Moral 
Philosophy, ed. Thomas Schroder, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 
18; 2-3. Cited as PMP hereafter. 
645 MCP, 46. 
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mediation falls short of dialectical mediation because it posits a middle term as 
something existing between the two extremes, not through them.  That is, rather 
than grasping the extremes, of moving through them to see where they lead, 
Aristotle turns back from these extremes and seeks refuge instead in a “happy 
medium,” a point that is neither too close to the limits of one side or the other.646  
The mediating term is thus one available among the existing options lying 
between the two poles at opposite extremes, rather than to something new arising 
from the extremes as they surpass their limits.  Adorno thus argues that Aristotle 
is not a dialectical thinker, and moreover that “the dialectic did not exist at that 
time,”647 a claim that seems to abruptly contradict much of what is thought about 
Aristotle and the Greeks today.  While vastly different contemporary scholars 
have referred to Aristotle’s dialectical use of concepts,648 the idea that the 
dialectic did not even exist in Aristotle’s day seems to be an even stranger claim 
that is worth attempting to clarify, if we are to understand Adorno’s reading of 
Aristotle and consequently the place of Aristotle in Adorno’s works.  
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes between the sophist, the 
philosopher, and the dialectician (dialektikoi).  Although all three concern 
themselves with many of the same objects of study, Aristotle claims that the 
philosopher uniquely concerns himself with the being (on) common to these 
                                                     
646 MCP, 47. 
647 MCP, 31. 
648 See for instance Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 7; 
Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 
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things, and thus has a claim to real knowledge, whereas the sophist merely 
imitates the knowledge of the philosopher, differing from him with respect to his 
choices.649  The dialectician, on the other hand, differs from the philosopher in 
that he relies on a different power or capacity (dunameos) than the philosopher, 
remaining “merely critical” of things rather than knowing them in their being.650  
Though Aristotle does not say precisely here what capacity it is that the 
philosopher relies upon that the dialectician does not, if what separates the 
philosopher is knowledge of the truth of what is, then given the above discussion 
of the powers that compose human beings, it must be commune with the divine 
nous that enables the philosophical grasping of being, and to which the 
dialectician is indifferent.  
That the dialectician engages with the objects of philosophical study in a 
manner that remains beneath that of nous and philosophy would appear to be in 
accord with what Aristotle has to say about dialectic elsewhere in his work, 
especially in the Rhetoric. There Aristotle claims that dialectic is closely related to 
rhetoric: both refuse to be limited by any single branch of study, but concern 
themselves with virtually all objects of knowledge—all objects “that call for 
                                                     
649 That is, the sophist is a kind of crude philosopher, one whose choices show a lack not in philosophical 
ability but in practical wisdom.  In this sense, the sophist is a kind of upstart who applies philosophical 
methods of questioning in ways he ought not.  Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I.1 1355b17-18.  Adorno also makes a 
similar claim regarding the relation between dialectic and sophism in his Minima Moralia.  See Adorno, 
Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), A152, 244. Cited hereafter as MM. 
650 Meta., IV.2 1004b15-26. 
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discussion.”651  Dialectic concerns itself with deductions, real and apparent, and 
so it also concerns arguments that, while established among people as reputable, 
may in fact be spurious.652  Moreover, Aristotle claims that along with rhetoric, 
dialectic is the only art capable of drawing opposite conclusions from its 
premises.653  In this sense, while dialectic must be closely related to logos, it is 
bound to the particular utterances of language, dialektos, that may not 
necessarily be reducible to that which is in being, and thus might even be said to 
speculatively overreach being, in a manner similar to poetic fiction. 
That the above distinctions appear to relegate dialectic to a space beneath 
philosophy suggests Aristotle did not consider himself a dialectician, or at least 
not merely a dialectician.  However, it remains to be seen exactly what is missing 
in Aristotle’s definition of the dialectic to legitimate Adorno’s claim that not only 
did Aristotle not think dialectically, but that such a form of thinking was not 
available to him.  Indeed, much of what Aristotle says about dialectic above 
resonates with Adorno’s ideas concerning dialectic: namely, its critical bent, 
indifferent to the knowledge of being or ontology, along with its close ties to 
language and to rhetoric.654  The crucial element missing in Aristotle’s account of 
the dialectic and that for Adorno is sufficient to say that dialectic did not exist in 
                                                     
651 Rhet., I.1 1354a1-5; 1355b6-9; I.2 1358a10-17; 1356b33-1357a3. 
652 Rhet., I.1 1355a8-10; 1355b16-18; II.24 1402a3-8. 
653 Rhet., I.1 1355a34-35. 
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antiquity at all, is the absence of a concept of constitutive subjectivity.655  That is, 
the objects available to dialectic are transparent to Aristotle in a way they are not 
to Adorno: dialectic is for Aristotle a way of making deductions concerning 
speech-objects that are directly connected to the objects themselves.  Or put 
differently: the concepts considered by Aristotle to be available to speech and so 
to the dialectic are not projected upon objects by a speaking subject, but rather 
the concepts available to speech inhere in the objects themselves.656  It is for this 
reason that Adorno calls Aristotle a thinker of both immediacy and mediation, for 
though Aristotle thinks universals are necessarily mediated through particulars, 
he sees this mediation as existing simply and immediately at an ontological 
level—a particular object is what it is and can be known as such through the 
inherence in it of a universal concept.657   
Dialectic is for Aristotle less exacting than philosophy because it focuses 
on the speech-objects irrespective of their truth or falsity, irrespective of how they 
relate to being.  In this manner, Aristotle reduces the speculative excess of 
dialectic to simple falsity: where dialectic draws conclusions about speech-objects 
that fail to correlate with an object at the ontological level—that is, they refer to 
something that is not—then these conclusions are false. If the speculative excess 
of dialectic is simply false, then dialectical deductions are true where their 
conclusions correlate with what is.  Dialectic might thus be said to overlap with 
                                                     
655 MCP, 48-49. 
656 MCP, 55-56. 
657 MCP, 31. 
 
 
353 
philosophy where it concerns correct deductions related to being, but where it 
speculates on that which does not correlate with anything in being, there it 
exceeds philosophy to the detriment of knowledge.  By reducing the speculative 
excess of dialectic to the false, and truth to what correlates with being, Aristotle 
renders dialectic incapable of grasping movement and change, for the coming to 
being from nothing that is becoming is only intelligible on the side of being—the 
speculative excess necessary to grasp the passage of something coming into being 
is excluded in advance as false.  Thus Aristotle is capable of writing that one 
becomes a certain way because that is the way one is: “the process of becoming 
attends upon being and is for the sake of being, not vice versa.”658  Change is thus 
not transformation, but the successive revealing of what already is.  Dialectic as 
the compulsion of thinking to grasp change is thus denied in Aristotle. 
 However, despite the anti-dialectical bent of Aristotle’s conception of 
mediation, Adorno thinks this conception nevertheless does fortuitously gesture 
toward that which is excluded from its conception, and thus the possibility of 
thinking change.  Adorno finds this possibility most readily apparent in 
Aristotle’s formulation of the conceptual pair of form and matter.  Recall that for 
Aristotle, form gives shape to matter, which on its own is indeterminate and 
lifeless: form is the actuality of matter, while matter is the potentiality of form.  
Yet in stripping matter down to simple potentiality, to an empty state of potency 
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prior to all determination, Adorno claims Aristotle has given conceptual 
articulation to something non-conceptual.659  By defining matter as an indefinite 
striving toward definition, something that lies on the other side of form but 
without which form could not be, the power of form as actuality is made 
dependent on a second power, the power of matter to become actualized in form.   
Insofar as the actual is what is, and the potential what might be, or that 
which has the power to be something other than it is, it would appear Aristotle 
has here inadvertently subordinated being to becoming.  Matter, though a 
concept in its own right, refers to the non-conceptual whose own lack of 
determinacy gestures toward determinacy—it points toward the concept of form 
through which it will be organized and known.  As the indeterminacy upon which 
determinate form depends, matter also contains the potential for the 
actualization of form to go awry, to fail to hit its mark or realize its telos in the 
fully flourishing actuality of form. Thus Adorno will claim matter (hule) becomes 
a kind of repository for mythical categories displaced by form: namely, fate 
(anagke) and chance (tuche).  The question of change and transformation, whose 
mythical articulations in the concepts of fate and chance were banned by “the 
Greek enlightenment” and its philosophical inquiry into being, return in the 
concept of matter.660  Though Aristotle’s Metaphysics fails to grasp the concept of 
change, its failure nevertheless indicates the point or departure from which a 
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possible solution to the problem of change might spring: one must look to that 
which is excluded from the concept, the indeterminate array of material that 
Adorno will call the non-conceptual, or the non-identical. 
It is in the light of the non-identical, of that which the concept excludes, 
that the isolated references to Aristotle and the Greeks scattered throughout 
Adorno’s writings must be interpreted.  Held together in a kind of force field, 
Adorno’s references to the Greeks point toward the future in which they might be 
redeemed, both as obstacles to its realization, and promises of its possibility.  For 
instance, from this perspective Aristotle is guilty of being complicit with 
domination for his insistence on the superiority of contemplative to practical 
activity: as the greatest good, contemplation becomes indifferent to the task of 
changing the world, and is thus colonized by the dominant political forces of the 
day, as witnessed in the fall of the polis and the form of praxis particular to it that 
accompanies Aristotle’s praise of the life of contemplation.661  Yet this emphasis 
on contemplation that allows for complicity between Aristotle’s philosophy and 
the destruction of Athenian political life at once provides a critique of the very life 
that would replace it, “the resignation of the Hellenistic private citizen,” in the 
promise of “blissful contemplation” divorced from “the exercising and suffering 
of violence.”662   
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Likewise, Adorno finds Aristotelian aesthetics to be complicit with “ruling 
interests” in their theorization of the task of art being to provide an “aesthetic 
semblance” of the satisfaction of the needs and instincts of the public.  In this 
sense, Aristotelian catharsis is a “substitute satisfaction,” akin to what will be 
appropriated and managed by the culture industry over two millennia later.663  
Nevertheless, in seeking “the effect of art in the affects of individuals,” 
Aristotelian aesthetics preserve a kind of experience irreducible to political 
exigencies, and thus make, despite their complicity with domination, a promise 
that things might be other than they are.664  And perhaps most importantly with 
respect to politics, while Adorno accuses Aristotle of having fused  
“inner worth” with the status made possible through property and enshrined in 
law, thus making the “good man” one “who rules himself as he does his own 
property,”665 Aristotle will also limit the power of the rule of this law through his 
concept of equity (epieikes).  Against the “abstract legal norm,” in equity we see a 
turn toward the particulars that cannot be subsumed under the generality of the 
law, and so assimilated to the order of property over which the “good man” rules.  
In the light of the non-identical, equity becomes the promise of justice beyond the 
                                                     
663 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), 238. Cited hereafter as AT. 
664 AT, 202. 
665 Adorno, MM, A119, 185.  
 
 
357 
rule of what can be equalized as property, and it is for this reason that Adorno 
claims Aristotle’s concept of equity is to his “imperishable glory.”666 
In thrall to the non-identical, to that which eludes the concept, Adorno’s 
references to Aristotle form a “force field” of statements concerning the relation 
of metaphysics to the possibility of a transformed world.  This transformed world, 
the future of which Aristotle is made to speak, is one that he both denies and 
promises—his conceptual innovations militate against their own transformation, 
and so the transformation of the world, yet in doing so they produce a remainder 
that points in the opposite direction—one that suggests something else is 
possible. Insofar as Adorno finds in the origin of metaphysics the kernel of its 
other, the non-identical which carries within itself a compressed history of 
displaced origins, the origin of metaphysics is found to be no origin at all.  
Rather, it is a reference point in the trajectory of domination, carrying in it the 
scars of this domination while at once gesturing toward something else.  Just as 
Adorno writes in the “Finale [Zum Ende]” to his Minima Moralia that “the only 
philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair” attempts to 
contemplate all things “from the standpoint of redemption,” so his references to 
Aristotle and his metaphysics are attempts to “displace and estrange” Aristotle’s 
thought, and so reveal “its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will 
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appear one day in the messianic light.”667  So illuminated by the light of its other, 
Aristotle’s metaphysics becomes citable in its relation to this future, to its 
possible transformation.668   
Adorno’s famous declaration of solidarity with metaphysics “at the time of 
its fall”669 that concludes his Negative Dialectics is precisely this: a solidarity 
with metaphysics through its determinate negation, which both recognizes the 
contemporary impossibility of a metaphysical system yet continues metaphysical 
speculation in the form of attending to that which lies beyond the concept, the 
point at which, as in Aristotle, the material particulars split their conceptual 
casing, and so compel a transformation of the conceptual world.  This 
determinate negation of metaphysics will have been at the same time a 
determinate negation of Aristotle’s thought, and as such, an attempt to solve the 
problems concerning the relation between the human and the animal, and the 
relation between art and politics, that arose in the above discussion of Aristotle.  
In this way, Adorno must be seen as a critic of Aristotle, but one bound to the 
Aristotelian problematic—a thinker whose anti-Aristotelianism takes up the 
challenge his philosophy poses, and attempts to “string the bow” Aristotle has left 
for posterity.  How Adorno’s fate in this endeavor might differ from the other 
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“suitors” examined in Part I will depend on his approach. In order to better 
elucidate this approach and the possible consequences of the transformed 
conceptual world Adorno inhabits, along with the place of humans, animals, art, 
and politics therein, we must now ourselves turn to the non-conceptual, to that 
which Adorno calls “non-identity,” and of course, their relationship to identity 
and to the concepts that form the core of Adorno’s contribution to philosophy. 
 
Non-Identity and Dialectic  
As seen above, the core problems Adorno highlights in Aristotle’s metaphysics 
concerning the possibility of change and the relation between universal and 
particular remain unresolved, and the moral and political dimensions of these 
problems remain for Adorno the most pressing of their kind.  Adorno claims that 
the central problem of moral philosophy is likewise the relationship of “the 
particular interests,” or “the behaviour of the individual,” in relation to the 
universal, and that this question relates to “the question of the organization of the 
world,” and the “quest for the right form of politics,” in as much as such a politics 
is possible today.670  Aristotle’s claim that a discrepancy exists between the best 
human life and the best citizen, thus making the best human life dependent upon 
political organization, becomes revolutionary in Adorno, for whom “wrong life 
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cannot be lived rightly.”671  That is, the moral quest for the good life cannot be 
divorced from the political task of changing the world such that life might no 
longer be wrong, that political organization would no longer be its impediment.  
Solidarity with metaphysics at the time of its fall is to take up these problems in 
their interrelation.  However, in examining what Adorno takes to be the core 
problems of Aristotle’s metaphysics, it was found that he relies on a conception of 
dialectic whose relation to non-identity and the messianic requires further 
development if the particularity of Adorno’s use of this term is to be understood. 
 In the preceding look at Aristotle’s metaphysics, it was found that a 
conception of mediation is required in order to relate universal and particular 
and so grasp the relation between things and their concepts and how these might 
change—that is, how to think or conceptualize something that changes.  It was 
also found that Aristotle’s conception of mediation fails in its attempt to grasp the 
relationship between universal and particular in a manner that might 
accommodate the possibility of change, and that consequently a dialectical 
conception of mediation is necessary, for only a dialectical conception of 
mediation seeks to grasp things as they are and as they pass beyond the limit that 
defines them as what they are.  In this sense, it might be said that dialectical 
thinking attempts to think objects both in their identity, that is, in the 
conjunction of concept and object, and in their non-identity, in the disjunction 
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between concept and object created by changes in the object.  As the object 
changes, so it sheds its identity with the concept. Dialectic attempts to think this 
movement by formulating concepts such as to enable their revision according to 
the changes in the object.  Though the object is constantly undergoing changes, 
dialectical concepts are constantly being revised by these changes, such as to re-
establish the identity with the object lost through its change.  Thus, non-identity 
in dialectical thought precipitates identity: it is the open door that dialectical 
thinking is forever closing.  But here we must ask: is this continued attempt to re-
establish identity within non-identity consonant with what Adorno has in mind 
with his turn toward the non-identical, to the other side of the concept?  Is 
Adorno’s attempt to see in things their “rifts and crevices,” their indigence and 
distortion, simply to better capture them conceptually, and so expand the ever-
growing universe of the conceptual domain? 
 We must answer that no, Adorno’s turn toward non-identity is not done in 
the same vein as past dialectical thinking—his aim is not to seek identity in non-
identity, and so to simply better conceptualize the world.  However, this answer 
should not suggest that Adorno then makes a fetish of indigence and distortion, 
to worship or celebrate the failure of the concept to establish identity with its 
object, as if freedom lay in their discord.  Rather, what Adorno denies is the 
separation between thinking and acting that would make possible the peaceful 
concord of concept and object in a thinking subject, despite the discord of a world 
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where that subject’s actions are the result of compulsion.672  So long as our socio-
political world remains organized such that we must act in accordance with the 
exigencies of our unequal standing in that world—either as dominated or 
dominator—then the very texture of our thinking will be colored by this 
organization.  For Adorno, to think an object is sufficiently captured by a concept 
is to legitimate its place in the prevailing conceptual order bound to its socio-
political order—it is to deny that either the object or the order in which it has 
definition could be otherwise.  To perpetually seek out identity in non-identity, to 
set out and attempt to conceptually capture that which lies outside the concept, is 
the cognitive equivalent of a bounty hunter chasing a fugitive.   
Yet to recognize a compulsive and even violent element in thinking should 
not then lead us to the conclusion that it would be better not to think at all—such 
a life is not possible, or even desirable.  Rather, thinking can only abjure violence 
to the extent that the society in which it takes place abjures violence.  In a society 
where violence is deemed abhorrent and yet perpetuated in multifarious forms 
each day, we should not be surprised to find thinking present a peaceful accord 
between concept and object that denies the existence of its remainder.  This 
identity would hide anything that falls outside of the concept, just as public 
denunciations of violence unconnected to a socio-political change that might 
inhibit future violence only serve its perpetuation.  To turn toward this 
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remainder, the non-conceptual or non-identical, in the manner Adorno would, is 
to use the violence of thought against itself in order to reveal the radical 
insufficiency of the prevailing conceptual order, and so compel its re-
organization.  This thinking is the cognitive equivalent of what would be for the 
prevailing socio-political organization a revolution.  However, it is worth asking 
at this juncture: how is it possible to think a revolution that is not being enacted 
at the socio-political level, if Adorno denies the separation of thinking and acting 
that would allow each a sphere independent of the other? 
 It is here that we must return to the “messianic light” that illuminates the 
other side of the concept in the “Finale” of Minima Moralia.  By positing the 
future as a utopia in which the struggles that animate the present are no more, 
one is capable of seeing in these struggles what will have been the promise of 
their redemption, but that otherwise go unrecognized.  It is for this reason that 
Adorno can write that “the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself 
hardly matters,”673 for redemption is itself posited by thinking in order to think 
against the thinking bound up with compulsion—it is a ruse, a conceptual trick 
made at the expense of concepts, possible thanks to the historical possibility of its 
own redemption.  Insofar as the future remains unknown, the possibility of its 
being radically other than the present cannot be disproven, and so the ruse lives 
in this unknown, drawing interest from a principal which may or may not prove 
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redeemable.  In this way thinking is able to orient itself to the world and its own 
activity such as to work against the compulsion which animates their 
organization, instigating a revolution in thought that might, hopefully, contribute 
in some way to a revolution in the organization of society.  The political 
ramifications of this thinking, including its relation to art and aesthetics will be 
taken up in Chapter 14.  At present, it must be seen what this “revolution” means 
for the dialectic. 
Just as certain concerns of Aristotelian metaphysics are illuminated by this 
messianic light and made Adorno’s own, so is dialectic, especially the Hegelian 
variety, illuminated and harnessed toward Adorno’s project. While Hegel’s own 
affinities with Aristotle are noted repeatedly throughout Adorno’s texts,674 by 
placing Hegel in relation to Benjamin’s messianic conception of history, Hegel is 
drawn away from Aristotle and toward Benjamin in manner that allows for the 
redemption of the promise of the dialectic that had been denied by the dominion 
of identity. We might say, following a simile used by Adorno to describe 
Benjamin, that just as “everything that fell under the scrutiny of his words was 
transformed, as though it had become radioactive,”675 so the Hegelian dialectic 
too becomes “radioactive,” mutating or decaying such as to be transformed from 
what it was in Hegel. This mutated form of the dialectic, one turned not to 
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establishing identity in non-identity, but in finding the non-identical in the 
identical, is what Adorno calls negative dialectic.676 
 However, Adorno makes little attempt to forge an analytical distinction 
between negative dialectic and the traditional understanding of dialectic, and will 
frequently refer to the dialectic and his negative dialectic interchangeably.  For 
instance, in Negative Dialectics Adorno claims that dialectic says simply that 
objects leave a remainder beyond their concept, and so the attempt to 
conceptualize an object produces a contradiction in the conceptualizing subject 
between the object of experience and the conception of it.  To think dialectically is 
to persist in this experience of the non-identity between concept and object, 
driven by the “inevitable insufficiency” of our thinking to erase this 
contradiction.677  Or put differently: thinking dialectically is to conceptually 
reflect upon the gap in our experience that both divides concept and object and 
promises their possible reconciliation.  Defined in this manner, if only 
provisionally and imperfectly, Adorno’s understanding of dialectic appears to 
differ little from the Hegelian variety. The dialectic that animates Hegel’s 
philosophy, Adorno writes, is “the permanent confrontation of the object with its 
concept […] the unswerving effort to conjoin reason's critical consciousness of 
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itself and the critical experience of objects.”678  Hegel himself, supposedly in a 
conversation with Goethe, called the dialectic “the organized spirit of 
contradiction,”679 and in taking up these contradictions, Hegel’s philosophy 
attempts to express the non-identical, even if this very attempt identifies it in the 
process.680   
But here is where the difference between Hegel’s dialectic and Adorno’s 
comes to light.  Adorno wants to express non-identity in a way that does not 
suppress it beneath identity, in a way that turns the conceptual toward the non-
conceptual without the latter being simply devoured or “crushed” by the 
former.681  While the passage of the Hegelian dialectic appears more or less 
indistinguishable from that of the dialectic championed by Adorno, the former 
variety “is untrue when measured against its own concept.”682  Though Hegel’s 
dialectic opens up the possibility of thinking through the passage between 
contradictory particulars with neither ground nor origin remaining permanent or 
fixed,683 Hegel’s idealism forbids this passage, seeking instead to ground this 
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movement in an absolute subject.  For Hegel, it is only through the activities of 
consciousness culminating in an absolute subject that all particulars find unity 
and so are assigned fixed identities in a totality.  The absolute subject, or spirit, is 
at once found to be the origin of the process, and its goal—the constitutive 
conception of the subject needed for dialectic noted by Adorno above becomes in 
Hegel the ultimate guarantor of objects in their particularity, for the subject does 
not simply project concepts onto objects, but the truth of the objects themselves 
are for Hegel to be found in these projections, their ideality.684  Thus there is a 
preponderance of the subject and the concept over the object in Hegel which, like 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, falls back into a static conception of the totality of the 
world, and the positive identities of the objects therein.685  
The image of the circle employed so frequently by Hegel underscores the 
stasis of totality: things are not transformed into new things, but rather preserve 
an identity with what they become concretely (or, in their actuality) with what 
they always already were abstractly (or, potentially) through the successive 
stages of the development of consciousness.686  Though we might say Hegel 
approaches Benjamin’s messianic conception of history with his insistence that 
the beginning is only found to have been the beginning in the end, and is thus 
always already mediated by the end in which it will be discovered as the 
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beginning,687 this retro-active positing of foundations ensures that the end is 
likewise mediated by its beginning, and is thus never something alien to it.  
Insofar as the beginning retro-actively posited by the end is never “an arbitrary or 
merely provisional assumption,”688 then recognizing that the development of a 
thing is at its end depends upon a version of this end being already present in the 
beginning.689  The end must grow out of the beginning, even if the beginning can 
only be fully known in the end, and the necessity of this organic link serves to 
transform Hegel’s messianic moment into theodicy.  Rather than being caught in 
a messianic light that illuminates their radical otherness from themselves, 
Hegelian theodicy ensures that things necessarily progress along a given 
trajectory, developing into the complete form of what they always already were in 
embryo.690  Thus Hegel’s idealism serves to arrest the passage of his dialectic in a 
static system of identity.691  Adorno’s turn to Benjamin and the messianic is thus 
an attempt to split the unity of dialectic and idealism found in Hegel, and so open 
up the possibility of a dialectical experience in Hegel’s “freedom toward the 
object”692 irreducible to idealist categories and the circle of their organic 
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development.  Indeed, Adorno rests the very possibility of philosophy having any 
future at all on the possibility of there being dialectical experience “independent 
of the idealistic machinery” emphasized by Hegel.693   
Thus, while Adorno’s negative dialectic owes a great deal to Hegel’s 
dialectical idealism, he is not, as Bernstein claims, simply continuing the 
Hegelian tradition beyond the point at which Hegel had left it, in the manner 
available to one attempting to do so “after Marx, after Nietzsche, and above all 
after two centuries of brutal history in which the moment to realize philosophy 
[…] was missed.”694  Though the contradictions found in a world shaped by 
organized compulsion and domination ensure dialectic remains the shape of 
thinking, in order to turn toward the non-conceptual and so separate dialectic 
from idealism Adorno must do violence to Hegel—violence that brings Adorno 
closer to grave-robber than legal heir.695  Bernstein fails to grasp this, for he fails 
to distinguish between Hegelian dialectic and Hegelian idealism: though 
Adorno’s Hegelianism is unorthodox, Bernstein claims that he nevertheless 
“accepts the rudiments of Hegelian idealism.”696  While there remains some 
argumentative flexibility in the term “rudiments,” we have seen above that 
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modification of terms such as contradiction, mediation, reflection, and determinate negation amount to a 
rejection of the Hegelian project as such.  See Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism 
(Cambridge” Cambridge University Press, 1982), 161-162; 176-177. 
696 Bernstein, “Negative Dialectic as Fate,” 19. 
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Adorno’s approach to Hegel, while deeply indebted to the Hegelian dialectic, is 
equally opposed to the idealism in which the Hegelian dialectic is framed.  For 
this reason, Adorno’s negative dialectic must be seen less as an organic growth 
pushing itself up through the fertile soil of Hegelian idealism than as an attempt 
to think against Hegelian idealism by introducing into it the messianic, as a 
foreign body assailing the body of this philosophy.  Rather than perpetuate 
Hegelian philosophy then, Adorno, through the immanent critique of the 
dialectic this foreign intrusion precipitates, “explodes Hegelian idealism.”697  Free 
from idealism, the remnants of the Hegelian dialectic might pursue their passage 
between contradictory particulars bound by neither origin nor foundation. 
 
Constellation of Objects 
Yet what might be the moral and political import, if any, of Adorno’s immanent 
critique of the dialectic, and how might these relate to the concerns of 
metaphysics?  And moreover, how can negative dialectic be an “immanent” 
critique of Hegel’s dialectical idealism, if it employs a concept foreign to Hegel?  
If the messianic comes from outside the body of his philosophy, then how can it 
at once be “immanent” to it?  I will begin here by taking up the latter group of 
questions, those concerning the immanence to the dialectic of Adorno’s critique.  
Most generally, one might call Adorno’s critique of the dialectic “immanent” 
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insofar as he employs the dialectic to engage in critique of the dialectic.  However, 
there is more to this critique than simply the self-application of the dialectic, for 
Adorno also claims, as noted above, that Hegel’s philosophy “is untrue when 
measured against its own concept.”698  That is, it is not simply a matter of being 
dialectical where Hegel was not, but rather, it is a matter of being dialectical 
where Hegel ought to have been, had he pushed his own philosophy past the 
limits that he was willing to set for it.  Thus, Adorno’s foreign “assault” upon the 
body of Hegel’s philosophy has with it also an element of recovery.699   
For the purposes of this discussion, we can isolate two reasons that allow 
Adorno to insist that negative dialectic is an “immanent” critique of Hegel’s 
dialectical idealism, despite having to employ a concept foreign to Hegel to 
accomplish it.  The first is that dialectic, as Adorno claims, shows that objects are 
never subsumed beneath concepts without leaving a remainder.700  The 
implication here is that dialectic is always pushing beyond itself, always creating 
a limit whose recognition already presupposes some notion of what lies beyond 
the limit.  Thus to claim that knowledge has been realized in the totality of a 
system is, dialectically speaking, to gesture toward what might lie beyond the 
                                                     
698 Recall HTS, 17. 
699 That Adorno employs Hegel against Hegel has often been remarked upon, though it remains a matter of 
debate as to whether or not Adorno succumbs to the same problems he would criticize.  For some recent 
treatments of this question, see Charlotte Bauman, “Adorno, Hegel, and the Concrete Universal,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 37.1 (2011): 73-94; Lauren Coyle, “The Spiritless Rose in the Cross of the 
Present,” Telos 155 (2011): 39-65; Darrow Schecter, “Unity, Identity, and Difference,” History of Political 
Thought XXXIII.2 (2012): 258-279. 
700 Recall ND, 5. 
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limits of that system, what remains un-known, as the remainder produced in the 
movement that establishes the totality of the system.  In this sense, the passage of 
the dialectic that allows for the building of a system also makes possible that 
system’s destruction, for the creation of stable knowledge through dialectic at 
once produces an outside to that knowledge which threatens its stability.  Thus 
the movement immanent to the very concept of dialectic already militates against 
the closure that idealism would impose upon it, pointing instead toward what lies 
beyond itself.  In this sense, that which transcends the dialectic is already 
immanent to dialectical movement: dialectic, as self-transcendence, has 
transcendence immanent to its own concept.   
This brings us to the second reason as to why Adorno’s use of “the 
messianic” or “redemption” can be considered part of an immanent critique of 
dialectical idealism. That is, the messianic transcendence of the dialectic cannot 
be said to be completely outside the dialectic’s own movement.  As a conceptual 
“ruse,” redemption is without positive existence or identity in the present; 
however, at the same time it does not forego the possibility of both of these in the 
future.  Whatever content can be assigned to that which lies beyond the passage 
of the dialectic can only be a projection of the immanent movement of the 
dialectic, of the conflicts that animate society in the present.  Yet at the same 
time, insisting on a ban of utopian images—of images of the world transformed 
beyond its constitutive conflicts—is equally a projection of the movement of the 
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dialectic and the perceived needs of struggle in the present.701  The very 
availability of a concept of redemption for Adorno to turn against identity and 
synthesis, and so allow for a turn in the movement of the dialectic toward non-
identity, is itself a product of the dialectic and the social conflicts it articulates.  
Its positive instantiation, however, would mean the end of the dialectic, for it 
would mark the end of the split in experience that dialectic expresses. 
The object, in its resistance to the suffering it endures through its identity 
with the concept, seeks its transformation, its freedom to not be measured 
against the concept. The suffering of the object here refers not simply to the 
experience of pain, but to experience as such.  Insofar as the experience of the 
object made identical to a concept is mediated by that concept, the object suffers 
this identity and its concept—identity strives to define the limits of experience 
available to the object.702  The suffering of this limitation cannot be distilled to a 
limitation of inherent rational capacities, as Honneth argues, for rational 
capacities are not inherent for Adorno, but are tied rather to socio-historical 
possibilities which mediate bodily comportment.  When they are taken to be 
inherent, rational capacities are bound up with the limits identity-thinking would 
                                                     
701 On Adorno’s use of the Bilderverbot, see Webb, “If Adorno Isn’t the Devil, It’s Because He’s a Jew,” 
523-527. 
702 Though Adorno has been criticized for drawing on an undifferentiated—even “undialectical”—
conception of suffering, the multiple uses Adorno makes of suffering in his work implies a more complex 
conception, which would include the meaning I give it here, even if he often does not draw clear 
distinctions between different kinds of suffering.  See Raymond Geuss, “Suffering and Knowledge in 
Adorno,” in Outside Ethics, 128-130.  Cf. Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 144-149. 
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impose on objects, and thus contribute to this suffering.703  Thus, insofar as its 
conceptual identity fails to capture its own lived experience, that is, its own 
persistence and transformation in time, the object desires to be free of this 
identity, and these desires take the shape of the messianic or redemption: or 
rather, redemption/the messianic is the conceptual reflection of the desire for 
transformed experience—transformed life.704  Redemption is born in the 
immanent movement of the dialectic, as the desire that things be otherwise—
redemption only appears to come wholly from outside, and so be foreign to this 
movement, insofar as idealism, in its attempt to build a closed and complete 
system, served to relegate the unstable remainders produced by the movement of 
the dialectic to the outside of this system.  In this sense, while negative dialectic is 
the dialectic illuminated by the “messianic light” of redemption, it is at the same 
time the recovery of the possibility immanent to the concept of the dialect as a 
transcendence of itself, a self-transcendence betrayed by Hegelian idealism.705   
                                                     
703 Axel Honneth, “A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Form of Life,” trans. James Ingram, Constellations 
12.1 (2005), 60.  On some anthropological consequences of these claims, see Chapters 12 and 13 below. 
704 Cf. Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Suggested Reading,” in Things Beyond Resemblance, 230.  
705 Contra Buchwalter, who claims Adorno practices a “transcendent critique” that remains at the level of 
abstract negation.  Buchwalter claims Adorno dissociates any possible meaning between the realms of life 
and death, thus precluding the possibility of the determinate negation necessary to change the world as it 
exists, for this would require finding in this world some kind of truth or meaning.  Though Adorno does 
indeed deny the possibility of there being meaning or truth in the Hegelian sense for what transpired in 
Auschwitz, what this means for Adorno is that it is no longer possible to be Hegelian, not that the world 
cannot be changed.  Compared to one who would be simply Hegelian after the transformation of the basic 
conditions of his philosophy, Adorno’s attention to the transformed constitution of the object reflects a 
greater concern with the immanence of critique to socio-historical change and the possibilities available 
therein, not less.  See Andrew Buchwalter, “Hegel, Adorno, and the Concept of Transcendent Critique,” in 
Dialectics, Politics, and the Contemporary Value of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 
2011). 
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Nevertheless, in turning back to the former set of questions concerning 
these philosophical speculations and the practical world, it might be said that just 
as logic, metaphysics, and politics were deeply conjoined in Hegel,706 so do they 
remain in Adorno.  Negative dialectic aligns itself with the central concerns 
Adorno highlighted in Aristotle’s metaphysics—namely, the questions of the 
relation between universal and particular and the conceptualization of change— 
which for Adorno are at once the central problems of moral philosophy and the 
most salient problems facing politics.  Liberated from idealist origins that would 
ground its operations and pre-determine its passage, negative dialectic would 
attempt to think a different relation between universal and particular, one that 
Adorno calls, against the idealism from which he has attempted to separate this 
dialectic, materialist.  As Jarvis notes, this materialism is “not a set of fixed 
metaphysical or methodological commitments,” nor “a dogmatic ontology stating 
that only matter is real”707; rather, it is an orientation to the world, a manner of 
re-interpreting it in light of the contamination of thinking by its other, by the 
trace in thinking of what is not thinking but that makes thinking possible.  
Following the trace of matter in thinking and insisting on re-interpreting 
concepts in its sense means to turn against the concept of the constitutive subject 
necessary for dialectical thinking, and which in Hegel’s idealism reigns supreme, 
toward a preponderance of the object. 
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Adorno calls the object “the positive expression of non-identity,” and as 
such, it is little more than a “terminological mask” for material that can otherwise 
only be grasped in their particularity.708  To turn toward the object, to accept its 
preponderance, is thus to recognize all the particulars in their irreducible variety 
that form the substance of both thought and the thinking subject, and thus to 
limit, and so end, the power of the constitutive subject of idealism.  We might say 
that it is this end of the constitutive subject of idealism that is for Adorno the 
prime moral and political task of philosophical speculation; thus the turn toward 
the preponderance of the object is at once a philosophical, moral, and political 
endeavor.  While the object can only be conceived by a subject, its otherness to 
the subject is irreducible: the object is never simply subject, but rather 
subjectivity remains only a moment of the object.  Moreover, what is called 
subject is itself always also an object—its own objectivity is inescapable.  Thus in 
the subject-object polarity, object preponderates: it is simultaneously subject and 
object.709  Yet Adorno insists the preponderance of the object does not, or should 
not, establish a new hierarchy between these terms,710 one where subjectivity is 
perpetually reduced to objectivity, where the concept is reduced to its material 
conditions, and so explained away. The objectivity of matter is never simply 
immediate, for object is itself a concept, a “positive expression” of the non-
conceptual, and hence presupposes the cognition of a subject.  A negative 
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dialectical grasp of subject and object, then, involves seeing in each the manner in 
which their reciprocal permeation fails to coalesce in a stable identity.711  Subject 
and object are together an expression of nonidentity: they are constituted 
through their non-coincidence with each other, and as such remain “negative 
throughout.”712 
The negativity of subject and object in objective preponderance means that 
the transformation of objects interpolates different subjects through the 
cognition of these objects.  That is, the material designated by the concept of 
object includes both the socio-political factors that shape the activities available 
to a given body, and the body itself, predisposing this body to a certain range of 
relations with its world, including a range of objects of cognition.  In relating to 
the world through its activities and its understanding of this world and these 
activities through their cognition, that is, through thinking, a subject is born.  
Attempting to think the preponderance of the object is to deny the fixed character 
of subjectivity as itself constituting the objects of cognition, insisting instead on 
being open to being subjectively transformed through different relations to the 
object.  Being open to the object, to its primacy, means to rend the veil that 
subjectivity would weave around the object by seeing in it subjectivity’s own 
contingency.  As the subject “is the agent, not the constituent”713 of the object, 
that is, the subject has an objective core, then one must seek after the object not 
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in the absence of the subject, but through it.714  Where the subject is found at its 
most particular and contingent, there object will be.   
Thinking toward the object without reducing it to something constituted 
subjectively thus requires for Adorno its placement relative to other objects in 
what he calls, following Benjamin, a “constellation.”715  Here again, we find 
Adorno making use of a kind of ruse, or a conceptual trick against concepts 
themselves, for the placing of objects in constellation is itself a subjective act that 
works against subjective preponderance.  The tension of the objects in 
constellation illuminate in each other the non-conceptual that each on their own 
would hide.  Torn from their organic context and placed in a foreign set of 
relations established by the thinking subject, they lose the ability to speak their 
own names, and so to repeat their ideological function, instead becoming 
readable together as “a sign of objectivity.”716  In unlocking the non-conceptual 
from the conceptual, like “a safe-deposit box,”717 this constellation of objects, 
while itself the work of subjective cognition, at once allows for the release of the 
grip of the cognizing subject.  That is, just as the individual objects are 
transformed in the relation made possible through the constellation, so is the 
                                                     
714 “On Subject and Object,” 250. 
715  Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 2009), 
34.  The affinities between Adorno and Benjamin have led rightly to the claim that on certain themes “it is 
difficult to specify the precise location of the boundary between them.”  See Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 
Exact Imagination (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 53.  Concerning the boundary between these two 
thinkers on the question of constellations, see Simon Jarvis, Adorno (New York: Routledge, 1998), 175-
176. 
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717 ND, 163.  Cf. Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 35. 
 
 
379 
cognizing subject transformed from its relation to this transformed object.  The 
constellation, through its transformation of the objects of cognition, thus evokes 
a new subject, one that would possibly replace the subject that served to bring the 
constellation together in the first place.   
Thinking in constellations, this kind of neutralization of the violence of 
thought by turning it against itself, comes closest to the “distanced nearness” of 
the non-violent contemplation that would be possible in a transformed world.718  
Releasing the subject from its own grip, it allows for an experience of the weight 
of the object, of the suffering that is otherwise hidden,719 and the possibility of a 
new subject constituted through this constellation of objects.  Yet this power of 
constellations to transform subjects must itself be seen as being drawn from the 
“messianic light” projected from the suffering object, rather than the subject 
through which a constellation is constituted.  That is, as the subject is the agent of 
the object, not its constituent, a constellation must be seen as the subjectively 
produced response to the resistance of the object to conceptual capture. In 
placing objects in constellation, the subject hopes to reveal or even generate non-
                                                     
718 MM, A54, 89-90.  It must be emphasized here that thinking in constellations is not in and of itself non-
violent.  As noted above, Adorno denies the kind of separation between thinking and acting, or individual 
and society, that would enable one to simply stop being violent tout court, as though through an act of 
individual will, or as Marder writes, by “refusing to reproduce the idealist absorption of the object into the 
subject” (my emphasis).  Insofar as our thinking is social all the way down, it is permeated by social 
violence.  Thinking in constellations mimics what would be non-violence in order to point in its direction, 
but one cannot on one’s own pretend to have so mastered one’s own powers of cognition—most of which 
are involuntary—to simply accomplish this through an act of individual refusal.  A truly non-violent 
society is a pre-requisite for non-violent cognition.  Cf. Michael Marder, “Minima Potentia: Reflections on 
the Subject of Suffering,” New German Critique 97, Vol. 33.1 (2006), 67. 
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conceptual affinities among them.  A non-conceptual affinity is a relation, either a 
similarity or a difference, which does not operate at the conceptual level—it is a 
similarity or difference between objects that it not part of their conceptual 
identity.  Constellating different objects such as to express non-conceptual 
affinities thus reveals non-conceptual dimensions of the constellated objects, 
which bring the identity established between these concepts and their objects 
into contradiction.  A constellation of objects thus reveals how objects might 
relate to each other otherwise, and so reveals the tenuous, fragile, and contingent 
nature of the conceptual order that presents itself as total and complete.  
In this way Adorno forges a new conceptual relation between particulars.  
Rather than the idealist relation in which the universal exists over and above 
particulars as their origin and ground, thus reducing them to simple moments of 
the universal’s necessary trajectory, Adorno theorizes the universal as emerging 
only in a particular and subjectively produced constellation of objects. His 
negative dialectic, which illuminates the reciprocal permeation of subject and 
object and their instability as tenuous moments in a clash of particulars, serves to 
think against Hegelian idealism and the absolute subject enshrined therein, 
theorizing instead the possibility of subjects produced in and through a new 
constellation of objects, and thus existing against the totality in which the subject 
is but a relay point in this totality’s reproduction.  However, while it has been 
claimed that like in Hegel, dialectical logic, metaphysics, and politics all remain 
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inextricably intertwined in Adorno, some of the more salient consequences of his 
re-casting of relation between universal and particular through negative dialectic 
must be examined.  Specifically, it remains to be seen what exactly Adorno’s 
revolution in thinking might mean for the human-animal distinction as we have 
seen it formulated by Aristotle in relation to art and politics.  It is to these 
questions we presently turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
382 
Chapter Thirteen:  
Adorno on Humanism and the Human Being 
 
As we have seen, Adorno’s negative dialectic, the turn toward the primacy of the 
object, and thinking in constellations, all have in common an attempt to make 
visible in thought that which evades thought but makes it possible: that which is 
non-identical to the concept.  This turn toward the non-identical is called by 
Adorno “an axial turn”720 of the Copernican revolution in philosophy; yet unlike 
Kant’s Copernican turn, which attempted to organize human knowledge into 
metaphysical categories grounded in a transcendental subject, Adorno’s turn 
toward the object and the non-identical is intended to show the impossibility of 
such a subject.  Insofar as there are concepts, Adorno thinks that some kind of 
subject must necessarily persist to think them; however, the primacy of the object 
means that this cognizing subject is always constituted in relation to these 
objects, and is thus forever being displaced and transformed by the shifting 
constellation of different objects.  The turn toward the object thus reveals the 
tenuous and fragile nature of the subject: non-identical with itself, the subject 
becomes incapable of serving as the stable ground upon which objects can be 
definitively known.  Even the generality of the Kantian categories of a priori 
apperception, space and time, can no longer serve as stable ground, for even 
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though space and time can always be found to structure a given subject’s 
cognition of an object, these cannot be abstracted from the subject’s particular 
experience of them in the object so as to form an unchanging substratum of 
experience.  The subject is the how of the object,721 a report on the experience of 
its ever-changing constellation.722  As such, space and time are always 
experienced in the particular array of constellated objects, and are inseparable 
from them, just as is the given subject of these objects.  To isolate from this 
experience an unchanging substratum, even one so general as to be constituted 
only by space and time, is to reduce experience to an expression of a priori 
conditions, and so transform it into a wall standing between subject and object, 
vivisecting the subject’s lived experience of the object.723 
                                                     
721 “On Subject and Object,” 250. 
722 This is not to make the subject-object relation itself a transcendental condition of experience, and 
Adorno a transcendental philosopher, as does O’Connor.  Though the elegant simplicity of O’Connor’s 
argument is seductive, it must be rejected, for Adorno claims the very existence of the subject-object 
relation is “the result of a coercive historical process” which must not be “transformed into an invariant.” 
Subject and object are themselves concepts, and to make them the condition of experience would be to 
undermine Adorno’s turn toward the object, which is precisely an attempt to displace the primacy of 
concepts, showing that though they mediate experience, they are not its condition of possibility.  See Brian 
O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 15. Cf. Adorno, “On Subject and 
Object,” 246. 
723 What we might experience as subjective continuity through internal experience such as memory is not, 
therefore, the product of the machinery of subjectivity, but continuities that persist in the objective 
constellations of our experience.  For instance, insofar as individual subjectivity is bound to a body, the 
changed constellation of objects that serves to displace and transform our subjectivity still includes our 
bodies and its changes. The birth of a new subject in a changed constellation of objects is only as different 
from past subjects as the object is different from past objects.  It is worth noting that this conception of the 
subject bares a striking affinity to certain Buddhist ideas which hold that consciousness of an object should 
not imply a ‘self’ insofar as we think of a self as a kind of enduring subject with a separate existence.  See 
Evan Thompson, “Self-No-Self?” in Self, No Self? eds. Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168.  For a comparison of Adorno and certain Buddhist ideas, see 
Asher Horowitz, “Adorno on Emptiness,” in Subversive Itinerary, eds. Shannon Bell and peter kuchyski 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
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 Yet if Adorno’s turn toward the object thus attempts to express the 
subject’s non-identity with itself, what consequences might this turn toward non-
identity entail for political subjects, specifically, the subject of humanism?  In the 
above account of Aristotle’s conception of the human being and its relation to 
other animals, it was possible to isolate different capacities Aristotle considers to 
be uniquely human, and those shared with other animals.  The uniquely human 
capacities, such as nous and the different capacities bound up with logos that 
underscore supposedly human activities such as thinking, speaking, deciding, 
and recollecting, were found to be unequally distributed among human beings.  
Though these capacities can be enabled or obstructed through political 
organization and cultivated or corrupted through the arts, the basic set of 
capacities available to the human being, and indeed, individual human beings, is 
fixed and unchanging.  In this sense, we can say that Aristotle has a positive 
conception of the human being, in that the plurality of human life can be 
subsumed beneath a single concept, identical to itself.   
To place Adorno in dialogue with Aristotle on this issue, and so to apply 
Adorno’s turn toward the non-identical to this conception of the human being 
and its difference from other animals, is thus to trouble this conception of the 
human being.  If the subject is without ground, enthralled instead to the 
continually shifting constellation of different objects, then what continuity can 
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there be among humans across time and place?724  What can serve as the 
transcendental conditions of humanity if transcendental conditions have 
themselves been called into question?  Though Adorno and his colleagues at the 
Frankfurt School of Social Research have been considered examples of the 
Marxist humanism that emerged philosophically in response to the discovery of 
Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” and politically, against Stalin 
and the policies of the Soviet Union, Adorno’s turn toward non-identity must be 
seen as a critique of the “species imperialism” of humanism,725 and a challenge to 
the Aristotelian conception of human being. 
 However, the word human and its related terms are used by Adorno in 
several different ways.  To get a better grasp of what the human being is, or might 
be, according to Adorno and his philosophy of non-identity, I will give an account 
of two of the most prominent conceptions of the human being found in Adorno’s 
work. The first, what we might call the actuality of humanity, if it were not for its 
negative character, concerns the ways in which Adorno thinks humanity exists, 
fitfully and inconsistently, in a world where life is “wrong.”  Humanity here is not 
a positive condition or self-identical subject, but rather exists only in opposition 
to inhumanity, as the other of the inhumanity perpetuated by the world.  The 
second form of humanity we might call the potential of humanity, if not for the 
fact that again this potential is without any positive existence, nor is it 
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725 Martin Jay, “The Frankfurt School’s Critique of Marxist Humanism,” Social Research 39.2 (1972), 296. 
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unchanging—it might even be said to be produced through the resistance to 
inhumanity that constitutes the first kind of humanity. This second form of 
humanity is what Adorno calls “reconciled” humanity.  Like Adorno’s utopian 
speculations noted above, reconciled humanity does not actually exist, but rather 
lives off the promise of a future positivity that may or may not ever be realized.  I 
follow my consideration of this reconciled humanity with an examination of 
Adorno’s often overlooked conception of progress, which I argue is necessary to 
connect these two different accounts of humanity. 
In this way, I use Adorno to begin to formulate a response to Aristotle’s 
conception of the human being and the anthropological invariant thought to lie at 
the root of western thought, shaping our relations to art, politics, and other 
animals.  I argue that, though it would appear that through his condemnation of 
the inhumanity of the world Adorno gestures toward a humanity to come, and 
thus that the idea of what would be human has remained until now merely a 
promise of a kind of subject that has not yet been, Adorno’s descriptions both of 
inhumanity and this reconciled humanity suggest that what would lie on the 
other side of the struggles of “pre-history” is not human at all, but a different kind 
of animal.  As such, the concept of humanism, and even the word “human,” are 
deeply misleading and encourage the perpetuation of a cycle of violence, the 
dialectic of enlightenment, from which Adorno’s utopian speculations on the end 
of humanity would escape. 
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Humane Humanity 
Adorno’s complex relationship to the concept of “humanity” or the “human,” and 
thus the difficulty of referring to him as a humanist,726 can perhaps be grasped 
most starkly by opposing two statements made on the subject in lecture courses 
he delivered in the 1960s. In a lecture given on July 27, 1965, part of a series of 
lectures Adorno gave on the topic of metaphysics, Adorno refers to “the infinite 
possibility which is radically contained in every human life,” and he even tells his 
audience: “you may think me an old-fashioned Enlightenment thinker, but I am 
deeply convinced that there is no human being, not even the most wretched, who 
has not a potential which, by conventional bourgeois standards, is comparable to 
genius.”727  It is hard to find a more succinct statement on humanism than this 
reference to the “infinite possibility” and even “genius” of every individual human 
being, merely awaiting their realization.  From a certain perspective even, we 
might say that these statements are consistent with contemporary interpretations 
of Aristotelian humanism, such as those of MacIntyre, Nussbaum, and Salkever.   
                                                     
726 By ‘humanist’ I mean a more expansive idea than the modern tradition arguably beginning with the 
French Revolution and the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.’ ‘Humanist’ or ‘humanism’ 
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humanist in this broad sense, even if they do not necessarily promote the kind of practical or political 
humanism we see today.  In this regard there is a largely unacknowledged affinity between Adorno and that 
infamous enemy of ‘theoretical humanism,’ Louis Althusser.  See Althusser, “The Humanist Controversy,” 
in The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, ed. François Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian 
(London: Verso, 2003). 
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And yet, merely two years earlier, on July 25, 1963, in a lecture given on 
the problems of moral philosophy, Adorno tells his audience that he “is reluctant 
to use the term ‘humanity’” in discussing questions of “the good life,” for this 
term “is one of the expressions that reify and hence falsify crucial issues merely 
by speaking of them.”  Moreover, Adorno recounts a story of declining to join the 
Humanist Union, telling its members: “I might possibly be willing to join if your 
club had been called an inhuman union, but I could not join one that calls itself 
‘humanist’.”728  How are we to make sense of the apparent contradiction found 
between these two statements?  Is it possible that by 1965 Adorno’s views on 
humanity and humanism had changed from what they were only two years 
earlier, and that Adorno’s later humanistic statements represent an Adorno who 
had put aside his earlier reservations? I do not think Adorno abandoned his 
reservations concerning humanism, but an examination of Adorno’s positive uses 
of the term human and its related concepts is necessary to understood why 
Adorno expresses more solidarity with the notion of an “inhuman” union than a 
human one. 
Adorno’s statements regarding humanity defy any attempt to see in his 
thought an initial disillusion with humanity following the Second World War that 
would eventually give way to a more optimistic view of the possibilities for human 
life.  Rather, Adorno’s comments on humanity reveal a curious relation between a 
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kind of extreme pessimism, and an extreme optimism, which remains fairly 
consistent throughout his work.  For instance, while the alleged pessimism of the 
major works Adorno completed during his American exile has been much 
commented upon, Adorno, in conversations recorded with Horkheimer in 1956 in 
preparation for a political manifesto (which was ultimately abandoned), Adorno 
insists that he does not “believe that human beings are evil when they come into 
the world,” and that humans “are not as bad as all that by nature.”729  Moreover, 
Adorno claims that “[f]reedom truly consists only in the realization of humanity 
as such.”730  While what Adorno might mean by “humanity as such,” that is, a 
humanity that has been realized, will be examined further below, there are 
numerous other remarkably sanguine statements regarding humanity in the 
present scattered throughout Adorno’s work that must first be confronted. 
 In his role as a public intellectual in post-war West Germany,731 Adorno 
will frequently rely on humanist language to outline the political tasks necessary 
to build the kind of culture that might resist fascism and its tendencies.  In radio 
lectures delivered in 1965 and 1966, Adorno claims the principal task of 
education is nothing less than the “debarbarization of humanity,”732 and that this 
                                                     
729 Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 
2011), 47-48. Cited hereafter as TNM. 
730 TNM, 50. 
731 Adorno’s reputation in the contemporary Anglo-American world as cultural mandarin often serves to 
obscure the degree to which he was in fact deeply engaged in public debate.  See Tom Huhn, “Introduction: 
Thoughts beside Themselves,” in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3. 
732 “Taboos on the Teaching Vocation,” in Critical Models, 190. 
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“debarbarization” has been less successful in the German countryside, where 
democratic and humanistic values have yet to become firmly entrenched.733  
Against the political imposition of these values, which remain in the Germany of 
his day “nothing more than [the] formal rules of the game,” Adorno cites the “real 
humanitarianism” found in the United States, where the “political form of 
democracy is infinitely closer to the people,” and where everyday life is marked 
by “an inherent element of peaceableness, good-naturedness, and generosity.”734  
It is this “peaceablness,” or freedom from compulsion, that appears throughout 
Adorno’s writings as what might be the promise of humanity.  Adorno writes that 
it is the separation between theory and practice, and so the possible disjoining of 
thinking from the compulsions of practical activity, in which “[h]umaness 
awakes,”735 and the ability to rigorously discipline one’s particular actions 
through the application of universal rules in the Kantian fashion would make one 
“more of a monster than a human being.”736  To recognize in one only their 
membership in a universal category, and so ignore their particularity, is precisely 
to deny them their humanity,737 and hence the possibility of non-violent or non-
compulsive universality. Indeed, Adorno claims humanity is nothing but the 
resistance to force, the resistance to violence and compulsion.738 
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 In this way Adorno appears to advocate a negative or non-identical notion 
of humanity.  Like Adorno’s turn toward the preponderance of the object that 
served to limit the transcendental function of the subject, making it instead the 
agent of the object rather than its ground, Adorno’s non-identical conception of 
humanity would make humanity not a transcendental subject whose basic 
potentialities are already given in advance of their actualization, but rather a 
subject constituted in resistance to the forms of domination that organize the 
objective world.  Humanity, or human subjects, would thus be continually 
reconstituted around new objective constellations, always pushing against the 
forces of compulsion found therein.  The concept of humanity in this sense would 
point toward the non-conceptual, the other side of the positive order of 
domination.   
It is perhaps for this reason that Adorno claims that while we cannot know 
positively what the human or humanity is, we can recognize the inhuman, and 
thus “the concrete denunciation of the inhuman” is a more appropriate 
expression of moral philosophy than “vague and abstract attempts to situate man 
in his existence.”739  Positive conceptions of humanity serve the inhuman in two 
different but related ways.  Either positive conceptions present humanity as 
already reconciled to the existing order, one wherein violence remains among the 
tools at this order’s disposal, and thus rob humanity of its utopian potential by 
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making it the subject of this order and a possible agent of its violence.  Or, 
positive conceptions of humanity serve to establish the human in the place of the 
transcendental subject, thus making its abstract and eternal qualities the frame of 
reference through which experience of the object can be reported, dulling the 
possible experience of this object and rendering humanity deaf to the possible 
suffering therein.  By rejecting these positive conceptions of humanity, Adorno 
uses the concept of humanity against itself, opposing its promise to its 
actualization, and thus attempts to compel it beyond itself, in perpetual 
dissatisfaction with what the constituted order would represent as humane and 
good. 
 This opposition between negative and positive conceptions of humanity 
might thus allow us to explain the apparent contradiction noted above in 
Adorno’s attitude toward humanity.  Adorno’s affirmation of the “infinite 
possibility” and even “genius” of individual human beings concerns not some pre-
existing set of possibilities available to human beings qua human, but rather to 
possibilities that are themselves historically constituted in relation to that which 
these possibilities have opposed as inhuman.  Likewise, Adorno’s refusal to join 
the Humanist Union reflects his rejection of the positive articulation of human 
possibilities and their political promotion, which would serve to reify or fix these 
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possibilities at a given moment in history and so deny the possibility of a different 
instantiation of humanity—of different human subjects.740   
And yet, there seems to be something missing from this explanation. That 
is, if humanity is nothing but the resistance to inhumanity, then humanity is 
nothing but the perpetual disruption of the borders drawn by the positive order 
of the world and its claim to be the realization of humanism, or what is best, 
given the possibilities available to human beings.  While such a claim would bring 
Adorno closer to the “agonistic humanism” of Honig and its roots in the work of 
Arendt and Rancière,741 what is extinguished in the above presentation of Adorno 
and his relationship to humanism, were it to be considered complete, is the 
messianic light that serves to illuminate the possibility of objects and their 
concepts being other than they are.  That is, the dynamism of the relation 
between negative and positive humanity, or between humanity and inhumanity, 
serves to reify the place of struggle in the human constitution, thus presupposing 
the unchanging nature of political conflict, and so reviving a mythical 
understanding of the world as an eternal return of the same, with agon as its 
ground.  If Adorno is to avoid chaining his negative conception of humanity to 
                                                     
740 Hence Adorno’s opposition to prominent philosophical anthropologies of his day, such as those of Max 
Scheler, who espouses a kind of metaphysical possessive individualism through his conception of 
personality, and Arnold Gehlen, who makes personality into a moment of the state’s institutions.  See Max 
Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. 
Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 480; Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of 
Technology, trans. Patricia Lipscomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 166; Adorno, “Gloss 
on Personality,” CM. 
741 Bonnie Honig, Antigone Interrupted, 17-19.  Recall also Chapter 1, p.10, note 24, above. 
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inhumanity, and so limit the possible articulations of humanity to opposing 
violence and domination, then there must be something lying beyond humanity 
as the resistance to inhumanity, something toward which this conflict is turned 
but that remains irreducible to this conflict.  This other, we shall see, is Adorno’s 
conception of a humanity to come, that is, a “reconciled” humanity. 
 
Reconciled Humanity 
Like Adorno’s use of Benjamin’s concept of the messianic, which serves to 
transfigure concepts in the present and thus make it possible to imagine them 
being radically other than they are, so is Adorno’s use of the concept of a 
“reconciled” humanity, a realized or “redeemed” humanity, necessary to separate 
his negative conception of humanity from its enthrallment to the totality in which 
the dialectic of enlightenment unfolds.  That is, Adorno’s conception of humanity 
needs to relate to something outside of the totality in which it is itself constituted 
in order to remain non-identical to what it would be in this totality, and so avoid 
absorption in an identity with that with which it struggles.  Also like Adorno’s 
secularized use of the concepts of the messianic and redemption, this 
“reconciled” humanity is not a positive reality; or rather, the possibility of its ever 
becoming a positive reality cannot be definitively demonstrated or rejected in the 
present.   
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Adorno posits the telos of this humanity as the opposition to inhumanity 
in a reconciled humanity, not as the necessary unfolding of human potentials, but 
as a conceptual device that allows us to see a gap in the struggle between the 
terms human and inhuman that makes it possible to imagine a world not 
constituted by their struggle.  Without positive existence, this humanity to come 
is not a fixed point that will necessarily be realized, nor is it something like a 
transcendental condition of the negative conception of humanity, the humanity 
found in opposition to violence. Rather, this “redeemed” humanity arises through 
the ambiguous promise made by negative humanity to resist the inhuman, but 
that is at the same time a condition that this negative humanity must presuppose 
in order to maintain its negativity within the circle of perpetual violence and its 
resistance, through the possibility of a future positivity that may or may not ever 
become reality.742  Thus like the concept of redemption examined above, 
redeemed or realized humanity is both immanent to the struggle between the 
human and the inhuman, and transcends this struggle in an image of humanity 
other than what it is.  It is this transcendence, the possibility of humanity 
becoming something fundamentally other than what it presently is, that 
differentiates Adorno’s conception of humanity from “agonistic humanism,” or 
other theories that might seem similar to Adorno in their opposition to the 
closure of totality, or the permanent and fixed identities such closure is thought 
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to entail.  A brief consideration of such a theory may thus help shed light on some 
implications and consequences of Adorno’s project and the importance of this 
reconciled humanity to it. 
  A groundbreaking work that has proved influential in shifting the 
theoretical focus from classically conceived revolutionary struggle toward 
agonism and difference is Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(1985).743  From their perspective, not only would the term humanity be a 
discursive construct, but one without clear and definite content.  On this view, 
humanity would be nothing but a “floating” or “empty” signifier to be filled with 
whatever content the political partisans who deploy it are able.744  Of course, 
Adorno’s own deployment of the concept of a reconciled humanity is itself a 
political gesture, and as such, Laclau and Mouffe might claim that the concept of 
“reconciled humanity” is simply Adorno’s way of giving content to the “empty 
signifier” that is humanity.  However, this response would deny the negative 
character of reconciled humanity in the present.  Unlike other attempts to fill this 
signifier, which are made as positive declarations of what humanity is, and so 
                                                     
743 Though works such as William Connolly’s Identity/Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 
Bonnie Honig’s Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
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been more influential on this trend in political theory as it exists in North America, none make the explicit 
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insisting on the relation between the recovery of agonism and socialism.  If agonsim can indeed aid 
socialist strategy, then agonists can indeed be socialists without being interested in “the purging fire which 
dominates the revolutionary tradition.”  See Alex Thomson, “Polemos and Agon,” in Law and Agonistic 
Politics, ed. Andrew Schaap (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 105. 
744 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), 171. Cf. Ernesto Laclau, 
“Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?” in Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), 44. 
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would legitimate the aims of those making the declaration as the basis for these 
aims, Adorno claims only that humanity might be otherwise than it is as 
constituted through struggle.  Thus reconciled humanity would not serve as the 
content of an empty signifier, but instead serves as an attack on any attempt to 
fill this signifier, yet without claiming that the signifier must necessarily remain 
empty, or even that the structure that produces this signifier will necessarily 
persist.   
Claiming that interaction between speaking beings that would produce 
meaning at once necessarily produces empty signifiers that are given content 
through their deployment in various contexts involves making ontological claims 
about the structure of society that Adorno tends to avoid.  For Adorno, a theory 
so formulated might at best accurately describe the structure of a given society, or 
even a group of societies that share common characteristics, but it could not tell 
us what lies beyond these societies were these characteristics to change, and so 
cannot speak for a conception of society in itself.  In this aversion to ontological 
claims about society that might elucidate social features separable from any 
particular society, Adorno’s dialectical critique is radically skeptical of the 
predictive power of concepts. Dialectic, Adorno writes, “is the ontology of the 
wrong state of things.”745 As such, it allows for the socially and politically 
constituted to mobilize this constitution against itself, and so grasp its process of 
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grasping, but it does not allow for the possibility of knowledge that would 
somehow work above or below this constitution, and so make claims above what 
it is that could be independent of its historical constitution.  Through this refusal, 
Adorno’s negative dialectic leaves open the possibility for radical change in the 
elements of both society’s constitution and individual cognition as basic as the 
relation between universal and particular.  
Laclau and Mouffe, on the other hand, write of “social negativity” as if it 
were a positive condition, that is, as if society were negative in its being, thus 
making positive identities the precarious attempts to construct a whole around an 
original lack that can never be completely closed.746  While society is thus never a 
closed totality, and social identities are forever subject to slippage or 
displacement, the most that can be hoped for in this situation is the construction 
of a hegemonic bloc in which different identities are linked through chains of 
equivalence that allow for their equal co-existence.747  While the particulars of 
social relations might thus change, the fundamental structure of society and 
social identity, or how universals relate to particulars, remain unchanged, 
regardless of the type of society under consideration.748  Moreover, such a theory 
reduces what Adorno calls “the truth content” of language to the instrumental 
machinations of what is basically a form of communication, even if Laclau and 
Mouffe promote the recognition of agonistic differences over the consensus 
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building of dialogical unity.  In this way, the ontology of agonism promoted by 
Laclau and Mouffe serves as a wall on the other side of which are placed the kinds 
of utopian speculations that inform Adorno’s thought and the possibility for 
radical change it holds.  Laclau and Mouffe thus can be said to opt instead for a 
kind of second sailing in which the place of conflict as it exists in late-modern 
capitalist societies becomes the condition for society as such.  The possibility 
toward which Adorno’s “reconciled” humanity gestures, on the other hand, lies 
beyond the present structure of society, and can appear within it only in the 
negative and the fragmentary. 
 Thus Adorno claims that “if humanity has any meaning at all, it must 
consist in the discovery that human beings are not identical with their immediate 
existence as the creatures of nature.”749  That is, humanity is not identical with 
the struggle against inhumanity.  This critical understanding of humanity, made 
possible through the dialectic of philosophical reflection which places it in 
relation to a reconciled humanity, thus serves to “smash through human-made 
constructions,” such as the mythic conception that would identify humanity with 
endless struggle and suffering.  The “human measure” to which such 
constructions “return”750 is precisely their relation to this future humanity, the 
“reconciled” or “liberated” humanity that does not yet exist,751 but whose 
realization becomes the guiding light of human activity in its resistance to 
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inhumanity.  By positing what would be truly human as a state not yet realized, 
and interpreting instead all positive articulations of humanity as obstacles to its 
realization—indeed, Adorno even claims that the potential of the individual 
human self “stands in polemical opposition” to its reality752—Adorno can oppose 
himself to humanism, allying himself instead with the “principle of being 
human,” which remains “still unrealized.”753  This rejection of humanism in favor 
of an as yet unrealized “principle of being human” leads Adorno to return to an 
Enlightenment concept that is taken as a given among some circles, while blithely 
maligned in others, yet remains fundamental to understanding his idea of a 
reconciled humanity: progress.   
 
The Question of Progress 
The concept of progress expresses optimism concerning the future, and Adorno is 
not generally known for his optimism. Adorno’s famous statement in Negative 
Dialectics that “[n]o universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, 
but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb,” 754 would seem 
to militate against a concept of progress.  Moreover, Lukács’s claim that Adorno 
occupied a room in the Hotel Abyss has proven stubbornly persistent, and for 
those familiar with Habermas’s critique of the alleged nihilism of Horkheimer 
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and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment,755 the idea that Adorno might cling to a 
concept of progress may perhaps seem surprising.  However, in light of Adorno’s 
relation to the concept of humanity outlined above, we find that a concept of 
progress seems necessary for this idea of a reconciled humanity, insofar as the 
possibility of this future humanity would be better than that which presently 
exists. Thus we must turn to Adorno’s most concise statement on progress, made 
in a radio lecture of the same name, if we are to move beyond simple caricatures 
and grasp instead Adorno’s own conception of progress. 
 Adorno begins his lecture with terms drawn from Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and the dire pronouncements on human history found in 
Negative Dialectics.  For Adorno, the question of the possibility of progress must 
first face what is for humanity at once its most basic and most drastic challenge: 
the possibility of its own continued survival.  With the radical increase in the 
human capacity for destruction made evident in the Second World War, “the 
possibility of progress” must be understood in terms of “averting the most 
extreme, total disaster”: the annihilation of the human species, and perhaps even 
life on the planet as such.  Yet here, in the shadow of the possibility of this “total 
disaster,” it may be possible to cite those lines of Hölderlin, in echo of their 
citation in Dialectic of Enlightenment: “But where danger threatens/ That which 
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saves from it also grows.”756  The radical nature of this possible disaster, 
extending as it does beyond any single group to encompass all of humanity, and 
perhaps even all life on the planet, thus also opens up both the possibility, and 
the necessity, of resistance to this disaster on a much larger scale than that on 
which resistance was conceived in the past.  Averting this total disaster requires 
nothing less than what Adorno calls a “global subject.”757   
However, despite the temptation of directly associating this “global 
subject” with the rise of new social movements and the possible emergence of a 
global civil society which have gained prominence in the years since Adorno’s 
death, Adorno’s hostility to positive articulations of humanism troubles any 
direct or simple association with such movements.  Humanity is not for Adorno 
the origin of resistance to this disaster, but the goal, and its concept can only be 
thought through extreme forms of differentiation and individuation—not as a 
“comprehensive generic concept.”758  Thus humanity might be said to be found in 
the particular activities of various subjects formed in opposition to inhumanity, 
and perhaps also in the solidarity they express for other subjects formed in 
opposition to other localizations of inhumanity, but one does not find humanity 
in the sum of these resistances, for as we have seen, only a reconciled humanity 
would be truly human.  Claiming the sum of these resistances is itself an 
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expression of humanity as a whole, that is, a particular instantiation of a 
universal subject, would be to subordinate their particularity to a universal 
concept and so erase the contexts in which these acts of humanity were actually 
found, while at once reconciling the concept of humanity with struggle.  But 
reconciled humanity is not an animal constituted through struggle, nor can it be a 
universal concept that exists above its particular instantiations.  The global 
subject that might emerge in response to the threat of “total disaster” is not itself 
reconciled humanity, but a possible agent for the ends, which, realized, would 
enable the emergence of a reconciled humanity.   
Progress, it might be said, is thus the process of different particular 
subjects constituted in resistance to varying local conditions, aligning themselves 
with other such subjects so as to crystallize into a global subject.  In this way, 
progress is “measured” in relation to the possibility of a reconciled humanity 
becoming reality, however indirect this possibility may be.  It is important to 
note, however, that insofar as this global subject does not exist above and beyond 
these particular instantiations of humanity, it cannot be something for which 
they might sacrifice themselves.  This is where Adorno’s Benjaminian mutation of 
Hegel again becomes evident.  The theodicy of Hegelian world spirit is such that 
particular instantiations of this spirit can be sacrificed for the whole; in fact, 
particular instantiations of this spirit are really only known insofar as their 
typically unwitting self-sacrifice serves to further the cause of world spirit.  As 
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such, history is a “slaughter bench”—it is the chronicle of the perpetual self-
destruction of particulars whose destruction furthers the cause of the universal.   
Regardless of what Hegel may have considered the correct disposition of 
the individual enlightened by this knowledge to political events as they unfold, 
transposed into the realm of political struggle, these ideas allow for the most 
galling violence and barbarity in the name of higher causes, and the submission 
to the inevitable “march” of history is seen as the realization of progress.  We 
might find in Benjamin’s rejection of “moving with the current”759 of history, 
then, resistance to the Hegelian view, which, refracted through Adorno’s 
conception of the global subject, means a rejection of the theodicy that would 
allow for the “evil” of the calculated sacrifice of particular struggles for a 
perceived greater good.  If humanity is only found in the particular and 
differentiated ways in which inhumanity is resisted, then aligning with others in a 
way that would compel the calculated sacrifice of particular struggles would be a 
loss of humanity, and hence work against the formation of the kind of global 
subject Adorno is outlining.   
However, the rejection of theodicy alone is not enough to give progress an 
unambiguous character for Adorno.  Insofar as the activities that serve to build a 
global subject are bound to activities of resistance, and thus to the forces that 
compel resistance by precipitating the “total disaster” that must be averted, 
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progress finds itself inextricably bound to the development of the forces of 
compulsion and domination, and the “total disaster” that looms beyond them.  
Thus, Adorno must claim that “progress occurs where it ends,”760 for progress 
would only truly be realized when resistance to inhumanity is no longer 
necessary.   True progress, the progress that might see a qualitatively different 
form of human life step out of the shadows, and in so doing, show human history 
to have really been pre-history, would itself need to be beyond the progress of 
this global subject, bound as it is to the forces in resistance to which it is 
constituted.  Yet if human beings must be liberated from the very power that 
makes possible their liberation, insofar as humans first liberated themselves from 
inhuman nature through the exercise of their powers of reason, then it is this 
power from which humans must be liberated: the compulsive power of reason.  
As we saw in Aristotle, and as Adorno continues to claim, it is the power of reason 
that enables humans to separate themselves from the rest of the natural world, 
and allow for its domination toward human ends.  Moreover, for Adorno, it is 
reason that now propels humans toward the “total disaster” through its 
instrumental exercise divorced of the realization of reconciled humanity.   
Yet this possible liberation from reason does not, for Adorno, amount to 
its rejection.  While the shape reason might take in a reconciled humanity is an 
open question that must be put aside for the moment, as far as Adorno is 
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concerned the question of resistance in the present cannot be divorced from the 
exercise of reason.  Contrary to a view that persists, despite the most explicit 
evidence, Adorno does not see a way beyond the present order of things that does 
not involve reason, and even an appropriation of the Enlightenment, for only 
through these is Adorno’s critique even intelligible.761 However, to critically 
reflect on reason and its place in domination, not as simply the capacity that 
enables humans to lift themselves above domination, but a capacity that has at 
once served to facilitate domination, means to displace the centrality of reason in 
the constitution of what might be a reconciled humanity.  Though Adorno claims 
there can be no “idea of progress without the idea of humanity,”762 for, as we have 
seen, it is only insofar as the cause of a reconciled humanity has been advanced 
that progress can be said to have taken place, it is worth asking whether this 
reconciled humanity would be human at all.   
If humanity has only ever been the struggle for survival against a hostile 
natural world which has since been brought to heel, as it were, and transformed 
into the fodder for human aims, then would not the act of stepping out “of the 
magic spell” that binds humanity to itself through the domination of nature be to 
                                                     
761 Despite Horkheimer and Adorno claiming in the preface to Dialectic of Enlightenment that they have no 
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step out of the circle that is humanity?763  That is, if human identity has always 
been established in distinction from nature through its mastery—both “external” 
nature and its own “internal” nature764—then would not the end of this mastery 
make human identity impossible?  Is this not the real goal of the progress toward 
which Adorno points, and whose accomplishment would mean the end of 
progress as necessary resistance to the inhuman?765  Yet Adorno does not take 
this step and abandon the concept of humanity, or at least not completely.  
Adorno refers to a “definition of humanity as that which excludes absolutely 
nothing,” that is, a human totality  that no longer holds within it “any limiting 
principle,” and is hence free of the coercion that would subject its members to a 
common standard.766  Strictly speaking, such a totality would be no totality at all, 
but simply a collection of different subjects, united only in their difference.767  
Only here, Adorno claims, “would there be humanity and not its deceptive 
image.”768   
                                                     
763 Adorno, “Progress,” 150. 
764 Adorno, “Progress,” 148. 
765 Tellingly, the most extreme attempt to make Adorno a philosopher of permanent revolution, and so 
make historical dynamism permanent, also sees the moving force of this permanent dynamism to be 
humanity itself—“ [n]ot animals, not God, not nature.” See John Holloway, “Why Adorno?” in Negativity 
and Revolution, eds. Holloway et al (London: Pluto, 2009), 14. 
766 Adorno, “Progress,” 145. 
767 This “Utopia of misfits,” as Jameson imagines it, would not quite be the blossoming  of “neurotics, 
compulsives, obsessives, paranoids, and schizophrenics,” for these conditions would not all exist, at least 
not in the same manner, in this utopian future.  This is not to say that mental illness would not exist, but 
simply that how its symptoms relate to various socio-political factors would be radically transformed. See 
Jameson, Late Marxism, 102. 
768 Adorno, “Progress,” 146.   
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But why must this reconciled humanity, this humanity without any 
exclusion or “limiting principle,” be called humanity at all, if humanity was itself 
only constituted through exclusion and the establishment and institutionalization 
of principles of limitation?  How might such a humanity even cohere as a concept 
without some limiting principle?  The simplest answer here is that these limits 
and the exclusion they promote also promise their opposite.  In establishing 
limits, the other side of these limits come into focus, just as acts of exclusion 
ultimately depend upon those they exclude, and contain within them the 
possibility of inclusion.  As the determinate negation of the exclusion and 
“limiting principle” that served to constitute humanity, reconciled humanity 
preserves these within itself.  In this sense, reconciled humanity is held together 
as that which no longer must dominate, that animal whose aggressive impulses 
have been deprived of the objects through which they were made actual.  While 
these aggressive impulses remain in potential, even such potential can be 
expected to diminish and fade over time, like the loss of prominent canine teeth.  
If these impulses would indeed fade over time, then reconciled humanity, as the 
determinate negation of humanity, might cease to be any kind of humanity at all, 
for this animal would cease to be constituted through the contradiction in 
experience expressed by dialectic through negation—the instrumental necessity 
of opposing oneself to others in order to ensure self-preservation. Insofar as 
reconciled humanity preserves within it the memory of the limiting principle of 
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humanity and the impulses that went with it, then it might be said to be 
constituted through the contradiction existing between its own peaceful state and 
the struggle from which it was born, but as its aggressive impulses fade, so would 
this contradiction and thus its status as some kind of human.  In this sense, it is 
perhaps not as some form of humanity at all that reconciled humanity serves as 
the telos of the human struggle against the inhuman, but as some other kind of 
animal.   
Recall that for Aristotle, the potentials thought to be exclusively human 
served to elevate humans above other animals, but to differing degrees based on 
the natural distribution of these potentials found in particular human 
individuals.  It was through the institution of certain activities in civic and artistic 
life that this natural inequality was made to flourish by allowing for lower human 
types to reach toward higher ones and so be reconciled to them.  In this way the 
capacities humans share with other animals were made subordinate to those 
considered exclusively human. This way of formulating the human as the 
suppression of the animal serves to make “the animal” into the other of the 
human—the non-identical remainder produced through the conception of the 
human and its flourishing.  In this sense, the image of “the animal” might be said 
to haunt human life as the specter of life organized otherwise, of life drawing on 
different capacities than those which served to compel some to recognize others 
as their betters.  In this sense, Adorno’s conception of a reconciled humanity and 
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the transformation of human life it entails would appear to proceed through a 
transformation in our conception of how humans relate to animals.   
Thus, it can be said that there is good reason to believe that reconciled 
humanity cannot be something arising simply out of the struggle between the 
human and the inhuman, and the progress made through the production of a 
global subject whose resistance to “total disaster” might propel humanity toward 
its own reconciliation.  Reconciled humanity, if indeed a humanity constituted 
without a limiting principle and hence without exclusion or coercion, is as much 
animal as it is human.  In this light, the goal of progress is less the production of 
the conditions in which humanity might be transformed into another kind of 
humanity, i.e. another creature that must resist inhumanity, but rather, to 
transform the very conditions that compelled humanity to come into existence in 
the first place, and so to transform humanity into another kind of animal.  This 
relation between the animal and the human, between the human and its own 
animality, are thus necessary to grasp the animality of this reconciled humanity 
and hence the moral and political underpinnings of Adorno’s project.  To this 
end, I now turn toward their consideration, specifically through an examination 
of Adorno’s use of animal imagery, and a defense of my claim that reconciled 
humanity is an animal other than human. 
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Chapter Fourteen:  
Relatively Modest Horrors: Adorno and Animals 
 
In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel refers to the negative freedom of the abstract 
will that cancels all particularity as “the freedom of the void.” This abstract 
freedom “becomes in the realm of both politics and religion the fanaticism of 
destruction, demolishing the whole existing social order, eliminating all 
individuals regarded as suspect by a given order, and annihilating any 
organization which attempts to rise up anew.”769  According to Hegel, this 
situation describes the Terror of the French Revolution.770  The French 
Revolution, Comay claims, introduced an “untimeliness” into historical 
experience, a kind of “traumatic dissonance” that has served to make a split in 
historical experience since: events like the Revolution always happen at once too 
soon (we are never ready for them) and too late (they are always already long past 
due).  The introduction of this traumatic split and re-orientation in the very 
structure of experience separates subsequent history from what came before, 
thus making the French Revolution “the epochal marker of modernity.”771   
                                                     
769 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), §5. 
770 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §5. Addition. 
771 Rebecca Comay, Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011), 4-7. 
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Insofar as Hegel’s philosophy can be seen as being constituted around the 
experience of the French Revolution, and Hegel himself can be called the “most 
lucid theorist” of this trauma,772 we might find in the subjective preponderance 
Adorno opposes in Hegel to be Hegel’s attempt to master this trauma.  The 
preponderance of the subject over the object can be seen as an attempt to master 
the trauma of experience in the modern world, conceptualizing it in such a 
manner that its shock is deadened and it can be integrated into the order 
constituted through the subject’s own development.  Yet it is precisely this 
deadening and integrating of the shock into a repressive socio-political order that 
Adorno argues enabled its return even more horribly in the violence of the 
twentieth century.  In Negative Dialectics, Adorno refers to “the relatively 
modest horrors of the French Revolution,” from which the philosophers of the 
age were so quick to distance themselves, lauding instead order and the rule of 
law.773  If the repressed trauma of the French Revolution that constitutes the 
unconscious of modernity was able to erupt in events such as Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima, how much more terrible will the next eruption be, if the trauma upon 
which the new order sits has so outstripped these past horrors as to render them 
nothing more than “modest”?  It is here again that we see the specter of “total 
disaster” that threatens the continued existence of human and other life, and in 
opposition to which was found Adorno’s definitions of humanity and progress.  
                                                     
772 Comay, Mourning Sickness, 4-5. 
773 ND, 251. 
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Indeed, only in resistance to this “total disaster” might it be possible to 
psychologically reconstitute the subjects of modernity such that trauma and 
destruction no longer occupy the central place in this constitution. 
 Yet if “that which saves” really does grow from “where danger threatens,” 
we might find, as I have already suggested above, strange allies in this struggle 
against inhumanity, and in the liberation from this struggle.  Adorno, along with 
the other members and associates of the Frankfurt School, are known to have 
been animal lovers, and even gave each other animal pet-names: Adorno was 
hippopotamus, his wife Gretel Adorno was Giraffe-Gazelle, and Horkeimer was 
Mammoth.774  A widely published photograph from Adorno’s days in Los Angeles 
shows him at his desk surrounded by figurines made in the images of his favorite 
animals, a collection to which Adorno referred as his “household horrors.”775 
Might this curious nickname give a clue to where “that which saves” might 
actually lie?  While Adorno’s thoughts on nature have become the object of 
scholarly study,776 little systematic attention has been paid to the role animal 
imagery serves in Adorno’s work.777   
                                                     
774 Lorenz Jäger, Adorno: A Political Biography, trans. Stewart Spencer (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 107. This practice of giving each other animal nick-names appears to be the extension of one 
already in use in Adorno’s family from his childhood.  See Savage, “Adorno’s Family and Other Animals,” 
107. 
775 Jäger, Adorno, 108. 
776 See for instance Deborah Cook’s Adorno on Nature (Durham: Acumen, 2011); Eric S. Nelson, 
“Revisiting the Dialectic of Environment: Nature as Ideology and Ethics in Adorno and the Frankfurt 
School,” Telos 155 (2011): 105-126, and Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical 
Theory (Albany: State Univeristy of New York Press, 1996). 
777 For exceptions to this rule, see Christina Gerhardt, “The Ethics of Animals in Adorno and Kafka,” New 
German Critique 97.33 (2006): 159-178; Christina Gerhardt, “Thinking With: Animals in Schopenhauer, 
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In his review of Claussen and Muller-Doohm’s biographies of Adorno, 
Savage argues that these animal-related anecdotes point to the possibility of re-
interpreting certain key passages in Adorno’s writings that suggest a “structural 
and functional identity of animality and utopia in Adorno’s thought,” serving to 
remind us that “the path to humanity leads toward animality, not away from 
it.”778  However, as I have suggested in my consideration of Adorno’s conception 
of humanity above, we might push these claims even further.  The realization of a 
reconciled humanity not only involves a transformation of the relation between 
human and animal, but a transformation of what we think of human such that 
this reconciled humanity is not really human at all, but rather some new kind of 
animal, one whose destructive tendencies emerging from the trauma involved in 
the struggle for survival have been pacified.  Reconciled humanity, if it is indeed 
to embody the promise Adorno claims, must be something fundamentally other 
than the humanity born and perpetuated in the struggle against inhumanity, the 
struggle for its own survival.  
 Defending this claim that Adorno’s concept of a reconciled humanity is not 
human but a new kind of animal will involve demonstrating four separate but 
related points.  The first is that what we call human is a radically constructed 
creature, one whose constitution is entirely dependent upon the socio-political 
                                                                                                                                                              
Horkheimer, and Adorno,” in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, ed. John Sanbonmatsu (Lanham: 
Rowan and Littlefield, 2011); Eduardo Mendietta, “Animal Is to Kantianism as Jew Is to Fascism: 
Adorno’s Bestiary,” in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation. 
778 Savage, “Adorno’s Family and Other Animals,” 109-110. 
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order in which it lives.  Here I examine Adorno’s thoughts on “anthropology” and 
its relation to socio-political forces, arguing, contrary to many of his interpreters, 
that Adorno does not have an anthropology, and that his thoughts on the subject 
must be seen as being a polemic against the various philosophical anthropologies 
deployed within the Western philosophical tradition.  Secondly, if reconciled 
humanity would be a new kind of animal, and that the thinking that might orient 
oneself to society in such a way that might bring about its creation involves a turn 
toward the object and the non-identical, then there must be some relation 
between the concept of the animal and the non-identical.  Here I argue that the 
concept of the animal points to that which is non-identical to the human, and this 
can be understood through the violence done to animals in constructing and 
maintaining what we call human.  Thirdly, insofar as the animal illuminates the 
non-conceptual side of the concept of the human, seeing the “rifts and crevices” 
in this concept, its intransigence and distortion, means to see human activity as 
animal activity, and historically conditioned social activity as natural activity.  In 
so doing, the centrality of the concept of the human is displaced, and both the 
possibility and desirability of its mastery over the animal is brought into 
question.  Lastly, I examine the relation between Adorno’s use of animal imagery 
and his conception of utopia, concluding that a truly reconciled humanity can 
only be something decidedly other than human, a kind of animal whose life is no 
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longer characterized by the kinds of conflict that served to bring the human into 
existence. 
 
Anthropology, Dialectical and Otherwise 
The final section of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, “Notes 
and Sketches,” comprises twenty four fragments, most of which relate to what the 
authors call in the preface of the book, a “dialectical anthropology.”779  No further 
elaboration of this term is given.  However, many of the fragments that make up 
this section explicitly concern the human being and its constitution, especially in 
relation to animals and the violence done to them.  While the relation established 
between humans and other animals through violence will be discussed in further 
detail in the next section, here I want to focus instead on the various references to 
“anthropology” scattered throughout Adorno’s other works, often polemically.  
This “anthropology” should be understood much more broadly than the academic 
discipline of the same name.   
For Adorno, anthropology concerns the theories and popular 
representations of human life and its possibilities in a given society, and how 
these relate to the structure of society and the activities it compels.  Insofar as 
Adorno considers what we call human to be a product of specific socio-political 
relations, and not a creature naturally possessed of a certain set of potentials, 
                                                     
779 Horkheimer and Adorno, “preface,” DE, xix. 
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these theories and representations make up an important part of what constitutes 
human life in a given society.  As human constitution is bound up with the form 
of society in which it appears in this manner, positive articulations of what 
humanity is have the ideological function of supporting the existing order by 
imposing an understanding of the possibilities available for living in the terms of 
this order.  The role Adorno attributes to anthropology here is one of solidifying a 
particular constitution of human being, and so giving a natural appearance to the 
set of historically produced socio-political relations in which this human being 
appears.  Thus, if progressive change is to be realized, that is, if a given form of 
socio-political relations are to change in a manner that might facilitate the 
emergence of a reconciled humanity, an important part of the task of theory is to 
show how what we call human is a function of these relations.  In this way, 
Adorno should not be understood as being engaged in philosophical 
anthropology as some argue,780 for he does not attempt to identify what is 
definitively human or promote the centrality of its concept.  Rather, Adorno’s 
work polemically opposes itself to philosophical anthropology, from the 
Aristotelian variety, to those prominent in his own day, such as in the work of 
                                                     
780 See for instance, Stefan Breuer, “Adorno’s Anthropology,” trans. John Blazek, Telos 64 (1985): 15-31; 
Jameson, Late Marxism, 17; 64; 68; 104; 109; or Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 253.  That 
Breuer’s development of Adorno’s “dialectical anthropology,” focuses primarily on the development of 
capitalism, rejects any conception of ‘first nature,’ and ultimately claims to be “an anthropology without 
anthropos” (31) leaves one to wonder exactly what remains of philosophical anthropology at all, after the 
passage of the dialectic.   
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Max Scheler or Arnold Gehlen,781 both of whom where influenced by Aristotle in 
important ways.782 
 Perhaps Adorno’s most concise statement on the ideological role of 
anthropology is made in Negative Dialectics, in reference to Franz Neumann’s 
book about the National Socialist state, Behemot.783  There Adorno calls 
anthropology “the chemism of humankind.”784  The extreme concision of this 
statement requires some unpacking, specifically with reference to Hegel’s Science 
of Logic, which Adorno is here appropriating in his characteristically fragmented 
fashion.  On the subjective side of Hegel’s logic, objectivity is divided between 
three moments: mechanism, chemism, and teleology.  In order for an object to be 
known in its objectivity, that is, known by a cognizing subject, yet known free of 
the imprint of the subject’s own knowing, according to Hegel, requires that this 
objectivity be known free of limitation, opposition, or contingency.785  For 
example, if the object in question were a work of art, knowing this work of art in 
its objectivity, or calling a work of art objective, means to know it in its entirety, 
                                                     
781 Indeed, Adorno and Gehlen debated one another on West German radio, an account of which can be 
found in Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno: A Biography, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 
2005), 378-379; 390-391.  Freyenhagen also uses this episode to frame his discussion of Adorno in 
Adorno’s Practical Philosophy (2; 242), though Freyenhagen sees philosophical anthropology as a point in 
common between Adorno and Gehlen, despite their particular differences on what is actually proper to 
human being, whereas I argue that Adorno is critical of the very possibility of philosophical anthropology. 
782 See Arnold Gehlen, Man, trans. Clare McMillan and Karl Pillemer (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1988), 17; 169; 276; 299; 339; 356; 360; 361; 363; Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-
Formal Ethics of Values, 481; Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: 
Noonday, 1970), 91. 
783 Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944, trans. Peter 
Hayes (New York: Octagon, 1963). 
784 ND, 346. 
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without remainder; knowing it in its individuality, that is, knowing it on its own 
terms without necessary reference to some other work; and lastly, to grasp its 
necessity, that is, to know that it is the result of a necessary unfolding that could 
not be otherwise.  The possibility of actually knowing in this manner and so the 
coherence of this position will not be considered here; rather, I will restrict 
myself to explicating this part of Hegel in terms of Adorno’s conception of 
anthropology.  
For Hegel, coming to be objective in this manner requires the passage 
from mechanism, wherein the object is seen as an aggregation of parts whose 
actions on themselves and each other are “extraneous” to themselves786—where 
they are seen to operate without intention, end, or self-direction— to teleology, 
whereby the actions of the parts of the whole are known by an intelligence which 
directs itself toward given ends in accordance with some purpose.787  Chemism 
serves as the mediating point between these two, whereby the various mechanical 
processes are synthesized as a whole, and known to be the parts of a totality.788  
For Hegel, chemism ultimately remains on the side of mechanism, part of an 
external way of knowing that for Hegel cannot grasp the self-moving drive toward 
various ends that is life, and consequently treats objects as dead things.789   
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To call anthropology “the chemism of humankind,” then, is to call 
anthropology a process of synthesis whereby the various positive instantiations of 
humanity, the various kinds of human life that appear in different societies, are 
synthesized into a totality that is, in the Hegelian terminology, a “chemical 
object” external to itself and hence un-reflective.  Or in other words, the human 
being, as the object of anthropology, is a general conception that purports to 
capture what the human being really and necessarily is, based on these positive 
instantiations of how humans are compelled to live—that is, based on how 
humans live under domination.  As a chemical object, humanity does not 
understand its own processes of construction, that is, how its unity has come to 
be imposed as a concept through its own practices of knowing, and thus it takes 
the object that it sees distorted through an existing articulation of the subject to 
be the object in its totality.  However, in order to grasp the objectivity of the 
object, the subject’s own role in the object’s constitution must be understood.  
Only in understanding how the subject structures the object can its objectivity be 
known, and the external unity established through “chemism” can be made 
internal, and so allow the object to begin to determine its own ends and strive 
toward them, in the Hegelian sense. Thus, humanity as an object of anthropology 
is not a living, breathing entity, capable of the agency Hegel ascribes to 
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teleological subject-object relations, but a corpse produced especially for 
dissection.790   
An example of one such anthropological process can be found in Adorno’s 
criticism of television.  In television dramas, Adorno claims the dramatic changes 
the characters suffer reveal only what they always already were, their “true 
nature,”791 as opposed to the myriad ways in which these sufferings are socially 
produced.  People become only what their nature allows, and so the “hidden 
message” of the various forms of entertainment that compose the culture 
industry is contained in the view of humanity they promote.792  In seeing such 
views of nature and the boundaries it sets to human life so dramatized, viewers 
come to adopt similar attitudes, and so understand these same boundaries to be 
those that mark their own lives and their possibilities.  Insofar as these ideas 
regarding human life come to influence their own daily decisions and practices—
insofar as people come to seek opportunities in their own lives to re-enact the 
narratives they have absorbed through television or elsewhere—these ideas come 
to have substance in positive instantiations of human life, which in turn serves 
itself up as the fodder for further dramatic representation.  In this way, the 
television drama, as one instance of the “chemism” of anthropology, serves to 
                                                     
790 Hence Adorno’s claim that reconciled humanity is the telos of the struggle against inhumanity, for 
inhumanity includes the positive articulations of the limits of human life enshrined through the “chemism” 
of anthropology.  Adorno’s use of telos and this Hegelian schema is ironic, however, in that Adorno’s 
reconciled humanity would be free of the dynamism that characterizes the subject-object relation found in 
the teleological moment of objectivity. 
791 Theodor W. Adorno, “Television as Ideology,” CM, 66. 
792 Ibid., 61. 
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create a view of humanity incapacitated and alienated from other potentials its 
socio-political constitution has made available, in the opposite image of Adorno’s 
global subject, which would be constituted as an expression of solidarity between 
different instances of human resistance to inhumanity. 
If anthropology is to a significant extent involved in the creation of its own 
object, the human being, then the human being must be, as noted above, 
constituted through socio-political relations. We might be tempted to see here a 
likeness to the argument found in Foucault’s The Order of Things concerning the 
discursive construction of the human being through a shift in the social sciences, 
which included anthropology.  At the end of that work, Foucault famously claims 
that a discursive transformation might result in the disappearance of the concept 
of the human being, “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”793  Such a 
transformation is welcomed by Foucault, who, in Heideggerian fashion, would 
see anthropology destroyed in order to make possible a more primordial relation 
to language, and so rediscover “a purified ontology or a radical thought of 
being.”794  Though Adorno does not appear to have been familiar with Foucault, 
he did know this argument as it is found in Heidegger, and of which he expresses 
deep suspicion.  For Adorno, though “[t]he current talk of humanism is awful,” he 
sees in Heidegger’s turn toward a being more lofty or more primordial than 
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human a quietism that would remain unmoved by suffering. 795  Humanity 
contains both the danger of domination and destruction and the promise of a life 
free of these, and the task of Adorno’s critique of humanity is to resist these 
dangers in the interest of its promise, even if the promise of humanity will, as I 
argue, be found not to have been human.  To better grasp this difference between 
Adorno and Heidegger/Foucault’s position on anthropology, then, we must ask: 
to what extent must humanity be seen as the product of particular socio-political 
relations?  What, if anything, remains unchanged through the vicissitudes of 
anthropology?   
Put most simply, it is Adorno’s turn toward the object that distinguishes 
him from Foucault and Heidegger.  Insofar as anthropological processes concern 
ways of knowing, they can be considered subjective.  As we have seen, Adorno 
argues against the absolutely constitutive powers of subjectivity, in favor of a 
preponderance of the object.  For Adorno, objects are given and pre-exist 
subjects, even if they cannot be known without subjects.  Thus subjective 
processes such as those of anthropology cannot be said to constitute the human 
absolutely; rather, there must be some object, some material, that is continually 
being conceptualized as human, but that remains irreducible to this 
conceptualization.  However, just as the subject is also an object, so is 
anthropology also objective—its existence cannot simply be separated from the 
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objectivity of society, and so simply removed from it, as a tumor from a body.  
That is, anthropology must correspond to some need in society, some aspect of its 
objectivity, as opposed to being a complete and arbitrary construction.  To turn 
toward this need, to the objectivity of society veiled by the subjective processes of 
anthropology, is thus to search for the object in the subjective constructions of 
anthropology.  Adorno attempts to accomplish this turn by illustrating the ways 
in which the different aspects of the subjective constitution of the human being 
correspond to social needs—to the structure of the object.  To answer the 
questions, then, regarding the extent of the anthropological constitution of the 
human being, and so what remains non-identical to it and perhaps as such even 
resists it, we must examine the instances where Adorno locates the object 
through cracks in the subjective wall.  I will examine first the various aspects of 
human constitution that Adorno sees to be the specific articulations of social 
compulsion, before turning to what might be seen as the condition of this 
compulsion. 
According to Adorno, “man as a constituens,” that is, the human subject 
that not only transforms nature and builds cities, but that grounds the objects of 
cognition, “is in turn man-made,” a fact that must displace the creative centrality 
of the human mind.796  The self that is so often taken as the emblem of the 
individuality particular to humans is “entwined with society,” owing to society its 
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very existence, for, as Adorno claims, all of the content of the self comes from 
society, from its relation to the object.797  Moreover, Adorno claims there is no 
“substratum” that might lie beneath the social deformations of humanity, no 
interior upon which social forces exert their pressure from outside;798 rather, 
interiority must itself be seen as part and parcel of the particular form of 
humanity created in the historical transformation of socio-political relations.799  
Thus, Adorno holds that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between who or 
what people are, as particular instances of humanity, and their social roles, for 
these roles “extend deep into the characteristics of people themselves, into their 
undermost composition.”800   
These claims directly challenge any positive conception of the human 
being based on a necessary set of a-historical potentials, such as Aristotle’s, which 
attempts to isolate certain fundamentally human capacities. Indeed, Adorno will 
claim that the attempt to isolate such capacities is itself the product of the 
division of labor, and thus mediated through specific socio-political relations.801  
The consequence of such claims is that even capacities that are taken for granted 
in our society must necessarily be seen as its products.  For instance, concepts 
such as the individual and its freedom, and the competition between individuals, 
must all be seen as the products of social-historical relations, as are basic features 
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of the individual, such as the ego, will, reason, and even its bodily reflexes.  The 
competition between formally equal individuals that characterizes bourgeois 
society and that is thought to be the necessary consequence of certain 
fundamental human building blocks are thus all found to be themselves produced 
by the very set of relations they are held to legitimate.  If the individual, at least 
when taken as an “absolute” as opposed to a result, is indeed “a mere reflection of 
property relations,”802 then the competition between individuals, “the truly 
bourgeois principle”803 that characterizes their relations, is itself a product of the 
distribution of property.  Adorno will even speculate that pre-bourgeois 
competition, or the antagonism thought to structure human relations at a more 
fundamental level, is the consequence perhaps not even of the human struggle for 
survival against a hostile natural world, but of the reification of “archaic arbitrary 
acts of seizing power.”804  In this case, the antagonism that exists between people 
would be the inheritance of acts of violence that were themselves contingent, and 
unnecessary from the perspective of human development.  In both cases, 
however, this antagonism is itself maintained and reproduced through socio-
political relations that might be otherwise, as is the ego, which is part of the 
architecture of the individual “implanted” by society.805  
                                                     
802 MM, A99, 153. 
803 MM, A6, 27. 
804 ND, 321. 
805 ND, 297. 
 
 
427 
Even reason itself, the very cornerstone of the difference between human 
and animal, is for Adorno a social product.  Though reason has so frequently been 
understood as an important, even definitive, capacity in defining human life, here 
again Adorno sees in reason its artificiality, or socially produced nature.  Reason 
evolved genetically through the “force of human drives,”806 in the interest of 
survival.  Insofar as there is no human history that is not at once social history—
that is, insofar as humans have been social at least as long as they have been 
human—then the survival that was facilitated by reason was always already 
survival in the context of human societies, and so cannot be isolated as a capacity 
that pre-existed them.  As the most “hypostatized” category, reason or ratio in 
bourgeois society becomes the self-preservation of the individual against the 
whole, and thus serves to perpetuate the antagonism between individuals.807  The 
executor of this self-preserving reason is the will.  Yet the act of willing involves 
the capacity to command the body, and in order to marshal the body to its 
command, the will must treat the body as an object, as its instrument.  In so 
doing the will serves to separate itself and the ratio from the body and its 
impulses, from its reflexes, which are now seen as alien and mechanical, divorced 
from that which is highest and most definitively human.808  Divided and 
alienated from itself in this manner, the model of a hierarchical division of labor, 
or social domination, becomes the model for the inner architecture of the human 
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being.  It is for this reason that Adorno writes that perhaps the freedom of a free 
society would mean being free from the will,809 for insofar as the will is a 
mechanism for inner repression produced by the outward repression that 
structures society, the disappearance of outward repression would mean the 
transformation of this human architecture. 
 In this way, Adorno reveals the socially constructed character of 
anthropological concepts, and thus the objectivity of the subjective constitution 
of the human being.  This manner of finding objectivity through the subject might 
even be seen to dialectically mediate the positions of Foucault and Aristotle noted 
above.  Against Foucault, Adorno’s turn toward the object serves to open up the 
discursive constructs of anthropology to their other: the un-intentional reflexes 
and impulses of the body suffering the activities imposed upon it by social 
organization, whose experience remains irreducible to the concepts of 
anthropology.  At once, however, and against Aristotle, these bodily reflexes and 
impulses cannot be isolated from their social expression or their mediation by 
language in an unchanging set of potentials that might serve to definitively tell us 
what a human being is.  As Adorno writes, “We cannot say what man is.  Man 
today is a function, unfree, regressing behind whatever is ascribed to him as 
invariant […] He drags along with him as his social heritage the mutilations 
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inflicted upon him over thousands of years.”810  Thus attempts to define the 
human being serve only to chain human being “to the rock of his past.”811  That 
the human being evades definition in this manner does not serve to elevate 
anthropology; rather, “it vetoes any anthropology.”812  Anthropology forges the 
conceptual manacles in which what might have resisted inhumanity is bound. 
 Thus, even if what we consider human is largely the function of 
anthropology, there nevertheless remains something non-identical to the 
conception of human being proffered by anthropology.  This “something” is not 
simply to be found in the discursive slippages produced by an excess of 
significations, but rather the result of the embodied condition of discourse that 
both enables and limits discursive constructions.  That is, what can be said about 
human beings and its acceptance as plausible depends on the bodily experience 
of social subjects—if anthropology had no point of contact with objectivity in this 
sense, it would be without force or even meaning.  This point of contact, the most 
basic meaning-making activity that both serves to enable and limit the reach of 
anthropology, is what Adorno calls mimesis: the “indelible […] element in all 
cognition and in all human practice.”813  Insofar as mimesis has traditionally been 
linked to imitation, Adorno can thus claim that humans are only human insofar 
as they imitate one another; however, Adorno’s use of the term suggests a much 
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broader meaning, and commentators have often noted the difficulties of pinning 
this term down.814   
While Aristotle’s conception of mimesis was not limited to direct 
representation or imitation of objects of observation, but instead allowed for their 
imaginative transformation—utilizing capacities humans share with other 
animals, we must recall—it nevertheless remained tied to what Aristotle 
considered the naturally human desire to know.  Insofar as knowledge serves a 
more important role in human life than those of other animals, and insofar as 
Aristotle sees the human desire for knowledge to reach up toward divine thought, 
mimesis thus shares these associations: just as humans are held to be the most 
intelligent, so are they held to be the most imitative of all animals.815  Adorno, 
however, does not simply adopt the Aristotelian conception of mimesis.  As 
Horowitz writes, Adorno’s conception of mimesis, “primordially,” involves “the 
desire to be what there is contact with before there is a self to make contact.” But 
even this formulation, Horowitz claims, involves too great a separation between 
subject and object: “‘One’ is ‘the object.’  And that is all there is.”816   This 
conception of mimesis, it must be noted, while serving to condition the desire for 
knowledge and what we call humanity, is reducible to neither.  
At its most basic, mimesis is a desire for contact, and this desire is not 
exhausted in the divisions of self and other, or subject and object.  For this 
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reason, mimesis can be considered something like the drive that animates the 
bodily excess of conceptual organization.  It makes possible the process of 
identification, yet no identification can ever fully encompass it, and consequently 
it lends itself to a continual series of mediations that re-translate it into new 
conceptual schemas, of which anthropology is but a set.  Thus we might say the 
dynamism that characterizes human development, the constant transformation 
of humanity through its own self-organized processes of compulsion, depends on 
mimesis, as would the transformation of this compulsion, and the humanity 
constituted thereby.  However, a full account of mimesis will have to wait for 
Chapter 14 below, and my discussion of the relation of Adorno’s conceptions of 
art, morality and politics.  At present it is sufficient to note that what we call 
human is the product of socio-political relations operating on both subjective and 
objective levels, and the condition of this humanity and its vicissitudes depends 
on a bodily desire not reducible to the human.  It remains to elucidate now, what 
relation this construction of the human might have to other animals.  How has 
the human managed to differentiate itself from other animals, and maintain its 
privileged status?  To this question, I presently turn. 
 
Animal Violence in Human Constitution 
Having demonstrated the degree to which the human being is produced through 
socio-political relations, and having highlighted the bodily impulse whose 
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continual mediation informs these relations and the vicissitudes of anthropology, 
we might now return to the “dialectical anthropology” of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.  Like Schoenberg or Beethoven’s “failed” compositions that 
through their failure bring to light the status of the object more truthfully than a 
successful composition might have, Horkheimer and Adorno’s failed attempt to 
write an anthropology—even a “dialectical” one—illustrates the impossibility of 
the task, and thus the status of its object, the human being.817  Adorno has 
described Dialectic of Enlightenment as an attempt to write “a primeval history 
of the subject,”818 and it is perhaps for this reason that DE might be considered 
their bleakest work: the authors here attempt to draw the outline of the shadow 
in which they sit, while historical events serve to burn this shadow into the 
ground.  In this light, the human being is that moment in the history of the 
subject where the destructive and violent impulses that allowed for its clear 
distinction from its object through the latter’s domination are given their most 
complete articulation: in the possibility of the total destruction of the natural 
world. 
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In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno display the other 
side of the struggle against inhumanity that constitutes the human being: 
inhumanity is not only a kind of brutality perpetuated by humans against each 
other, but it must also be seen as that which is simply not human, such as the 
natural world and the other animals that populate it.  In turning toward the 
primeval history of the subject, Horkheimer and Adorno find that the human is 
only a moment of the subject which has been constituted through the violent 
suppression of nature, and most notably, the violent suppression of animals.  If 
the subject is to emerge as something distinct from its object, and so ultimately 
take up the banner of human being, a creature distinct from nature and from 
other animals, it must master and suppress its own objectivity, its own history 
and condition of possibility—its animal body.  As I will attempt to show, it is in 
part for this reason that Adorno’s idea of a reconciled humanity cannot be 
human, for the turn toward the preponderance of the object and the non-
identical is, in the case of humanity, a turn toward animality, to the suppressed 
animal impulses that inform all human activity but must continually be 
suppressed, transformed, and disciplined by the repression of a society organized 
around the exigencies of domination for the human to be produced. The object 
for which the anthropological subject is but an agent is an animal, and it is only in 
recognizing this that the repressive social relations necessary for the 
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reproduction of human life might be relaxed, and human life might dissolve into 
a different kind of animal life, free of this repression.  
As commentators have noted, sometimes pejoratively, this aspect of 
Dialectic of Enlightenment bears a close affinity to Nietzsche,819 especially the 
Nietzsche to be found in the second essay of his On the Genealogy of Morality.  
Here Nietzsche also provides something very much like a “primeval history of the 
subject,” wherein human social features and institutions are treated as part of the 
biological evolution of the species.  For Nietzsche humans came to reason, and 
with it the mastery of their emotions and drives, through memory, which had to 
first forge a connection between past, present, and future such as to enable 
remembering individuals to identify themselves in their past and so make 
calculated projections for their future.  In order for the future to look enough like 
the present and past to render calculations concerning it useful, human activities 
had to first be made regular and reliable.  Such reliability was produced through a 
transformation of this “necessarily forgetful animal,” for which forgetfulness had 
been a strength that enabled daring, by means of the pain inflicted through “the 
most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits […] the most disgusting mutilations […] the 
cruelest rituals.”820  Religious and socio-political institutions were the mnemonic 
devices employed to “breed” this animal capable of making a promise, an animal 
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possessed of an inner life to serve as the Archimedean point for the vicissitudes of 
its experience—a subject.  First among these institutions was the institution of 
debt, and so the debtor-creditor relation, which established in the human animal 
the concept of equivalence.  Insofar as widely disparate things might be made 
equivalent under certain conditions, the expansion of these conditions involves 
an increasing number of things coming under the law of equivalence, including 
these promise-keeping animals, whose equivalence between each other and their 
values allows for the emergence of their common humanity.  Thus for Nietzsche 
humanity is not something that exists by nature possessed of certain distinctive 
capacities, but is rather the subject of repression as it has been socially organized 
through history.  
Much of Nietzsche’s genealogy is consistent with what Horkheimer and 
Adorno have to say in Dialectic of Enlightenment: the idea that the things 
commonly considered to be naturally human are the product of millennia of 
social repression, and that this repression might be discernible through a 
“biological” standpoint—or a “natural-historical” standpoint, for Horkheimer and 
Adorno—allow for a certain degree of harmony between their respective 
positions.  Yet despite Nietzsche’s clear influence,821 the latter might be said to 
differ from Nietzsche on three related points that ultimately put their projects in 
discord: the place of power in the natural world (1), the role of reason and its 
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historical possibilities (2), and consequently, the possibilities available for politics 
and the relations it establishes between animals (3).  Concerning the first of these 
points, Nietzsche claims that “anything in existence” has come to be the way it is, 
and continues to be transformed, according to the purpose imposed upon it “by a 
power superior to it.”  This continual process of transformation in which old 
meanings and purposes are “obscured or completely obliterated” is a result of the 
“overpowering and dominating” forces of which “everything in the organic world” 
consists.822   
While terms such as “anything in existence,” or everything in the “organic 
world” suggest that Nietzsche is making ontological claims that would hold for 
any society at any point in history, for Horkheimer and Adorno, as is consistent 
with Adorno’s later philosophy, such ontology could only ever be that of the 
“wrong state of things.”823  That is, while Nietzsche’s “biological” standpoint 
shows that any power is itself historically constituted, the relation between 
historically constituted powers based on domination and submission that 
characterizes the “organic world” is held to be unchanging.  Yet for Horkheimer 
and Adorno, not only is the power that overpowers another always an historically 
constituted power, but so must the relation between these powers that compels 
one to dominate another be seen as historically constituted.  The organic world is 
thus not an unchanging substratum upon which human society sits, nor an 
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unchanging drive that animates continually changing historical entities; rather, 
nature and natural drives are themselves internally mediated by history through 
emerging forms of socio-political organization.  While the idea that meanings and 
purposes are continually being displaced and re-interpreted informs Adorno’s 
approach to concepts in his turn toward the non-conceptual, as we have seen, this 
turn is illuminated by a “messianic light” that shows these things might be other 
than they are, not simply in the sense that what appears to be a natural power is 
in fact historically constituted, but that the structure of domination in which 
power is exercised might be radically transformed.  While Nietzsche himself 
comes close to something like a messianic impulse with the notion that his “man 
of the future” will “redeem” what came before, ultimately the redemption to be 
found in forgiving debts and renouncing the law of equivalence is for Nietzsche a 
new display of power, and with it, a new imposition of values.824  That the strong 
will and must triumph, even in redemption, is for Adorno a projection of socio-
political domination—it does not tell us what might lie beyond a society organized 
around such domination. 
 We might consider the first consequence of this differing approach to the 
place of power in the natural world to be a different relation between Nietzsche 
and Horkheimer and Adorno to reason, and so to the legacy of the 
Enlightenment.  Nietzsche’s biological or “genealogical” standpoint undermines 
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the notion of reason as a godlike capacity that distinguishes humans from other 
animals, showing reason instead to have evolved as another instance of the 
biological drive for dominance, and as such, the means by which a certain 
historically constituted animal learned to exercise its power and so dominate 
others through the imposition of its own standards.  While Horkheimer and 
Adorno agree with this exposition of reason to the extent that its nature must also 
be seen as internally mediated by history, they hold that reason as an expression 
of domination has at the same time made intelligible its opposite, the possibility 
of freedom, and with it the possibility of a different articulation of reason.  To 
reach this different articulation of reason and the freedom it may enable requires 
that reason recognize its own complicity in domination, and so its own relation to 
nature.  Insofar as domination is perpetuated by reason unaware of this 
complicity, becoming aware of complicity would be to deprive domination of one 
of its tools, thus compelling it to perpetuate itself by different means.  Through 
this transformation of social domination, reason would itself be transformed, for, 
like nature, it is continually subject to the internal mediation of history and the 
forms of socio-political organization that emerge therein.  In this way, 
Horkheimer and Adorno cling to the idea of the transformative capacity of 
reason, and thus can write that “freedom in society is inseparable from 
enlightenment thinking.”825 
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 Concerning the prospects of reason in the service of future life, Nietzsche’s 
genealogical standpoint is not so sanguine. Reason, calculation, and memory 
have for Nietzsche served to give the human animal greater depth, perfecting 
repression in such a way as to create the possibility of a new kind of animal that 
might be to the human as the human takes itself to be toward other animals.  
However, reason, calculation, and memory are embedded in a system of 
equivalences that has grown so broad as to have become an impediment to the 
realization of this possibility.  For a new, higher kind of animal to emerge that 
might rule over humanity, what is needed is the ability to posit values, meanings, 
and purposes that are exclusive—values that not all will be capable of holding.  
The positing of such values presupposes the power to affirm both one’s 
particularity and one’s superiority over and above the rest of humanity as a 
singular individual, a power that has been eroded by the system of equivalences 
in which reason, calculation, and memory have emerged.  If values can be made 
equivalent, then none can rule, and so the very principle of life—the drive to 
overpower and to dominate—is undermined.  If life is to triumph against “the 
great nausea, the will to nothingness,” and “nihilism,”826 then potential rulers 
must be seduced into exercising their power and distinguishing themselves as 
singular individuals.  Insofar as reason is tied to a system of equivalences, 
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distinguishing oneself as singular will involve the emphasis of something other 
than one’s capacity for reason. 
The political consequences of these two points mark the decisive split 
between Horkheimer and Adorno with Nietzsche.  For Nietzsche one must be 
seduced into affirming one’s singularity against all equivalences, thus making 
oneself capable of affirming one’s life not only in the triumphs but also in the 
defeats and suffering, such that one might say, “I wanted it thus!”827  In making 
one’s own life in its singularity the content of the will, and so living as if one had 
given oneself one’s own life, one separates oneself from the humanity that exists 
only in the equivalences established between particular triumphs and defeats, 
particular sufferings, and subject to external authority. The capacity to withstand 
being the sole author of one’s life becomes the new capacity that elevates one 
above others, and makes the singular individual capable of this performance 
superior to them.  Insofar as the affirmation of the singularity of one’s life is at 
once a response to seduction, to being seduced by its potential beauty, then 
Nietzsche can be seen to re-establish the aristocratic rule of the beautiful, the 
nobility of those who would rule others like cattle by virtue of the strength of 
their mythic superiority.   
Horkheimer and Adorno, of course, reject this as the perpetuation of 
domination, even class rule.  For them, Nietzsche’s “man of the future” is all too 
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human in that the order he represents is precisely the same kind of socio-political 
domination that has characterized virtually all human development—that is, one 
where humans separate themselves from other animals and rule over them as 
their superiors.  For Adorno, rather, the political problem posed by humanity is 
the possibility of a world free of domination, and so one where the aggressive 
instincts that have informed such human development have been pacified.  To 
understand how this pacification relates to other animals, and thus how 
Nietzsche’s own solution is a perpetuation of the order of domination in which 
humanity emerged and whose continued existence it maintains, we must look to 
the constitution of the human in relation to the animal, and how “the animal” can 
be considered non-identical to the concept of humanity. 
 Recall that what Adorno calls identity is a correspondence between an 
object and its concept.  To think is to identify, to establish a correspondence 
between a concept and an object given in the material world.  Establishing such 
correspondences is the means that the animal that became human evolved for 
self-preservation; thus Adorno refuses to separate thinking and life activity into 
independent spheres, for thinking evolved as a response to life activity, and is 
itself an activity meant to preserve life.  Identity must therefore be seen as a 
response to the threat nature posed to early or even pre-humans, and the 
concept, the “idea-tool” allowing for the seizure and control of the objects of the 
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natural world.828  From this evolutionary standpoint, the non-identical has the 
appearance of a threat to human survival, and for this reason must continually be 
seized by concepts and identified.  Identification must therefore be seen as a 
compulsive activity born in terror, whose continuation represents both the 
perpetuation of the human attempt to dominate “the nightmare of nature,” and 
the “dizzying horror of the organic”829 that spawned this compulsion.830  Yet just 
as the physical seizure, control, and manipulation of the natural world is always 
evading human efforts in myriad ways, so does the object always exceed the 
concept, and undermine its subjectively established identity.  Adorno’s turn 
toward the non-identical, then, is a turn toward that which is continually 
suppressed by the concept in the terror-stricken human compulsion to dominate, 
in the hope that this terror might be exorcised.  
 Perhaps nowhere is the violence of this suppression, and so the terror that 
accompanies it, more evident than in the concept of the human being.  With 
Horkheimer, Adorno writes: “Throughout European history the idea of the 
human being has been expressed in contradistinction to the animal.  The latter’s 
lack of reason is the proof of human dignity.”831  If the concept of the human is a 
way of establishing an identity between the material entity, or body, in the array 
of a certain set of relationships and activities it engages, then the non-identical 
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would be that which falls outside of the concept—all the practices, relationships, 
and physical features that fall outside this ideal.  Insofar as the concept of the 
human is “expressed in contradistinction to the animal,” and “few other ideas are 
so fundamental to Western anthropology,”832 then the concept of the animal 
points to the practices, relationships, and physical features that are non-identical 
to the concept of the human.  The animal, then, appears as a symbol for the 
rejected possibilities of the life that calls itself human—that which is subject to 
the ban erected by the concept of the human.  It is for this reason, Adorno claims, 
that identifying certain visible groups of human beings with animals “is the key to 
the pogrom.”833  In identifying certain humans as animals, their destruction 
becomes the preservation of the relationships, practices, and features that can be 
identified beneath a given conception of human, and so the maintenance of the 
ban this concept imposes on other forms of life. 
 Insofar as it is specifically reason or intellectual capacities that are found 
to be the marks that distinguish between human and animal, then insofar as 
reason is not seen as a function of the body, the body becomes a liminal space 
between the human and the animal.  While the body is the necessary site of all 
human endeavors, it is only as commanded by reason that it performs in ways 
that fall beneath the concept of human—in its involuntary functions, such as the 
rudiments of perception and the experience of pleasure and pain, the body is 
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animal.  Without reason, the world of the body, like that of the animal, is one 
without concepts, caught in a flux of drives that conform only to vital patterns, 
deprived of volition, meaning, and purpose, and produced as such through what 
might be seen as the other side of the anthropological processes that serve to 
constitute the human: the treatment of other animals.  It is in “the twitching 
movements of the bound victims” that the human body is found to be 
“mechanical, blind, automatic,” in the same sense as an animal, yet it is precisely 
this involuntariness of the body that resists identity with the concept of the 
human.  The concept of the animal, in pointing toward what is non-identical in 
the concept of the human, that which resists life organized under the concept of 
humanity, bears witness to the possibility of a humanity transformed.   
The problem of human constitution in relation to “the animal” and the 
ethical implications thereof have been taken up by recent philosophers, perhaps 
most notably Jacques Derrida.  Derrida notes that the concept of “the animal” is 
itself a bêtise that reduces the “heterogeneous multiplicity of the living” to a 
singular concept in order to facilitate the identification of the human.  Yet insofar 
as this bêtise also facilitates resistance to the human, we should be cautioned 
against its simple rejection. Derrida’s claim that the very act of reducing the 
multiplicity of animal life to “the animal” in the singular reveals the animality of 
the human, both in terms of its latent aggression and cognitive limits, is 
consistent with Horkheimer and Adorno’s attempt to expose the non-identical in 
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the concept of the human.834  However, rather than conclude that this moment of 
human animality gestures toward the possible transformation of the human, as 
do Horkheimer and Adorno, and perhaps even the transience of the concept of 
the human as such, Derrida suggests instead that the dissolution of this concept 
of “the animal” in the singular into a concept of animals in the plural—the 
“heterogeneous multiplicity of the living”—might inhibit the violence perpetuated 
through these concepts.835  However, my discussion of Aristotle and the world of 
poetic myth above suggests serious problems with Derrida’s conclusion.   
Aristotle shows little interest in the concept of “the animal” in the 
singular—for him the study of animals and their contrast to human beings is 
always a matter of grasping animal life in its heterogeneity and multiplicity, and 
these do not prevent their conceptual capture and hierarchical organization.  
Moreover, the relation between humans and animals in the world of poetic myth 
allowed for different kinds of human-animal alliances, yet these were established 
in order to identify oneself as a master over certain other animals, and with them, 
other human beings.  Derrida’s turn to heterogeneity and multiplicity seems to 
assume that the plural and singular, or the many and the one, are liberating or 
repressive in and of themselves, rather than attending to the particular 
instantiations of the singular and the plural at the socio-political level, as these 
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change historically.836  Though his apparent intent is laudable, Derrida’s attempt 
to extend “the similar, the fellow, to all forms of life, to all species” and so claim 
that “[a]ll animals qua living beings are my fellows,”837 serves to advance the 
empire of the same, whose subject is positive humanity, the humanity constituted 
and maintained through violence.  Like attempts to extend human rights to 
certain kinds of non-human animals without a concomitant transformation of the 
human subject, their inclusion in the world of humans ignores the degradation of 
humanity and the intraspecies violence by which society is maintained.838  Thus 
the task is not simply to expand the domain of the human, and so make animals 
into human subjects, but to liberate the human from itself, and its own need to 
dominate others.   
 As my examination of Nietzsche has attempted to show, however, this 
recovery of animality, of thinking of humans and their particular capacities 
genealogically, as one would other biological organisms, is on its own not enough 
to transform the relation between these animals wherein some must overpower 
and dominate others.  In Hegelian terms, Nietzsche’s overcoming of the human 
amounts to its abstract negation: it fails to take the actual structure in which the 
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human emerged as its object, and so fails to transform the conditions of 
possibility upon which the human depends.  Instead we require, again in 
Hegelian terms, the determinate negation of reason and humanity put forward 
by Horkheimer and Adorno, wherein reason is not lost but rather displaced and 
transformed in its mediation by its other, the animality of the body and its 
involuntary impulses. Only mediated by its own repressed animality might the 
strictures that give rise to the human be relaxed, and the human might finally be 
reconciled to its own animality, and thus to other animals.  Theorizing this 
possibility, and thus the turn to the non-identical of humanity found in the 
animal, thus involves not seeing the humanity of animals, but the animality of 
human constitution.  It is thus Adorno’s account of the animality of human 
particularity toward which I presently turn. 
 
Non-identity as Human Animality 
In the interest of showing that the reconciled humanity toward which Adorno 
gestures is an animal other than human, I have argued that the mimetic impulses 
that underlay all forms of human life have been produced as human through 
what Adorno calls “anthropology,” and that the various practices and capacities 
designated as “animal” should be considered non-identical to the 
anthropologically produced conception of the human.  Adorno’s attempt to reveal 
that which is non-identical to the concept within the conceptual framework of 
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thinking, in this context, thus involves revealing the animal within what we 
consider human, or showing those aspects of the human we take to be most 
definitively human to in fact be animal—the task I take for this section.   
The rudiments of this task can be found as early as “The Idea of Natural-
History” (1932), wherein Adorno attempts to comprehend what is most historical 
as being natural, and what is most natural as being historical.839  This attempt to 
grasp the entwinement of history and nature will find a new articulation in the 
entwinement of myth and enlightenment in his collaboration with Horkheimer, 
and also inform his later work, perhaps most notably in his readings of Hegel and 
Marx.840 And yet, following this trend in Adorno’s thinking and attempting to see 
in the human its repressed animality brings my interpretation of Adorno into 
conflict with what is arguably the most prominent interpretation of Adorno’s 
ethical thought, what has been called Adorno’s “ethical modernism.” 
The chief proponent of this view, J.M. Bernstein, expounds what he calls 
Adorno’s “ethical modernism” in a rich and complex interpretation of Adorno’s 
texts, a full account of which cannot be pursued here. Broadly put, however, it 
might be said that for Bernstein Adorno’s “ethical modernism” is an attempt to 
reconstruct the ethical meaning lost to the ravages of enlightenment, which has 
served to disenchant the world and so undermine the traditional objects of ethical 
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life.  For Bernstein, this makes Adorno something of a romantic Weberian: 
Adorno sees the disenchanted or secular world of modernity to be without a 
“rationally compelling” or “intrinsically motivating” normative account, and takes 
providing such an account to be the aim of his philosophy.841  In order to 
accomplish this aim, Adorno sets to reformulating how we think about concepts 
and their relation to objects, such that our concepts might once again correspond 
to those objects that make up the “fundamental structures of ethical reasoning 
and moral insight”: that is, authority, knowledge, and experience, all of which 
have been set adrift by the corrosive powers of enlightenment reason.842   
With respect to nature, this project orients itself against the enlightenment 
view that served to disenchant the natural world by seeing all anthropomorphism 
as myth, and so, in the interest of purging myth, drove a wedge between the 
human and natural worlds, transforming the objects of the natural world into 
mere fodder for human aims, and so robbing them of the capacity to make ethical 
claims upon humans.  Insofar as human nature is itself part of nature, however, 
this hard distinction is irrational, and requires re-conceptualization.  To this end, 
Bernstein sees Adorno as reviving an idea of anthropomorphic nature, albeit a 
secular one, wherein the objects of the natural world have been re-enchanted.  
That is, the objects of the natural world are understood as being entwined with 
the human world such that what might be called human is impossible without 
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them, and insofar as human relations need necessarily encompass natural 
objects, natural objects would form part of human ethical life and so require 
some degree of ethical consideration.843  In this way, Bernstein writes, “Adorno 
pursues romantic ends […] through hyper-cognitive means.”844 
Bernstein’s interpretation is attractive for a number of reasons: Adorno is 
found to provide an answer to important ethical problems raised by modernity, 
and offers a theory concerning the possibility of a more peaceable relation 
between humans and the natural world, thus making Bernstein’s Adorno the 
(perhaps not-so-reluctant) colleague of Aristotelians such as MacIntyre, 
Nussbaum, and Salkever.  And yet, as I shall argue, Bernstein’s view fails to 
capture what I understand to be crucial in re-thinking the human-animal relation 
and its relation to politics and art.  Bernstein downplays the transformative 
aspect of Adorno’s thought, both politically and what we might call mimetically, 
by reifying the place of the human and so attempting to stamp the whole of the 
natural world with a human imprint in order for it to have ethical weight.  
Moreover, this view demands of the individual the kind of human activity which 
is itself linked to its own domination, for it bases the possibilities available to 
ethical life on an idealized notion of the human subject, one  for whom the 
exercise of its basic capacities are precisely what sustain the order to which it is 
enthralled.  On my reading, Adorno is not trying to find new foundations for the 
                                                     
843 Ibid., 191; 197. 
844 Ibid., 4. 
 
 
451 
ethical life modernity has displaced and so reconstruct its meaning, but rather 
trying to theorize how one might live a life denied of such meaning.845  To better 
grasp this life and its relation to animality, it is worth examining a critique 
leveled at Adorno and his work on enlightenment with Horkheimer that actually 
serves to capture this aspect of Adorno’s thought better than does Bernstein.  
In Nihil Unbound, Brassier seeks to advance the enlightenment project, 
arguing that the disenchantment of the world is not a debilitating calamity to be 
mourned, but rather an “invigorating vector of intellectual discovery” that ought 
to be celebrated, and taken to its radical fulfillment.  The philosophical 
fulfillment of the enlightenment project, Brassier argues, involves affirming 
precisely the corrosive potential of reason that has disenchanted the world, and 
the nihilism that is its consequence, by “kicking away” the “pseudo-
transcendental props” that persist in supporting the image of the world as 
possessing inherent meaning and value.  With this comes the recognition of the 
mind-independence of the world and its utter indifference to human aims, which 
Brassier claims has been the triumph of modern scientific discovery.846  From 
this perspective, human beings are less the source of enlightenment rationality 
than they are its temporary bearers, a transitory point in a narrative wherein an 
inhuman intelligence has awoken, and is “in the process of sloughing off its 
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human mask.”847  Reading Adorno (and Horkheimer) along the lines traced by 
Bernstein, their thought, as the rehabilitation of anthropomorphic nature and the 
“resurrection of Aristotelianism,”848 is an anachronistic and romantic attachment 
to the human being and its pinning after a lost nature.  For Brassier, following the 
inhuman trajectory of the enlightenment means to see the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment not in the terms of Homer’s Odyssey, that is, not as humanity’s 
homecoming in anthropomorphic nature, but rather in the terms of Cronenberg’s 
The Fly: “human reason is revealed to have been an insect’s waking dream.”849 
 To read Adorno against Bernstein, as attempting to think the animality of 
humans and how to live after the loss of meaning, instead of the resurrection of 
meaning through anthropomorphic nature, is to find, perhaps startlingly, Adorno 
and Brassier aligned on certain important points.  Adorno is not, as Brassier 
would have it, simply on the side of those who would mourn the disenchantment 
of the world.  Though Adorno can be said to mourn its disenchantment in that he 
sees the liquidation of features of the past that served to resist domination, such 
as individuality, as unhappy developments, and Adorno remains far less sanguine 
concerning the progressive possibilities of recent developments than Brassier, he 
nevertheless rejects the idea of returning to some pre-given structure of ethical 
life seen as fundamental in the way Bernstein would have it.  Instead, Adorno 
aims to exploit the possibilities history has made available to thinking in the hope 
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of seeing new life dawn.  Of nihilism and its relation to this hope, Adorno writes: 
“A thinking man’s true answer to the question whether he is a nihilist would 
probably be ‘Not enough’—out of callousness, perhaps, because of insufficient 
sympathy with anything that suffers.  Nothingness is the acme of abstraction, and 
the abstract is the abominable.”850   
To begin unwinding the ideas bound in this quotation, we might note that 
while Adorno thinks the abstractions of thinking involve anesthetizing oneself to 
suffering in ways that can allow for one to continue going about one’s affairs 
despite one’s own suffering and the suffering of others, a lack of abstraction can 
also serve to trap one within one’s own particularities, and so fail to critically 
grasp the anaesthetizing role played by abstraction.  In this sense abstraction is 
the only means of curing abstraction, for it is only through critical thinking—that 
corrosive element of reason—that the conceptual screen that would shield us 
from the world becomes visible.  To maintain a critical disposition to the world 
and so continue to press against one’s own conceptual capture is, in a sense, to 
adopt a nihilist posture to the world, one which refuses satisfaction with any 
positive content: “Thought,” Adorno writes, “honors itself by defending what is 
damned as nihilism.”  To this end, Adorno claims that “true nihilists” are those 
who would oppose this nihilism—that is, the nihilism that sees the emptiness of 
all conceptual structures that has accompanied modernity—with the meanings 
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and values of the past.  Against such attempts, Adorno insists on persisting in the 
critical negativity of thought that would reject these “faded positivities,”851 
striving instead toward its own fulfillment.    
 Adorno’s thoughts on nihilism gesture toward his critique of anthropology 
and the concept of humanity produced therein, and serve to align his attempt to 
see the animality of the human through what we see to be most human with 
Brassier’s comment on human reason being the dream of an insect.   Though 
Adorno will occasionally employ conventional rhetorical tropes that make 
pejorative reference to human characteristics as being “brute” or animalistic in 
some sense,852 there is an important tendency in Adorno’s thought that interprets 
those capacities that are traditionally held to be most human as in fact animal, 
thus undermining anthropocentric accounts of the world.  For instance, while 
Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the “hypertrophy of the cerebral organ” in 
human beings is well-established enough to be considered more than “a freak 
event in natural history,” they nevertheless insist on thinking of human beings as 
kinds of animals whose technological prowess must be understood as an 
extension of the aggressive drives mobilized to self-preservation, just as is found 
in other animals.853  Likewise, Adorno reads the history of the transformations of 
economic forms described by Marx as analogous to the rise and fall of different 
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animal species over millions of years.854 Perhaps most important for this view, 
however, is Adorno’s insistence on describing the mental life of human beings, 
that which is traditionally considered to be most definitive of humankind and so 
thought to separate humans from other animals, in terms of animal life. 
 For Adorno, not only can ideology be likened to the rage a lion must have 
for the antelope it attacks,855 and psychological pathologies can be likened to the 
mutations suffered by dinosaurs prior to their extinction,856 but the “sovereign 
mind” and its subjectivity must be seen to be entirely embedded in “the animal 
life of the species.”857 As noted above, Adorno thinks thinking must be 
understood as the particular way humans evolved in their struggle for self-
preservation: establishing correspondences between concepts and objects 
allowed for humans to identify objective continuities in their worlds that signaled 
possible threats and aids to self-preservation.  Yet with this capacity has come a 
kind of mental captivity, one that deadens our experience of particularity, which 
is to say, one that deadens us to suffering.  Recall that to suffer is not simply to 
experience pain, but to experience as such—to undergo: it is at once to persist in 
time and to be changed by it, in the particular manner that one does as a living 
creature.  In this sense suffering involves an indelibly passive element, for even 
where we are active, to experience our own activity as self-changing we must be 
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worked upon by this activity—we must suffer it, and our selves, as the complexes 
we contribute to creating both in resistance to and adoption of the identities 
foisted upon us by our societies.  Insofar as we tend to experience objects through 
concepts, the particularity of the suffering we witness is continually mediated and 
categorized within the forms of thought we have inherited through our cultures 
and languages, which in turn shape and are shaped by the vicissitudes of our 
societies.   
In this sense, Adorno writes, our “mental captivity is exceedingly real.”858  
The structure of individual consciousness and the limits it imposes on experience 
repeats the social captivity of the individual, whose very notion of the individual 
freedom being trammeled by society is itself a projection born of these social 
relations.  Adorno thus likens this mental captivity to armored animals, such as 
the triceratops and the rhinoceros, which seem trapped beneath the weight of 
their weapons forged in the struggle for self-preservation, and which they are 
compelled to drag around, as a kind of “ingrown prison which they seem—
anthropomorphically, at least—to be trying vainly to shed.”859  Adorno even 
suggests that this “imprisonment in their survival mechanism” might explain the 
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animal’s ferocity—both for the rhinoceros, and for the human being.  Like the 
armor of the rhinoceros, humans have inherited their conceptual imprisonment 
as both a defense mechanism and a weapon, and insofar as they are so equipped 
to defend and to attack, it is really no surprise that they produce societies that 
require one do both in order to survive.  However, in seeing the animality of this 
condition, that “the human being is a result, not an eidos,”860 a response to 
certain historical pressures which are, conceivably, subject to change, then we 
might envision the evolution of an animal other than the one we are, one other 
than the animal constituted in resistance to the threats of starvation, exposure, 
and violence. 
 Insofar as the animal can be seen as the non-identical of the human, 
attempting to reveal in the identical concept of the human what is non-identical 
to it is to see human activity as being animal activity.  Put differently: Adorno 
uses animal objectivity to limit the pretension to absoluteness of human 
subjectivity.  This turning of the human toward the animal has three important 
socio-political consequences.  Firstly, in seeing human activity as animal activity, 
human pretentions to sovereignty and autonomy are revealed to be contingent, 
fragile and transient.  That is, what is understood to be most fundamentally and 
irreducibly human has come to be the way it is and remains as such only as a 
response to certain conditions that could be otherwise.  Secondly, and following 
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from this first consequence, the human is found to be most animal precisely 
where it had thought to make its break from animality, thus revealing a 
continuity between human reason and animal aggression: that is, we are most 
inhuman precisely where we see ourselves to be most human.  Thus 
understanding ourselves to be uniquely human and so uniquely possessing 
reason, faith, or even historical dynamism is to lock ourselves in a particular form 
of life no less free from compulsion than “the industriousness of ants and bees, or 
the grotesque struggles of the beetle as it carries a blade of grass.”861   
Lastly, if we are to resist the inhumanity of humanity that serves to trap 
humans as humans, the inhumanity that would reconcile us to societies wherein 
we are compelled to struggle for our survival, we must then draw upon those 
capacities seen as merely animal—those that would be excluded from the heights 
of what is considered most definitively human.  Drawing on animal capacities in 
this way is what it means to live in a world where humanity is inhumane, where 
historical events have served to rupture the correspondence between ethical 
meaning and the daily activities one must suffer to live. It is for this reason that 
Adorno writes that against the “caricature of freedom” offered by personality, 
what is left to morality today is “to try to live so that one may believe himself to 
have been a good animal.”862  Our own animality is the necessary starting point 
for the resistance against inhumanity, for it at once allows us to acknowledge our 
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own inhumanity and complicity with its order, while drawing upon that which 
shrinks from the grammar of that order—that which resists what is seen to be 
definitively human.863   
For Adorno, we are all Gregor Samsa—Gregor’s triumph is to have 
realized his own animality, to have come directly into contact with the fact of 
human reason as the waking dream of an insect.  Where Gregor fails is that he 
refuses to pursue the challenge his animality presents to human compulsion, 
attempting instead to live his human life as before.  The impossibility of living as 
an insect in a human world, of circulating between the points of what would be 
human meaning but which can no longer apply, is one for which Gregor pays with 
his life.  Brassier’s critique of Adorno actually serves to follow this particular 
vector of his thought more closely than Bernstein.  There can be no new 
correspondence between ethical meaning and the daily activities we pursue for 
self-preservation without the concomitant transformation of society, and with it, 
all that is considered human. 
 
The Utopian Animal 
I have argued that for Adorno those activities considered to be most definitively 
human are the spellbound attempts to repress animality, and are thus continuous 
with the compulsion traditionally thought to animate animal life.  This insight 
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serves to underscore the inhumanity of the human, the reason for Adorno’s 
rejection of humanism as the promotion of certain fundamentally human 
capacities.  However, revealing the animality within humanity is not simply to 
discard humanity because of its animality, as if humanity were simply a lie, nor is 
it to reveal the necessity of overcoming this animal condition in a truly human 
one, for as we have seen, insofar as the promise of humanity is a humanity 
without boundaries or limitations, it is not humanity at all.   
To better understand this point we might again make reference to Hegel 
and Adorno’s critique of him.  As we have seen, Adorno criticizes the elements of 
theodicy and teleology in Hegelian philosophy, arguing that these limit Hegelian 
dialectic to the positive unfolding of that which is originally given. While this 
unfolding may pass through the negative, it must necessarily conclude with the 
positive reconciliation of this negativity to a whole that was already contained in 
its origin as embryo. Through his utopian or messianic displacement of the origin 
and with it the possibilities available to thinking, Adorno claims that his negative 
dialectic avoids the false reconciliation of the Hegelian variety: a negation of a 
negation does not result in a positive, Adorno claims, but rather serves to 
transform the whole in which negative and positive were opposed.864   
To think that the negation of inhumanity results in humanity is to follow 
the logic that Adorno rejects—this idea that the negation of a negation results in a 
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positive—by seeing the imperfect or negative humanity that needs the passage of 
history to become what it positively is.  However, Adorno thinks what can 
legitimately be called human, those acts of resistance that gesture toward the 
arrest of violence and compulsion that I called negative humanity above, always 
already were the negation of the inhuman.  A second negation, the negation of 
this negation, is thus not to choose humanity over inhumanity, but to negate the 
very structure in which each are constituted in opposition to each other.  The 
persistence of negativity here, Adorno’s “nihilist” posture, is thus an attempt to 
transform the very constellation of possibilities in which the human has come to 
be, and so gesture toward a new form of life.  As Adorno requires the third term 
of reconciled humanity to obstruct the reconciliation of negative humanity with 
inhumanity in a positive order constituted through their permanent struggle, we 
get intimations of what reconciled humanity might look like through its 
refractions in instances of resistance, and as I shall argue in the next chapter, in 
the experience of works of art.  As I shall argue in this section, however, the link 
between Adorno’s utopianism and animality, seen in these flashes of animality, 
confirm that reconciled humanity would be an animal other than human, and 
that the socio-political transformation required to end compulsion would free 
humanity of its own constitutive fetters. 
In understanding Adorno’s reconciled humanity to be a kind of animal, it 
is important to realize that this animality is not a return to some pre-human, 
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animal past.  With Horkheimer, Adorno writes that animals are without concepts, 
and as such trapped in a perpetual present that, uninterrupted by thought, is 
“dreary and depressive.”865  Though we have seen that human reason must itself 
be seen as an animal drive, we have also seen that to see the human as an eidos 
possessed of certain fundamental capacities is to trap what we call human in a 
state much like this perpetual present.  It is reflection that might serve to 
interrupt this cycle and so propel humans toward their transformation,866 and for 
this reflection concepts are necessary.  However, in order for this reflection to 
displace rather than reinforce the conceptual capture of human identity, it needs 
to stem from an experience of the non-identity of the human, which was found to 
be the animal, or animality.  It is for this reason that Adorno, in conversation 
with Horkheimer, will claim that although our “animal phase” can no longer be 
retrieved, animals might nevertheless “teach us what happiness is.”  To this, 
Horkheimer responds that freedom is to “achieve the condition of an animal at 
the level of reflection,” which he links to the possibility of no longer having to 
work.867  Adorno further refines this point in a later conversation, stating: 
“Philosophy exists in order to redeem what you see in the look of an animal,” 
which he links to the negation of the interests of self-preservation.868 
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In these passages, we see the animal as a symbol of what is blocked by the 
concept of humanity, but its redemption requires both conceptual thinking, and 
the transformation of society.  Specifically, this transformation would be one to 
end the struggle for self-preservation in which the human was constituted, and 
that formed the ground on which our interests have been discernible and the 
organization of our lives through labor has depended.  The animal in this sense, 
what is seen in its gaze, is the possibility of living a life unsubordinated to 
instrumental interests.  It is for this reason that “Utopia goes disguised in the 
creatures,”869 in animal life, for the lives of animals are without human purpose, 
and so not directed toward necessary ends organized beneath the banner of 
exchange.  In this sense, what the animal reveals is the possibility of 
individuality, that hallmark of the most definitively human, whose gross parody 
is thought to be for whom modern Western societies are organized.870 
 The possibility of this individuality and its denial are visible in the tiger 
“endlessly pacing back and forth in his cage,” 871 and its promise can be found in 
zoological gardens, which Adorno claims are like the bourgeois equivalent of 
Noah’s Ark, preparing for the flood that the bourgeoisie itself precipitates.  The 
zoological garden, and the imagination it stirs, exhibits the hope that animals 
might survive “the wrong” done to them by humans, and so “give rise to a better 
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species, one that finally makes a success of life”872—a hope that likewise reflects 
the human desire for the end of its capture.  It is in fact this human capture to 
which Adorno alludes when he writes that the eyes of apes “seem objectively to 
mourn that they are not human,”873 for insofar as humans are no less trapped in a 
form of life they take to be the measure of good, they might only recognize their 
own capture through the capture of other animals.   
In this way, we might liken humanity to the stupidity [Dummheit] of 
which Adorno and Horkheimer write in the concluding fragment of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.  “Stupidity is a scar,” that “marks a spot where the awakening 
play of muscles has been inhibited instead of fostered”: it marks “the points 
where hope has come to a halt.”874  Adorno and Horkheimer take the feeler of the 
snail, vulnerably stretching out into the world in curiosity, as their “emblem of 
intelligence,” for it is only in seeking out new directions in this manner that the 
animals that exist came to be as they are, and it is only insofar as extending 
further into this beyond is repulsed that they must remain as they are, continuing 
along the same beaten paths.  Self-same humanity might in this way be seen as 
the emblem of stupidity, the ossification of intelligence that would turn away 
from the possibility of a new form of life dawning, a form which, through the 
“feeler” of intelligence, of reflection, “might emerge from the clearly formed 
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species to which the individual creature belongs.”875  Reconciled humanity, then, 
represents a state wherein humanity has laid down its humanity, where the 
particular traits thought to be definitively human and those considered to be 
common with other animals have been drawn upon such as to bring about a new 
form of life.  Though the coring of human meaning by enlightened modernity has 
reduced the “divine parody” of humanity to its animality, it is here in our 
animality that hope persists, for only in “the feeble tail-wagging of a dog” might 
“the ideal of nothingness evaporate.”876  That is, only our animality can cure the 
nihilism that has reduced humans to animality, and only as some new kind of 
animal might reconciled humanity become a positive reality, and so leave the 
dynamism of struggle behind.   
Perhaps the most concise statement of this utopian shedding of human 
dynamism is to be found in the aphorism entitled Sur l’eau in Minima Moralia.  
There Adorno speculates upon the possible ends of a utopian “true society,” 
claiming that the insistence on the positing of ends and the bustling mobilization 
to meet them is a reflection of bourgeois values and the concept of nature these 
presuppose: dynamism is itself an “anthropological reflex of the laws of 
production.”877  Against the natural persistence of dynamism, Adorno imagines a 
world were humans are without want, and whose own enjoyment is thus 
transformed beyond its present manner of organization and maximization.  
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Rather than throwing themselves into “the conquest of strange stars,” such a 
humanity might be content in an animal existence, “lying on the water and 
looking peacefully at the sky.”878  This, Adorno suggests, would be true peace, the 
“eternal peace” of a “fulfilled utopia”—one that is free not only of socio-political 
domination, but one free even of the compulsion that inheres in what we consider 
the natural psychological structure of humanity.879  In order to grasp the two 
layers of the transformation involved in such a utopia, of society and of the 
individual, Adorno pairs two wildly different texts: Maupassant’s account of 
sailing between St. Tropez and Monte Carlo, Sur l’eau, from which the aphorism 
takes its name, and Kant’s philosophical sketch, “Perpetual Peace,” referenced by 
Adorno toward the end of the same aphorism.  Together these texts form a 
constellation whose particular combination of terms, like the lock of Adorno’s 
safe-deposit box, serves to fly open to the possibility that would otherwise remain 
hidden.880  These texts, and the relation between them Adorno constructs, are 
worth examining in greater detail.881 
                                                     
878 MM, A100, 156-157. 
879 Though Chrostowska claims the relation here between utopia and animality cannot be taken literally, it 
might be asked here exactly what “literally” would mean in this context.  Though Adorno does indeed rely 
on simile to illustrate that life in his utopia would be experienced like animals experience it, even a 
humanity transformed to some other kind of animal would still be a particular kind of animal undoubtedly 
different from other animals as apes, dogs, and porpoises are different from one another.  Why this would 
mean that the subject of Adorno’s utopia would not literally be some kind of animal is unclear.  See S.D. 
Chrostowska, “Thought Woken by Memory,” New German Critique 118 Vol.40.1 (2013), 110n61. 
880 Recall ND, 163; “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 35. 
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attempt here.  Moreover, his interpretation of the reference to Maupassant depends on an episode in the 
1876 version of the story, rather than the story Maupassant published under the same title in 1888.  In the 
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As its title indicates, Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace” is a kind of theoretical 
plan for securing lasting peace, here understood principally as that between 
states. To briefly summarize the most important points of this essay to my 
present discussion, Kant claims that war is a result of the lawless condition in 
which states and their interests exist in opposition to each other, and that this 
condition would be ended with the establishment of a world republic wherein 
each state, like an individual in the state of nature, would renounce the 
lawlessness of their pure freedom and so bring themselves beneath the yoke of 
public coercion, or international law.  However, Kant claims that this solution is 
unlikely because it runs contrary to the “will of the nations” and their own 
understanding of their particular rights—that is, their commitment to the 
sovereignty of their own state and its particular laws.882  Consequently, Kant 
advances a kind of second-best solution, one that might take men as they are, 
and laws as they might be.   
Kant’s second-best solution is to establish a federation for the promotion 
of peace that would aim to end all war by securing the sovereign rights of 
individual states, though without binding them to the coercive power of a higher 
                                                                                                                                                              
1876 version, the peaceful experience of being on the water suddenly turns to terror as the sailor finds his 
boat caught on something below the surface and rendered unmovable.  He regains his composure after his 
boat is dislodged only to discover later that it had been the corpse of an old woman with a stone tied around 
her neck that had weighed down his anchor.  For his part, Adorno makes no attempt to clarify which 
version of Sur l’eau his own appropriation refers.  I base my reading below on the 1888 version and the 
account of animality therein, though the experience of peace as dependent or bound up with the suffering of 
others persists in both versions, thus requiring the mediation of Kant, I argue.  See Schweppenhäuser, 
Theodor W. Adorno, 87-89.   
882 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 104-105. 
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law, as would a world republic.  Kant envisions this pacific federation as 
balancing the power-seeking and self-serving inclinations of states against one 
another: each would be held to recognize the sovereign rights of other states and 
so abstain from waging war upon them, for fear of losing recognition of its own 
sovereign rights, and so being attacked in turn.  In this way, “peace is created and 
guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry.”883 No longer 
dependent on moral improvement, but relying instead on the power of nature 
and the inclinations Kant thinks it has given human beings, such an arrangement 
would accommodate even “a nation of devils,” so long as these devils were 
sufficiently rational to understand how this arrangement promoted their own 
particular interests.884 
While the reading of Adorno I have pursued above places him in 
agreement with Kant that “perpetual peace” must be the goal toward which 
humanity strives, and that this peace must inevitably be rooted in something like 
natural inclinations and require the transformation of political institutions, 
Adorno’s turn toward the animality of humanity keeps him from a full 
endorsement of Kant’s position. Kant’s theorization of the possibility of perpetual 
peace depends on an understanding of the human being as a creature divided 
between its free will and the capacity for reason, on the one hand, and the 
mechanism of its nature on the other.  Consequently, while the world republic 
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requires that humans cultivate morality by aligning their particular wills with the 
universal exigencies of reason and adapting themselves to law, the pacific 
federation organizes human life such that nothing more is required of human 
beings than that the mechanism of their nature pursue the course it is bound to 
pursue.  However, for Adorno this arrangement means Kant has bought peace at 
the price of freedom, for he makes human nature the basis of his political 
recommendations, rather than seeing it to be part of the mechanisms of coercion.   
Insofar as Adorno sees what we consider natural to be historically 
produced, to follow the blindly mechanical workings of one’s nature is to 
acquiesce to the compulsions that animate one’s society at a particular point in 
history, and which are required for the perpetuation of socio-political 
domination.  We might say there is peace in Kant’s pacific federation, perhaps, 
but it is the peace of the vanquished and unfree.  Kant’s world republic fares little 
better: here freedom is found only insofar as one is capable of subordinating 
one’s natural inclinations to those of the whole.  Elsewhere Kant candidly puts 
this process of adapting one’s particularity to the necessary universality in terms 
of the human being requiring “a master to break his self-will and force him to 
obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free.” Or more bluntly: 
“man is an animal who needs a master.”885  As we have seen, Adorno considers 
such statements to be the anthropological reflexes of social domination, and for 
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this reason speculates that a free humanity will be free even of the will.886  In this 
light, Adorno’s turn toward the non-identical of the human, the animal, can be 
seen as an attempt to draw upon Kant’s insights regarding the possibility of a 
perpetual peace without having to sacrifice freedom.  To this end, he requires an 
experience of freedom that is animal in the sense of being unsubordinated to the 
exigencies of the will, and yet something other than the compulsive activity of 
natural mechanism.  Adorno finds such an experience in Maupassant’s Sur l’eau. 
 In the 1888 version of Sur l’eau, Maupassant recalls a leisurely voyage by 
sail between St. Tropez and Monte-Carlo, reflecting on everything from the wind, 
war, and human nature and society, all of which he prefaces with the disclaimer 
that his trip provided him with the opportunity to see nothing more than “water, 
sun, cloud, and rocks,” which gave him no more than the simple thoughts one 
has, borne “drowsily along on the cradle of the waves.”887 Not only does this 
preface recall Adorno’s utopian image of an animal “lying on the water, and 
looking peacefully at the sky,” but Maupassant’s critical view of humanity and his 
celebration of animal solidarity resonate deeply with Adorno’s turn to animality.  
In characteristic hyperbole, Maupassant claims one would need to be “blind and 
besotted by stupidity and vanity” to think that one is “anything more than an 
animal.”  We human beings are, for Maupassant, “shut-up, imprisoned inside 
ourselves” and our vain sense of superiority: in reality, the human being is but “a 
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two-legged insect.”888  It is this vanity that blinds us to our own barbarity, most 
clearly visible in the efforts humans exert waging war.  For these efforts, 
Maupassant writes that “[a]mong all the species, the human race is the most 
frightful [affreuse] of all,”889 thus performing an inversion of Sophocles’ choral 
ode to the deinos of anthropos in Antigone: through this affreuse, lacking as it is 
the double meaning of both fear and wonder found in deinos, Maupassant 
refuses to celebrate human power, finding in it instead only cause for contempt. 
In rejecting humanity in this way, Maupassant can only feel himself to 
have escaped the dreariness of existence by hurling his body “like an animal” into 
the pleasures of life, loving the sky, forests, rocky crags, tall grass, and clear water 
like a bird, a wolf, a chamois, a horse, and a fish without being uplifted—that is, 
without finding in them his humanity, but rather loving these only as a “brute 
beast.”890  It is this love that Maupassant feels for these aspects of the world that 
bring him a feeling of peace and solidarity for other animals, and this love grows 
from his own experience of himself as an animal non-identical to his humanity.  
It is this animal experience of peace as solidarity that is missing from Kant’s 
perpetual peace and its rational cessation of hostilities.  Yet this is not to make 
Maupassant into a simple critic of Kant, for in placing Sur l’eau in constellation 
with “Perpetual Peace,” Adorno also delivers Maupassant the animal to be broken 
by Kant the master.  Though Maupassant spurns the aristocratic love of battle, 
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there remain three elements of his misanthropy and celebration of animality that 
echo the aristocratic alliance with animals found in the world of poetic myth that 
Adorno uses Kant to disarm: a disinterest in questions of equality; a belief in the 
unchanging nature of human animality and progress; and a sense of the 
hopelessness of politics. 
With respect to equality, Maupassant’s aristocratic sensibilities allow him 
to praise the life of solitude despite the company of two sailors who obey his 
orders, fantasize about a luxurious life including the ownership of slaves and a 
harem, and complain about the ugliness of peasants.891  Insofar as Kant insists 
that the possibility of perpetual peace is tied to Republican government and the 
equality made possible therein,892 the importance Kant places on establishing 
political institutions provides a critique of the experience of animality that would 
fail to translate itself into a politics.  With respect to politics and the question of 
progress, Maupassant claims that “man never changes,” and for this reason 
despite the evils of war and the monstrosities perpetuated by governments of all 
stripes he readily acknowledges, Maupassant can only imagine that humans will 
continue to bear the burden of these “hateful customs” and “criminal 
prejudices.”893  Like in the Sur l’eau of 1876, Maupassant finds the experience of 
freedom toward the object, of peace with nature, inseparably linked to human 
misery. 
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In opposition to the endless turning of the mythic wheel of peace and 
violence, Kant links the compulsion of mechanistic nature with progress, arguing 
that the conflicts brought about through the natural inclinations of human beings 
can be turned toward human progress and the possibility of a perpetual peace, 
even if Adorno rejects certain details of this conception.894  Moreover, for Kant, 
this progress necessarily involves a kind of political solution to the evils of war in 
a way that Maupassant cannot grasp.  In this way, Kant serves to ‘break’ 
Maupassant’s animality, less in the sense of domestication than in the sense of 
showing it to be radically incomplete without political direction that would make 
the experience of this animality more than one only available to some at the 
expense of others. For his part, Maupassant’s animality shows Kant’s conception 
of peace to lack the experience that would make his perpetual peace something 
other than empty form, and allow for a freedom Kant’s peace would not permit—
a freedom without coercion.   
In this sense, the lock is sprung, and the utopian content revealed: we are 
returned to a concept of a political animal, though this animal can only be the 
product of political struggle which ceases to be struggle, the utopian possibility 
that guides and might emerge from political struggle but lies beyond it, not the 
basic set of capacities that serve unchanging to condition this struggle.  In placing 
Kant and Maupassant in constellation, Adorno works against the tendency that 
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sees politics as a necessarily human affair, as it is in Kant, or that sees animality 
as a kind of escape from politics, as it is in Maupassant.  Both sides of this 
tendency, it might be said, depend on the flattened understanding of Aristotle 
that sees the human being as a political animal, to the exclusion of other animals.  
In bringing Kant and Maupassant together, Adorno returns to the question of the 
political animal posed by Aristotle, but now transformed: the problem is no 
longer how to establish the political supremacy of what is best in humanity, but of 
rescuing animality from its clutches, a rescue that would entail a radical 
transformation of humanity. Through Adorno’s conception of reconciled 
humanity we see that a political animal is what we might become, not what we 
always already were.  If Homer’s Odyssey chronicles the primeval history of the 
subject in its return into its most fully developed form, humanity, then 
Maupassant’s voyage, read in relation to Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” allows us to 
glimpse a voyage that does not return to its source, but arrives rather at a foreign 
destination.   
If reconciled humanity was itself the concept whose negativity served to 
preserve the negativity of negative humanity, and glimpses of which were 
revealed in the resistance to force, then even the resistance of negative humanity, 
in its striving towards reconciled humanity, was already the animal non-identity 
of inhuman personality.  In this way, the realization of reconciled humanity, the 
creation of an animal heretofore unseen, must require the cultivation of animality 
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toward its necessary political direction.  For the utopian animal that is reconciled 
humanity to become a positive reality, we must therefore indeed learn to live as 
good animals—we need a practice of animality directed toward the possibility of 
future transformation.  The relation of this moral vocation to politics, and the 
place of art in this relation, will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Fifteen: The Politics of an Aesthetic Animal 
 
In a now infamous note to his lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Alexandre Kojève claims that with the realization of the struggles that animate 
history, the human as Action, that is, the dynamic negating of the given, would 
become superfluous.  This cessation of Action would mean the end of revolutions, 
wars, and even philosophy: the human being would survive itself, in a sense, 
remaining alive as an animal now in harmony with nature, no longer a Subject 
opposed to an Object.  Of the lives of these post-historical animals, Kojève writes 
provocatively: 
If Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must also 
become purely ‘natural’ again.  Hence it would have to be admitted that 
after the end of History, men would construct their edifices and works of 
art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform 
musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like 
young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts.895 
 
The image painted here shares an affinity with the animal aspect of Adorno’s 
speculations upon utopia; however, Kojève goes on to revise this position in two 
important ways.  Rather than seeing this state of post-historical animality as one 
lying in a communist future, as he claims to have thought in 1946, Kojève would 
come to believe that history had in fact already ended with “Robespierre-
Napoleon,” and that the subsequent world wars, revolutions, and anti-colonial 
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struggles for independence served simply to align the rest of the world with the 
basic system of recognition attained by its vanguard in Revolutionary France.   
However, this revision does not signal Kojève’s dismissal of his claim 
regarding the return to animality.  Rather, Kojève claims this return to animality 
is already an accomplished fact, for life is no longer organized around the 
existential crisis of recognition that defined humanity, but rather has become 
focused instead upon raising living standards, the acquisition of consumer goods, 
and the general satisfaction of “animal” needs seen in both the United States and 
the post-war communist bloc.  For Kojève, “the Russians and the Chinese are 
only Americans who are still poor but are rapidly proceeding to get richer.”896 
Insofar as American capitalism is thought to be more capable of providing these 
creature comforts, the American way of life is the life most suited to the post-
historical period—that is, it is the most suited to an animal way of life, devoid of 
metaphysical concerns. 
 The second revision Kojève made after a visit to Japan in 1959.  Claiming 
that Japan had already experienced three centuries of post-historical existence, 
rather than returning to the kind of animality found in American gratification, 
the Japanese had adopted instead a kind of aesthetic “Snobbery.”897   That is, the 
Japanese had adopted formalized values rooted in aesthetic tastes rather than the 
simple pursuit of animal satisfaction, thus making them human insofar as the 
                                                     
896 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 161n6. 
897 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 161-162n6 
 
 
478 
separation between form and content maintains the subject-object distinction, 
yet empty of the historical content that characterized human struggle in the West.  
Rather than returning to animality, then, in Japan the human persists—but as a 
style, rather than a substance. 
While it may be tempting here to simply dismiss, as most do, Kojève’s 
brand of high-altitude history, a perspective from which the complex political 
entanglements represented in the innovations and failures of Robespierre and 
Napoleon appear as a single event separated only by a hyphen, or that sees the 
tumult and horror of the twentieth century to be no more than the worrying of 
details whose essential realization proceeded them by a century.  Moreover, such 
grand brush strokes may appear to be out of line in a discussion of Adorno, 
turned as he was to contact with objects in all their micrological detail.  However, 
Kojève’s speculations on the end of history, its relation to animality, and the 
revisions of his position, all present important insights for my discussion of 
Adorno and the animality of reconciled humanity. 
 Kojève’s speculations not only posit a utopia lying at the end of the history 
of struggle wherein the human has become a different kind of animal than what it 
always had been, but he then complicates this utopia by claiming it to already 
exist, to “force” this reconciliation, as it were. But Kojève accomplishes this 
forced reconciliation only at the price of producing an excessive remainder, the 
Japanese example, thus making his post-historical animal utopia only one among 
 
 
479 
at least two alternatives.  Thus it appears that for Kojève one might choose to be 
an animal by adopting ways of life congruent with the satisfaction of animal 
needs, such as that supposedly found in the United States (or Russia/China!) or 
one might choose to be human, by insisting on living a life mediated by certain 
formal aesthetic strictures.  
By choosing, here, I must be clear: Kojève is not suggesting that one might 
directly choose between human and animal at an individual level, as if these were 
simply lifestyles that might coexist within the same society; rather, the choice 
here is a political one, concerning the structure of society and the form of life it 
makes possible.  The distinction between human and animal is here a question of 
how one would live, not simply in terms of the moral decisions that inform one’s 
daily activities, but in the political organization that enables these decisions and 
makes possible different modes of life.  In this way, we find Kojève’s speculations 
on animality to also point toward the Aristotelian problematic and the particular 
way it relates ethics and politics: that is, the question of aligning the best life and 
the political organization that might sustain it.  Though these conclusions, in 
bringing us back to Aristotle, would appear to raise serious problems for Kojève’s 
claim that history and philosophy have come to an end,898 for Adorno we might 
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see this return as a challenge to the idea that reconciled humanity would be an 
animal other than human, and how this animal of the future might be linked to 
our animality in the present.   
In taking our animality as the starting point of the political possibilities 
available today, and asking how one might live such as to say one had been a 
good animal, Adorno is suggesting the kind of moral cultivation that produces 
individuals both alike and unlike the manner advocated by Aristotle.  Rather than 
cultivating those potentials thought to be most definitively human according to 
their natural distribution, Adorno, in recognizing that this nature is itself the 
socio-political result of the vicissitudes of history, shows that to cultivate one’s 
humanity in this way is to reconcile oneself to society as it exists and the 
domination it perpetuates.  Consequently, if one is to oppose this order, and 
strive instead to resist its inhumanity and so work to bring about the global 
subject that might transform society such that reconciled humanity—a new 
animal—might come into being, one must cultivate one’s animality.  Cultivating 
animality for Adorno is not simply about the satisfaction of animal needs in the 
sense given these by Kojève,899 but rather concerns how we might orient thinking 
and acting in ways that oppose those enthralled to positive humanity, to the 
                                                     
899 Indeed, Hullot-Kentor claims that Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory is a book “written in utter opposition to 
what we [Americans] are.”  That this book tends be either polemically rejected or “rehabilitated” in various 
ways, typically rendering it less austere and more friendly to pop-culture and the culinary appropriation of 
art, speaks of the allergy of American “animality” to the kind of animality Adorno would cultivate.  See 
Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Adorno, 195.  
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humanity that thinks itself already to have arrived.  Elucidating this process of 
cultivation, as a kind of moral resistance linked to politics through art, is the task 
of this chapter.   
Adorno, I argue, like Aristotle, sees the possible actualizations of one’s 
animality to be linked to the mimetic comportment facilitated by the arts. 
However, for Adorno it is through the arts that the moral resistance to humanity 
is made possible, and it is through the arts that this moral resistance might 
become political in the sense of precipitating change—goals, which, as we have 
seen, were not Aristotle’s.  However, mimesis alone is not enough, for while the 
persistence of the mimetic impulse ensures that humans might become animals 
other than the ones they are, mimesis also serves an important role in making 
humans human in the first place, and continues in this role in reproducing the 
human as it is.  Consequently, the mimetic impulse needs to be disrupted and set 
upon a different course: it needs to enter into a new relation with reason if it is to 
produce the human as some other animal.   
The moral experience of this disruption, the moral impulse to something 
other than humanity, is what Adorno calls the addendum (Hinzutretende), the 
corporal side of the will that relates reflex and activity.  The addendum, as a kind 
of liminal space between the will and reflex, volition and reaction, is a kind of 
animal impulse entwined with the body, as the resistance of animality to the 
imposition of human aims upon the body.  In this way, the addendum both 
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makes possible and undermines human thought and activity.  Orienting thought 
and action around the addendum is to attempt to transform humanity through its 
animality, to orient the identity-producing activity of mimesis around the rupture 
of the non-identical in human constitution.   
There are two sides to cultivating animality through the addendum, and 
both of which require for Adorno the intervention of the arts.  The first side is 
what I call the receptive experience of artworks, which involves relating the 
passive moment of the “shudder,” the aesthetic analogue of the addendum, to the 
active moment of reflection in such a way as to resist the re-constitution of the 
human subject, and so to persist in one’s animality. This receptive experience, 
insofar as it involves the critical resistance to the violence and domination upon 
which the empirical world is built, I call moral.  The second side is what I call the 
productive experience of artworks, which involves building on this reflection 
through practical activity.  Here reason is deployed through technical procedures 
in order to invent new ways of expressing animal experience.  Productively 
experiencing artworks thus involves their creation in accordance with moral 
experience, and where these artworks serve to contribute to the creation of a 
subject who might threaten the established order of the community, this 
experience can be called political.  Together the receptive and productive 
experience of artworks serve to realign the relation between mimesis and reason 
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in what Adorno calls “aesthetic comportment,” the subject of which, seen in this 
light, cannot be considered human, but rather a new kind of animal. 
 Adorno’s attention to the experience fostered by artworks through both 
their reception and production is thus not only closely bound up with the 
releasing of animality from its human confines, but with elucidating the specific 
moral and political dimensions of this project.  It is specifically the latter, the 
productive-political dimension of artistic experience, that has been overlooked in 
studies of Adorno’s aesthetics.900  Adorno’s account of the receptive experience of 
artworks reverses the Aristotelian attempt to use the practice of theoria to 
reconcile animal to human by creating instead a dissonance from which the 
animal might resist the human.  However, Adorno requires a productive-political 
dimension in order to break from Aristotle’s focus on the effects of art, and hence 
the division between those who embody the (human) ideal, and those who can 
only recognize this ideal.  In theorizing a productive-political experience of 
artworks, Adorno abolishes the inequality produced and reconciled in Aristotle’s 
poetics, between the division of labor between artist and critic, and with it the 
possibility of drawing an analogy between the artistic avant-garde and a political 
vanguard.  The importance of avant-garde art, or as I call it here, simply new art, 
remains, but it is the prerogative of all to experience it both receptively and 
                                                     
900 For example, Zuidervaart’s classic study overlooks this dimension when he argues that Adorno 
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productively.  Though Adorno himself does not explicitly advocate that all 
become artists, his aesthetic theory removes the obstacles that ensure the 
division of labor that produces artists and critics as systematically distinct 
subjects.  His aesthetic theory thus points in this direction, even if it does not 
announce it with a megaphone. 
In this way, Adorno’s taking up of the Aristotelian problematic concerning 
the relation between humans and animals, on the one hand, and art and politics, 
on the other, is not a return to or even a perpetuation of Aristotle.  It is not, as 
Brassier would have it, a regressive slip into the mythic aspects of Aristotelianism 
that the enlightenment and modern scientific discovery have long outflanked. 
Rather, it is the utopian recovery of the fragments of Aristotelianism that would 
allow for him to speak to us from a future wherein the political animal has 
become an aesthetic animal—an animal no longer human.  In this sense, Adorno 
provides the determinate negation of Aristotle, such that the promise made in 
Aristotle’s philosophical enterprise is preserved in a transformed constellation of 
possibilities, unlike the abstract negation attempted by Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
who would have done with Aristotle and his problematic through their reversal.  I 
will begin by examining Adorno’s thoughts on mimesis, morality and politics, and 
their relation to the addendum before turning to the receptive and productive 
experiences of artwork that make up aesthetic comportment. 
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Mimesis 
Mimesis, of course, comes to us from the Ancient Greek.  It is thus a foreign 
word, and all the more so for being part of a dead language—that is, there is no 
one living for whom mimesis is not foreign.  Treating mimesis as a foreign word 
according to what Adorno has to say about the role of foreign words in language 
means that we should see Adorno’s use of mimesis to be an assault on the 
pretense of language to organic unity: when Adorno writes ‘mimesis,’ he is not 
simply referencing a tradition of aesthetic thought connected, in some way, to 
Aristotle and the Greeks, but he is at once haunting his own text with the 
destruction of that world—with the fall of democratic Athens and its absorption 
by the Hellenic empire, and the unfulfilled promises these might represent.901  
For Adorno, Aristotle’s is an aesthetics of effect, in collusion with the quietist 
tendencies toward privatization in Hellenism and the idea that art must serve as a 
kind of “surrogate satisfaction,” but at the same time it preserves a conception of 
individuality that might be turned against these.902  Insofar as mimesis is a 
central concept to Aristotle’s aesthetics, it might be said to display this same 
duality: mimesis is both culpable in the production of the world as it is, yet 
retains something irreducible to the world as it is, and which might be solicited to 
transform the world as it is. 
                                                     
901 Cf. Edith Hall, “Is there a Polis in Aristotle’s Poetics?” 304-305. 
902 AT, 202; 238; “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” CM, 267.  
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 In the presentation of Aristotle’s conception of mimesis above, I argued 
that although Aristotle appears to suggest that mimesis is a fundamental human 
capacity, one of those most definitive in distinguishing humans from other 
animals, its humanity, or its entwinement with other human capacities, can only 
be recognized through that which mimesis has itself produced, such that these 
other human capacities cannot be known, and so cannot be said to exist, prior to 
mimetic production.  In this way, it was argued that mimesis serves to crystallize 
the various capacities that come to be taken as the human ideal and measure of 
what is definitively human.  Insofar as capacities similar but non-identical to the 
human ideal are frequently called animal, it is really a set of certain animal 
capacities that become human through mimesis, thus making mimesis a 
transformative process, not simply one wherein pre-existent potentials become 
actual.  Though Adorno does not devote any specific text to the examination of 
Aristotle’s conception of mimesis, his objections to other elements of Aristotle’s 
aesthetics, and indeed, his insistence on its double character, can be understood 
as the result of Adorno turning a historicized conception of mimesis against 
Aristotle and the tradition strung together by those who would be his 
descendents. This appropriation of Aristotle comes to Adorno not simply through 
the channels established through the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, but 
also through somewhat more occult sources: those of Walter Benjamin. 
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 In Benjamin’s fragment “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Aristotle is both 
present and absent, channeled as if through telepathy or séance, such that what 
speaks through Benjamin’s text bears a resemblance to Aristotle, but is not 
identical to him.903  Most explicitly, the title of Benjamin’s piece invokes Aristotle 
by calling mimesis a faculty (Vermögen): like the English faculty, the German 
Vermögen refers to potency, potential, capacity, ability, and power, all of which 
capture something of Aristotle’s dunamis, and likewise has been used to translate 
it.904  In so linking mimesis to the psychological structure of human being, 
Aristotle’s shadow falls over Benjamin’s fragment.  Moreover, Aristotle’s voice 
reverberates in Benjamin’s claim that “[n]ature creates similarities” through 
mimicry, and that it is the human being that possesses the “highest capacity for 
producing similarities.”  The human being is endowed by nature to produce 
“similarities,” to mimic the world around and so “become and behave like 
something else,” and is most natural in doing so.905  In this way Benjamin takes 
as his starting point the rudiments of Aristotelian mimesis, along with the 
relation it would establish between nature, art, and human beings: humans are 
endowed by nature with certain potentials or faculties, which, as we have seen, 
require artifice in order to become actual and so display that which is naturally 
                                                     
903 Interestingly, in a letter to Gretel Adorno, Benjamin drew a connection between this fragment and an 
essay of Freud’s on telepathy.  See Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 238. 
904 See for instance Nikomachische Ethik, trans. Eugen Rolfes (Leipzig: Meiner, 1911).  
905 Walter Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(New York: Schocken, 1978), 333. 
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human.  The goal of artifice is thus the actualization of nature, and so art must 
aim to mimic nature.  However, as we have seen, what Aristotle calls nature is 
already historically produced, already mediated by artifice, though he is without 
the conceptual tools to express this.  It is here where Benjamin’s modifications of 
Aristotle begin. 
 Benjamin writes that the mimetic faculty, though natural, has a history, 
claiming that “neither mimetic powers nor mimetic objects remain the same in 
the course of thousands of years.”906  Both natural and historical, mimesis is here 
divided between the explicitly natural component, the “mimetic powers” thought 
to inhere in human beings, and the explicitly historical component, “mimetic 
objects,” which might be considered both those things that one might mimic, and 
the formal rules or general shape taken by the exercise of the mimetic faculty in 
mimicking these things.  As children humans learn to exercise their natural 
powers of mimesis through play, but this play is historically mediated both 
through the kinds of games—the sorts of play—in which children engage, and the 
particular things they would mimic: the shopkeeper, the teacher, the windmill, 
the train.  As children grow they are assimilated to society mimetically, by 
reproducing its objects in their own activity, and in so doing society is both 
reproduced and transformed.  As society changes, new mimetic objects are 
produced that set the boundaries that organize the exercise of the mimetic 
                                                     
906 Ibid. 
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faculty.  The nature of the mimetic faculty thus exists only in its actualization in 
history, in mimetic objects, whose transformation precipitates transformation in 
the nature of the mimetic faculty.   
For Benjamin, however, mimetic objects are not all alike in relation to the 
mimetic faculty: some objects demand more of it, encouraging the faculty to 
develop more broadly, to increase its power, while others demand less, and the 
mimetic current reduces to a trickle.  A powerful mimetic faculty is one capable of 
forging creative connections between widely disparate objects or phenomena, 
which Benjamin calls “nonsensuous” similarities.907  Such similarities persisted 
in past societies in the form of magical correspondences and occult practices, but 
the demands of the understanding of clarity, precision, and causality imposed by 
Enlightenment rationality have served to radically alter the ability to establish 
nonsensuous similarities.  For Benjamin, the question thus becomes: are the 
changes wrought by the Enlightenment and modernity bringing about the decay 
of the mimetic faculty, or its transformation?  Benjamin spends the rest of this 
short fragment trying to locate evidence that might indicate the latter, alighting 
on the relation the mimetic faculty has long established with language, even 
claiming that language is “the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most 
complete archive of nonsensuous similarity,”908 and suggesting that it is through 
                                                     
907 Ibid., 334. 
908 Ibid., 336. 
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its “admittance” and expression in language that mimetic production managed to 
rid itself of its ties to magic.   
This last claim is the most significant: if mimesis not only lives on in 
language but it is through its particular relation to language that magic was 
“liquidated,” then magic and the occult on one hand, and Enlightenment and 
modernity, on the other, might all be distilled as different combinations of 
particular linguistic conventions and innovations.  This insight does not suggest 
that the difference between magical correspondences and Enlightenment 
rationality is simply their respective ways of using language, however, for both 
attempt to read their own “script” in objective phenomena, thus making them 
both ways of establishing nonsensuous similarities: or in other words, thus 
making them both forms of mimesis.  In this way, Benjamin’s’ fragment appears 
to curl back upon itself, like a snake biting its own tail—the very search for the 
possibility of a future life for mimesis through the vicissitudes of society arrives at 
the conclusion that mimesis is itself the very possibility of its own vicissitudes.  
The mimetic faculty is revealed to occupy a kind of foundational status in the 
language, thought, and the reproduction of society, such as to be considered, 
though Benjamin himself does not explicitly push this far, a transcendental 
condition of their possibility.  Benjamin’s attempt to historicize Aristotelian 
mimesis has thus accomplished this aim only at the price of making mimesis a 
permanent, if perpetually changing, feature of history. 
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Though Adorno will not simply adopt Benjamin’s account of mimesis, and 
thus not quite follow Benjamin in his peculiar brand of “Marxist-Kantianism,”909 
this fragment will prove immensely important for Adorno.  Apart from building 
on the natural-historical perspective Adorno outlined in “The Idea of Natural-
History” a year earlier—in part already a response to other of Benjamin’s 
writings—Adorno will inherit three specific points from Benjamin’s discussion of 
mimesis that will inform his own. 1) Mimesis has contributed at a fundamental 
and largely unconscious level to making society what it is; 2) mimesis is internally 
mediated through its historical forms, thus it has been and still might be 
otherwise; and 3) the possibilities for mimetic transformation today exist within 
language, both in the sense of interpreting it such as to forge new 
correspondences between phenomena, and in the sense of finding new forms for 
expressing these correspondences.  It is especially in this last point that we find 
the beginnings of the theoretical importance of art for Adorno, for art makes 
possible a range of non-conceptual affinities, and is in certain ways much like a 
language.910 
With respect to where Adorno’s account of mimesis differs from 
Benjamin’s concerns the status of the subject-object distinction.  For Adorno, the 
permanence of transcendental conditions, even historically mediated 
transcendental conditions, have something of the mythological about them, of 
                                                     
909 Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude, 238. 
910 AT, 54; ND, 18; Cf. Adorno, “Music and Language,” in Quasi una Fantasia, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(London: Verso, 1998). 
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which he is deeply suspicious.  Benjamin’s account of mimesis as the dynamic 
interaction between a natural mimetic faculty (a mimetic subject) and historical 
mimetic objects theorizes mimesis in terms of the subject-object relation, and 
insofar as it treats this form of mimesis as a transcendental condition of 
language, thought, and history, makes this relation permanent.  As we have seen, 
Adorno’s turn toward the primacy of the object means acknowledging that the 
subject is also object; hence, the natural aspect of the mimetic faculty must be 
found to itself be an historical product.   
If the mimetic faculty is produced historically, then it is either the product 
of some other, pre-mimetic drive, or mimesis is not originally a faculty, but 
something else which only becomes describable in terms of inherent faculties 
insofar as it becomes captured in the subject-object relation.  Though these two 
possibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, Adorno adopts the latter 
strategy, and attempts to show mimesis to be a form of bodily comportment—an 
impulse [Impuls] rather than a faculty [Vermögen]911—that becomes tied up with 
concepts and identity-thinking as imitation [Nachahmung], through changes in 
what will become the human constitution.  In this way mimesis is non-identical 
to the conceptual order of identity, and as such Adorno would turn toward it, 
attempting to ‘make contact’ with the mimetic element of non-identity, as he does 
                                                     
911 It is also notable that Adorno again highlights the mediated—and hence non-foundational or originary—
character of this impulse in choosing the word Impuls, with its Latin root, rather than something “more 
German,” such as Drang, or Trieb, with its Freudian connotations, or even Gehlen’s Antrieb, which his 
translators also render as “impulse.”  See Gehlen, Man, 339. 
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animality.  However, Adorno sees two distinct possibilities leading from such 
contact: a regressive possibility, one where conceptual thought is shunned in 
favor of mimetic myth-making, and a progressive one, one that would serve to 
displace and re-formulate the conceptual order based on mimetic experience.  
Adorno’s commitment to some version of Enlightenment thinking leads him to 
attempt to theorize the possibility of the latter. 
Though Adorno claims that there is an “indelible mimetic element in all 
cognition and all human practice,”912 as noted in Chapter 13, mimesis is for 
Adorno the desire to make contact with the object prior to there being a clear 
distinction between the object to be contacted and the subject making contact; as 
such, the mimetic impulse is irreducible to the subject-object distinction, or its 
particular instantiation in the human subject.913  That is, while a mimetic impulse 
might be discernible in “all human practice,” this claim should not be seen to 
indicate that it is specifically or definitively human: mimesis is part of the other 
side of the conceptual order in which the human comes to be.  It is, in this sense, 
animal.  Yet it is the mimetic desire for contact that facilitates the grasping that is 
the violence of the conceptual order, and in which the human will emerge.  The 
desire for contact may propel one toward the object before there is a one to be 
propelled, but the one, the subject, is formed in this propulsion and contact, such 
as to become conscious through contact with the otherness of the object.  Where 
                                                     
912 ND, 150. 
913 Recall Horowitz, “Adorno and Emptiness,” 272. Cf. AT, 110; 329. 
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consciousness experiences the otherness of the object as a threat, as the human 
does the animal, there subject and object relate to each other antagonistically.  
The subject’s attempt to reduce the perceived threat posed by the object to the 
subject is accomplished through the identification of the object with a concept, 
thus giving concepts the instrumental function associated with the preservation 
of the subject.  
However, this displacement of mimesis by the conceptual order does not 
serve to eradicate mimesis.  Like Benjamin, Adorno holds that something of 
mimesis survives in the conceptual order,914  though his account of how it comes 
to inform that order differs based on the pre-subjective status of mimesis.  With 
Benjamin, we saw that it is through mimetic comportment that subjects become 
attached to the objects of their world: mimesis is what holds subjects and objects 
in thrall.   For Adorno, however, the mimetic pull serves to constellate objects in 
such a way as to make possible the subject that is—the subject is thus posterior to 
the constellation of mimetic objects.  Adorno will thus occasionally refer to the 
shape mimesis takes within the context of the subject-object relation in its 
reproduction of socio-political domination as imitation, rather than mimesis as 
such.915  The subjective release of objects, and so the possibility of their re-
constellation such as to produce a new kind of subject, must therefore involve 
                                                     
914 ND, 14; AT, 96. 
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162; GSB7, 243), that “mimetic comportment does not imitate something but rather makes itself like itself” 
(AT, 111); and that the “doctrine of imitation [Nachahmungslehre]” might be reversed (AT, 132; GSB7, 
199-200). 
 
 
495 
some kind of recovery of mimesis, of contact with the animality of the mimetic 
impulse against the reproduction of oneself as a human subject through the 
imitation of the objects given to imitate by one’s society.   
Yet, as noted above, Adorno is not trying to exchange the world of 
concepts for some primordial idea of mimesis, some pre-subjective relation to the 
world—his turn to animality is not reducible to a kind of nostalgia for the ape, or 
a celebration of the ‘primitive.’  There is no pre-subjective world, pristine and 
conceptless, to which return is possible, and attempts to animate such an idea 
can only result in gross parodies of un-reflexive nature, and a return to 
mythological thinking.  It is for this reason that Adorno will also on occasion 
employ mimesis pejoratively, referring to the “mimetic regression” involved in 
attempting to think the “Many” without subjective mediation, or the “cave of a 
long-past mimesis” into which thinkers like Heidegger would “crawl.”916  For 
Adorno, recovery of mimesis is not an attempt to invoke a past prior to the 
transcendental subject of humanity, but rather an attempt to invoke a future that 
lies past such a subject, one constituted through a new relation to our animality.  
Yet how might one intervene on the pull exuded by mimesis between subject and 
object, such as to break the spell that holds them in thrall?  What words might be 
spoken, or what experience might there be, which could possibly allow for the 
release of the social objects to which a given subject is mimetically attached?  And 
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perhaps most importantly: how might such a mimetic transformation of the 
subject be accomplished in the progressive manner Adorno envisions, one that 
would represent a sublation of the transcendental subject, as opposed to its 
repressive desublimation?917   
The beginning of an answer might be found in Adorno’s ideas on art and 
aesthetics.  Adorno claims not only that art is “a refuge for mimetic 
comportment,” but that art makes possible a semblance of the reconciliation of 
reason and mimesis.918  That is, artworks require both rational and mimetic 
comportment in their production, and demand mimetic and rational reception, 
both as what Benjamin called “mimetic objects,” and through their 
interpretation.  In constellating ratio and mimesis in this way, art demands that 
reason be reconciled to animal impulses, rather than their simple repression, 
while at once demanding that mimesis be directed toward rational ends, that is, 
the construction of a better world.  The artwork, through its adherence to its own 
formal principles distilled through a kind of antagonistic dialogue with its own 
history and the techniques upon which it draws, serves to put itself at a distance 
from the objects that make up its socio-political context—its material—and in 
winning this degree of autonomy, comes to resemble itself, rather than them.919  
In this way the artwork presents itself as an example of mimetic activity alienated 
                                                     
917 To borrow a term from Marcuse.  See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon, 1991), 
Ch.3. 
918 AT, 20; 54. 
919 AT, 104. 
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from the instrumental functions of imitation that serve to reproduce society as it 
is, a mimesis seeking contact with the nature that “does not yet in any way exist,” 
its “nonexistent” truth.920  Artworks might thus make possible a liberation of the 
mimetic impulse that would reverse the conceptual capture of imitation, 
compelling reality to imitate art, and making possible “the happiness of 
producing the world once over.”921   
In theorizing mimesis as central both to the production and reception of 
art, and to the reproduction of society and the possibility of its transformation, 
Adorno thus invests the very autonomy of art—that is, its fundamental distance 
from morality and politics—with moral and political weight.  Through its relation 
to mimesis, art has potentially radical and far reaching moral and political 
consequences, and these are in turn entwined with humanity and its future, along 
with the possibility of living in the present as if one were a good animal.  I turn 
now to these threads and their unwinding. 
 
Morality and Politics 
In taking animality as the starting point for the possibility of socio-political 
transformation and asking, with Adorno, how might one live such as to have been 
a good animal, it has been established that such a life, along with the desired 
socio-political transformation, are integrally connected to mimesis.  Adorno 
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theorizes mimesis as the comportment that serves to establish and reproduce the 
connection between social objects that makes a subject possible.  However, 
insofar as mimesis has been displaced or colonized by ratio, the subject produced 
through mimesis has been transformed into a transcendental human subject, one 
seen as the source of the web of social objects through which it is constituted, 
rather than their product.  Recovery of the animality of mimesis is therefore 
necessary to undermine the power of this subject, and the antagonism to others it 
requires to sustain itself.  Such a recovery, and the possibility of a reconciliation 
with reason rather than its rejection, are made possible through art, whose 
autonomy has for Adorno both important moral and political consequences.  It 
remains to elucidate what these consequences might be, and to this end, we must 
examine Adorno’s thoughts on morality and its relation to politics. 
 Though the growing literature on Adorno’s “ethics” has helped establish 
small niches for his work in a variety of disciplines, Adorno remains relatively 
neglected as a political thinker.  Part of the reason for this relative neglect might 
be that Adorno devotes little direct attention to the study of politics, even though 
it is difficult to find a work of his that is not touched by politics in some sense: 
indeed, Adorno claims that “politics is not a self-enclosed, isolated sphere,” but 
must be understood to be connected to all manner of social forces and their 
contest.922  However, and perhaps more controversially, we might suggest that it 
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is precisely this emphasis on Adorno’s “ethics” that has served to obscure the 
political dimension of his insights, insofar as these would examine his ethics 
independent of political consequence.923  Adorno himself is skeptical of “ethics,” 
preferring instead the term “morality,” precisely for its perceived relation to 
politics. 
 In his lectures on moral philosophy, Adorno draws a distinction between 
morality and ethics through an appeal to their respective etymologies.  Morality, 
from the Latin mores, concerns the customs of a community, both the explicit 
and implicit rules that govern the common relations between people.924  Ethics, 
on the other hand, comes from the Greek ethos, which Adorno considers to be 
something more or less equivalent to nature, referring “to the way you are, the 
way you are made,” though for the Greeks this also concerned one’s fate and one’s 
relation to the gods.925  To live ethically then, is to live according to one’s nature, 
according to one’s fate, and so to live according to the laws of nature or the gods, 
                                                     
923 Contra Schweppenhäuser, who acknowledges Adorno’s preference for the term morality, yet 
nevertheless reduces this and moral philosophy to “ethics.” See Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, “Adorno’s 
Negative Moral Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, 331-332. 
924 These mores can be found both in the word Moral (or Moralität/Moralismus), and in the Sitte or 
‘custom’ of Sittlichkeit (PM, 9). That Adorno places Moral and Sittlichkeit together in opposition to ethics 
(Ethik), might perhaps indicate a further break with Hegel, for in his Philosophy of Right, Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit constitute separate spheres wherein the former is sublated by the latter.  If Moral and Sittlichkeit 
can be conflated in the manner Adorno suggests, then the politics to which they point is something lying 
beyond the institutions of the state, which for Hegel constitute the realm of Sittlichkeit.  Adorno’s 
opposition to Hegel here is noted by Zuidervaart, though he misses Adorno’s conflation of Moral and 
Sittlichkeit, thus taking Adorno to oppose Moral to Sittlichkeit, and so reject Hegelian Sittlichkeit in favor 
of Kantian Moral.  But Adorno is not trying to return to Kant; rather, he is attempting to move beyond both 
Kant and Hegel—hence the opposition of Moral and Sittlichkeit to Ethik..  See Zuidervaart, Social 
Philosophy after Adorno, 176. Cf. Adorno, Nachgelassene Schriften: Abteilung IV: Vorlesungen Band 10: 
Probleme der Moralphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 21-23. 
925 PM, 10. 
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while to live morally involves navigating the changeable rules of the community.  
Though one might object to Adorno’s interpretation of the antiquarian roots of 
morality and ethics, the point here is to note that Adorno’s use of the term 
morality is for him linked to the changeable structure of society in a way ethics is 
not, and so expresses a different set of possibilities in relating the individual to 
the general.  In this way, Adorno sees morality as being linked to reflection and 
the possibility of radical change, whereas ethics is bound up with the world of 
myth and the eternal return of the same.  Morality and the reflections upon it 
gathered in moral philosophy thus have “a necessary connection with practical 
action,” and the “crucial question of moral philosophy” is: “What shall we do?”926   
Though Adorno does not acknowledge it explicitly here, the historical 
resonance of this question hits a decidedly political note, recalling Lenin’s 
famous: “What Is to Be Done?”  Despite Adorno’s longstanding opposition to the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, along with his criticism of Brecht’s “vulgar 
Marxism,” one might find in writings unpublished in Adorno’s lifetime 
surprisingly sanguine remarks on Lenin as late as 1956.  In conversation with 
Horkheimer, Adorno claims that against the “reified” thinking of Soviet 
bureaucrats, he has always wanted to “develop a theory that remains faithful to 
Marx, Engels and Lenin, while keeping up with culture at its most advanced,” and 
that the manifesto he and Horkheimer were then attempting to write must be 
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“strictly Leninist.”927 Moreover, Adorno attributes to Lenin the idea “that people 
are products of society down to the innermost fibre of their being,” an idea that 
has informed much of the preceding discussion of Adorno’s understanding of 
humanity and its relation to animality.928   Nevertheless, these comments are not 
enough to make Adorno a Leninist, at least not in any straightforward sense.  Not 
only does the fact that the writing of this manifesto was ultimately abandoned 
undermine Adorno’s apparent Leninist ardor, but the series of conversations in 
which Horkheimer and Adorno recorded their ideas for this manifesto contain 
numerous contradictions, suggesting these comments represent possible avenues 
for their thought, rather than definitive statements of it.  In this sense, Adorno’s 
statements on Lenin here ought to be qualified by his other writings, which serve 
to paint a rather different picture of the possibility of politics and its relation to 
morality. 
 As I have attempted to show in my discussion of Adorno’s conceptions of 
progress and the global subject in Chapter 12, Adorno is against advancing a 
universal conception of the good that requires the sacrifice of particular struggles, 
theorizing instead a collective subject that exists only in the solidarity established 
at the level of particulars.929  These conceptions are at odds with the direction 
taken by Lenin and Leninist parties, and appear to offer a different way of 
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conceiving the organization of progressive political struggle to the top-down 
model of a revolutionary vanguard, organized beneath the aegis of a political 
party, leading the working class to victory.  Moreover, Adorno’s persistent 
rejection of the unity of theory and praxis, which in denying the way in which 
theory is already a kind of praxis serves only to bury the objective possibilities of 
theory beneath the pre-given subject of praxis, opposed what Adorno saw as an 
anachronistic strain of Leninism existing within the student movement.930  For 
Adorno, it is no longer possible in the administered society of the West to rely on 
past modes of organization to guide political struggle, as if the possibilities 
available to political action had not changed with the defeat of the Sparticists.  In 
this way, whatever might be left of Lenin must necessarily address a radically 
transformed terrain of political possibility, and it is for this reason that Adorno 
makes something very much like Lenin’s famous slogan “the crucial question of 
moral philosophy,” for herein morality and philosophy are not only pulled toward 
politics, but politics is turned toward philosophy and morality.   
In this way Adorno can be seen to subject Lenin to his own moral and 
philosophical roots: the question ‘what is to be done?’ is ‘how ought I to live?’ in 
a political crisis, where philosophy cannot afford to be an activity of the leisured, 
but rather seeks desperately to clarify the nature of the socio-political problems 
such that “total disaster” might not be simply deferred, but averted through the 
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transformation of the structure that precipitates its possibility. Adorno’s 
emphasis on the moral nature of this question ties it to questions of individual 
actions and how one relates to others in a way that would obstruct the kind of 
political theodicy that sees violence as the evil necessary for salvation.  By making 
Lenin’s question a moral one, the overarching structure of the party whose 
interests must be placed ahead of the individual are dissolved into moral 
demands on the individual who can no longer use the party as a screen with 
which to obscure these demands or a vehicle to secure one’s release from them. 
Thus, while Geuss thinks it possible “to retain much of Adorno’s analysis 
within a (revised) Leninist framework,”931 without considerable elaboration of 
exactly what of Adorno might remain, and what revisions to Lenin might be 
necessary, it is difficult to see how exactly one could call Adorno’s politics 
Leninist.  Likewise, the moral dimension of Adorno’s politics and its relation to 
knowledge seem to be lost on the vanguardist view that sees Adorno as endorsing 
the political authority of philosophers.  Freyenhagen claims that Adorno thinks 
that, insofar as only “a few critical individuals” might have access to “genuine and 
unrestricted experience” in the world as it is, others must defer to and take 
direction from their authority as “the most progressive minds.”932  Though 
Adorno does indeed speak of “the most progressive minds [fortgeschrittensten 
                                                     
931 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 107n49. 
932 Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 248-249. Cf. Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy after 
Adorno, 165. 
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Bewußtsein]”933 and think that insofar as most people live without engaging in 
critical reflection they fail to see the veil that has been drawn over their eyes, 
philosophical reflection can only ever be a partial solution, for, as Adorno 
claims,“[i]f there really is no correct life in the false life, then actually there can be 
no correct consciousness in it either.”934  
If there is no correct consciousness, then there can be no definitive 
authority assigned to the philosopher concerning political matters, only a general 
demand that all engage in critical reflection.  Adorno’s insistence on this moral 
dimension to Lenin’s question thus impedes the political authority of 
philosophers rather than advocates it.  Not only does Adorno explicitly link 
critique with the possibility of democracy,935 but even if only a few of the “most 
progressive minds” were to make this practice their own, at best what such 
individuals might offer through their attempts to clarify the socio-political 
problems that present themselves is theoretical leadership. That is, while 
philosophers may provide theoretical leadership through the clarification of 
problems and the provision of conceptual tools that might be of use in political 
struggle, it is up to the participants in these struggles to reflect on them and do 
                                                     
933 PMP, 168; Adorno, Probleme der Moralphilosophie, 249. 
934 “Opinion Delusion Society,” CM, 120. 
935 “Critique,” CM, 281-282.  Though Adorno does not elaborate a theory of democracy, his insistence on 
the necessity of theory and the rejection of its synthesis with praxis suggests a more open-ended and 
ongoing project of critical reflection than that typically thought possible within the framework of 
democratic centralism.  For an attempt to formulate such a democratic theory, see Andrew J. Douglas, 
“Democratic Darkness and Adorno’s Redemptive Criticism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 36.7 (2010): 
819-836. 
 
 
505 
with them what they will.  I see little evidence to suggest that Adorno thinks this 
theoretical leadership should translate itself into practical leadership, that is, 
that political practice could be based exclusively on a pre-existent theory that 
would thus endow the theorist or his or her adherents with the authority to tell 
others what to do. While the theorist or the philosopher might engage in political 
activity through theorizing, and perhaps even aid different political struggles in 
doing so, nothing in this relationship would secure a position of privilege for the 
philosopher within political struggle. 
However, in highlighting the moral dimension of Adorno’s politics, I do 
not intend to suggest that Adorno reduces politics to morality, for in bringing 
politics into contact with morality, Adorno is also trying to push morality toward 
politics.  In fact, as we have seen in Adorno’s opposition of morality to ethics, it is 
precisely its political potential that makes Adorno see morality as the more 
promising of the two concepts.  The dissolution of the Leninist party as a kind of 
transcendental subject must likewise spell the dissolution of the hard distinction 
between the demands of revolutionary politics and morality.  That moral 
decisions are a-political, or even anti-political, is an illusion that must be 
rejected, for morality, as the practical interpretation and navigation of social 
rules, already implies a politics.  That is, morality already implies a position with 
respect to the creation or transformation of the over-arching framework in which 
moral rules have force.  Adorno confirms the political dimension of his own turn 
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to morality in the conclusion of these lectures, where he claims: “In short, 
anything that we can call morality today merges into the question of the 
organization of the world.  We might even say that the quest for the good life is 
the quest for the right form of politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay 
within the realm of what can be achieved today.”936 
We must now ask: how does the proximity of morality and politics 
theorized by Adorno relate to art and his theory of mimesis?  If morality 
concerns, as Adorno holds, the relation between the individual and the general 
that we find in interpreting and navigating the rules of the community, then it 
would appear that there are two rather different kinds of moral activity.  Firstly, 
we can be said to act morally when we follow the rules of our community as we 
understand them, more or less un-reflexively; and secondly, we act morally when 
we reflect on the rules of our community and try to give reasons that justify why 
one action is a more appropriate interpretation of a rule than another, or even 
when certain rules need not be followed.  If, then, politics concerns “the 
organization of the world,” that is, the order in which the rules of the community 
have force, and thus one’s moral disposition contains a political position, then 
these two moral dispositions result in a number of possible political positions. 
Either one upholds the political order as it is through following the rules of the 
community, either un-reflexively or for one’s own reasons, or one contributes to 
                                                     
936 PM, 176. 
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changes in this order through practical adaption of the rules to personal 
circumstances, or one opposes this political order by failing to comply with the 
rules it attempts to guarantee, either un-reflexively or for one’s own reasons.   
Despite the possibility of considerable differences here between positions, 
especially with respect to activity that is ‘un-reflexive’ compared with activity that 
bases itself on explicit reasons, what both of these moral dispositions and the 
political positions they entail have in common is that they all proceed from a 
subject.  That is, their respective ‘starting positions,’ or the place from which 
moral activity or a political position is experienced, has already come to be as the 
product of a particular constellation of social objects.  Even if we grant that the 
production of this subject is ongoing, that moral decisions or political 
consequences can serve to alter the social objects from which our subjectivity 
springs such as to make it possible to consciously change who we are, these 
decisions are always limited by the subjectivity from which they initially spring. 
We may be capable of consciously changing ourselves, but only according to the 
limits imposed on consciousness that is our subjectivity, i.e. as the subject that we 
are through a particular constellation of social objects.  Or put differently: We 
interpret the rules of our community and so act accordingly always already in 
terms of the subject that we are through the particular constellation of social 
objects available to us in that community.  In this sense, we tend to uphold the 
political order through our moral activity, even where we would oppose ourselves 
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to parts of it through our interpretations of the rules, as we interpret and act in 
terms of the subjective possibilities already given by this order through the 
particular array of objects disposable to us.   
Adorno’s theory of mimesis is relevant here in that it concerns how we 
produce the relation between these social objects through our own thoughts and 
actions without direct intention.  By attempting to address moral and political 
activity at the level of mimesis, one directs one’s attention to the constitution of 
the moral and political subject that is irreducible to the conceptual order of 
reason, the rules of the community, or the political order in which their force is 
guaranteed.  This approach can be seen as radical in two senses: in attempting to 
alter the root of moral activity and its related political positions, and in the sense 
that the alteration of the relation between subject and social objects would create 
different ways of interpreting the rules of the community.  Insofar as such 
dispositions would depend on a subject other than that produced through the 
simple reproduction of society, this moral activity would be more likely to be 
antagonistic to the political order.  That is, through the mimetic transformation 
of the subject, moral activity is rendered politically radical. 
Yet, how, we might ask, is this kind of deliberate mimetic transformation 
possible, if mimesis is itself irreducible to reason, morality, or politics, though 
included in all?  Through what register must such an intervention take place?  As 
we have seen above in my brief outline of the relation between art and mimesis, it 
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is through art that mimetic transformation might be possible, for Adorno holds 
art to be something of a reservoir for the mimetic impulse, and insofar as it might 
disrupt the subjective coordinates upon which morality and politics are based, art 
can thus be said to harbor inherently radical political potential.  It is precisely for 
reason of this radical political potential that Adorno thinks that art that directly 
and explicitly aims to make itself political actually serves to limit its radical 
political potential, for in adapting itself to the exigencies of struggle in the present 
it serves to reify these exigencies and the subject from which they emanate, rather 
than disrupt them with the possibility of their own otherness—of a world 
organized otherwise, along with a different kind of subject.  Conversely then, it is 
precisely the art that aims at its own autonomy, at its fundamental distance from 
morality and politics, that most threatens to disrupt the subjective coordinates 
upon which morality and politics depend, and thus possesses the most radical 
moral and political potential.937  Thus Adorno writes that “politics has migrated 
into autonomous art” and claims that “an emphasis on autonomous works is 
itself sociopolitical in nature.”938 
In terms of the question of humanity, of the positive conception of 
humanity which serves as the central subject whose coordinates dictate what is 
morally and politically acceptable, disruption of these coordinates requires art 
                                                     
937 AT, 228; 242; 255. Cf. Adorno, “Reconciliation under Duress,” in Aesthetics and Politics, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Verso,), 160. 
938 Adorno, “Commitment,” in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike 
Gebhardt, trans. Francis McDonagh (New York: Continuum, 2005), 318. 
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that is most distant and strange to humanity—art that is inhuman.  It is this 
inhuman art that Adorno sees as most threatening to the subjective coordinates 
entwined with the world as it is, and it is to the conditions and experience of this 
inhumanity, of this animality, that we presently turn. 
 
The Inhuman Addendum 
Let us summarize the key elements of the argument of this chapter to this point: 
Mimetic comportment serves to constellate the social objects through which a 
subject is produced, a subject who then serves to maintain through moral and 
political activity a world in which a given set of social objects are available for 
mimetic comportment to constellate.  In this way, the world as it exists 
reproduces itself through the activity of subjects; or for Adorno: domination is 
reproduced precisely by means of the activity of the dominated, as their 
expression.  The consequence of this view is that just being as one is, living 
according to one’s desires more or less in accord with one’s society, ‘expressing’ 
oneself through one’s choices and life activity, is to reproduce the power 
structures of one’s society, for what one is, one’s personality and humanity, are 
functions of this society, not externally existing things upon which society is 
imposed.   
Adorno theorizes the possibility of breaking out of this cycle, and thus 
transforming this subject and this world, through an appeal to the mimetic 
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comportment that serves to constellate the objects from which their subjectivity 
is produced.  Insofar as artworks serve to congeal mimetic activity, art appears to 
hold a position of privilege in this project—or at least artworks that serve to 
disrupt the subjective coordinates that bind moral and political activity in the 
world as it exists, that is, the world to which the human subject is reconciled.  But 
here we must ask: what kind of experience might serve to disrupt the subjective 
coordinates that fix us as human?  How might the mimetic impulse be diverted 
from its role in imitation, and so turned against constellating the social objects of 
the world from which a human subject will be reproduced in order to reproduce a 
human world, that is, one reconciled to violence and domination?  And what kind 
of art might make such experience possible? 
 For now I will bracket the question of what kind of art might produce this 
kind of subjectively disruptive experience in order to focus on the experience 
itself.  Insofar as the mimetic impulse is an impulse, that is, a kind of corporal 
disposition to objects, a way of relating to them through bodily comportment that 
is both less than conceptual and less than voluntary, the human subject is in part 
constituted through an attempt to master this impulse in the figure of the body.  
The body is for the human subject the unruly matter that must be tamed and 
formed through the conceptual designs of the intellect, or at least through habits 
informed in some way by intellect—the body is the animal other lurking within 
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human subjectivity that continually threatens these designs.939  Commanding the 
mimetic impulse in this way is not impossible, but such commands are never 
wholly successful, and the involuntary aspects of our bodily comportment 
frequently repel such commands.  An experience that might disrupt the 
subjective coordinates of the human and so allow one to attempt to live as a good 
animal would thus appear to involve an experience of the involuntary and 
corporal aspect of our human subjectivity.  In this way, an object might be 
introduced into mimetic comportment that resists the particular constellation of 
objects that make up the human such as to enable its mimicry to produce 
something inhuman—a subject constituted through the experience of objects that 
resists being constituted as human.  We might find such an experience in what 
Adorno calls “the addendum.” 
 In Negative Dialectics Adorno provocatively claims that “[a] new 
categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to 
arrange thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that 
nothing similar will happen.”940  He further claims that this imperative cannot be 
dealt with discursively, but rather “gives us a bodily sensation of the moral 
addendum”: it is only in the revulsion we feel when confronted with images or 
knowledge of Auschwitz that “morality survives,” only in this involuntary reaction 
                                                     
939 DE, 192-193.  It is also, as we shall see, the other in me who is in the right—the other to whom 
solidarity is due.  See Alexander Garcia Duttman, “Adorno’s Rabbits; Or, Against Being in the Right,” 
trans. James Philips, New German Critique 97, Vol.33.1 (2006), 186. Cf. PMP, 169-170. 
940 ND, 365. 
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rather than any possible reason we could give for calling what transpired in 
Auschwitz wrong that a new subject might be constellated.  Insofar as Auschwitz 
must be seen as a uniquely human creation, one that drew upon what have 
traditionally been conceived as uniquely human intellectual capacities and 
perpetuated according to uniquely human conceptual distinctions that served to 
divide different varieties of the human animal, arranging our “thoughts and 
actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself” demands the subjective re-
constitution of the human being—it demands that we become an animal other 
than the human animal for whom Auschwitz was a possibility.  To this end I must 
show that the addendum is both an experience of animality, and that cultivating 
this experience and so producing the kind of animal for whom Auschwitz would 
be an impossibility requires a certain kind of aesthetic education.  In this way, 
Adorno revives classical notions of aesthetic education dating back to Plato and 
Aristotle, but ironically, in that the subject he would produce is an animal 
opposed to the human, rather than the exemplar of what is most divine in the 
human.941 
 Adorno uses the concept of “the addendum” (das Hinzutretende) to 
undermine the purity of the intellect as it is found in both Cartesian mind-body 
dualism, and the Kantian will, by claiming a kind of ‘addition’ or supplement 
would be needed to make sense of each, an addition whose existence would 
                                                     
941 Likewise, Adorno’s insights here would radically historicize the contexts in which a given activity might 
be conceived as virtuous, or a given disposition, good. See Rahel Jaeggi, “ ‘No Individual Can Resist,’” 
trans. James Ingram, Constellations 12.1 (2005), 71. 
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undermine or contaminate the very purity upon which these conceptual 
distinctions depend.942  For Adorno there is no mind that is not an embodied 
mind, no will that is not an embodied will, for both mind and will are the 
historically mediated products of specific transformations in our bodily 
comportment.  According to Adorno’s natural-historical view, both mind and will 
must be seen as natural insofar as they are history-moving entities: both mind 
and will must contain within themselves a natural element, something that is not 
completely mastered or self-produced; however, as historical, they must also be 
seen as the products of particular historical developments.   
The addendum is likewise both natural and historical.  It is natural in that 
it is a bodily impulse, a somatic tic that the intellect cannot wholly escape or 
master, and so the intellect brands it as irrational in order to consolidate its 
mastery of the body.943  Yet were the intellect to ever fully succeed in this 
mastery, it would be its death, for it is only through the body that the intellect 
came to be, and only its persistence, through the addendum—through the traces 
of the bodily impulses within the intellect—that it might continue to confront its 
other and so be a recognizably different entity.  Only entwined with the body does 
reason have life and some access to the world. Thus the concept of the will, of a 
                                                     
942 The addendum can also be seen as a polemical response to philosophical anthropologies that would 
theorize the sovereignty of human being, such as Scheler’s conception of personality as the immediate 
“domination over the lived body,” or Gehlen’s conception of the “hiatus” that distances human actions from 
bodily impulses, allowing for the voluntary nature of the former, and so the mastery of the human being as 
a self-creating and responsible entity.  See Scheler, Formalism…, 480; Gehlen, Man, 329-330.  
943 ND, 228-229. 
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particular faculty of the intellect that enables reason or consciousness to act upon 
the objects of the world and so change what exists, is for Adorno thoroughly 
dependent upon the involuntary bodily impulses of the addendum: as Adorno 
writes, “if the hand no longer twitched, there would be no will.”944 
Yet the historical dimension of the addendum must also be insisted upon, 
against a simple and reified conception of it as a set of natural impulses. Drawing 
on Adorno’s claim that a sense or even the idea of freedom depends upon the 
memory of an “archaic impulse” that precedes the ego, an impulse “not yet 
steered by any solid I” and so “later banished to the zone of unfree bondage to 
nature,”945 commentators have often described the addendum in a manner that 
suggests it is a neglected but basically unchanging and so perpetually available 
part of human experience.  In understanding the addendum in this manner, it 
becomes a kind of natural human potential that Adorno is trying to actualize, 
obscured only by particular historical circumstance.  Accounts of the addendum 
as a potential thus take on a purely ontogenetic character, making it the 
recollection of a natural part of any human individual’s development, or a 
phylogenetic character, as the recollection of a state in which humans actually 
lived at some point in the past. 
Cook takes the latter approach, writing that the addendum “points back to 
an earlier stage of history in which human behaviour was largely reactive and 
                                                     
944 ND, 230; Cf. ND, 241. 
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reflexive, but also points forwards to a stage where nature and mind may finally 
be reconciled.”946  Freyenhagen also emphasizes this phylogenetic side of the 
addendum, claiming that the memory of the “archaic impulse” serves to remind 
us of a spontaneous relation between consciousness and body which might be re-
established through a social transformation whose material conditions have been 
brought to fruition by capitalism.947  For their part, Habermas and Bernstein 
interpret Adorno ontogenetically: Habermas construes the lived bodily 
experience Adorno would incorporate into the idea of a free act to be the 
expression of the character which develops naturally out of an individual’s lived 
history.948  Bernstein takes a slightly different tack, dismissing the phylogenetic 
reading as “bad speculative anthropology,”949 and insisting instead that the 
addendum’s function is one of immanent critique. However, in claiming it to be a 
piece of “anthropomorphic nature,”950 he appears to leave the possibility open to 
an ontogenetic reading that would see the addendum as pointing back to a phase 
of individual development prior to a rigid distinction between mind and body.   
 The problem with these interpretations is that they treat the natural 
dimension of the addendum as a potential that pre-exists its particular historical 
instantiation and that persists as a possibility that might be recovered more or 
                                                     
946 Cook, Adorno on Nature, 54. 
947 Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 263. 
948 Jürgen Habermas, “ ‘I Myself Am Part of Nature’—Adorno on the Intrication of Reason and Nature,” in 
Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 189. 
949 Bernstein, Adorno, 258. 
950 Bernstein, Adorno, 254-256. 
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less unchanged through the socio-political changes wrought by history.  In this 
way, they bring Adorno closer to Aristotelian humanism and its anthropology 
than his philosophy actually sanctions.951  However, if we are to follow Adorno’s 
conception of natural-history here, we must see the nature for which the 
addendum stands as being historically produced, an idea to which Bernstein 
comes closest when he refers to the addendum as an “excrescence of the pure 
will.”952  The addendum, or Hinzutretende, is precisely that: an addition (Hinzu), 
something added on to the will through the act of willing. The addendum is not 
an unchanging capacity, for it does not pre-exist the will; rather, it is produced by 
the will as that which is non-identical to the will, that which the will cannot 
master and so rejects as mere “unfree” nature, against which the will’s own 
freedom is defined.  What is prior to the will, the mimetic impulse, is fractured by 
the will and transformed, its remnants gaining shape in opposition to the will—
this is the addendum.  The addendum must thus be understood as the remnants 
of the mimetic impulse displaced and internally mediated by the socio-political 
transformations that served to shape the human animal into one for whom 
actions depend upon a will.953  
                                                     
951 See especially Freyenhagen, Adorno’s Practical Philosophy, 262; Ch.9. 
952 Bernstein, Adorno, 256. 
953 The addendum thus does not refer to “unmediated physical impulses,” though it does, as we shall see, 
allow for a “deep concern with animal suffering.” See Mathijs Peters, “ ‘The Zone of the Carcass and the 
Knacker’—On Adorno’s Concern with the Suffering Body,” European Journal of Philosophy (August 
2013), 17. 
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The “memory” of “archaic impulses” that survives in the addendum thus 
does not point to a past that necessarily existed either as a moment in socio-
political history or even an individual’s history, but rather to what is non-
identical in the will as it exists, as a kind of mimetic resistance to its permanence.  
Retrieving these “archaic impulses” through an experience of the addendum is 
thus not to recover the kernel of a lost humanity, and from which a new humanity 
might be born, but to seize upon the non-identical excrescence produced by 
humanity so as to oppose its subjective coordinates.  The addendum marks the 
spot where the architecture of the human is most fragile, where the otherness it 
suppresses is closest to the surface: it is here where contact might be made with 
the remnants of the mimetic impulse that serve to constellate the social objects 
that produce the human subject. As I have attempted to show above, what is non-
identical to the concept of the human, that which evades the violent dominance of 
the human and its particular capacities, is the animal.  The addendum is thus a 
kind of animal wriggling through human concepts, itself produced as the 
excrescence of these concepts.  To attempt to build a new subject around this 
experience, as Adorno’s new categorical imperative demands, is to attempt to 
build an inhuman subject—a new kind of animal out of the suppressed and 
discarded impulses. 
Living such as to be capable of saying one is a good animal thus involves 
learning to allow one’s willed actions to receive direction from the addendum, by 
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these involuntary bodily responses to others and the situations in which we find 
ourselves in contact with them.  It is not, however, simply to forsake reason and 
reflection in favor of what are popularly known as ‘gut instincts’—to do simply 
what feels right to us, for these involuntary bodily responses are deeply 
ambiguous: they include both impulses toward affection and solidarity, and 
toward aggression and dominance. It is for this reason that Adorno sees the role 
of reflection as being absolutely vital here, for we must continually interrogate 
our bodily responses, and see how they relate to others, especially insofar as they 
might cause them pain, if the circuits of domination are indeed to be resisted and 
one is to live as a good animal.  Yet Adorno’s turn to animality would also 
obstruct the capacity to ignore these impulses, for insofar as they are the 
repressed nature constructed by our society, they not only tell us about the 
structure of our society, about how it is reproduced and the possibilities for 
change therein, but they bring us into a visceral contact with others in a way the 
bureaucratic machinery of modern society is able to obscure.   
Imagine, for example, that you are witnessing a man being apprehended 
on the street by the police.  After being tackled hard to the ground he is now lying 
on his belly, hands above his head, legs splayed.  The officer is crouched over top 
of him, his right hand weighing heavily on the man’s head, pressing the side of 
his face into the pavement. With his left hand, the officer reaches for one of the 
man’s outstretched hands while his knee digs into the small of the man’s back, 
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pinning him in place. The man thrashes a little, emitting pained and angered 
shouts as best he can with his face pressed against the road. There may be 
relatively good reasons for this treatment: perhaps the man had murdered a child 
on a school playground, and had then killed the first police officer that had 
attempted to apprehend him.  But you do not know this.  The impulse to give 
reasons for this treatment, to identify with the authority of the police officer and 
construct a narrative in which this treatment is acceptable without knowing why 
is what being directed by the addendum would oppose.   
Through their conceptual capture, the impulses both to participate in this 
violence and to shrink from it become separated from suffering in a way that 
contributes to a certain subject maintained through this separation.  In 
identifying with the police officer as a figure of authority, this violent activity 
becomes a kind of surrogate for your own aggressive impulses.  In standing-in for 
your desire to participate, the space opened up between you and the violent 
activity by the police officer as the authorized agent of violence serves to deaden 
the visceral connection between yourself and the suffering and establishes a 
stable order wherein your aggressive impulses can be expressed by proxy, and so 
treated as if they were not your own.   Insofar as the violent activity of the police 
officer is required to maintain your own distance from the suffering and thus 
maintain the particular form of subjectivity you are embodying, the impulse to 
shrink from this violence becomes attended by reasons for why you should not 
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involve yourself, for why what you are witnessing is somehow acceptable, and in 
this way impulses toward solidarity are conjured away.  Being directed by the 
addendum, on the other hand, is to deny the authority of these reasons, and the 
separation they would establish between you and suffering. To persist in the 
crisis of one’s visceral connection to suffering is to be directed by the addendum, 
a persistence with which comes the demand for an interrogation of this crisis. 
Interrogated in this way, the feelings of revulsion and the impulse toward 
solidarity one experiences when confronted with such violence might be 
mobilized so as to intervene against it.  However, this kind of mobilization would 
not necessarily mean that there would be no forces of coercion, no police, or even 
that the man in our example would be released.  These are political questions that 
demand critical scrutiny, reflection, and debate, and these would not be erased by 
opening ourselves up to the addendum, for the addendum prescribes no positive 
institutional arrangement.  However, what we can say is that a society wherein 
our reason was directed by the addendum to end violence when confronted with 
it, rather than to secure one’s own safety, even in situations such as our example 
above, could not operate as ours does—it would simply not be possible to accept 
police direction to ‘move along,’ and so ignore the man pinned to the pavement.  
Power in such a society would not have free hands, for its authority would be 
under perpetual scrutiny, and any coercion it would exercise would be 
continually subject to intervention.   
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In this way, we see that what Adorno is trying to get at through the concept 
of the addendum is the disposition of the human subject toward suffering and 
power, and to attempt to tip the scales toward solidarity with suffering, as 
opposed to power.  As I have argued above, insofar as reason and the use of 
concepts evolved according to the exigencies of self-preservation such as to 
eventually come to dominate nature, reason has evolved entwined with power, 
and the human being is the product of this evolution.  To attempt to live a life of 
activity directed by the addendum is to attempt to disentangle reason from 
power, to make decisions where reason is not directed toward maximizing 
benefits to the individual and so securing its survival or prestige, and thus to 
direct reason toward a different evolutionary path.   
Reason would thus no longer hold the majority of seats in the parliament 
of the subject, but instead occupy a minority position: its role would become one 
of critically scrutinizing impulses, not directing them, and so would enter into a 
relation with animality that does not involve its mastery or suppression.  To 
transform the role of reason in this manner is to alter the subjective coordinates 
of the human being.  To privilege the addendum is to direct the mimetic impulse 
toward objects it would not be directed toward if guided by instrumental reason, 
and so bring about a shift in the constellation of social objects from which 
subjects spring.  The reason employed by a transformed subject is one that would 
perceive its interests differently than the instrumental reason that animates 
 
 
523 
human survival, and so transform the manner in which this subject conceives of 
its relations to others, and so its moral activity, along with the overarching 
structures that enable this activity—its politics.  Only through this manner of 
subjective transformation that brings about a change in moral and political 
activity might one be able to say that one had been a good animal.  
However, if the addendum concerns the bodily comportment involved in 
willing, in making decisions, we must now ask: how is it that we come to feel the 
way we do, when we do?  What if we do not feel the revulsion we are supposed to 
feel, say, at images or knowledge of Auschwitz?  If the involuntary reactions or 
impulses that make up the addendum stand for the repressed nature our society 
has produced, how might we ensure that this nature is produced such as to 
promote solidarity with suffering, rather than identification with power?  To gain 
a better idea of how this mimetic displacement of the subjective coordinates of 
the human might proceed, we must turn to Adorno’s ideas on that reservoir of the 
mimetic impulse, art. 
 
Inhuman Art 
As argued in Chapter 13, Adorno’s concept of a ‘reconciled humanity’ refers to 
what would be a different kind of animal than what the human being is and 
always has been—an animal constituted in struggle for whom the capacities that 
enabled its self-preservation are aligned with socio-political domination.  
 
 
524 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the passage toward this political 
transformation through which this new animal might emerge leads through the 
moral practice of attempting to live as if one were a good animal: that is, 
attempting to accommodate ‘animal impulses’ in one’s decisions and actions such 
as to displace reason from its role in simple self-preservation—which is to say, in 
maximizing individual benefits—in favor of fostering solidarity with others.  The 
specific animal impulses that would be fostered here are what Adorno calls ‘the 
addendum,’ the bodily comportment or affects entwined with willing.  In this 
way, allowing oneself to be guided by the addendum is to allow for a different 
mimetic connection to the social objects of which one is subjectively constituted, 
and so to attempt one’s own subjective re-constitution: indeed to live as if one 
were a good animal, as opposed to a person.   
 However, while Adorno claims in Negative Dialectics that the addendum 
has become part of the human constitution in response to the horrors of 
Auschwitz,954 we must ask: how might the experience of the addendum 
contribute to solidarity, as opposed to something else—say, a corporal feeling of 
individual or collective power, such as that promoted by Nietzsche?  How can 
Adorno ensure that untying “the historically tied knot”955 of the person through 
                                                     
954 Moreover, Adorno sees the basic substance of modern industrial capitalist society to be continuous with 
Auschwitz.  See for example, TNM, 13. Or as Geulen writes, 1945 “marks the end and the break that 
changed everything, precisely because not enough changed […] the truly disruptive effect of this break 
consists in the ensuing continuity.” See Eva Geulen, “Theodor Adorno on Tradition,” in The Actuality of 
Adorno, ed. Max Pensky (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 186. 
955 ND, 277. 
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the cultivation of the addendum will not result in a form of subjectivity and 
society much worse than the present?  The short answer to these questions is 
simply: he cannot, for there is no such guarantee.   
Adorno readily acknowledges that the removal of the conception of the 
person makes its “residue” easier to dominate956—the moral status of the person, 
demanding as it does some kind of individual responsibility imposed upon 
impulses, not only serves to obstruct the emergence of what Adorno considers a 
better organization of society, but potentially worse ones as well, as fascism 
makes only too plain.  Consequently, Adorno needs some conception of pedagogy 
that would serve to educate, not the will, but its non-identical impulses, such that 
these impulses would recoil from violence.  Insofar as Adorno theorizes art as a 
kind of reservoir for the mimetic impulse, art could prove to be an important 
means for this education.  However, apart from a few radio lectures Adorno 
delivered in the 1960s concerning education, he makes no sustained attempt to 
develop such a theory, or explore the educational possibilities of art.957  This is 
likely due in part to Adorno’s insistence upon the autonomy of art; however, as I 
will attempt to show, a politically progressive aesthetic education need not be at 
odds with artistic autonomy, for the attempt to establish art’s autonomy in the 
manner Adorno theorizes is already politically progressive in a broad sense, as 
already noted above.   
                                                     
956 MM, A39, 64. 
957 He did, however, outline a research plan for such a study, though it was never completed.  See Adorno, 
“The Problem of a New Type of Human Being,” 468.  
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Though the relation between Adorno’s aesthetics and Hegel is often 
noted,958 others see also the influence Schiller’s concept of aesthetic education.959 
Though the question of the truth content of artworks appropriated from Hegel 
remains important to my discussion, I want here to expand this association with 
aesthetic education in order to see Adorno attuned to the problematic first set out 
by Plato and Aristotle examined above.  Thus certain of Adorno’s ideas on art 
might be used to re-animate the classical idea of the aesthetic education of the 
impulses.  However, this re-animation does not come without an ironic twist, for 
this education would not attempt to cultivate the animal such as to make it 
human, which amounts to drawing a division between reason and impulse, and 
teaching reason to command and impulse to obey, but rather to cultivate animal 
impulses such as to enable them to resist human capture, and so to facilitate the 
kind of displacement of the subjective coordinates that constitute the human in 
the manner already indicated through the addendum and the turn toward non-
identity.  In this way, Adorno’s aesthetics can be seen to address the question of 
producing an aesthetic animal, not simply in the sense of an animal being 
constituted through the senses, through its bodily comportment toward objects, 
but through the arts.   
                                                     
958 See for example, Raymond Geuss, “Adorno and Berg,” in Morality, Culture, and History, 118; Max 
Paddison, Adorno, Modernism, and Mass Culture (London: Kahn & Averill, 1997), 64.  For more nuanced 
accounts of Hegel’s role, at least in AT, see Weber Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, 130-133; and 
Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, 115. 
959 Robert Hullot-Kentor, “Back to Adorno,” 17; Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 8; 102. 
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For Adorno, an aesthetic animal would be the subject found in aesthetic 
comportment, which is in turn produced through the tutelage of two different 
kinds of aesthetic experience: a passive or receptive experience of artworks, in 
which one’s subjective coordinates are displaced by the shock one receives 
through its sheer alien character; and an active or productive experience of 
artworks, wherein one must navigate the various technical problems foisted upon 
one by history in order to produce a work of art.  It is through the conjunction of 
these two kinds of experience that one might re-align mimesis and reason, and so 
recover from the illness that is the human. These are the kinds of experience 
necessary to learn to live as a good animal, one whose morality would push 
against the order of domination and so bring about its transformation, and so 
make the emergence of a qualitatively new kind of animal a possibility.   
In this subsection I will elaborate on what I have called the receptive 
experience of the artwork.  Specifically, I seek to show that a receptive experience 
of artwork can disrupt the subjective coordinates of the human in a manner 
analogous to the addendum, and that certain kinds of artworks are more likely to 
disrupt in this way.  Consequently, exposure to such artworks gives one both a 
bodily experience of one’s fragility and finitude—one’s animality—combined with 
an impulse to reflect on this animality and its relation to others.  Ongoing 
receptive experience of artworks might therefore serve to foster the kind of 
disposition which I have called animal: that is, a disposition to solidarity rather 
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than individual benefit-maximizing, and with it an aversion to violence.  It is not 
pretended, however, that such experience alone is enough to radically transform 
human subjectivity.  In order for Adorno’s idea of aesthetic comportment to push 
beyond the Aristotelian notion of aesthetic education, aesthetic comportment 
must consist not only in its receptive dimension, but a productive one as well, 
and this will be examined in the following subsection. 
Concerning this receptive experience of the artwork, we find an experience 
of the less than voluntary, less than conceptual, bodily reaction to artworks.  This 
experience is closely related to the addendum; however, the addendum, we must 
recall, is the mimetic impulse internally mediated through the moral will, 
produced through the moral will as its excrescence, its non-identical other.  
Though the receptive experience of artworks is likewise tuned to the mimetic 
impulse, this impulse will be mediated differently through artworks than through 
the moral will, and is thus articulated somewhat differently, and will thus require 
a different name.  The most common terms Adorno employs in describing the 
mediation of the mimetic impulse through artworks is the shudder (der 
Schauder), or shaking (Erschütterung), both of which evoke non-voluntary, non-
conceptual aspects of a bodily reaction to artworks akin with the reaction of the 
body to the moral decisions and actions with which it is confronted in the 
addendum.  These terms are, once again, heavily dependent upon Benjamin and 
his influence. 
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In his essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Benjamin examines 
modernity according to its lived experience, according to what the modern age 
feels like, as new social objects are introduced into the mimetic comportment of 
the subject that serve to alter its corporal disposition.  Specifically, Benjamin 
focuses on the experience of being jostled in a crowd on the street, and the 
experience of laboring with industrial machinery, claiming that both share an 
element of “shock.”960  That is, the lived experience of modernity is one of shock, 
one of continual exposure to rigid, even violent, stimuli that demand particular 
bodily reactions. Both factory machinery and traffic signals demand a certain 
automatic deference to their operations by the subject confronted with them, and 
failure to comply with these demands can be met with serious physical injury or 
death—one cannot negotiate terms, one must simply react.  Being the denizen of 
a world made of such objects means to mimetically assimilate oneself to their 
mechanisms, and thus to submit to their training, to the uniform and constant 
movement characteristic of a drill, rather than a practice. As Horowitz notes, 
drills are without the rhythm that characterizes practice of all kinds: poetry, 
music, human speech and expression—drills possess virtually no rhythm at all.961 
Insofar as shock experience reduces the practices that make up lived experience 
                                                     
960 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn (New York: Schoken, 1969), 176. 
961 Horowitz, Ethics at a Standstill, 111-112. 
 
 
530 
to drills, then the bodily experience of modernity is a radically impoverished form 
of experience,962 one perhaps even describable as inhuman.963 
Adorno assents to much of Benjamin’s critique and the central place of 
shock experience within modernity964; however, for Adorno it is precisely the 
inhumanity of this experience, which, mediated through art, offers the possibility 
of socio-political transformation.  Modern artworks make possible a 
transformation of the subject produced through shock experience by mimetically 
reproducing this shock;965 in so doing, the shock is alienated from its function in 
the reproduction of modern society, and becomes instead poetic—it gains 
something like a rhythm.  Of course, art must radically alter its received 
categories, forms, and techniques in order to render itself capable of expressing 
this shock, and the ‘rhythm’ it produces in doing so is like no rhythm before it.  
Gone is the classical claim to wholeness and harmony—what is left are only 
twisted fragments: the wreckage of the world as it had been and the rhythm that 
animated it.  What Adorno calls the shudder is shock experience reflected 
through the artwork: it makes directly palpable the truth of the experience of 
modernity that would be hidden by the primacy of the subject and the positive 
articulation of humanity, the person.  Thus the truth of the work is revealed to the 
                                                     
962 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 180. Cf. Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude, 243;248. 
963 Indeed, Benjamin will refer to the jostling crowd, fomenting as it does this shock experience, as 
“essentially inhuman.” Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 172. 
964 Cf. MM A33, 54. 
965 Cf. PMM, 39. 
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spectator “as if it must also be his own”966—the indigence and the distortion of 
the work reveal the indigence and distortion of the spectator.  It is for this reason 
that Adorno refers to the shudder as “a memento of the liquidation of the I, 
which, shaken, perceives its own limitedness and finitude.”967  “Convulsed by 
art,”968 the subject can no longer maintain its veneer of independence, and the 
object shines through the widening fissures.  
This aesthetic rupture of the subject by its objectivity is, as we have seen, a 
turn to animality.  Thus Adorno writes that “[a]rtworks win life only when they 
renounce likeness to the human,”969  approvingly cites Schoenberg’s praise of 
Webern for having spurned “animal warmth,”970 and lauds Baudelaire for his 
work that “wipes out any human trace.”971  However, disrupting the subjective 
coordinates of the human in this manner cannot be all the artwork has to offer if 
it is to contribute to socio-political transformation.  Adorno is quick to point out 
that though the shudder reveals the human subject and its self-preservation to be 
semblance, the conditions from which this semblance is born persist.  Or in other 
words: the receptive experience of art makes promises it cannot keep.972  
Moreover, as we have already seen in his critique of Aristotelian poetics, Adorno 
                                                     
966 AT, 269. 
967 AT, 245. 
968 AT, 269. 
969 AT, 168. 
970 AT, 43; PMM, 118; Adorno, “Arnold Schoenberg, 1874-1951,” in Prisms, 158;  Adorno, “Vers une 
musique informelle,” QF, 309.  What Schoenberg calls “animal warmth,” a sense of comfort and 
familiarity, of surety in oneself and one’s surroundings, is not animality in the sense I have been using it, 
but rather part of the positive articulation of humanity, the person, which his music would transcend. 
971 AT, 21. 
972 AT, 245. 
 
 
532 
considers overvaluing aesthetic effects to run the risk of making art into a form of 
“substitute satisfaction” to be manipulated and administered by the culture 
industry, and so serve the forces of repression.973  That is, while the very power of 
mimesis serves to reveal the truth of shock experience in its semblance, in being 
an aesthetic semblance, distant to some degree from the actual shock experience 
of the crowd or the factory, it serves to make the aesthetic experience of these 
things pleasurable.   
This is part of the reason why Adorno claims that “artworks tend a priori 
toward affirmation”: artworks “bring forth another world,” detaching themselves 
from the empirical world.974  In doing so they not only reveal the truth of the 
object, and so alienate the apparent naturalness of the empirical world and one’s 
own subjective place in it, but they also do so in a manner that gives the subject 
pleasure—thus anesthetizing the subject to the suffering expressed in the work, 
which, as art, is enjoyable.  In this way artworks serve to reconcile the aesthetic 
subject to the empirical world, by way of the image of the other world they offer.  
Insofar as the experience of subjective displacement and alienation found in the 
shudder lasts but a moment, it is possible for the pleasure one receives from the 
work to annex the transformative moment the shudder reveals, and so to make it 
part of the overall effect of the work to be manipulated and administered.  
Instead of experiencing the dislocation of the social objects of which one’s 
                                                     
973 AT, 238. 
974 AT, 1. 
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subjectivity is composed as a moment from which return becomes impossible, 
one instead comes to seek out those artworks that provide one with this affect, 
delighting in the frisson of inhumanity they provide as one does the tingling on 
the tongue one feels eating blowfish, touched as it is by poison. 
Indeed, this particular mode of experiencing artworks Adorno polemically 
refers to as “culinary.”  Though Aesthetic Theory is replete with references to the 
culinary character of artworks,975 for a definition one must look to Adorno’s 
writings for Americans.  In Current of Music, Adorno writes that the term 
“culinary” is used to denote musical qualities that provide instant and transitory 
sensual pleasure, serving to stimulate the senses.976  These qualities, and the 
problem with art (or in this case, music) structured around its culinary 
consumption, or even a disposition toward artwork that would seek out such 
qualities, is that it ignores the truth of the artwork, and thus fails to provide 
anything for the listener or spectator that might displace his or her subjective 
coordinates, that might threaten his or her personality.  If art is indeed the 
unconscious writing of history,977 then to experience the truth of an artwork is to 
grasp in some sense the truth of the movement of history as the possibility of 
                                                     
975 See for instance, AT, 157; 276; 333; 334; 347. 
976 Adorno, “Radio Physiognomics,” in Current of Music, 123. 
977 Adorno, “Those Twenties,” CM, 48; Cf. PMM, 43.  Or in more Hegelian terms: “Artworks are 
enigmatic in that they are the physiognomy of an objective spirit that is never transparent to itself in the 
moment in which it appears” (AT, 128). 
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redemption, of the possibility of a world not constituted by violence, in the 
fragment that is the individuality of the particular work.978   
Thus the image of redemption that was found in philosophy to be a 
conceptual trick played at the expense of concepts is made palpable in the 
artwork—it becomes not simply a cognitive experience, but a bodily one: it is the 
intimation of truth that makes one shudder.  It is for this reason Adorno claims 
that art that is experienced only in relation to who one already is, art that is 
classifiable into the world one already knows, is not experienced at all,979 for the 
truth of the artwork is not visible within the confines of the world as it is—from 
the perspective of one’s positive humanity.  Just as “Utopia goes disguised in the 
creatures,”980 so does the future come disguised in artworks: artworks are 
fragments of a future world that express themselves in the language of the 
present, but in so doing, the language of the present is transformed—it thereafter 
bears the imprint of the future toward which it now points.  The “culinary” 
consumption of artworks is the reduction of their truth to the terms of the human 
subject, which thus serves to shore up its primacy and provide sustenance to the 
ersatz experience possible in the modern world. 
What is needed, then, in order for the receptive experience of artworks to 
be capable of grasping their truth, is an active moment, an activity that, while 
                                                     
978 Cf. Raymond Geuss, “Form and ‘The New’ in Adorno’s ‘Vers une musique informelle’,” in Morality, 
Culture, and History, 143. 
979 AT, 246. Cf. AT, 183. 
980 Recall MM, A146, 228. 
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remaining receptive to artworks, at once resists their culinary appropriation and 
persists in the inhumanity of the subjective displacement found in the shudder.  
Hullot-Kentor provides a hint of what this activity might be when he equates 
Adorno’s use of the Greek thaumazein in “The Idea of Natural History” with 
“shock.”981 Thaumazein in Aristotle is typically understood to be something 
closer to “awe” or “wonder” than the modern “shock,” with its violent and 
mechanical associations; thaumazein informs philosophical activity—it is the 
wonder one feels in being confronted with nature that propels one to inquire and 
to reflect.982  Though the harmonious experience of thaumazein as wonder is 
transformed in modernity to the fragmented experience of shock that would turn 
one away from reflection, mediated through the artwork as the shudder, this 
bodily disposition to objects might likewise provide an impulse to reflection, just 
as the addendum demands its own reflexive interrogation.  It is worth recalling 
here that in Politics VII, Aristotle includes “study and thought [theoria kai 
dianoeseis]” among the components of a life of action (bios praktikos).983  
Adorno echoes this view in “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis” when he writes that 
“[t]hinking is a doing” and that theory is itself a form of praxis.984  That Adorno 
cites Aristotle here, noting both the ideological function of his emphasis on the 
                                                     
981 INH, 118. Cf. Bob Hullot-Kentor, “Introduction to Adorno’s ‘Idea of Natural History,’” 107. 
982 Meta. I.2 982b12-13. 
983 Pol. VII.3 1325b13-23. 
984 “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” CM, 261; 277.   
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life of contemplation and its truth content,985 further illustrates the degree to 
which his treatment of these questions is bound up with Aristotle’s problematic. 
As we have seen in Chapter 10, the praxis of theoria in Aristotle is 
specifically bound up with the civic rites of tragic spectatorship, and it is through 
these that both the hierarchical division of human beings into higher and lower 
sorts based on their animal proximity is established and reconciled.  Adorno 
relies on the Aristotelian formulation of theory and praxis in order to turn it 
against itself, to turn it against the production of the human as master and the 
animal as pet, prey, or slave, which in turn involves the domination of some 
humans by others.  The “irruption of objectivity into subjective consciousness”986 
in the experience of the truth of art is the animal shedding its human confines, 
and so offering an image of its subjective possibilities re-constellated.   The 
practice of theory is the active moment of the receptive experience of artworks 
that makes possible the grasping of their truth, and thus what establishes their 
greatness, for it is only insofar as an artwork is true that it can be said to be great.  
It is for this reason that artworks, “especially those of the highest dignity,” can be 
said to “await their interpretation.”987  Interpretation, commentary, and critique 
are all internal to the artwork, to its process of becoming, for these serve to 
transform the artwork which has through expression captured a socio-political 
                                                     
985 Ibid., 267. 
986 AT, 245. 
987 AT, 128. 
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antagonism at a certain point in history.988  The understanding of this socio-
political antagonism and its place in history, and so the understanding of future 
possibilities, and so the possibilities one understands to inform one’s own life, are 
thus transformed through the interpretation of the work.  
In this way we find the receptive experience of artworks to indeed be 
capable of displacing the subjective coordinates of the human.  However, do all 
artworks enable this experience alike? If an artwork’s greatness concerns the 
truth of its expression of a particular antagonism, which is itself determined 
through critical reflection,989 how could there be a significant distinction between 
different kinds of artworks and their relative suitability for interpretation?  Are 
not all works equally in need of interpretation, and thus equal in their possession 
of truth content?  Though Adorno does indeed claim that truth content can assert 
itself through even the most ideological works,990 and that art wholly free of 
ideology is probably impossible,991 he nevertheless does hold that certain 
artworks do a better job of expressing a given historical moment than others, and 
thus that artworks possessed of certain qualities have greater truth content, 
where the relative truth content of a work is related to its power to disrupt the 
subject’s coordinates.   
                                                     
988 AT, 194. 
989 Cf. Peter Uwe Hohendal, “Adorno: The Discourse of Philosophy and the Problem of Language,” in The 
Actuality of Adorno, ed. Max Pensky (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 78. 
990 Insofar as ideology is itself “the distorted image of the true” (AT, 233). 
991 AT, 236.  Contra the notion that Adorno is a champion of art’s “purity.”  See Rancière, Aesthetics and 
Its Discontents, 132; Albrecht Wellmer, “Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime,” in The Actuality of 
Adorno, 124. 
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Thus it is not simply a matter of the quality of the interpretation—Adorno 
does not, as Jameson would have it, wish “to reinvent a new kind of primacy of 
philosophy over artistic experience.”992  Rather, the truth content of works is 
entwined with the work itself, and the particular way in which its form reveals its 
material as content.993  For instance, Adorno claims that though interpretation 
gives to artworks the life in which they become what they will be, in which the 
antagonism captured in the work at its birth is theoretically elaborated and 
grasped, this process is finite, in a sense.  Eventually the work will be 
conceptually grasped such that its content and its form will be assimilated to the 
dominant constellation of social objects, and it will cease to be experienced as a 
work of art—it will no longer possess the power capable of dislocating the social 
objects that compose the subject, for it will be among the objects that constitute 
the subject as it is. Or more bluntly: even inhuman art risks becoming human.   
For this reason, art must perpetually re-invent itself in order to be 
experienced, and so must continually invent ways to break from past forms and 
techniques that have become assimilated by the order of what is: art must be 
new.  The necessarily antagonistic character of newness makes new artworks 
dissonant, in that they must disrupt the harmony established in the order of what 
is: their newness is heard as the torture of accepted forms.  The new must also be 
abstract, for insofar as its innovation calls into being a world that does not exist, 
                                                     
992 Jameson, Late Marxism, 208. 
993 Cf. Paddison, Adorno, Modernism, and Mass Culture, 61. 
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it is a world that is unknown, like “the secret of Poe’s pit.”994  Opposing these are 
artworks that can no longer be experienced: artworks that have become 
“archaic.”995  However, Adorno insists this process of ossification, this becoming-
archaic, has no fixed trajectory, for “[m]odernity is a qualitative, not a 
chronological category.”996  Rather, the process of becoming-archaic is 
fragmented, dynamic, and dependent upon the modern, upon the new, for new 
artistic innovations may serve to appropriate the past in novel ways that serve to 
breathe into it new life.  Artworks of the past might live again by finding 
themselves in new light, and it is their distance from this light that renders them 
invisible.   
Thus important, even definitive, examples of new or modern art for 
Adorno, such as Schoenberg’s Five Pieces for Orchestra, Op.16, called by Adorno 
the “oldest, boldest and most important” of large scale atonal works,997 today 
might be confused with parts of the soundtrack of Planet of the Apes.  Yet even if 
the culture industry has managed to assimilate the most dissonant examples of 
modern art and transformed them into fodder for the reproduction of positive 
humanity, it has done so in large part by managing the contexts in which a 
subject is exposed to it.  The experience of musical dissonance outside of the 
                                                     
994 AT, 15; 20.  Together these three form the core of Adorno’s modernism.  See Peter Osborne, “Adorno 
and the Metaphysics of Modernism,” in The Problems of Modernity, ed. Andrew Benjamin (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 36. 
995 AT, 349. 
996 MM, A140, 218. 
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context of expressing the intensity or psychological distress of a scene in a film, 
that is, outside of a context in which it is expected and so forms part of the social 
objects in which personality is constituted, might still threaten to displace our 
subjective coordinates.  
One might imagine, for example, the confusion and even distress at having 
Op.16 being piped into the food court at a shopping mall.  The fact that 
Schoenberg could still today empty the food court lays bare the antagonism 
between the kind of experience captured in his work and the kind that supports 
the activities appropriate to a food court.  Thus even the now century-old music 
of Arnold Schoenberg—considered by some passé even at the time of Adorno’s 
writings—might be seen, thanks to the abstract and dissonant qualities of the 
work, as something like an undigested stone, even a tumor, in the bowel of the 
culture industry.  Whether or not this tumor proves to be benign or malignant 
depends upon how it is articulated theoretically and appropriated by future art, 
but its availability for such appropriation is fundamentally different than works 
that have never at one time been new.998  Works that have once been new thus 
embody a transformative capacity that carries with it moral and political 
                                                     
998 A work can be said to never have been new if it was never the attempt to express an experience that 
necessitated innovation in artistic techniques, and whose own experience never served to displace the 
subjective coordinates of the listener/spectator.  Works that lack sufficient contact with the material to 
require a transformation in their techniques fail to express the experience of the social antagonisms from 
which they were born; rather these works would hide this antagonism with pseudo-experience.  Such works 
are born old—they are already “archaic” the moment they hit the shops. 
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possibilities, even though these works reject direct moral and political 
association. 
In this way, the receptive experience of artworks that contributes to the 
emergence of the subject of aesthetic comportment is one wherein the bodily 
reaction to new artworks disrupts the subjective coordinates of one’s 
personality—of one’s humanity—and becomes mediated by reflection in a manner 
that resists re-establishing the subjective coordinates of humanity.  While this 
experience is without positive political content, in serving to undermine the 
relation between the subject and the objects of which it is constituted, and 
opening up the subject instead to its own animality and reflection upon this 
animality, a wrench is thrown into the gears of society as it exists, opening up an 
interval from which transformation is possible. Yet just as man cannot live by 
bread alone, so the animal cannot be sustained merely by reflection on aesthetic 
experience.  Aristotle’s poetics, though reserving a place for the lower types 
within civic and even properly human life through tragic spectatorship, 
nevertheless do so in a manner that reproduces the division between higher and 
lower, human and animal, for it is left for spectators to identify through 
contemplation the highest human types as they reveal themselves through their 
speech and overall bearing, and reject what they see as animal.  In this way, tragic 
spectatorship allows for the lower to participate in the higher so that they might 
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be reconciled to the higher as lower, and so to a conception of the human that 
serves to cordon off other animal possibilities.   
If Adorno is to appropriate from Aristotle an idea of aesthetic education 
yet transcend Aristotle’s manner of dividing higher and lower, human and 
animal, then he must also transcend Aristotle’s aesthetic education based solely 
or even primarily on spectators assimilating themselves to social objects by way 
of aesthetic experience.  Instead, Adorno requires an aesthetic education that also 
includes subjects being capable of learning for themselves to produce the objects 
that will form part of the constellation of social objects from which they will in 
turn be produced.  The practices needed to sustain the transformation of the 
human subject in this way must thus extend beyond the active moment in the 
receptive experience of artworks, reflection, which, like theoria, serves to make 
the subject of receptive experience a critic, and connect to a productive 
experience of artworks, wherein the subject becomes an artist.  Becoming an 
artist in this way means to enter into an active relationship with the techniques 
used to produce inhuman works of art.  Thus while new works of art, as we have 
seen, serve to disrupt the subjective coordinates of humanity, I shall argue below 
that in order for Adorno to transcend Aristotle and so theorize the possibility of a 
truly aesthetic animal, he must incorporate the practices required to create these 
works.  While the receptive experience of art serves to disrupt and resist the 
subjective coordinates of humanity, truly aesthetic comportment that might 
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actualize a practice of animality requires more direct engagement with the 
production of art.   
 
Animal Technique 
The subject of Adorno’s conception of aesthetic comportment is one for whom 
the relation between mimesis and reason have been radically altered, such that 
reason is no longer a domineering force oriented to maximizing individual 
benefits in the interest of self-preservation.  Instead, reason is oriented to 
inventing ways to express the mimetic impulse toward contact and solidarity with 
others.  I argue that the subject of aesthetic comportment is not human, but some 
other kind of animal, an animal that emerges through a kind of aesthetic 
education comprised of both a receptive and a productive experience of artworks.  
The receptive experience of artworks, discussed above, is comprised of a passive 
moment, the involuntary shudder that runs through a body confronted with the 
new, and an active moment of reflection upon the shudder and the works that 
invoked this reaction.  While the passive moment disrupts the subjective 
coordinates of the human, the active moment serves to resist the re-constitution 
of the human, and thus allows for the persistence of animality.   
However, insofar as the receptive experience of artworks leaves the subject 
in a position of dependence upon artworks produced by others, there remains a 
division between the critic and the artist characteristic of the division of labor 
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that has enabled socio-political domination. If this division is to be transcended, 
from Aristotle’s distinction between action as speech and action as 
contemplation, to the Leninist division between revolutionary vanguard and 
masses, a productive experience of artworks is required.  This productive 
experience must be one wherein the inhuman subject of receptive experience 
learns to act according to impulses other than those of self-preservation, and at 
the same time produce the social objects from which new forms of subjectivity 
will spring.  In this way the productive experience of artworks is a kind of 
alienation of alienated labor: it seeks to appropriate the most advanced 
productive techniques and the discipline necessary to employ them, but turned 
toward the production of objects that are without the instrumental function of 
reproducing the world as it is. 
In producing objects that are not immediately or obviously part of any 
system of equivalence, the subject experiences activity irreducible to that 
necessary to reproduce the existing socio-political world, while at once 
contributing truly individual objects to the socio-political constellation from 
which new subjects will be formed.  In this way “art becomes the schema of social 
praxis,” and every “authentic artwork is internally revolutionary,”999 for such 
works are expressions of the possibility of production organized otherwise than it 
is in the world of domination.  Insofar as the experience of producing objects 
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according to impulses other than those of instrumental reason amounts to a kind 
of education of the impulses and the rationality needed to express them, this 
productive experience must be seen as a moral one, and insofar as its products 
contribute to the order of social objects from which subjectivity emerges, it must 
also be considered political.  We must read Adorno’s thoughts on artistic practice 
or technique, then, as part of a kind of moral and political education, one where 
subjects practice the activities which will serve to produce a subject of a certain 
sort: in this case, the good animal of which Adorno has written, the actualization 
of subjective possibilities repressed by the human. 
Like the receptive experience of artworks, productive experience consists 
of passive and active moments.  The active moment of the productive experience 
of artworks concerns forming activity, that is, the mastery of artistic material 
through techniques that serve to dislodge the material from the forms in which it 
is historically sedimented and so make from it something new.  Like the shudder, 
which was found above to be the shock experience of modernity aesthetically 
pacified, so is the aesthetic mastery expressed in form and technique a kind of 
pacified mastery.  The technical mastery of artistic material is a pacified image of 
the technological domination of nature, for the former is mastery without 
violence, mastery that expresses what lay trapped in the material but would 
otherwise remain mute. In offering an image of non-violent mastery, the 
technical practices of artistic production provide an education of animal impulses 
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that would enable their articulation in a subject whose reason is the agent of 
animality, rather than its censor.  Understanding this non-violent mastery 
involves understanding its status in relation to concepts and reason. 
Just as concepts are for Adorno the means by which humans carve up and 
identify objects in the material world, so are forms the way in which artists have 
served to organize the plethora of possibilities available through artistic material, 
rendering it as content.1000  Forms are thus analogous to concepts without 
themselves being conceptual—we might say that forms are to mimesis what 
concepts are to reason.  Forms and concepts are the means through which 
mimetic and rational impulses are bound up with the world: they are the point of 
contact where the body meets objects and is itself constituted as an object, 
capturing the world and in so doing being captured by it.  Content is material 
given artistic form, and thus transformed.  The material as it existed in the socio-
political world—what Adorno calls the “empirical world”— through artistic form 
acquires an individuality and a degree of distance, of autonomy, from the social-
political world.  As we have seen, this autonomy is not so great as to render 
artworks incapable of being re-integrated into the socio-political world and so 
incorporated into its reproduction, and even this autonomy itself can be seen to 
harbor an ideological element insofar as it is possible for art’s refusal of the terms 
of socio-political world to have a quietist dimension—hence the impossibility of 
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state” as material. See Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, 128. 
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art wholly free of ideology.1001  Nevertheless, even the tiny distance opened up 
between the world as it is and the world as it appears through artistic form is 
enough to introduce new possibilities into the world as it is. 
Adorno offers an example of new possibilities introduced through artistic 
form in his account of Morike’s poem “Moustrap Rhyme,” wherein a child circles 
a mousetrap, calling for a mouse to come pay him and his cat a visit.  The social 
material upon which this poem draws concerns the human practice of identifying 
some animals as friends or allies to be cared for (the cat), and others to be 
identified as vermin and destroyed (the mouse). Reduced to its social material, 
the poem indeed appears to be an allusion to this practice through the taunts of a 
sadistic child, intent on seeing the triumph of human mastery and identifying 
with it as his own in the dangers posed to the mouse by his cat and his trap.  Yet 
Adorno claims that to interpret this poem as simply a taunt referring to this 
“miserable, socially conditioned ritual,” that is, to reduce the poem to its social 
material, is precisely to overlook the poem as a work of art, and thus its form and 
content.   
The poetic allusions to the mouse’s capture, the child’s claim that they will 
“sing” and “dance,” transforms the violence of the social material into the 
ambiguity of poetic content, calling up “involuntarily” the “friendly image of 
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child, cat, and mouse dancing, the two animals on their hind legs.”1002  In this 
way, even an artwork that takes violent material as its content transforms this 
material into content whose meaning can no longer be reduced to what it was as 
material. Once appropriated by art, the material no longer has the last say: the 
“ritual” of which the child’s taunt is a part becomes through artistic form a kind 
of counter-spell to invoke the liberation of the child, cat, and mouse from their 
socially-determined antagonistic roles. Thus through the artwork, even the 
practice of destroying vermin can be recast as the utopian image of solidarity 
between animals. 
The importance of technique here is twofold: 1) it is technique that serves 
to impart form to the material, transforming it into content and thus giving it the 
critical distance from the empirical world necessary to introduce new 
possibilities; and 2) technique serves as an example of activity that is both 
rational and conceptless,1003 that is, activity that attempts to give rational 
expression to the non-identical as non-identical, as something that does not yet 
exist, rather than identify non-identity with a concept and so assimilate it to the 
conceptual order of the existing world.  Artistic technique can thus be said to be 
both mimetic and rational activity.  It is mimetic in that it is organized along 
formal rather than conceptual lines, and it is rational insofar as it is logical and 
calculating—artistic technique employs all the resources of cunning in order to 
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invent means of expressing an experience of the material through a new form, 
rather than identifying it with a concept.    
In this way technique is a practice that is not human in the strict sense, for 
it demands a different relation between reason and mimesis than that which 
serves to constitute the human.  Whereas humanity is born in the failed attempt 
to repress its mimetic impulses through the rational deployment of concepts, 
artistic technique attempts to make reason an ally of mimesis. In this way, the 
artistic techniques deployed in the production of artworks can be seen as moral 
praxis in the Aristotelian sense, that is, as practice that serves to engender the 
practitioner with the kind of constitution capable of supporting certain values.  
However, where Adorno continues to resist Aristotle is that not only are these 
practices not aimed at values thought to be derived from what is naturally and 
necessarily human, but are rather linked to human animality, and their practice 
encourages the emergence of a different subject, one opposed to the human.  In 
this sense, artistic practices retain for Adorno an important critical dimension: 
they are not aimed at identifying different actualizations of human animality with 
the concept of the human and so reconcile the former to the latter, but rather 
with fostering an unruly profusion of individuality in solidarity with each other’s 
difference. 
In terms of artistic technique, these practices are critical through their 
engagement with the material and its history.  Adorno writes that form 
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“converges with critique,”1004 for the material itself is already the sedimented 
forms and contents of the past.1005  Material is thus already, in a sense, a 
graveyard of forms and their contents. Finding ways of giving expression to the 
material is thus a way of individuating through re-division what is already 
artistic, historical, social, and political: it is a way, as noted above, of giving voice 
to a particular antagonism that their sedimentation has produced, and in so 
doing, acquiring a distance from this antagonism that might conjure up the image 
of its solution.  
It is for this reason that articulating the new is an historical process, for in 
working through the material one is necessarily working through the ways in 
which past artists have employed different techniques in order to impart form to 
the material with which they were confronted.  Producing an artwork that is new, 
one that might possess the power of disrupting the subjective coordinates of its 
audience, thus involves technical innovation in order to master the material, to 
transform the way in which it presents itself such as to be cast in a new light.   
The practice of applying these technical innovations and creating the new is 
moral through the kind of education of the impulses it requires, and can be called 
political insofar as it involves transforming the overarching structure in which 
moral activity has its force, through the production of new social objects that will 
enter the constellation constitutive of subjectivity.  
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In order to accomplish this expression, however, the productive 
experience of artworks requires also a passive moment: form must not be simply 
be imposed upon content haphazardly; technique must not simply be applied to 
material arbitrarily: rather, both form and the techniques of which it is composed 
must themselves be responses to material necessity.  It is thus only through a 
passive attunement to the material, to a sensitivity to its structure, that an artist 
might know how techniques might be employed and transformed to express it, 
and form might emerge out of the content, rather than remain something 
antagonistic to the material.1006   
It is this passive moment that serves to limit the subjectivity of the artist, 
to make this subjectivity the agent of the material’s objectivity, and so ensure that 
the mastery learned through artistic practice is indeed non-violent.  Thus, while 
Adorno will refer to technique as being “mastery,” and “repression,” and even 
“domination,” he also can claim that the artist mobilizes this domination against 
domination for her domination of the material through technique is at once her 
submission to technical dictates emerging from the material.1007  Adorno 
compares this reciprocal form of mastery to linguistic fluency: one can claim to 
have mastered a language only insofar as one has allowed oneself to be mastered 
by that language.  Thus, if the logic of technique is one of “authentic control,” 
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then it must also include its opposite, “the education of the subjective sensibility 
to respond to the impulses of whatever is not the subject.”1008   
In this way Adorno rejects the model of the artist as creator, both in its 
explicitly theological articulation and in its humanist echo, for in attuning herself 
to the material the artist accepts the technical demands necessary to express it, 
and so makes herself something like the “extension of the tool,” the means 
through which the potentiality of the work latent in the material is made 
actual.1009  The artist’s reason then is not god-given or definitively human, but 
rather an animal impulse entwined with the mimetic impulse that might 
participate in the invention of forms to express this animal, and in so doing, 
produce the new—the nature that does not yet exist.  In the moral sense, this 
passive moment involves practicing one’s attunement to the objective animality 
the receptive experience of artworks serves to foster, such that employing artistic 
techniques and producing artworks becomes a kind of mastery in service of 
animal solidarity.  Read as political activity, then, artistic technique is the 
mastery of reason deployed in order to solve the problems that surround 
expressing the objective animality the human world characterized by domination 
would suppress.  Artistic technique is reason convulsed by the animal, reason 
driven to invent ways of enabling animal expression.   
                                                     
1008 Adorno, “Vers une musique informelle,” QF, 319. 
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Moreover, by introducing new objects into the social constellation of 
which subjectivity is constituted, such activity might then contribute to the 
creation of a new kind of subject.  In this way, art, through the receptive and 
productive experiences of its works, serves to cultivate resistance to the subjective 
coordinates of humanity and precipitate their transformation.  The subject 
educated by these experiences, the subject of aesthetic comportment, is one for 
whom violence is intolerable, and who is compelled toward solidarity with the 
suffering.  Where this aesthetic comportment serves to foster solidarity between 
such subjects, a global subject might be constituted, one for whom the intolerable 
status of violence serves as the necessity of its change, of transforming the world 
such that the possibility of “total disaster” is no more.  
 It is for this reason that Adorno will claim that “watching over the artist’s 
shoulder is a collective subject that has yet to be realized”1010: the “I” that speaks 
in artworks is not the “I” of the individual ego of the artist, his or her positive 
humanity, but the “We” of a collective subject.  This collective subject found in 
the image of reconciled humanity thus becomes the wound around which 
subjectivity is displaced and re-organized toward the construction of a global 
subject pushing towards this image of a future humanity, which, as we have seen, 
is human no longer.  It is by way of artworks and the techniques that produce 
them that the animal that is reconciled humanity weighs upon the subject, 
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displacing this subjectivity and enabling its reconstitution around the experience 
of displacement—the experience of animality.  Thus artworks “anticipate a 
nonexistent social whole,” a “non-existent subject,”1011 the reconciled humanity 
that they call through the creation of a global subject.  In this radically 
transformed world, the “nonexistent social whole” produced through the 
cultivation of animality, the human would become nothing more than a memory, 
the ancient nightmare of an animal that now finally wakes to life, eyes open. 
 What might such an animal be, one who was human, but now no longer?  
What would such a society be like, where self-preservation and its violence no 
longer occupy the center of gravity around which all else orbits?  A society where 
none are dominated?  What suffering would drive artistic expression, if suffering 
as the experience of one’s mortality and fragility was without the razor’s edge that 
accompanies life lived each against all?  Adorno writes that art in such a society 
would be “wholly different” than it is in the society of the present, that its role 
would be transformed.1012  But transformed how?  Would such animals “construct 
their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their 
webs,” or “perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas,” as 
Kojève fancies?  It is just as easy to laugh at such propositions as it is impossible 
to say.  Violence is so deeply embedded in the human constitution that its 
displacement from the central place of life’s organization—not even its outright 
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eradication—could mean the introduction of radically new ways of living.  
Radically new, even if this possible future already goes disguised in all the 
ordinary little fragments of peace we experience without even realizing it, 
entwined as they are with the different privileges particular to our societies.   
 Perhaps we might think of this possible animal future as a piece of music 
to be played with the instrument of our bodies.  A work for the modern piano, 
say, Schoenberg’s Three Piano Pieces, Op. 11, was already physically possible the 
moment the piano as it presently exists came into being.  In this sense, Opus 11, 
and every piece for the modern piano before and after it, was inherent to the very 
construction of the piano as a physically possible combination of sounds.  And 
yet, it took the history of compositions for piano in order to produce the 
particular combination of sounds that is Opus 11, and its existence transformed 
what was known about the possibilities inherent to the piano, and how it would 
be played thereafter.  In this same way, while the animal agency that would 
transgress the rules of composition that is the human is as old as the body, it has 
required the history of humanity to make possible this animality, to make 
possible the subject that might reveal just how our understanding of what a body 
can do has been obstructed by our own understanding of its possibilities.  I have 
argued that Adorno theorizes the possibility of the transformation of these 
obstructions—that a different animal is possible, one we might call aesthetic, not 
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after the senses endowed by nature from which it might be thought to spring, but 
from the sense of a nature it will invent. 
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Chapter Sixteen: Conclusion 
 
The rhinoceros king Archibald has a golden crown with a fat pearl and golden 
layers of skin over his eyes, but stands aloof from active government.  He is 
having an affair with the giraffe ‘Gazelle’, occasionally wears a silk-grey pair of 
pyjama trousers, and has published a pamphlet, the pan-humanist manifesto.  It 
has appeared in the publishing house of the united jackals and hyenas.  For years 
he has been working on his magnum opus.  It is called ‘The Rhinoceros Whip’, 
and is the theoretical groundwork of a human society that includes the animals. 
 
--Adorno, letter to Horkheimer1013 
 
 
I have attempted to show the prominence of Aristotle’s place in the Western 
conception of the human being, and that this conception is misrepresented by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and those thinkers working within their paradigm.  The 
result of this misrecognition is that the promise of the Aristotelian problematic—
the promise of a beautiful life lived in leisure, beyond the necessities of self-
preservation—is lost.  In order to retrieve the promise of the Aristotelian 
problematic, a promise also obstructed by different elements of Aristotle’s 
thought, I have argued that Adorno’s work serves as our best guide.  Adorno does 
not present us with a return to Aristotle, but a recovery of the promise of his 
thought, transformed in a different constellation of socio-historical objects.  It is 
through Adorno, then, that we might think the possibility of a posthuman 
subject, an aesthetic animal that might draw on repressed animal potentials in 
order to reconstitute the human subject in a way that no longer makes central the 
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drives that have produced this animal as human, as one whose quest for self-
preservation has been realized through the oppression and domination of others. 
 However, the imperfections of my argument, like so many loose threads in 
a hastily knitted scarf, remain hanging from the article, no doubt irritating the 
reader, who might like to give one or two of them a good pull. I would thus like in 
conclusion to address some of the more prominent of these insufficiently 
examined questions, and with them also indicate some possible avenues for 
future research.  These questions include: 1) how might this emphasis on the 
nonidentity of the human subject and the recovery of its repressed animal 
potentials differ among human subjects classed according to different 
particularities such as gender, race, or sexuality?  If the process of disrupting the 
reproduction one’s human subjectivity in the interest of becoming some other 
kind of animal is different for different kinds of human subjects, should not I be 
referring to aesthetic animals, not the aesthetic animal?  Does not the subjective 
transformation I advocate neglect human plurality?  And 2) What of the animal 
rights and liberation movements relative to the subjective transformation I 
advocate?  Am I not neglecting real pragmatic changes that can be accomplished 
here and now through political reform for some utopian dream of a post-
revolutionary future?  What about the alleviation of suffering that can be 
accomplished more or less immediately, irrespective of grand claims to subjective 
transformation? 
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 With respect to future avenues of research, my use of Adorno to unlock the 
animal potentials originally repressed in the Aristotelian problematic might be 
seen to point in a number of directions for new and original research.  These 
avenues include, but are not limited too: 1) an examination of other instances in 
the history of political thought, or even other kinds of literature, that intimate 
this posthuman subject, suggesting that they too, are messengers from a future 
yet to be realized.  In this way, our relation to the history of Western thought 
might be re-oriented through Adorno, allowing us to ‘brush it against the grain,’ 
as Benjamin put it.  2)  This theory of an aesthetic animal, recovered as it is 
specifically from a problem that characterizes the Western philosophical 
tradition, is worth examining the light of other traditions of thought, in an 
attempt to see not only the way in which this problem is formulated differently in 
other traditions (or not at all), but also how these traditions might indicate 
different routes of exit, different possibilities for subjective transformation.  3)  
The relation of Adorno’s critique of the self and personality, though clearly 
indebted in different ways to phenomenology and psychoanalysis, remains 
largely implicit and undeveloped.  To use Adorno to think through in greater 
detail the meaning of a subjective transformation that would displace and 
perhaps ultimately leave what we consider human behind appears to require a 
more detailed engagement with the phenomenological and psychoanalytic 
traditions than I have been able to do here, and so would benefit from further 
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investigation.  And lastly, 4) what does this radical transformation of the human 
subject mean for democracy, for democratic possibilities?  It is noted above that 
Adorno does not himself have a democratic theory, yet his critique of 
philosophical anthropology and the way it has so frequently accompanied our 
understanding of political possibility may have important and wide ranging 
consequences for democratic organization, and to this end it would be well worth 
examining Adorno’s relation to democracy in greater detail than has been 
possible here.  I will begin by examining the first two clusters of questions 
outlined above concerning various insufficiencies within my argument before 
turning to these last four points indicating new avenues of research opened up by 
this study of Aristotle and Adorno. 
 
The Animality of Human Plurality and Other Suffering Animals 
It has undoubtedly been noted by the reader that one is never simply human in 
general—one is only ever constituted as a human subject through a constellation 
of socio-political objects that will differ not only according to the place of one’s 
society in history and in the prevailing global order, but according to one’s own 
particular place in that society.  Consequently one is not simply interpolated 
through this range of objects as a human subject in general, more or less equal to 
all others in this society, but as a classed, gendered, and racialized subject of a 
certain sexual orientation, whose relation to the dominant conception of 
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humanity will be different according to the particularities of the ways in which 
power is exercised in one’s society.  Consequently, while the animal is non-
identical to the human subject, turning toward the animal as I have discussed 
above will differ markedly between human subjects whose humanity is 
interpolated in different ways. 
 For instance, in societies wherein the paradigmatic representative of the 
human subject is a white, heterosexual male, the identity of say, a black 
homosexual woman becomes non-identical to this conception of humanity.  This 
is among the reasons that different kinds of human subjects have been in 
different times and places considered ‘deviant,’ associated with animals, and 
denied the rights and privileges accorded to those more clearly identifiable with 
the dominant conception of the human subject.  From this perspective, affirming 
identities such as black, female, or homosexual all serve to oppose the dominant 
identities of white, male, and heterosexual, and so might potentially displace and 
even transform this conception of the human subject, insisting on a greater 
plurality of possible human subjects than that which identifies as white, male, 
and heterosexual.  This possible displacement of the dominant conception of 
humanity in the face of greater plurality might be seen as an important part of the 
progressive vector of identity politics.   
However, such identity politics is also possessed of a regressive vector. As I 
have attempted to show, Adorno argues that the way in which identities have 
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been formed is bound up with the struggle for survival and the oppression and 
domination through which this struggle has been expressed in most human 
societies.  Consequently, the identities of subjects in societies characterized by 
domination necessarily carry exclusion within their very structure—such 
identities are by way of excluding that which they are not.  Consequently, even 
the identity of a subject defined as black, female, and homosexual will necessarily 
exclude some other subjective possibility in order to affirm this identity.  More 
importantly, just as Adorno’s negative conception of humanity as the opposition 
to violence was bound up with the violence it would oppose, along with the 
subject who would mask this violence, so are subject’s constituted in this 
oppositional manner bound to that which they oppose.  Thus what is understood 
as being “black,” “female,” and “homosexual” in this instance are all the mirror 
images of the dominant subject against which they oppose themselves—they are, 
in effect, excrescences of the dominant identity, and to assume them un-critically 
is to accept the range of subjective possibilities consonant with that identity in 
society as it exists.  To actively identify with a given identity and the range of 
subjective possibilities given in the dominant order is thus to desire the 
amelioration of one’s own position in that order, but to otherwise accept that 
order as it is.  In this way, the dominion of humanity remains one constituted 
through the violence of oppression and domination, even if the humanity 
constituted through this violence is now a richer, more complexly plural subject. 
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This is not to say that the kind of identity politics sketched briefly above is 
to be rejected, however.  Rather, its progressive vector found in the opposition to 
and displacement of the dominant conception of humanity must be accompanied 
by a second progressive vector: an opposition to and displacement of the fixed 
identity one assumes in opposing the dominant one.  This later opposition or 
negation is the utopian moment of the struggle: like Adorno’s conception of 
reconciled humanity that serves to displace the permanence of the struggle 
between negative and positive humanity, the particular identities assumed in 
opposition to the dominant human subject must themselves be displaced by a 
utopian image of this subject transformed beyond the exigencies of the struggle 
for its survival if they are to avoid being trapped in a permanent struggle that 
ultimately maintains the dominant order.  How exactly “black” or “female” or 
“homosexual” are to be imagined in utopian images, shorn of the violence to 
which they are subject in the present, is a matter to be decided by those who 
struggle through these identities—it cannot be imagined or imposed upon them 
from without.  While others critically working through different sets of identities 
can offer their solidarity in these struggles—and must, if a global subject is to be 
constituted such as to radically transform society—the particularities of these 
struggles beyond the basic aversion to violence must be navigated by those 
caught up in these struggles. 
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Turning to animality then, to what remains non-identical to one’s 
constitution as a human subject, would necessarily take on a plurality of forms, 
for it must work through the plurality of ways in which the human subject is itself 
constituted, along with various non-conceptual moments produced through 
different struggles and oppositions to that which is constituted as the dominant 
or paradigmatic representative of humanity in different societies and cultures.  It 
thus makes little difference to refer to the aesthetic animal or aesthetic animals, 
for the aesthetic animal is always already an historically, socially, and politically 
situated possibility, and insofar as different societies and moments of history 
present different challenges to the realization of aesthetic animality, so this 
transformation will be different at different times and places. What allows these 
struggles to resonate with each other is the common movement toward a society 
free of domination, populated by subjects who are likewise not constituted 
through the violence of oppression and domination.   
Though there has been a wide range of views about the relevance of 
Adorno’s work for feminism, from those who focus on its limitations or 
ambivalence to those who see in it an important ally,1014 to those who even 
                                                     
1014 On Adorno’s limitations in this regard, see Regina Becker-Schmidt, “Critical Theory as a Critique of 
Society,” in Adorno, Culture, and Feminism, ed. Maggie O’Neill (London: Sage, 1999); Sabine Wilke and 
Heidi Schlipphacke, “Construction of a Gendered Subject,” in The Semblance of Subjectivity, ed. Tom 
Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); on its ambivalence, see Rebecca Comay, 
“Adorno’s Siren Song,” New German Critique 81, Dialectic of Enlgihtenment (2000): 21-48; and on its 
possible allegiance with feminism, see Lisa Yun Lee, Dialectics of the Body; and Maggie O’Neill, “Adorno 
and Women,” in Adorno, Culture, and Feminism. 
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recognize in it the possibility of a transcendence of feminism’s basic concepts,1015 
there has been comparatively little written about how Adorno’s ideas might be 
fruitfully cultivated in thinking about race.1016  While I have not in this study 
contributed to changing this state of affairs, I hope the above comments and the 
more broad strokes I have painted concerning Adorno’s ideas on humanity and 
animality above will aid in clearing the way for other future studies of how 
Adorno’s conception of identity might intersect with different ideas concerning 
identity politics in new and novel ways.  It remains now to briefly engage the 
second set of questions concerning the loose ends I would, if not tie up, then at 
least call attention to here: those concerning animal rights and liberation, and the 
relevance of my study to them. 
I noted in the introduction that without Adorno’s radical ideas concerning 
the philosophy of subjectivity, and with it the subjective transformation that must 
accompany socio-political transformation, the kinds of reform-minded 
consensus-building activities to which the animal rights and animal liberation 
movements tend to direct themselves, and which theories of animal rights and 
animal liberation would justify, are without, as it were, teeth.  As I have 
attempted to show by way of Aristotle and Adorno, violence, oppression, and 
domination are intimately connected with human evolution and the manner in 
                                                     
1015 See Juliet Flower MacCannell, “ Adorno: The Riddle of Femininity,” in Adorno, Culture, and 
Feminism, 156. 
1016 For exceptions to this rule, see Fred Dallmayr, “The Politics of Nonidentity,” Political Theory 25.1 
(1997): 33-56; and Asha Varadharajna, Exotic Parodies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995). 
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which what we call human has been socially and politically established and 
perpetuated.  To simply include animals as persons or selves within this order is 
to overlook the violence that established and continues to perpetuate this order, 
even in terms of the subjective constitution of the human being itself.  Thus if 
animal liberation or the advancement of animal rights is to be successful, it must 
be tied to broader socio-political goals that include the transformation of society 
so as to eliminate oppression and domination as such.   
However, like the progressive vector of identity politics, the insistence 
upon a more radical, utopian dimension here should not be understood as a 
rejection of more pragmatically oriented goals tailored to particular situations 
that might alleviate the suffering of different animals therein.  Efforts by animal 
rights activists and proponents of animal liberation to outlaw animal testing for 
commercial and scientific purposes, the successful campaigns in many countries 
to criminalize cruelty to nonhuman animals, the insistence on better treatment of 
animals being harvested for their meat or milk, and even the insistence that meat 
and milk harvesting be themselves outlawed, are all laudable projects that the 
more utopian emphasis on radical subjective and socio-political transformation 
would not—indeed, could not, as we have seen through the way in which Adorno 
conceptualizes the relation between particular struggles and the constitution of a 
global subject—sacrifice for so-called greater aims, such as the radical 
transformation of society and its subjects.  The kind of global subject that Adorno 
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envisions transforming both the objective and subjective dimensions of society 
could not be one that suppresses particular instances of resistance, but that 
emerges out of these particular instances and allows them to resonate together 
through relations of solidarity.   
However, without this utopian dimension, the particular efforts of animal 
rights activists and their supporters fail to take into account the violence of 
oppression and domination through which humanity is itself constituted.  The 
persuasiveness of the arguments put forward in favor of animal rights and 
liberation concerning the more or less essential commensurability of humans to 
other animals depends upon materialist and scientific revolutions that have 
eroded previously dominant conceptions of the human being as an utterly 
distinct entity.  Moreover, the fact that the case for animal rights has come to 
seem so reasonable to many in a world characterized by flagrant violations of 
human rights, including violations of these rights made in the very name of their 
preservation, should indicate to us the degree to which the metaphysical 
elevation of the human being has collapsed into a material subject, more or less 
reducible to a body to be manipulated or protected.  Put differently: though the 
reduced status of the subject, or the fact that the human subject is now no more 
than an animal body, allows for other animals to potentially be included in the 
human category, at least its legal dimension, the underside or obscene secret 
concealed here is that this is so because humans are being treated almost as 
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viciously as other animals.  To ignore this is to overlook the way in which 
oppression and domination operate in contemporary societies.  
The likelihood of being subject to such violence—to the violation of one’s 
human rights—is radically different for those of different positions in society and 
in different parts of the world.  Consequently, a promulgation of animal rights 
that fails to address the broader issues of socio-political oppression and 
domination would mean a return to the possibility of being treated like a human 
or animal to depend not on species, but to class, race, gender, and sexuality—
much like in the ancient world of poetic myth, where power defines the way in 
which one is a human and how one relates to other animals.  Only the attempt to 
build on the gains of animal rights by linking them to broader struggles against 
oppression and domination would thus avoid the age-old problem of the affluent 
caring more for their pets than the poor.  Or more bluntly: in a world where the 
majority of humanity suffers the scourges of poverty, malnourishment, and 
preventable disease, a devotion to the welfare of other animals devoid of any 
intent on transforming this basic state of affairs can only be a bourgeois conceit.   
I have argued that Adorno is the most apt guide to this world and theorizing its 
transformation for he not only allows us to see our own animality and take the 
possibilities for transformation to begin from this situation, but unlike those who 
would neglect the universality of a global subject to focus entirely on particular 
struggles to the point of exhaustion, Adorno shows us that we cannot get rid of 
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the universal dimension of political struggle; rather, we must seek to realign the 
relation between universal and particular in a non-violent manner if a truly 
radical transformation is to be possible. 
 
Future Avenues, Possibilities 
I would like now to turn to a discussion of some of the possible avenues of future 
research I see being opened up by this work.  One of the things I have attempted 
to show in my studies of Aristotle and Adorno is the way in which the animal is 
non-identical to the human: that is, the way in which what we think of as ‘animal’ 
often represents alternate subjective possibilities to the ‘human’ that have been 
repressed, often violently, in order that the human might emerge.  While I have 
argued that Aristotle helps us understand how this dynamic has been related to 
art and politics in the history of political thought in the West, and that Adorno 
indicates a way in which this dynamic might be transformed, the emphasis placed 
on these two thinkers should not be understood as a claim that only these two 
thinkers offer useful insights concerning this knot of issues. Instead, the history 
of western political thought, and even other important literary texts not typically 
seen as being political, might be read in this light and so examined for further 
insights.   
 One potentially fruitful line of inquiry in this vein might be formulated as a 
recovery of the ideas of Diogenes of Sinope, the infamous Cynic.  Diogenes is 
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known today primarily for artists’ depictions of him in his domicile (a bathtub by 
the side of the road), and a host of alleged capers: he is said to have eaten a raw, 
and hence, un-sacrificed and therefore unclean octopus, masturbated publically, 
and, when asked by Alexander the Great to name a favor he might be granted by 
the Macedonian, Diogenes responded only with a curt, “stand out of my light.”1017  
Moreover, Diogenes is said to have been one of the earliest examples of a 
cosmopolitan, claiming world citizenship and rejecting membership in the polis.  
Thus we see in Diogenes a figure who challenged the subjective coordinates of 
what was considered to be a good human being in his day, a fact highlighted all 
the more by the school of thought associated with him today, the Cynics.   
The word ‘Cynic’ comes from the Greek Kyon, meaning dog: it was 
Diogenes the dog who transgressed the religious and political rites that bound 
the consumption of animals and allowed for the unstable relationship between 
gods, humans, and other animals to be regulated in the polis; Diogenes the dog 
who denied the shamefulness of pleasure and hence the proto-possessive-
individualism that can be found in its enforced privacy; Diogenes the dog who 
wandered between borders, indifferent to their authorities.  Diogenes thus stands 
as an important early instance of the turn to animality and the attempt to 
displace the human subject, and a Socratic figure who never seems to have found 
his Plato.  Diogenes the dog may even be seen as something like the non-identity 
                                                     
1017 Cited in Sorabji, Animal Minds, Human Morals, 158. 
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of the philosopher Socrates likens to a well-trained hound in Plato’s Republic—a 
mangy, urban mutt transgressing boundaries rather than the aristocratic 
thoroughbred trained to police them.  In this sense, Diogenes stands as a non-
identical excrescence of the founding moments in of the western tradition of 
political thought, offering an alternate path than the one that would become the 
tradition we know.  Building on the partial recovery of Diogenes found in 
Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason,1018 it may be possible to draw upon the 
idea of an aesthetic animal in opposition to the human to construct an alternate 
conception of cosmopolitanism, one which criticizes Nussbaum’s brand of 
humanist cosmopolitanism and the theoretical place it reserves for the Stoics,1019 
erstwhile philosophical competitors of the Cynics. 
However, though the preceding study has concerned thinkers who form 
part of the western tradition of political thought, I do not for this reason think 
that my study is without relevance to other traditions of thought, or that 
interesting and novel results might not be obtained through their cross-
pollination.1020  How exactly the human-animal distinction has been conceived, 
along with its possible relations to art and to politics, in other traditions of 
thought are of eminent importance to the possible consequences of this study.  As 
                                                     
1018 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988). 
1019 See especially Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996); Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
1020 Indeed, it has been noted that Adorno’s work may particularly be suited to such contact.  See Horowitz, 
“Adorno and Emptiness,” 256. 
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noted in the brief discussion in Chapter 14 concerning the possibility of a 
posthuman future outlined by Kojève, it was precisely his encounter with 
Japanese society which forced him to rethink his ideas concerning the end of 
history.   
In this way, an examination of certain elements of Japanese society, 
culture, and thought may perhaps prove especially fruitful in thinking about how 
the vicissitudes of the human-animal distinction have been understood in the 
West.  The work of those thinkers identified under the moniker of ‘the Kyoto 
School,’ such as Kitaro Nishida and Jun Tosaka, seem of especial importance.  
Nishida and the Kyoto School are perhaps best known for attempting to think 
through the insights of Western thinkers such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche in light of different ideas concerning nothingness and the self drawn 
from the Buddhist tradition, and Tosaka also attempted to connect some of these 
innovations to a critique of Japanese fascism.  For these reasons, trying to work 
through different points of contact between Adorno’s critique of personality and 
the self with ideas drawn from the Kyoto School of philosophy may prove 
important for understanding the limits of the Aristotelian problematic, along 
with other possible means of rethinking the subjective transformation I have 
argued to be necessary in redrawing the human-animal distinction as it is 
currently understood in the West.  Recent years have seen a number of important 
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texts of the Kyoto School translated into English;1021 however, there are to date 
only a few attempts to submit their work to comparative studies with other 
prominent texts in the western tradition of political thought, and the possibilities 
of cross-cultural theoretical enrichment presently remain underdeveloped.  
In developing Adorno’s critique of personality and the self in this manner, 
and attempting to use his work to theorize a subjective transformation that might 
extend beyond what we call human, it may also prove helpful to re-think 
Adorno’s relation to psychoanalysis and phenomenology.  While Adorno himself 
draws heavily on Freud in parts of his work, he remains critical of different 
aspects of the psychoanalysis of his day; likewise, though Adorno devoted 
considerable attention to certain strains of phenomenology, he tends to keep a 
kind of aloof distance from its insights that keep them from flourishing in his 
work.  Adorno’s own statements concerning selflessness and the place of ‘I’ in 
relation to domination are highly provocative but often elliptical; a more 
sustained examination of this aspect of Adorno’s thought could perhaps put flesh 
on these statements.   
To this end, one might draw upon psychoanalytic theory to better 
understand the possible relationship between the repressed animality upon 
which our conception of the human depends, and the geography of the 
                                                     
1021 See for instance Nishida Kitaro, Ontology of Production, trans. William Haver, eds. Rey Chow, Harry 
Harootunian (Durham: Duke Univeristy Press, 2012); Nishida Kitaro, Place and Dialectic, trans. John 
W.M. Krummel, Shigenori Nagatomo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Tosaka Jun: A Critical 
Reader, eds. Ken C. Kawashima, Fabian Schäfer, Robert Stolz (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2014). 
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unconscious psychoanalysis has gone to some lengths in mapping.  Contact with 
recent work in phenomenology could also be productive: the ideas of Evan 
Thompson and others, drawing not only on the phenomenological tradition 
etched out by the likes of Husserl, but also the Buddhist tradition and recent 
research in cognitive science, may help construct a theory of the selflessness to 
which Adorno only alludes.1022  Moreover, Adorno’s work might enrich the work 
of these philosophers, who despite the sophistication of their understanding of 
the self and selflessness, tend to follow certain Buddhist ideas in emphasizing the 
moral dimension of transcending the self, while acknowledging yet downplaying 
the important political dimension of this endeavor.  Adorno might here, perhaps 
somewhat ironically, be the one to bring politics back in, for as we have seen, the 
subject is for Adorno a product of its society, and thinking its transformation 
cannot be separated from socio-political transformation.  
Lastly, at least in terms of the avenues I want to mention here, is Adorno’s 
possible relation to democratic theory.  Though Adorno does not, as I noted 
above, have a theory of democracy, insofar as he can be seen to theorize the 
radical transformation of the human subject, the subject often understood in 
various philosophical anthropologies to be essentially political, the transformed 
range of possibilities such a subject would actualize suggests the possibility of a 
transformed politics.  While recent work on affectivity and its relation to 
                                                     
1022 Incidentally, these phenomenologists also draw on the work of Kyoto School philosopher Keiji 
Nishitani. See Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1992), 243-244. 
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democracy may prove helpful in understanding some of the possible political 
consequences for a posthuman aesthetic animal,1023 Adorno’s ideas on freedom 
may prove the most substantial foothold within his work for developing a 
contribution to democratic theory.   
As Castoriadis claims, in ancient democratic Athens the axia of the 
democrat, that is, the “merit” or “measure” by which eligibility for political 
participation was to be established according to democrats, was freedom.1024  
Consequently, re-thinking the idea of freedom along lines that at once challenges 
communitarian ideas of freedom influenced by Aristotle and Hegel, on one hand, 
and the atomistic ‘libertarian’ ideas concerning individual freedom on the other, 
which have gained a worrying degree of currency in popular political discourse 
today, may in fact serve to enrich democratic theory.  Such an attempt to use 
Adorno to formulate a theory of freedom would perhaps follow in the footsteps of 
such attempts by Brown1025; however, Adorno’s emphasis here on a radical 
subjective transformation of the human, such as to no longer even be called 
human, would likely demand a greater degree of attention to the ways in which 
other animals are seen as being un-free, and therefore incapable of politics, which 
Brown has to my knowledge not examined.   
In this way, Adorno’s ideas on art and its relation to the human-animal 
distinction as I have examined them here place them at an intersection of 
                                                     
1023 See for instance Lars Tønder, Tolerance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
1024 Castoriadis, “Value, Equality, Justice, Politics,” 297. 
1025 Cf. Wendy Brown, “Introduction,” in States of Injury (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
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different trends in political theory, and future studies might thus both 
provocatively engage and challenge prominent ideas within these trends, while at 
once serving to shed further light on Adorno’s own work and how we understand 
the possibilities of a posthuman subject—the possibilities, of an aesthetic animal.  
As I have attempted to show through a look at these possible avenues of future 
research, retrieving the possibility of the Aristotelian problematic through 
Adorno’s theoretical insights is not simply a look backward, to both the horrors 
and the un-kept promises of history, but to the future and the hope and the 
menace of its unknown possibilities.  It thus appears that in order to be aesthetic 
animals we must also be, after all, time travelers—if indeed such a thing is 
possible.  Or as Pynchon writes, in a feat of ventriloquism, allowing subjects to 
crystallize around the words he would give them: 
 
We make our journeys out there in the low light of the future, and return 
to the bourgeois day and its mass delusion of safety, to report on what 
we’ve seen.  What are any of these ‘utopian dreams’ of ours but defective 
forms of time-travel?1026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1026 Pynchon, Against the Day, 942. 
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